
GIass_ 
Book. 



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The Facts — and the Documents 



AMERICAN RIGHTS & 
BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

On the Seas 







At Book-stores and News-stands, One Dollar 



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AMERICAN RIGHTS & 
BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

on the SEAS 



2 ?±^ 



The Facts and the Documents, 
Official and Other, 
Bearing upon the Present Attitude of Great Britain 
toward the Commerce of the United States 



Compiled, with introductory memoranda, by 

WILLIAM BAYARD HALE 



New York 

Robert M. McBride & Company 

191 5 



3^ 



Copyright, 19 15, 
by William Bayard Hale 



CONTENTS 

I The First Encroachments 

II The Summit of Arrogance 

III Ships and Cargoes Stopped at Sea 

IV The Case of Cotton 

V Indirect Interference with Trade 

VI Interference with Communication 

VII Our Larger Interests 

VIII List of Ships Detained 

IX Quotations Pertinent to the Issue 

X Official Documents 

XI Diplomatic Correspondence 



The Government of Great Britain has virtually set up in 
the midst of the busy seas an arbitrary court, claiming unheard-of 
powers and exercising the most tyrannous police functions; seiz- 
ing and haling into the dock as suspects all travelers upon the 
ocean highways, and visiting many of them with heavy penalties 
for unproven, and indeed unprovable, offenses. This lawless 
assizes of the seas, contemptuous alike of its own precedents and 
of the rights of others, scarcely stoops to the pretense of citing 
authority for its actions, which are determined solely by its brutal 
will, and enforced, though indeed largely through intimidation, 
by the gigantic power of its naval police. The extent of the 
earth's surface over which this extraordinary court is permitted 
to wield its self-arrogated jurisdiction, the magnitude of the in- 
terests which its actions vitally affect, and the supineness with 
which sovereign States submit to the erection, upon the ruins of 
their self-respect and the debacle of their highest commercial and 
political interests, of an island's municipal statutes into inter- 
national formulas, unite to render this one of the spectacles of 
history. 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH 
PRETENSIONS 

On the SEAS 



THE FIRST ENCROACHMENTS 



THE people of the United States have 
spent a great deal of breath in dis- 
cussing the respective merits and in- 
terests of the nations at war in Europe. 

Is it not time for us to give our attention 
seriously to our own interests, as they are 
affected by the struggle? 

It is an easier mental exercise, a more 
engaging diversion, unquestionably, to fol- 
low the fortunes of opposing armies, as dis- 
played in the morning papers day by day, 
than it is to study the unromantic subject 
of the treatment which American interests 
are receiving at the hands of the belliger- 
ents. Yet, after all, the question whether 
Roumania sides with the British Allies or 
with the Teutons, whether Bulgaria or 
Servia gets Macedonia, whether Germany 
retains or gives up Courland, is of slight 
practical importance to us compared with 
the question whether the condition of the 
people of the United States is bettered or 
worsened by the events of the war. 

This volume owes its existence to a belief 
that it is the business of Americans to guard 
the interests of America — and if to guard 
them, then, necessarily, to study them. It 
aims to afford materials for such study of 
American interests in at least one aspect 
— the aspect which, as the months draw on, 
emerges as perhaps the most anxious object 
of our concern : the vindication of the right 
of neutral ships to sail the seas on peace- 
able errands with innocent cargoes. 

Against Germany that right has been 
vindicated. 

It remains to assert it against Great 
Britain. Less tragic than German attacks 
upon our rights at sea, the persistent tres- 
passes of the British have not drawn the 
same strained attention nor aroused the 
same dramatic passions. Nevertheless, it 
would be difficult to exaggerate the serious- 
ness of the issue which Great Britain has 
forced upon us by a course of conduct, 
which, months ago, and long before it had 



reached its present excess of insolence, the 
United States Government was obliged to 
characterize as "an almost unqualified de- 
nial of the sovereign rights of nations now 
at peace." * 

Let us get a few principles in mind: 

Civilization does not countenance the 
view that war works a stoppage of the or- 
dinary vocations, or interferes with the or- 
dinary lives, of non-combatants. Com- 
merce is free to flow in its regular channels 
in war as in peace, subject to two limita- 
tions or exceptions only, clearly defined and 
universally understood. These exceptions 
are that vessels are forbidden to go through 
a blockade; and that they are forbidden to 
carry what is denominated "contraband." 

There are, then, two grounds on which 
goods may lawfully be stopped on their way 
to a belligerent: 

First, on the ground that they are at- 
tempting to run a blockade, which has been 
formally declared and is being physically 
maintained against the port to which the 
goods are consigned. 

Second, on the ground that the goods are 
contraband. 

As for goods coming from the country of 
a belligerent, there is only one good ground 
on which they may be stopped, namely : the 
ground that they are attempting to run a 
blockade. 

The subject of blockade will be more fully 
considered further on; at present it is 
enough to point out the indisputable fact 
that international law makes these require- 
ments concerning a blockade, namely : first, 
that it must be a real blockade ; second, that 
it must be effective ; and, third, that it must 
apply equally to all nations. The United 
States Government contends that no block- 
ade exists against any German port. 

It follows that it is only as contraband, 
and only when on the way to Germany that 

*Note to the British Government, March 30, 1915. 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



cargoes from America are lawfully liable 
to interference. Let us remind ourselves 
what, precisely, "contraband," is. 

Contraband goods fall into two distinct 
classes. Certain articles, which are mani- 
festly intended for warlike uses, are absolute 
contraband. They are subject to capture if 
shown to be destined to territory of the 
enemy. 

Certain other articles, which may or may 
not be intended for warlike uses, fall into 
the category of conditional contraband, and 
the rule of international law regarding it 
is this: Conditional contraband is subject 
to seizure by an enemy if it is detected at 
sea on its way to the army, navy, or official 
administration of the enemy Government. 
It is not subject to seizure if consigned to 
a neutral country or to private citizens of 
a country at war. 

The first issue between the Government of 
the United States and that of Great Britain 
lies here. Let us get the facts, then, clearly 
in mind : It is a firmly established principle 
of modern international law that articles 
of conditional contraband, carried in neu- 
tral ships, not intended for the use of the 
army, navy or Government of a belligerent, 
are not subject to capture or detention at 
sea. If intended for military use, they are 
so subject — they are contraband; but if 
destined for the ordinary use of life in the 
enemy's country, and not distinctly for the 
enemy's forces, they are not contraband. It 
is clear that no question can arise as to the 
character of goods known as conditional 
contraband when they are on their way to 
a neutral port; in that case they are inno- 
cent. 

There is nothing particularly abstruse in 
the subjects of blockade and contraband. 
They are two subjects upon which inter- 
national law has really reached clear con- 
clusions. On Feb. 26, 1909, an interna- 
tional conference in session in London pro- 
mulgated what has become known as the 
Declaration of London Eelative to the Laws 
of Naval Warfare. The provisions of this 
declaration were the result of long study 
on the part of experts in international law 
and practice; they represent the result of a 
careful weighing of the interest of belliger- 
ents on the one side and of neutral coun- 
tries on the other side during the prevalence 
of war. On the above date the Declaration 
of London received the signatures of all the 
Powers represented in the conference, 
namely: The United States, Great Britain, 
France, Russia, Japan, Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, Italy, Spain and Holland. It is 
true that it has never received formal rati- 
fication at the hands of the Powers; its 
authority consists alone in the fact that it 
represents the attested and conceded con- 
sensus of expert opinion established by ac- 
credited representatives of the world's 



Powers, and stands as the fullest and latest 
statement of the principles of international 
law on the subject. 

The principles set forth above are those 
which the signatories of the Declaration of 
London declared to be the understood and 
accepted law of nations with respect of 
blockade and contraband. 

Such being the principles and the laws 
governing maritime affairs in time of war, 
how has the practice of the British Govern- 
ment conformed to them? 

The long series of abuses and outrages 
inflicted upon American commerce by the 
Government of Great Britain may perhaps 
be summarized under the following heads : 

I. Neutral merchantmen carrying inno- 
cent merchandise from American to German 
ports, or from German to American ports, 
are forbidden to proceed on their voyages. 
Any neutral ship attempting to proceed 
from an American to a German port, or 
from a German to an American port, will be 
taken to a British port, where the cargo 
will be discharged and handed over to the 
marshal of the Prize Court. As a matter of 
fact, no ships now attempt to pass between 
Germany and America. And, yet, under all 
accepted rules of international law, neutral 
ships have a perfect right to proceed to Ger- 
man ports or to come out from German 
ports save such as are specifically blockaded. 
There is no blockade of any German port. 
(See, however, page 13, ff.) 

II. American and other neutral vessels 
on their way between American ports and 
other neutral ports are forced to call at 
British ports, there to be examined and 
often to discharge their cargoes. 

International law allows the right of visit 
and search at sea, but it does not contem- 
plate the dragging of merchantmen into 
ports out of the line of their voyage and 
their detention there for days, weeks or 
months, at all sorts of inconvenience and 
loss. 

III. Shipments of American goods of or- 
dinary character heretofore recognized as 
strictly peaceable and legitimate, on their 
way from American to neutral ports, are 
habitually seized by Great Britain, being, 
forcibly removed from American and other 
neutral ships. 

Under all recognized international law, 
Americans have a perfect right to ship ab- 
solutely anything they please to neutral 
ports, and no belligerent has a right to 
touch them. But especially is it an intoler- 
able outrage for England to stop American 
shipments of such innocent goods as food- 
stuffs and clothing stuffs on their way to 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark and the Nether- 
lands — countries with which we have a 
perfect right to trade without consulting 
Great Britain. 



THE FIRST ENCROACHMENTS 



IV. No goods of German ownership or 
origin are suffered to be shipped from any 
neutral port to America. Neutral mer- 
chantmen on their way to the United States 
are hauled into British ports and ransacked 
for goods bought in Germany by American 
merchants for use in American manufac- 
tures or for American consumption. 

We are not only forbidden to sell our 
products to Germany and Austria, but we 
are denied the right to procure the neces- 
sities and comforts for which we look to 
Germany and Austria. 

V. Great Britain not only interdicts us 
from selling our products to Germany and 
Austria, but she forbids our selling to any of 
the neutral countries more than a certain 
quantity of a product. Thus she has the 
assurance to notify us that we may sell 
Norse countries only a limited amount of 
cotton. Great Britain constantly declares 
that our increased exports to neutral coun- 
tries (which have hitherto been able to buy 
of the countries now too busy in war to 
manufacture) is suspicious. So Great Brit- 
ain confiscates our products on the way to 
our customers — and there proceeds to sell 
them herself at a profit for herself. 

VI. Great Britain refuses to recognize 
the registry awarded by the Government of 
the United States to ships purchased by 
American citizens, in good faith, for the 
sole purpose of relieving the distresses of 
our commerce. 

VII. American merchantmen which are 
suspected by the British government to be 
owned by persons whose nationality is of- 
fensive to it are seized and dragged to Brit- 
ish ports. One such ship, a native Ameri- 
can, proceeding without cargo of any kind, 
between the ports of New York and Norfolk, 
Virginia, was captured within gun-shot of 
our coast and taken, a prize, into Halifax. 

VIII. Thus the insolence of unrebuked 
naval power has been extended to our own 
waters, and British cruisers hover on our 
coasts and lie at the entrance of our harbors. 
There they wait to capture, and often do 
capture, innocent merchantmen suspected of 
carrying some of the articles included in the 
almost all-embracing British list of contra- 
band. There they overhaul passengers and 
require passports from American citizens 
still within sight of their own land. There 
they seize American vessels on one pretext 
or another and carry them off to a British 
prize court. 

IX. All this direct interference with 
American ships and American goods is not 
enough. It is supplemented by a series of 
ingenious devices craftily calculated by 
Great Britain to carry still further the work 
of destruction wrought upon our commerce. 
These devices are innumerable, and many 
of them are most adroitly concealed, but 



illustrations of their character are to be 
found in: 

1. The exercise of intimidating argu- 
ments designed (successfully) to prevent 
the American Government's meeting the 
critical national necessity of an American 
merchant marine; 

2. The intimidation (at first by the hand 
of its ally, France) of American enterprise 
in the legitimate purchase of mercantile 
vessels to ply the seas under the protection 
of the American Flag; 

3. A group of trade agreements enforced 
upon the rubber, textile, tin and other in- 
dustries of America — agreements under 
which American manufacturers are allowed 
to import raw materials only under a Brit- 
ish license carrying heavy conditions and 
involving severe hardships ; 

4. Agreements, like those enforced upon 
exporters in many trades, in which Amer- 
ican producers, in order to dispose of their 
goods, must agree not to sell to others than 
those living in British and Allied countries, 
except on permit from the British Admir- 
alty. 

5. The enforcement of a censorship of 
absurd severity over commercial cablegrams 
between the United States and the rest of 
the world, involving the suppression of com- 
munication between American merchants 
and their foreign customers, and between 
foreign merchants and their American cus- 
tomers, and the appropriation and dishon- 
est use of intelligence passing between 
American and foreign business houses. 

The chronology of the British war on 
American commerce is easy to master — the 
principal dates to learn are but three: 
August 20, October 29, 1914, and March 11, 
1915. These are dates of three Orders in 
Council — for it is by the same method 
and in the same form as that which out- 
raged our forefathers and finally provoked 
them to the War of 1812 that England to- 
day is closing the sea to our commerce. 

The Order in Council of August 20 de- 
clared it to be the intention of the British 
Government to act during the present hos- 
tilities in accordance with the provisions of 
the Declaration of London, subject to some 
additions and modifications. A glance at 
the additions and modifications which this 
order and that of October 29 then proceed 
to make reveals the fact that the pretense 
that the British Government is observing 
the Declaration of London would be much 
like the claim of a man who professed that 
he was carefully observing the command- 
ments of Moses, subject to the striking out 
of the nots. The additions and modifica- 
tions which the British Government has 
placed upon the Declaration of London are 
of such a character that they obliterate the 
Declaration. 



10 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



I 



The Declaration of London, in Articles 
XXIL, XXIV., and XXVIII., established 
a list of absolute contraband, another of 
conditional contraband, and another of mer- 
chandise not contraband. These lists Great 
Britain has revised beyond any possible 
recognition. The catalogue of absolute con- 
traband has been enormously expanded, and 
practically everything else has been marked 
down as conditional contraband. The free 
list has disappeared. And this in defiance 
of the rule of the Declaration itself, and of 
the well-understood principle of interna- 
tional law, and especially of the century- 
long contention of the United States, that it 
is vital to the legitimate commerce of neu- 
tral States that there should be, as Mr. Hay 
when Secretary of State put it, no deviation 
from the rule which determines what is and 
what is not lawfully subject to belligerent 
capture, namely: warlike nature, use, and 
destination. 

But even more vital is the modification 
which the British Order in Council makes 
in the sense of Articles XXXIII. and 
XXXV. of the Declaration of London. 

The former article declares that there can 
be no question of conditional contraband 
except in cases where the cargo is destined 
for the use of the administrative depart- 
ments, or the military or naval force of the 
enemy. Under the latter article there can 
be no question of conditional contraband 
on vessels sailing for a neutral port. 

The British Government announced that 
it would regard articles of conditional con- 
traband consigned' to "merchants or other 
persons under the control of the authorities 
of the enemy" in the same light as if they 
were consigned directly to the military 
forces of the enemy. This means nothing 
else than that provisions, for instance, on 
the way to a German port, consigned to a 
private importer and intended for no other 
use than the consumption by the peaceful 
population in the ordinary way of life, are 
subject to capture by British ships — be- 
cause all the inhabitants of the country are 
under the control of the authorities. Not 
only so, but the same harmless cargoes on 
the way to Danish, Dutch, or Norwegian 
ports are likewise subject to capture — be- 
cause it may suit the purposes of the British 
Government to suspect any importer, any- 
where, of being "under the control" of Ger- 
man authorities. In other words, American 
farmers, cattle-raisers, and pork-packers 
are today, by British edict, denied the right 
to sell and deliver their products to the 
peaceful populations of the countries with 
which Great Britain happens to be at war, 
and of the countries which she suspects 
sympathize with them. 

A year ago, when the above sentence was 
first written, it seemed a thing impossible 
that Britain would be permitted to forbid 



our selling the products of our farms to 
whom we would. She has been permitted to 
do it for a year, and the shock of the thing 
has passed. Yet surely, even though it has 
been endured for a year, it cannot be the 
settled policy of the people of the United 
States to submit to so intolerable an op- 
pression. 

There is too long a record of American 
insistence on the right to sell and ship food 
to civilian populations anywhere in peace 
or war. Something like the following has 
been our historic attitude : 

In 1795 the British Government, being 
then at war with France, by an Order in 
Council directed the seizure of all vessels 
laden with provisions bound for French 
ports. The Government of the United 
States protested against this action. It 
secured the appointment in 1795 of a Mixed 
Commission for the purpose of awarding 
damages by reason of illegal captures and 
condemnations by the British. This com- 
mission held that the action of the British 
in holding up provisions on the way to 
French ports, but not specifically intended 
for the French army and navy, was illegal, 
and awarded large damages. 

The language of Thomas Jefferson, Sec- 
retary of State of the United States, in in- 
structing Mr. Pinckney, our Minister in 
London, Sept. 7, 1793, represents the posi- 
tion which this Government has ever since 
consistently maintained : 

When two nations go to war, those who choose to 
live in peace retain their natural right to pursue their 
agriculture, manufactures, and other ordinary voca- 
tions, to carry the produce of their industry for ex- 
change to all nations, belligerent or neutral, as usual. 

Mr. Jefferson contended that the fact that 
Great Britain and France were at war af- 
forded neither of them the right to inter- 
rupt the agriculture and commerce of the 
United States. Such interruption tended 
directly to draw us from the state of peace 
in which Ave wished to remain. Mr. Jeffer- 
son instructed Mr. Pinckney that the 
United States Government could not allow 
itself to be forced either to withhold pro- 
visions from France, (thus making our- 
selves a party to the war), or to withhold 
them from both France and her enemies, 
(thus closing to our farmers, manufactur- 
ers, and shippers all the ports of Europe). 
He admitted that Great Britain might "feel 
the desire of starving an enemy nation, but 
she can have no right of doing it at our loss, 
nor of making us the instrument of it." 

Edmund Kandolph, Secretary of State, 
on May 6, 1794, instructed Mr. Jay, who had 
gone on a special mission to England in 
connection with the subject, that "provi- 
sions, except in the instance of a siege, 



THE FIRST ENCROACHMENTS 



It 



blockade, or investment, are not to be 
ranked among contraband." 

After 1795 the Government of Great Brit- 
ain did not, for 119 years, undertake to 
assert that provisions destined elsewhere 
than to the government, army or navy of 
a belligerent were contraband. Indeed, un- 
til the year 1914, it consistently maintained 
the opposite position. 

In the year 1885, France, being in a state 
of hostility with Ghina, declared shipments 
of rice destined to any ports in Northern 
China to be contraband. The pretension 
was resisted by Great Britain, on the 
ground that though provisions may, in par- 
ticular instances, acquire a contraband 
character, they cannot in general be so 
treated. Lord Granville, British Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, in a note to M. Wadding- 
ton, Feb. 27, 1885, replied to the French 
contention that the British Government 
could not admit it. 

The United States Minister at Berlin, 
Mr. Kasson, wrote to Mr. Bayard, Secretary 
of State, April 23, 1885, relative to the dis- 
cussion then going on in Europe over the 
French declaration making rice contraband. 
Mr. Kasson said : 

I beg your attention to the importance of the prin- 
ciple involved in this declaration, as it concerns our 
American interests. We are neutrals in European 
wars. Food constitutes an immense portion of our 
exports. Every European war produces an increased 
demand for these supplies from neutral countries. The 
French doctrine declares them contraband, not only 
when destined directly for military consumption, but 
when going in the ordinary course of trade as food for 
the civil population of the belligerent Government. If 
food can be thus excluded and captured, still more can 
clothing, the instruments of industry, and all less vital 
supplies be cut off, on the ground that they tend to 
support the efforts of the belligerent nation. Indeed, 
the real principle involved goes to this extent, that 
everything the want of which will increase the distress 
of the civil population of the belligerent country may 
be declared contraband of war. 

The entire trade of neutrals with belligerents may 
thus be destroyed, irrespective of an effective blockade 
of ports. War itself would become more fatal to 
neutral States than to belligerent interests. 

The rule of feudal times, the starvation of beleag- 
uered and fortified towns, might be extended to an 
entire population of an open country. It is a return to 
barbaric habits of war. 

During the Boer war, question having 
arisen as to the position of the British Gov- 
ernment with regard to dispatch of provi- 
sions to South Africa, Lord Salisbury, then 
head of the Government, (Jan. 10, 1900,) 
thus defined it : 

Foodstuffs with a hostile destination can be consid- 
ered contraband of war only if they are supplies for 
the enemy's forces. It is not sufficient that they are 
capable of being so used ; it must be shown that this 
was in fact their destination at the time of the seizure. 



During the Eusso-Japanese war the Rus- 
sian government undertook to put foodstuffs 
on the contraband list. The British Gov- 
ernment protested, and the American Gov- 
ernment declared its total inability to ac- 
quiesce in the Russian position. 

Lord Lansdowne, British Minister of For- 
eign Affairs, on June 11, 1904, instructed 
Sir C. Hardinge, British Ambassador at 
St. Petersburg, that his Government ob- 
served "with great concern that rice and 
provisions will be treated as unconditional 
contraband, a step which they regard as in- 
consistent with the law and practice of 
nations." 

The United States Government was es- 
pecially emphatic in its refusal to admit the 
Russian contention. The steamship Arabia, 
bound for Japanese ports and laden with 
railway material and flour, consigned to pri- 
vate commercial houses, was seized by the 
Russians and taken to Vladivostok. A prize 
court held that the Arabia's cargo should 
be confiscated. In the course of a remark- 
able letter of instruction sent to Mr. McCor- 
mick, our Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
on Aug. 30, 1901, Mr. Hay made use of the 
following language : 

When war exists between powerful States it is vital 
to the legitimate maritime commerce of neutral States 
that there be no relaxation of the rule — no deviation 
from the criterion for determining what constitutes 
contraband of war, lawfully subject to belligerent cap- 
ture, namely : Warlike nature, use and destination. 
Articles which, like arms and ammunition, are by their 
nature of self-evident warlike use, are contraband of 
war if destined to enemy territory; but articles which, 
like coal, cotton, and provisions, though ordinarily 
innocent are capable of warlike use, are not subject 
to capture and confiscation unless shown by evidence 
to be actually destined for the military or naval forces 
of a belligerent. 

This substantive principle of the law of nations can- 
not be overridden by technical rule of the Prize Court 
that the owners of the captured cargo must prove that 
no part of it may eventually come to the hands of the 
enemy forces. The proof is of an impossible nature ; 
and it cannot be admitted that the absence of proof in 
its nature impossible to make can justify the seizure 
and condemnation. If it were otherwise, all neutral 
commerce with the people of a belligerent State would 
be impossible; the innocent- would suffer inevitable con- 
demnation with the guilty. . . . 

If the principle which appears to have been declared 
by the Vladivostok Prize Court and which has not so 
far been disavowed or explained by his Imperial 
Majesty's Government is acquiesced in it means, if 
carried unto full execution, the complete destruction 
of all neutral commerce with the non-combatant popu- 
lation* of Japan ; it obviates the necessity of blockades ; 
it renders meaningless the principle of the Declaration 
of Paris set forth in the Imperial Order of Feb. 29 
last that a blockade in order to be obligatory must be 
effective; it obliterates all distinction between com- 
merce in contraband and non-contraband goods, and is 
in effect a declaration of war against commerce of 
every description between the people of a neutral and 
those of a belligerent State. 



II 



THE SUMMIT OF ARROGANCE 



GREAT BRITAIN does not, however, 
now limit herself to "war against 
commerce of every description be- 
tween the people of a neutral and those of 
a belligerent State"; she has gone on to 
declare war against commerce of every de- 
scription between the people of neutral 
States among themselves. It is no longer 
the complaint of American exporters mere- 
ly that they may not sell innocent goods 
to the noncombatants of Germany ; that out- 
rage has taken its place as only a minor fea- 
ture of the campaign of which our trade- 
rights are the victim, a campaign which has 
reached the length of forbidding our selling 
to or buying from any European country 
except under British supervision and with 
British permission in the case of each and 
every shipment of goods. 

The first steps in the hostilities against 
us were those considered above, namely : the 
extension of the definition of contraband to 
include practically all articles of commerce; 
and the presumption of a hostile destination 
in all cases. Within a few months after the 
beginning of the war — on November 2, 1914 
— England closed the English channel to 
navigation, planting mines in the seas north 
of the British Isles and notifying the world 
that entrance into those waters was hazard- 
ous. The effect of this was to compel trans- 
Atlantic vessels to take the northern route 
and to put into a British port to secure a 
British pilot — and submit to British exami- 
nation. 

On March 11, 1915, there issued an Or- 
der in Council which the calmest and most 
well-considered judgment can only describe 
as probably the most insolent public docu- 
ment of modern times. 

On March 11, 1915, His British Majesty, 
by and with the advice of His Privy Coun- 
cil, was pleased to order and did order that 

"No merchant vessel which sailed from 
her port of departure after the first of 
March, 1915, shall he allowed to proceed on 
her voyage to any German port. 

"No merchant vessel which sailed fromi 
any German port after the first of March, 
1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her 
voyage with any goods on board laden at 
such port. 

"Every merchant vessel which sailed from 
a port other than a German port after the 



first of March, 1915, having on board goods 
which are of enemy origin or are enemy 
property, may be required to discharge such 
goods in a British or allied port." 

Is it possible that the people of the United 
States understand these words and what 
they mean? Is it possible that they under- 
stand that during many months the power 
of Great Britain has forbidden a merchant 
vessel passing between America and Ger- 
many under any circumstances, or its pass- 
ing between America and any port on the 
continent of Europe except by British per- 
mission and after British examination? 
Can the American people be aware that 
Great Britain refuses to allow, and for many 
months has not allowed, an article suspected 
to be owned by a German, or to have orig- 
inated on German, Austrian, or Belgian 
soil, to cross the Atlantic Ocean? Are we 
really aware, do we understand, that for 
months every ship going and coming be- 
tween American ports and neutral European 
ports has been stopped and examined by the 
British naval constabulary and either held 
or unloaded or given a British license to 
continue her voyage? Have we apprehended 
the meaning of the language which, on the 
publication of the March 11th Order in 
Council, our own Government addressed to 
the British Government, namely, that "it 
would constitute, were its provisions actual- 
ly to be carried into effect as they stand, a 
practical assertion of unlimited belligerent 
rights over neutral commerce within the 
whole European area, and an almost unqual- 
ified denial of the sovereign rights of the na- 
tions now at peace?" And can we then be 
indifferent to the fact that for months those 
provisions have been actually in effect ; that 
for months England has been practicing "an 
almost unqualified denial of the sovereign 
rights" of the United States? 

Today the American Government is un- 
able to assure merchant ships flying the 
American flag that they may cross the At- 
lantic to any port except by permission 
of the British Admiralty. To-day an 
Iowa farmer or a Texas cattle-raiser is for- 
bidden, by the English Government, to sell 
his products to European customers whose 
families need food. Not a barrel of flour 
nor a ham can be landed in Rotterdam or 



THE SUMMIT OF ARROGANCE 



13 



Copenhagen without England's permission — 
which is unobtainable. Not a bale of cot- 
ton can be shipped except on the same terms. 
Not a case of medicines nor a box of Christ- 
mas toys, much desired by our people, can 
be obtained^-for it is more important that 
England should punish the chemists of El- 
berfeld and the toy-makers of Nuremberg 
than that American hospitals should get 
medicines and American children have a 
merry Christmas. So there lie piled up on 
the wharves of Eotterdam and Copenhagen 
and Malmoe, mountains of boxes of goods 
for which we are anxious to trade our own 
products, but which England forbids the 
ships to touch, because they are "goods of 
enemy origin." 

The British position is that Germany has 
committed illegitimate acts, and that this 
gives England "an unquestioned right of re- 
taliation." Whether or not it is becoming 
to England to use the illegal acts of her 
enemy to excuse unlawful acts of her own, 
even in respect of the enemy, it can hardly 
be claimed that the retaliation should be vis- 
ited upon the United States, an innocent 
neutral. England is assumed to be the 
enemy of Germany, not of the farmers, 
planters and merchants of the United States, 
but it is the merest statement of fact to say 
that thousands of the citizens of the United 
States are being interfered with in the ordi- 
nary pursuit of their livelihood, not to say 
in the enjoyment of the ordinary comforts 
of life — and unnecessarily interfered with — 
by the economic war which Great Britain is 
waging upon the United States under the 
excuse of its war with Germany. 

It was only after considerable hesitation 
that the British Government allowed itself 
to use the word "blockade" in describing the 
measures it had put in hand March 11th to 
stop commerce with Germany. It is not a 
physical fact. It does not apply alike to all 
countries; Sweden, Norway and Denmark 
are freely trading with German ports in the 
Baltic, access to which the British deny us. 
It forbids access to neutral ports. It is not 
maintained by ships; the fact is the British 
navy is, most of it, safe in harbor, while the 
so-called "blockade" is enforced, so far as 
it is physically enforced, largely by mines. 

How tremendous a departure from all 
known and accepted principles of interna- 
tional law is this new long-distance paper 
blockade ! Historically, the theory of block- 
ade by sea is closely connected with that of 
siege by land. The original theory of the 
blockade was that it was intended to reduce 
a seaside fort by means of investment on all 
sides. It was often questioned (for in- 
stance, by perhaps the greatest American 
jurist, John Marshall, afterwards Chief 
Justice, then Secretary of State, in an in- 
struction, September 30, 1800, to Mr. King, 
American Minister in London), whether the 



rule of blockade could be applied to a port 
"not completely invested by land, as well as 
by sea." Mr. Marshall was convinced that 
the extension of the doctrine to towns in- 
vested by sea alone was "an unjustifiable en- 
croachment on the rights of neutrals." 

Even though the principle of sea blockade 
independent of siege by land did establish 
itself, certain specified requirements have al- 
ways been insisted upon. Among these are 
the following — the particular form of state- 
ment being that given by Prof. T. A. Walk- 
er, of Cambridge University. [Manual In- 
ternational Law, III, 77, 78.] 

I. A Blockade to be Binding Must be Real. 

It is legally essential that there be a blockade in fact. 
A mere proclamation of blockade unsupported by the 
presence of an actual blockading force, i. e., a "paper 
blockade," is in no way binding upon a neutral. 
II. A Blockade to be Binding Must be Effective. 

The presence of an adequate force is an absolutely 
essential condition for a valid blockade. The powers 
of the Armed Neutrality required for the validity of a 
blockade that it should be maintained by vessel "an- 
chored and sufficiently near" to make the attempt to 
enter manifestly dangerous . . ." 

It may be convenient to have brought to- 
gether at this point some of the pertinent au- 
thorities on the subject. The rules of the 
Declaration of Paris and of the Declaration 
of London are given later, under the head- 
ing "Official Documents." The quotations 
below are from Secretaries of State of the 
United States: 

To guard against the abusive extension of the term 
"blockade," it will be necessary explicitly to describe its 
meaning, and to confine it as in the declaration of the 
Armed Neutrality, "to a port where, by the disposition 
of a Power which attacks it, with vessels stationed 
sufficiently near, there would be evident danger to enter 
it." [Mr. Pickering, Secretary of State, to Mr. King, 
Minister to England, June 8, 1796.] 

The law of nations requires, to constitute a blockade, 
that there should be the presence and position of a 
force rendering access to the prohibited place mani- 
festly difficult and dangerous. Every jurist of reputa- 
tion, who treats with precision on this branch of the 
laws of nations, refers to an actual and particular 
blockade. [Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Mr. 
Thornton, October 27, 1803.] 

No maxim of the law of nations is better established 
than that a blockade should be confined to particular 
ports, and that an adequate force shall be "stationed at 
each to support it. The force should be stationary, and 
not a cruising squadron, and placed so near the en- 
trance of the harbor or mouth of the river as to make 
it evidently dangerous for a Vessel to enter. [Mr. 
Monroe, Secretary of State, to Mr. de Onis, Spanish 
Minister, March 20, 1816.] 

The fictitious blockades proclaimed by Great Britain 
and made a pretext for violating the commerce of 
neutral nations have been one of the greatest abuses 
ever committed on_ the high seas. During the late war 
they were carried to an extravagance which would 
have been ridiculous, if in their effects they had not 
afflicted such serious and extensive injuries on neutral 
nations. Ports were proclaimed in a state of blockade 
previous to the arrival of any force at them, were con- 
sidered in that state without regard to intimations of 
the presence of the blockading force; . . . the 
British cruisers during the whole time seizing every 
vessel bound to such ports, at whatever distance from 
them. [Mr. Madison, Secretary of State, to Mr. Mon- 
roe, Minister to England, January 5, 1804.] 

The British Government in defending its 
long-distance blockade has made reference to 



11 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



precedents set by the American Government, 
especially to the Springbok case and the 
Peterhoff case. But a study of these cases 
[5 Wallace, 1, and 5 Wallace, 28] will 
clearly show that in neither of these in- 
stances the decision of our courts provides 
any support for the present British conten- 
tion. 

The Peterhoff — to take the time for but 
one instance — was a British vessel which, 
during the Civil War, cleared with a cargo 
for the Mexican port of Matamoras, just 
across the Eio Grande from Brownsville, 
Texas — then occupied by Confederate troops. 
The vessel was taken by United States au- 
thorities, but the court's decision held that 
"the ship and cargo are free from liability 
for violation of blockade." The temptation 
to include in the blockade our navy was con- 
ducting the little Mexican port across from 
the Confederate camp at Brownsville was 
surely no less than the desire to include in 
the present British blockade all the great 
city ports of neutral Europe. But the 
United States court resisted that temptation. 
It said: 

It must be premised that no paper or constructive 
blockade is allowed by international law. When such 
blockades have been attempted by other nations, the 
United States have ever protested against them and 
denied their validity. * * * 

We must say, therefore, that trade between London 
and Matamoras, even with intent to supply, from Mata- 
moras, goods to Texas, violated no blockade, and can- 
not be declared unlawful. 

Trade with a neutral port in immediate proximity to 
the territory of one belligerent, is certainly very incon- 
venient to the other. Such trade, with unrestricted in- 
land commerce between such a port and the enemy's 
territory, impairs undoubtedly, and very seriously im- 
pairs, the value of a blockade of the enemy's coast. 
But in cases such as that now in judgment, we ad- 
minister the public law of nations, and are not at 
liberty to inquire what is for the particular advantage 
or disadvantage of our own or another country. We 
must follow the lights of reason and the lessons of 
the masters of international jurisprudence. 

Much in contrast with this sober, law-re 
vering reasoning is the position assumed by 
the British Government today. In its note 
of July 24th, Sir Edward Grey says: "A 
blockade limited to enemy ports only would 
leave open routes by which every kind of 
German commerce could pass almost as 
easily as through the ports in her own ter- 
ritory." It is therefore absurd, is the Eng- 
lish conclusion, to say that they may not 
close those neutral routes. "If the blockade 
can only become effective by extending it 
to enemy commerce passing through neutral 
ports, such an extension is defensible." 

As a rule, goods which are of German 
ownership or origin are refused shipment 
from neutral ports, but in some instances 
such goods have been accepted by ship-mas- 
ters and have started on their voyage to 
America, only to be seized by British author- 
ities. What are the rights in such cases? 

The question whether goods which are 



the private property of citizen of a bellig- 
erent country may be seized at sea, if on 
board a neutral vessel, cannot be regarded 
as decisively settled. In early times the 
private possessions of citizens of an enemy 
country were regarded as good spoil wher- 
ever found. Nowadays, it is unpermissible 
for a belligerent to seize private property of 
citizens of the enemy country, when found 
on land. With regard to private property 
of citizens of an enemy country, found at 
sea, the law is not quite so clear. While 
there would seem to be no difference in the 
inviolability of private property by land 
and by sea, practically the international 
conscience cannot be said to have advanced 
to the point where there is absolute unan- 
imity that enemy goods must be respected, 
if they can be captured on the water. The 
doctrine "free ships, free goods," has always 
been popular in America, but, as a matter 
of fact, we can hardly rest upon it as an ac- 
cepted axiom of international law or prac- 
tice. Indeed, our own courts, except in cases 
where definite treaties prescribe a different 
rule, have with practical uniformity upheld 
the seizure of enemy property, if contraband, 
even when sailing under a neutral flag. 
True, a score of our treaties with foreign 
Powers recognize the principle "free ships, 
free goods." We have no treaty with Great 
Britain in which either party recognizes the 
principle. However, both the Declaration 
of Paris and the Declaration of London hold 
that privately owned property is inviolable 
at sea. 

Of course, goods once the possession of an 
enemy, but which have been sold to citizens 
of a neutral state in the ordinary ways of 
trade and in good faith, are exempt from 
capture or interference. 

As for goods of origin in belligerent terri- 
tory, precedents and opinions are contradic- 
tory; it cannot be averred that there was any 
clearly predominant decision up to 1909, 
when the London Conference declared 
against the seizure of property at sea on the 
ground that it was the product of the 
enemy's soil. During the present war, the 
British Government has stopped shipments 
from Belgium, as "goods of enemy origin," 
the local government of Belgium being to- 
day administered by Germans. Thus, while 
we are exhorted to contribute, and have con- 
tributed many thousands of dollars for the 
relief of Belgian distress, we are not per- 
mitted, by Great Britain, to offer the most 
practical form of relief, namely, by the pur- 
chase of Belgian goods. 

It is of course- apparent that, once the 
principle of the long-distance blockade is 
asserted, the mere matter of miles ceases 
to be of any consequence at all. If England 
is free to close the whole coast of Europe 
by a constructive blockade somewhere out at 
sea, there is no impropriety in her station- 



THE SUMMIT OF ARROGANCE 



15 



ing cruisers at the mouth of New York har- 
bor, the Delaware capes and Hampton 
Roads, to seize contraband — whatever she 
pleases being "contraband." The United 
States Government early in the war made 
representations to Great Britain that the 
presence of war vessels in the vicinity of 
New York harbor was offensive, and the 
cruisers were for a while withdrawn. But 
they were soon busy again on our coast, and 
now were not satisfied merely to waylay or 
capture vessels starting on the Atlantic 
voyage. 

On October 26th, the Dutch steamer Ham- 
bom, on the way from New York to Cabair- 
en, Cuba, for bananas for the American 
market, was captured by a British cruiser 
and taken to Halifax as a prize. 

A few days later, we found that the voyage 
from New York to Norfolk, Virginia, had 
become dangerous. For more than a year 
American ships bound to foreign neutral 
ports had constantly been seized and their 
cargoes taken off for England's benefit. But 
our ships still retained the proud privilege 
of travelling without molestation between 
our own home ports. 

On October 30th, the British Government 
took away this privilege. On that day one 
of the British blockading cruisers off Sandy 
Hook captured the steamship Hocking, an 
American vessel, flying the American flag, 
owned by Americans, steaming between two 
American ports. She had, and could have 
had, no contraband on board, for nothing 
can be contraband passing between two 
American ports. But, as a matter of fact, 
she was in ballast, without a pound of car- 
go in her. The cruiser put an armed prize 
crew on board the Hocking, hauled down the 
American flag, ran up the Union Jack, and 
took the prize into Halifax, where she will 
lie for months, and almost certainly be con- 
fiscated on the ground (which is positively 
denied), that German capital is invested in 
her. 

If this ship was not safe, no American 
coast-wise trading ship is safe. However, 
up to the present time, American vessels are 
permitted to navigate the Great Lakes and 
the Hudson River. On Nov. 11th, the Yin- 
land, of Danish registry, but on the way 
from New York to Norfolk, was chased by 
the British blockaders after leaving Sandy 
Hook, but escaped by running close inshore 
and creeping in thick weather down the 
coast. 

Thus far no vessel has been pursued into 
a port of the United States, though the Zea- 
landia, an American steamsh ip, was, on Nov. 
5th, while anchored off Progresso, Mexico, 
at the usual discharging place (there being 



no ship-landing at Progresso), within the 
3-mile limit, boarded and searched by an 
armed party from the British cruiser Iris. 

However, it is not the purpose to go, at 
this point, into details concerning captured 
ships; another chapter will do that. Other 
chapters will take up for more extended dis- 
cussion particular features of the British 
campaign against neutral commerce, such as 
the interference, through iron-clad trade 
agreements, in our domestic business; the 
cable censorship, ably used as an aid to the 
demoralization already wrought by the cen- 
sorship of cargoes ; the blacklisting of many 
specified ships in the neutral trade, etc., etc. 

All these devices for the injury of rival 
trade, outrageous as they are, are only out- 
growths of the central iniquity which makes 
them possible — England's violation of the 
neutrality of the sea. No indictment could 
be more complete than that which the facts 
cited, though incompletely, in this book, 
bring against the King and his Council and 
the Admiralty of England as the contemner 
of international law and the enemy of the 
rights of nations at peace. No one can 
peruse the cases set down in detail in later 
pages of this book without astonishment at 
the height to which British pretensions 
have been allowed to mount. The Govern- 
ment of Great Britain has virtually set up 
in the midst of the busy seas an arbitrary 
court, claiming unheard of powers and exer- 
cising the most tyrannous police functions ; 
seizing and haling into the dock, as suspects, 
all travellers upon the ocean highways, and 
visiting many of them with heavy penalties 
for unproven, and indeed unprovable, of- 
fenses. This lawless assizes of the seas, con- 
temptuous alike of its own precedents and 
of the rights of others, scarcely stoops to the 
pretense of citing authority for its actions, 
which are determined solely by its brutal 
will, and enforced, though indeed largely 
through intimidation, by the gigantic power 
of its naval police. The extent of the earth's 
surface over which this extraordinary court 
is permitted to wield its self-arrogated jur- 
isdiction, the magnitude of the interests 
which its actions vitally affect, and the 
supineness with which sovereign States sub- 
mit to the erection, upon the ruins of their 
self-respect and the debacle of their highest 
commercial and political interests, of an 
island's municipal statutes into interna- 
tional formulas, unite to render this one of 
the spectacles of history. 

A contemplation of that spectacle sug- 
gests that the hour imposes upon the United 
State a duty of supreme historical impor- 
tance. 



Ill 



SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA 



AMEBICAN manufacturers and export- 
ers to-day are unable; because of Brit- 
ish interference on the high seas, 
to send goods direct to customers in any 
neutral, non-belligerent European country. 
Deliveries of goods to such nations can be 
effected only after the cargoes of vessels have 
been examined by British authorities in 
such ports as Kirkwall, Leith, Shields, Hull 
or Liverpool, to whichall vessels — American, 
Dutch, Norwegian and Swedish — are forci- 
bly diverted, at a great financial loss. Even 
then, the continuance of a ship's voyage and 
the delivery of consignments are uncertain, 
because, on the mere suspicion that goods 
may be resold to Germany or her allies, car- 
goes Jire often discharged and held for Prize 
Court proceedings. American exporters are 
obliged to suffer losses in the deterioration 
of perishable goods, in the charter cost and 
operating expenses of ships detained, and 
in, what is more serious, the destruction of 
business relations enjoyed for years with 
foreign customers. In consequence of Brit- 
ish rulings certain goods, such as rub- 
ber, wool and tin, manufactured in the 
United States, cannot now be sold to cus- 
tomers in Norway, Sweden, Holland, Den- 
mark, or any neutral country, except 
through British brokers, located in London. 
These brokers charge a commission on sales 
thus made. American goods thus sold, must 
be shipped via England, which necessitates 
great expenses in loading, reloading and in 
warehouse tolls. 

Shut off from direct relations with their 
legitimate customers, American merchants 
are thus rendered helpless in the disposition 
of goods and the establishment of prices. 
Thus American business abroad, fostered 
and developed for years at great expense, 
has been usurped by British interests which 
can themselves, under present conditions, 
without hindrance or competition, supplant 
American manufacturers. 

Every American enterprise engaged in 
foreign trade has suffered from Great Brit- 
ain's maritime policy. Even trade with 
South American countries has been inter- 
fered with and damaged. The loss inflicted 
has fallen upon manufacturers, importers, 
exporters and ship-owners. No class of 
goods has been exempt from British deten- 
tion and seizure. The mere suspicion on the 



part of any British authority engaged in the 
examination of ships is sufficient for the 
holding of a cargo for Prize Court proceed- 
ings. 

According to the basic principle of Eng- 
lish common law, which places the burden 
of proof upon the accuser, and by the Dec- 
laration of London, which presumes that 
all cargoes are innocent of an enemy desti- 
nation until proven guilty, the policy pur- 
sued by Great Britain is illegal and in vio- 
lation of the established rights of neutral 
nations. Beversing these principles, Great 
Britain first assumes that all cargoes are 
suspect, and acts accordingly. Thus, any 
and all ships may be held and cargoes 
seized. American shippers are asked to 
guarantee that goods sent to Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and Holland will not be 
re-sold by their purchasers to Germany or 
her allies. By what right can Great Britain 
ask this of American merchants? How 
can such guarantee be logically given? The 
captain of any British patrol boat, hailing 
and taking into port an American, Norweg- 
ian, Danish or Dutch boat, at his discretion 
may assume that the cargoes may be re- 
sold to Germany. The American shipper, as 
well as his customers, has no recourse from 
long detention, actual seizure and Prize 
Court proceedings. Vessels are often 
brought into Kirkwall and other British 
ports even after the cargoes had been ex- 
amined by representatives of British consuls 
at American ports and the holds officially 
sealed before the ship set sail. Whether the 
cargo be seized or the vessel allowed to pro- 
ceed, a financial loss is inflicted upon ex- 
porters and ship charterers. 

Bealizing their helplessness under the 
monopoly exercised by Great Britain upon 
the sea, regular lines, like the Scandinavian- 
American and Norwegian- American, volun- 
tarily call at Kirkwall for inspection. Other 
lines using the English channel, such as the 
Holland-American Line, stop at the Downs. 
The mere deflection from their regular 
course of voyage means an expense in the 
burning of coal and in delay. If her pa- 
pers are deemed beyond criticism or sus- 
picion by the British officer examining the 
cargo and the vessel is allowed to proceed, 
there is a delay of at least forty-eight hours. 
In most cases ships are detained several 



SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA 



17 



days. In other cases the period which they 
are held has ranged from one to sis months. 
The damage inflicted, and the gross injustice 
of such detention upon the mere suspicion of 
some petty examining official, are obvious. 

Vessels of lighter tonnage pay a charter 
fee averaging from |400 to |500 a day. 
Larger vessels pay from $1,400 to $1,500 a 
day. The charter cost for a trip may aver- 
age about $45,000 to $50,000. Each day's 
detention in a British port means so much 
loss, which is, of course, not paid by the 
British Government, but must be deducted 
from the profit on the cargo should that 
cargo have the good fortune to be passed and 
finally reach its destination. 

To illustrate the working out of the con- 
ditions generally explained, certain specific 
cases may be cited. These are to be regarded 
as illustrations merely, as it would be im- 
possible to furnish a full list of ships de- 
tained and cargoes held : 

The steamship Edward Pierce, owned by 
an American concern and flying the Amer- 
ican flag, sailed November 25, 1914, from 
New York for Copenhagen and Gothenburg. 
This vessel was detained at Falmouth from 
December 8 to December 13, the master be- 
ing told that consignments of flour and peas 
were suspected, although these had been sold 
direct to parties in Copenhagen. The vessel 
was finally permitted to proceed, the loss 
in charter fees during the delay — on mere 
suspicion — amounting, according to the 
owners, to $7,000. The steamship George 
Eawley, owned by the same concern, sailed 
from New York, November 15, 1914, for Co- 
penhagen. This ship was held at Falmouth. 
The master was informed by the custom of- 
ficers that they were compelled to detain the 
ship on account of flour, wheat and oil on 
board. They later informed the master that 
the British government suspected the des- 
tination of 550 barrels of oil. On January 1, 
1915, the master was directed to proceed on 
his course, with the full cargo. The satis- 
faction of British suspicion in this case, re- 
quiring a delay of thirty-three days, cost the 
owners $14,000 in charter fees and other 
expenses. 

On February 9, 1915, the steamship An- 
tilla, American, sailed from New York for 
Malmoe and Copenhagen. The ship was 
stopped February 24 by a British cruiser 
and ordered to proceed to-Kirkwall with a 
prize crew on board. The ship was taken to 
Dundee on March 23. The cargo aboard this 
vessel had been loaded under the inspection 
of watchmen appointed by the British Con- 
sul in New York, and all of the ship's mani- 
fests had been certified and signed by the 
British Consul before the ship sailed. De- 
spite this fact, and the presentation of the 
British consul's certificate, the ship's papers 



were seized by the Admiralty authorities at 
Dundee, and part of the cargo, consisting 
of machinery, hardware, graphite and food- 
stuffs, was discharged. The vessel itself was 
held until April 27, when it was allowed to 
proceed with only the remainder of the car- 
go. The damage in this case, according to 
the owners, amounted to $98,000. 

On April 6, 1915, an officer from the Brit- 
ish cruiser Teutonic boarded the American 
ship, Joseph W. Fordney, sailing from New 
York to Malmoe, when the ship was four 
miles off the Norwegian coast but inside the 
headlands of Norway. Despite the fact that 
the captain showed that the hatches of the 
ship had been closed under the supervision 
of the British consul at New York with the 
consular seal, a prize crew was sent aboard 
and the vessel was ordered to Kirkwall, 
where customs officers seized all the ship's 
papers. The vessel was ordered to Dalton 
Bay and thence to Portishead, where it ar- 
rived April 27. There the cargo was arbi- 
trarily ordered to discharge, without explan- 
ation, and the vessel was released, sailing 
for New York on May 17. 

These are only isolated and typical illus- 
trations of Great Britain's treatment of 
American ships carrying American goods. 
Even in cases where cargoes are allowed to 
proceed, the expenses incurred by British in- 
terference often wipe out any chance of 
profit. The loss in charter fees and operat- 
ing expenses of ships are repeatedly in- 
creased by the capricious orders of British 
officials. Often ships ordered to Kirkwall 
are not examined there and the matter set- 
tled, but are compelled to proceed to Leith, 
Newcastle, Hartlepool or Middlesborough, 
and are sometimes thus sent from port to 
port, only in the end to have the cargo seized 
for Prize Court proceedings. These delays 
occupy periods ranging from several days to 
many months. The steamship Carolyn, 
American, for instance, sailed from Savan- 
nah, Ga., March 30, 1915, with a cargo of 
cotton for Botterdani. The ship put into 
Kirkwall for inspection on April 28. It was 
then ordered to Leith, where the cargo was 
detained. The ship was discharged only on 
May 21, the delay in this case covering a 
perod of twenty-three days. 

Another instance of great expense brought 
upon American shippers may be found in 
the case of the steamship Leelanmo, Ameri- 
can, which sailed from New York May 17, 
1915, for Gothenburg, Sweden, carrying a 
cargo of cotton for Eussia valued at $400,- 
000. This ship was captured May 31 by the 
British cruiser Mantua and detained at 
Kirkwall from June 2 to July 6, a period ex- 
ceeding one month. Because the British au- 
thorities suspected that the cotton might not 
go into Eussia from Sweden, clearance to 
Gothenburg was refused and the vessel was 



18 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



forced to deviate its course to Archangel. 
The shipper thereby suffered great loss by 
the delay and deviation, in charter cost, oper- 
ating expenses, war' risk and maritime in- 
surance. 

Ships carrying valuable cargoes are de- 
tained on the most petty pretexts. The 
steamship Portland, American, which sailed 
from San Francisco April 25, 1915, for 
Stockholm, was detained at Kirkwall, and 
thence sent on to Blyth, where it was held 
several days. The holding up of this ship 
was occasioned merely by British suspicion, 
which in this case cast its eye upon a 34-ton 
cargo of dried fruit, which was sent to the 
Prize Court. The mere suspicion that may 
rest on food shipments, from wheat to peas, 
from meat to prunes, may cost innocent 
American shipping concerns and exporters 
thousands of dollars. 

No consideration for the deterioration of 
perishable cargoes or for the expense of de- 
lay is shown by the British authorities. The 
case of the Norwegian steamship, Bjornst- 
jerne Bjorson, which left New York October 
28, 1914, for Copenhagen carrying a large 
cargo of American meat is illustrative. This 
ship was taken into Kirkwall on November 
10, 1914, where it was detained until the 
27th. It was then ordered to Newcastle, 
where it arrived November 29. Only on 
January 5, 1915, after a delay of 37 days, 
was the cargo ordered discharged. But even 
then this vessel, flying a neutral flag, was not 
released that it might go about its business. 
It was held until May, 1915, about five 
months after the seizure of the cargo. For 
the financial loss imposed the British author- 
ities made no plausible excuse. 

The steamship Alfred Nobel, flying the 
Norwegian flag, suffered likewise. This ship 
sailed from New York October 20, 1914, for 
Copenhagen, carrying a cargo including 
meat. It was detained at Lerwick from No- 
vember 7 to the 14, and was then ordered to 
Liverpool, where the cargo was seized on 
the 17th. The vessel was not released until 
May 13, 1915, the period of unnecessary de- 
lay covering almost six months. 

In addition to the daily expense of char- 
ter costs, and the operating cost of the ship 
in coal, food and the pay of crews, ship- 
owners must pay the cost of anchorage in 
ports where vessels are held. They must 
pay for the unloading of suspected cargoes, 
and if the cargoes are deemed innocent in 
the arbitrary opinion of British authorities, 
they must again pay the cost of reloading, as 
well as warehouse tolls for the storage of 
goods while in port. All of this must be 
borne by the innocent shipper. Should a 
cargo be thrown into the Prize Court, the 
owners must bear the expense of legal repre- 
sentation, which is not inconsiderable. 

The discrimination against American mer- 



chants dealing with customers in the Scan- 
dinavian countries resulted last August in 
the advance of war risk insurance upon car- 
goes to these countries. Because of the rig- 
orous hold-up of trade, and the constant seiz- 
ures of shipments, war risk insurance under- 
writers advanced their special hazard rates 
two to three per cent. The rates on cargoes 
destined for ports in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden, not beyond Malmoe, were raised to 
7 per cent, for each f 100 of insurance, and 
the rate on shipments sent to Scandinavian 
countries via Stockholm to a basis of 8 per 
cent. On the other hand the rates on ship- 
ments, in ships owned by the British Allies, 
to allied ports remained as they were — 1 per 
cent, on each f 100 for shipments to Liver- 
pool, 1% to Ireland, 1% to London, V/ 8 to 
Havre, 1% to the coast ports of England 
and Scotland, and 1% to the Far East via of 
the United Kingdom. While the rates to 
neutral Scandinavian countries were raised, 
it is significant that no advance Avas made 
in the rates to Archangel. 

The policy of Great Britain has been 
avowedly to discourage shipping to the neu- 
tral Scandinavian and Dutch countries. 
There seems to be no limit to the extent to 
which Great Britain will go in interfering 
with commerce on the suspicion that goods 
may be resold to Germany. On August 26, 
1915, for instance, the Swedish steamship 
United States sailed from New York carry- 
ing a cargo for Copenhagen. The ship had 
unloaded at Copenhagen, a neutral port, 
when the British Government, on the sus- 
picion that the goods might be resold to 
Germany, ordered this neutral vessel to re- 
load under threat of seizure and to take the 
cargo back to Great Britain. This act ap- 
pears to be not only a violation of the rights 
of neutral nations to trade with one another, 
but a gross infringement of the sovereignty 
of a friendly nation. 

According to the statement of Sir Edward 
Grey, in his note of January 7, 1915, Great 
Britain averred that she did not intend to 
consider foodstuffs contraband unless des- 
tined for the armed forces of her antagonists. 
The W. T. Green Commission Co.," of St. 
Louis, chartered the Wilhelmina to take ad- 
vantage of the position announced by Great 
Britain and establish a resumption of trade 
which had consisted previously in the ex- 
porting of provisions to Germany. The Wil- 
helmina was accordingly loaded with a car- 
go of grain, flour and provisions, valued at 
$200,000. The vessel sailed from Brooklyn, 
January 22, 1915, and the goods were con- 
signed to Mr. Brooking, manager of the W. 
T. Green Company, who sailed in advance to 
Hamburg to receive the cargo. The ship 
sailed with the endorsement of the Depart- 
ment of State, and later, on January 29, the 
German Ambassador at Washington com- 



SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA 



19 



ruunicated n guarantee to the Department of 
State that the cargo would not be used by 
the German Government, its agents or con- 
tractors, nor by the naval or military forces. 
According to a decree issued by the Ger- 
man Government on January 25, the Govern- 
ment took control of certain food supplies 
within the empire, but the decree specifically 
stated : "The provisions of this ordinance do 
not apply to grain and flour imported from 
foreign countries." Importers, however, had 
to deal through the War Grain Company, the 
Central Purchasing Company, or German 
community officials. This regulation regard- 
ing distribution did not throw such food- 
stuffs into the hands of the German mili- 
tary agents, but meant that the grain would 
be distributed through these agencies for 
private consumption. As the situation was 
not well understood abroad, the German 
Federal Council on February 5 rescinded the 
requirement regarding importers operating 
through the specified agencies. On February 
4 the British Foreign Office issued a state- 
ment that it would stop the Wilhelmina and 
throw her cargo into a Prize Court. This 
contemplated action was based, allegedly, on 
the German Decree of January 25. Paying 
no attention to the fact that the regulations 
did not touch imported flour and grain, 
nor to Count Bernstorff 's guarantee that the 
foodstuffs should reach civilians only, the 
British seized the cargo after the Wilhemma 
had been forced to put into Falmouth on ac- 
count of severe gales. Sir Edward Grey in- 
formed the United States Government that 
the seizure was based on the German Decree 
of January 25, and that the modification of 
the German Decree was not known in Eng- 
land on February 9, when the Wilhelmina 
was seized. In regard to this assertion it 
is significant that the modification had been 
passed by the Bundesrat on February 6, and 
the news was cabled to the United States via 
London. It was sent from Berlin February 
6, passed the British censor on February 7, 
and was published in the American papers 
on February 8. After long delay the Amer- 
ican shippers were finally compelled to sub- 
mit to the purchase of the Wilhelmina cargo 
by the British Government, and in May 
a settlement of $430,000 was decided upon 
by Lord Mersey, referee. Despite the com- 
pensation for loss of time, the shippers con- 
tended that they could find no satisfaction 
in the settlement for the enforced surrender 
of neutral rights and interests. 

Immediately after the beginning of the 
war a close espionage was established by 
British cruisers off American, ports. Neu- 
tral vessels, leaving for the ports of non- 
belligerent nations were stopped and 
searched, and in a number of cases forced 
to go to Halifax. The Norwegian steamer 
Sandefjord sailed from New York on No- 



vember 27, 1914, with a mixed cargo, includ- 
ing 1,000 bags of coffee, for Copenhagen. 
One half hour after she had dropped her 
pilot off Sandy Hook the vessel was 
stopped by a British man-of-war, a prize 
crew was put aboard, and she was forced to 
go to Halifax, where part of her cargo was 
discharged. The reason for this was declared 
to be that the 1,000 bags of coffee destined 
for Copenhagen were suspected, inasmuch 
as it probably exceeded the city's needs, and 
that it might consequently find its way into 
the homes of Germany. 

The steamship Brindilla, flying the Amer- 
ican flag, sailed from Bayonne, N. J., Octo- 
ber 13, 1914, with a cargo of kerosene for 
Alexandria, Egypt. This vessel had been 
bought by the Standard Oil Co. from the 
Biedermann Line and transferred to Ameri- 
can registry. Just outside the three-mile 
limit of Sandy Hook she was seized by the 
British cruiser Caronia, taken to Halifax 
and put through Prize Court proceedings. 
The steamship Maracas, American, sailing 
from New York December 9, 1914, for Genoa, 
without excuse or explanation, was forced 
by a British cruiser to go to Halifax, where 
later she was given permission to proceed 
on her journey. 

For a period, because of the protests of 
American shippers, this annoyance abated, 
but interference of a like kind, off the 
shores of the United States, has again been 
instituted. On October 31, 1915, the Dutch 
steamer Samborn and the American steamer 
Hocking, were brought into Halifax. The 
Hamborn had sailed from New York Octo- 
ber 27, with a general cargo for Caibarien, 
Cuba, while the Hocking had left New York 
to go to Norfolk for coal. 

The Hocking, according to Captain Fabre, 
was captured by the British just outside the 
three-mile limit and in sight of the New Jer- 
sey coast, off Asbury Park, just about four 
hours from New York. Upon its arrival at 
Halifax, the American flag was hauled down 
by the prize crew in charge, just as, eight 
months earlier, the Greenbrier's flag had 
been lowered under similar circumstances. 
In seizing the Hocking, which had entered 
American registry, on the suspicion of its 
ownership, Great Britain acted in accord- 
ance with the Order in Council, of October 
20, 1915, abrogating Section LVII of the 
Declaration of London : 

The neutral or enemy character of a vessel is deter- 
mined by the flag which she is entitled to fly. 

Great Britain has always maintained this 
principle and upon it has based her mari- 
time conduct in war. Her intention of con- 
tinuing to do so was restated in a note dated 
"British Foreign Office, February 10, 1915," 
and addressed to the American Ambassador 
at London, in which Sir Edward Grey said : 



18 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



forced to deviate its course to Archangel. 
The shipper thereby suffered great loss by 
the delay and deviation, in charter cost, oper- 
ating expenses, war' risk and maritime in- 
surance. 

Ships carrying valuable cargoes are de- 
tained on the most petty pretexts. The 
steamship Portland, American, which sailed 
from San Francisco April 25, 1915, for 
Stockholm, was detained at Kirkwall, and 
thence sent on to Blyth, where it was held 
several days. The holding up of this ship 
was occasioned merely by British suspicion, 
which in this case cast its eye upon a 34-ton 
cargo of dried fruit, which was sent to the 
Prize Court. The mere suspicion that may 
rest on food shipments, from wheat to peas, 
from meat to prunes, may cost innocent 
American shipping concerns and exporters 
thousands of dollars. 

No consideration for the deterioration of 
perishable cargoes or for the expense of de- 
lay is shown by the British authorities. The 
case of the Norwegian steamship, Bjornst- 
jerne Bjorson, which left New York October 
28, 1914, for Copenhagen carrying a large 
cargo of American meat is illustrative. This 
ship was taken into Kirkwall on November 
10, 1914, where it was detained until the 
27th. It was then ordered to Newcastle, 
where it arrived November 29. Only on 
January 5, 1915, after a delay of 37 days, 
was the cargo ordered discharged. But even 
then this vessel, flying a neutral flag, was not 
released that it might go about its business. 
It was held until May, 1915, about five 
months after the seizure of the cargo. For 
the financial loss imposed the British author- 
ities made no plausible excuse. 

The steamship Alfred Nobel, flying the 
Norwegian flag, suffered likewise. This ship 
sailed from New York October 20, 1914, for 
Copenhagen, carrying a cargo including 
meat. It was detained at Lerwick from No- 
vember 7 to the 14, and was then ordered to 
Liverpool, where the cargo was seized on 
the 17th. The vessel was not released until 
May 13, 1915, the period of unnecessary de- 
lay covering almost six months. 

In addition to the daily expense of char- 
ter costs, and the operating cost of the ship 
in coal, food and the pay of crews, ship- 
owners must pay the cost of anchorage in 
ports where vessels are held. They must 
pay for the unloading of suspected cargoes, 
and if the cargoes are deemed innocent in 
the arbitrary opinion of British authorities, 
they must again pay the cost of reloading, as 
well as warehouse tolls for the storage of 
goods while in port. All of this must be 
borne by the innocent shipper. Should a 
cargo be thrown into the Prize Court, the 
owners must bear the expense of legal repre- 
sentation, which is not inconsiderable. 

The discrimination against American mer- 



chants dealing with customers in the Scan- 
diuavian countries resulted last August in 
the advance of war risk insurance upon car- 
goes to these countries. Because of the rig- 
orous hold-up of trade, and the constant seiz- 
ures of shipments, war risk insurance under- 
writers advanced their special hazard rates 
two to three per cent. The rates on cargoes 
destined for ports in Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden, not beyond Malmoe, were raised to 
7 per cent, for each $100 of insurance, and 
the rate on shipments sent to Scandinavian 
countries via Stockholm to a basis of 8 per 
cent. On the other hand the rates on ship- 
ments, in ships owned by the British Allies, 
to allied ports remained as they were — 1 per 
cent, on each $100 for shipments to Liver- 
pool, 1% to Ireland, 1% to London, iy s to 
Havre, 1% to the coast ports of England 
and Scotland, and V/ 2 to the Far East via of 
the United Kingdom. While the rates to 
neutral Scandinavian countries were raised, 
it is significant that no advance Avas made 
in the rates to Archangel. 

The policy of Great Britain has been 
avowedly to discourage shipping to the neu- 
tral Scandinavian and Dutch countries. 
There seems to be no limit to the extent to 
which Great Britain will go in interfering 
with commerce on the suspicion that goods 
may be resold to Germany. On August 26, 
1915, for instance, the Swedish steamship 
United States sailed from New York carry- 
ing a cargo for Copenhagen. The ship had 
unloaded at Copenhagen, a neutral port, 
when the British Government, on the sus- 
picion that the goods might be resold to 
Germany, ordered this neutral vessel to re- 
load under threat of seizure and to take the 
cargo back to Great Britain. This act ap- 
pears to be not only a violation of the rights 
of neutral nations to trade with one another, 
but a gross infringement of the sovereignty 
of a friendly nation. 

According to the statement of Sir Edward 
Grey, in his note of January 7, 1915, Great 
Britain averred that she did not intend to 
consider foodstuffs contraband unless des- 
tined for the armed forces of her antagonists. 
The W. T. Green Commission Co.," of St. 
Louis, chartered the Wilhelmina to take ad- 
vantage of the position announced by Great 
Britain and establish a resumption of trade 
which had consisted previously in the ex- 
porting of provisions to Germany. The Wil- 
helmina was accordingly loaded with a car- 
go of grain, flour and provisions, valued at 
$200,000. The vessel sailed from Brooklyn, 
January 22, 1915, and the goods were con- 
signed to Mr. Brooking, manager of the W. 
T. Green Company, who sailed in advance to 
Hamburg to receive the cargo. The ship 
sailed with the endorsement of the Depart- 
ment of State, and later, on January 29, the 
German Ambassador at Washington com- 



SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA 



1!) 



municated a guarantee to the Department of 
State that the cargo would not be used by 
the German Government, its agents or con- 
tractors, nor by the naval or military forces. 
According to a decree issued by the Ger- 
man Government on January 25, the Govern- 
ment took control of certain food supplies 
within the empire, but the decree specifically 
stated : "The provisions of this ordinance do 
not apply to grain and flour imported from 
foreign countries." Importers, however, had 
to deal through the War Grain Company, the 
Central Purchasing Company, or German 
community officials. This regulation regard- 
ing distribution did not throw such food- 
stuffs into the hands of the German mili- 
tary agents, but meant that the grain would 
be distributed through these agencies for 
private consumption. As the situation was 
not well understood abroad, the German 
Federal Council on February 5 rescinded the 
requirement regarding importers operating 
through the specified agencies. On February 
4 the British Foreign Office issued a state- 
ment that it would stop the Wilhelmina and 
throw her cargo into a Prize Court. This 
contemplated action was based, allegedly, on 
the German Decree of January 25. Paying 
no attention to the fact that the regulations 
did not touch imported flour and grain, 
nor to Count Bernstorff's guarantee that the 
foodstuffs should reach civilians only, the 
British seized the cargo after the Wilhemina 
had been forced to put into Falmouth on ac- 
count of severe gales. Sir Edward Grey in- 
formed the United States Government that 
the seizure was based on the German Decree 
of January 25, and that the modification of 
the German Decree was not known in Eng- 
land on February 9, when the Wilhelmina 
was seized. In regard to this assertion it 
is significant that the modification had been 
passed by the Bundesrat on February 6, and 
the news was cabled to the United States via 
London. It was sent from Berlin February 
6, passed the British censor on February 7, 
and was published in the American papers 
on February 8. After long delay the Amer- 
ican shippers were finally compelled to sub- 
mit to the purchase of the Wilhelmina cargo 
by the British Government, and in May 
a settlement of $430,000 was decided upon 
by Lord Mersey, referee. Despite the com- 
pensation for loss of time, the shippers con- 
tended that they could find no satisfaction 
in the settlement for the enforced surrender 
of neutral rights and interests. 

Immediately after the beginning of the 
war a close espionage was established by 
British cruisers off American, ports. Neu- 
tral vessels, leaving for the ports of non- 
belligerent nations were stopped and 
searched, and in a number of cases forced 
to go to Halifax. The Norwegian steamer 
Sandefjord sailed from New York on No- 



vember 27, 1914, with a mixed cargo, includ- 
ing 1,000 bags of coffee, for Copenhagen. 
One half hour after she had dropped her 
pilot off Sandy Hook the vessel was 
stopped by a British man-of-war, a prize 
crew was put aboard, and she was forced to 
go to Halifax, where part of her cargo was 
discharged. The reason for this was declared 
to be that the 1,000 bags of coffee destined 
for Copenhagen were suspected, inasmuch 
as it probably exceeded the city's needs, and 
that it might consequently find its way into 
the homes of Germany. 

The steamship Brindilla, flying the Amer- 
ican flag, sailed from Bayonne, N. J., Octo- 
ber 13, 1914, with a cargo of kerosene for 
Alexandria, Egypt. This vessel had been 
bought by the Standard Oil Co. from the 
Kiedermann Line and transferred to Ameri- 
can registry. Just outside the three-mile 
limit of Sandy Hook she was seized by the 
British cruiser Caronia, taken to Halifax 
and put through Prize Court proceedings. 
The steamship Maracas, American, sailing 
from New York December 9, 1914, for Genoa, 
without excuse or explanation, was forced 
by a British cruiser to go to Halifax, where 
later she was given permission to proceed 
on her journey. 

For a period, because of the protests of 
American shippers, this annoyance abated, 
but interference of a like kind, off the 
shores of the United States, has again been 
instituted. On October 31, 1915, the Dutch 
steamer Hamborn and the American steamer 
Hocking, were brought into Halifax. The 
Hamborn had sailed from New York Octo- 
ber 27, with a general cargo for Caibarien, 
Cuba, while the Hocking had left New York 
to go to Norfolk for coal 

The Hocking, according to Captain Fabre, 
was captured by the British just outside the 
three-mile limit and in sight of the New Jer- 
sey coast, off Asbury Park, just about four 
hours from New York. Upon its arrival at 
Halifax, the American flag was hauled down 
by the prize crew in charge, just as, eight 
months earlier, the Greenbrier's flag had 
been lowered under similar circumstances. 
In seizing the Hocking, which had entered 
American registry, on the suspicion of its 
ownership, Great Britain acted in accord- 
ance with the Order in Council, of October 
20, 1915, abrogating Section LVII of the 
Declaration of London : 

The neutral or enemy character of a vessel is deter- 
mined by the flag which she is entitled to fly. 

Great Britain has always maintained this 
principle and upon it has based her mari- 
time conduct in war. Her intention of con- 
tinuing to do so was restated in a note dated 
"British Foreign Office, February 10, 1915," 
and addressed to the American Ambassador 
at London, in which Sir Edward Grey said : 



20 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



Another instance of the efforts which his Majesty's 
Government have made to deal as leniently as possible 
with neutral interests may be found in the policy which 
we have followed with regard to the transfer to a 
neutral flag of enemy ships belonging to companies 
which were incorporated in the enemy country, but all 
of whose shareholders were neutral. The rules appiied 
by the British and by the American Prize Courts have 
always treated the flag as conclusive in favor of the 
captors in spite of neutral proprietary interests. 

When the steamship Dacia, purchased by 
Edward M. Breitung, and placed under 
American registry January 4, 1915, sailed 
from Galveston January 31, 1915, for Rot- 
terdam, with a cargo of cotton, valued at 
|800,000, to be transhipped to Bremen, the 
British threatened to seize the vessel. This, 
however, they refrained from doing, as such 
a procedure would have been against the 
English position that the character of a ship 
is to be determined by the flag she flies. 
Unwilling at that time to make an issue of 
such a case, and violate all precedents, the 
British Government got the French to seize 
the Dacia, the French Government having 
no such - embarrassing precedents. Ten 
months later, the British seized the Hocking, 
thus repudiating all the precedents of Brit- 
ish courts and reversing and stultifying the 
British record. 

Richard G. Wagner, president of the 
Transatlantic Company, which owns the 
Hocking, declared there was not a cent of 
German capital in his corporation. The 
Hocking was built in England and was orig- 
inally the English tramp steamer Parkland. 
She was sold to a Dutch company and her 
name changed to Ameland. The vessel was 
then sold to the Gronland Steamship Com- 
pany, of Copenhagen, and the name changed 
to Gronland. Among other vessels she was 
purchased by Mr. Wagner's company. 

The change of registry in the case of the 
Hocking was made October 15, on her re- 
turn from Argentina. After discharging 
cargo and being overhauled in Erie Basin, 
the Hocking left in ballast for Norfolk, on 
which trip she was seized. 

The bill of sale for each ship purchased 
by Mr. Wagner was submitted to the De- 
partment of State by him and is there on 
file. Accompanying each bill of sale is an 
affidavit stating that Mr. Wagner and his 
associates are the sole owners of the vessels 
and that the absolute and full control of 
them is in their hands. In these papers it 
is further stated that the ships have been 
permanently transferred and sold without 
reservation of any charter, and that it is not 
the intention of the owners to resell or trans- 
fer them back to their former owners. The 
vessels received American registry after 
meeting all the requirements of the Govern- 
ment. This registry might not unnaturally 
be taken to mean that the ships accorded it 
were entitled to the protection of the Ameri- 
can flag. 



Great Britain lias inflicted untold damage 
on American business, not only by interfer- 
ence with our sales to neutrals, but by re- 
fusing to permit the shipment to the United 
States of goods purchased from Germany. 
For months goods amounting in value to 
many millions of dollars have littered the 
ports of Sweden, Denmark and Holland, 
especially Rotterdam. 

On April 4, 1915, the Ogeechee, flying the 
American flag, left Bremen for New York 
carrying a general cargo of goods purchased 
by American importers from German manu- 
facturers. This ship was seized by the Brit- 
ish and taken to Sharpness, where the car- 
go was unloaded and a great portion con- 
fiscated because of its German origin. 
An instance of how such a seizure hurts 
American merchants may be illuminating. 
Among the goods seized from the Ogeechee 
was a shipment of 50 cases of glassware val- 
ued at |600 for a New York dealer. This 
dealer decided to fight out the case and en- 
gaged a lawyer to represent him. He finally 
got his goods, but at a cost far exceeding 
their purchase price. The British charged 
the original freight rate from Bremen to 
New York to cover the transportation from 
Bremen to Sharpness, £27.13.3; warehouse 
charges after goods were seized, £15.2.3 ; cus- 
toms fees, £1.0.0; railroad express from 
Sharpness after goods were released to port, 
£2.11.0; freight to New York on the steamer 
Bristol City, £49.1.11, additional expenses, 
£5.6.0. In addition to these charges, amount- 
ing to $483.48, the legal fees involved 
amounted to $125, and re-insurance on the 
shipment from England, $18, making a total 
of $626.48. This brought the total cost, of 
the wares, including their purchase price, up 
to $1,226. Had they not been seized, the 
cost, including purchase price and freight, 
would have been $735. The loss entailed by 
British interference was therefore $491. 
This is the case of only one small importer 
among many who lost by this single seizure 
of the Ogeechee. By this sample case one 
may gauge the losses inflicted upon larger 
manufacturers and importers. 

An idea of the scope of British activities 
on the high seas, and the extent to which 
neutral commerce has suffered since the war 
began, may be gleaned from the list of ships 
published on page 49, ff. It will be seen that 
no class of goods has been exempt from seiz- 
ure. Cargoes of cotton, copper, grain and 
foodstuffs have generally been seized and 
thrown into the Prize Court. The Dutch 
steamer Rotterdam, sailing from New York 
for Rotterdam with a cargo of copper, was 
seized September 26, 1914, when copper was 
conditional contraband. The cargo was pur- 
chased by the British Government. Other 
cargoes seized and arbitrarily bought even 
before this metal was put on the contraband 



SHIPS AND CARGOES STOPPED AT SEA 



21 



list, were carried on the Dutch steamers 
Sloterdyk, Potsdam and Westerdyk. The 
list of copper-carrying ships seized at Gibral- 
tar is too long to mention. Before Italy 
joined the British Allies innumerable ship- 
ments destined for that country were seized. 
The fact that the British Government pur- 
chased shipments, on a basis whereby it 
practically made its own prices, did not mit- 
igate the wrong involved or the damage to 
American shippers in the breaking off of 
legitimate business relations. 

Within recent months cargoes of food- 
stuffs for the Scandinavian countries and 
Denmark have suffered especially from Brit- 
ish suspicion that the shipments exceeded 
these countries' needs. The Swedish steamer 
Indianic sailed from New York April 28, 
1915, with a cargo of foodstuffs for Gothen- 
burg, Sweden. The vessel was hauled into 
Kirkwall and the cargo sold at auction. The 
Swedish steamer Sydland, which sailed from 
New York May 1, 1915, was taken into Har- 
tlepool and a cargo of machinery and food- 
stuffs thrown into the Prize Court. 

Despite the position maintained by the 
United States in its note to Great Britain of 
March 30th, in which we declared our right 
to ship provisions and foodstuffs without 
hindrance to Germany via the Scandinavian 
countries, Great Britain has continued to 
seize cargoes of foodstuffs carried in neutral 
ships to Holland and the Scandinavian coun- 
tries on the mere suspicion that some of this 
food might reach Germany. By July, 1915, 
there was $14,000,000 worth of provisions 
held up in England. 

Disregarding our official protest against 
the seizing of food, Great Britain put 
through Prize Court proceedings the meat 
cargoes of four ships — the Kim, Alfred 
Nobel, Bjoernstjerne Bjoemson and Fried- 
land — which were seized in November, 1914. 

On September 16, 1915, the Prize Court 
ordered confiscated three cargoes of meat 
valued at |2,500,000. At the time this ver- 
dict was reached the cases of twenty-nine 
other vessels were pending, involving Ameri- 
can shipments valued at $12,500,000. 

The financial wrong wrought is not alone 
in withholding $15,000,000 worth of meat 
from neutral customers, but in the breaking 
off of an established trade annually amount- 
ing to many more millions. 

Among recent meat-carrying ships seized 
was the Vitalia, Norwegian, which sailed 
from New York August 19, 1915, for Bot- 
terdam. She was forced into Falmouth Sep- 
tember 7th, and the cargo seized for Prize 
jourt proceedings. 

On September 30th the Danish steamship 
Frederik VIII, sailing from New York to 
Copenhagen, was detained at Kirkwall and 
forced to discharge a cargo of bacon. 

In a memorandum sent October 11, 1915, 



by the British Government through Mr. 
Page, the doctrine was flatly asserted that 
shippers sending foodstuffs on neutral ves- 
sels to neutral ports are under obligation 
to the British Government to prove that 
their goods are not going to the army or 
navy or the government of Germany. 

The British memorandum of October 11th 
says that the Chicago shippers refused to 
admit that their shipments to Copenhagen 
were intended for Germany, but that "the 
pretense was kept up to the end that the 
whole business was bona fide neutral trade." 
To oppose this "pretense," the British Gov- 
ernment maintained that "there were strong 
indications" that a large part of this food 
was really intended to go on to Germany; 
"strong indications that it was not merely a 
civilian German destination which was con- 
templated." The British Government 
averred that it had been informed that "fat 
bacon," besides being of value for army ra- 
tions was in much demand in Germany as 
the raw material of "glycerine, out of 
which an explosive can be made." Thus, on 
the pretext that Germany might utilize 
bacon for the making of explosives, such 
ships as the Frederik VIII are held and 
cargoes of smoked bacon sold to Copenhagen 
merchants are seized and thrown into the 
Prize Court. 

A particularly outrageous case was that 
of the American steamer Llama, which left 
New York October 14, 1915, for Copenhagen, 
carrying a cargo of oil. The ship was seized 
by the British, boarded by a prize crew, and 
on October 30 run aground on Skal Skerries, 
Firth, Scotland. 

Meanwhile, with American business 
thwarted, throttled and utterly intimidated, 
Great Britain has gone the length of openly 
blacklisting ships flying neutral flags — ships 
upon which we are depending for the trans- 
portation of goods we need to buy and goods 
we want to sell — on the suspicion that they 
are controlled or owned by German capital. 
The British Admiralty in October published 
a list of forty-seven such vessels, warning 
shipping men against chartering these ships. 
Of this number ten fly the American flag. 
Their names are the Allaguash Ausabti, the 
Genesee, the Hocking, the Kankakee, the 
Maumee, the Seneca, the Spyros, the Val- 
lianos, the Winnebago and the Winneconne. 

The following nations were represented 
on the taboo list : Denmark, eight ships be- 
longing to the same company ; Norway, eigh- 
teen ships; Sweden, two; Spain, one; Hol- 
land, four, and Brazil, four. 

It was stated that such of the vessels 
named as would agree to trade only with the 
British Allies would be removed from the 
list. What is this but a flagrant intimida- 
tion of neutral commerce, and a wanton dis- 
crimination against the trade of all neutral 



22 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



nations to the advantage alone of Great 
Britain? The steamship Hocking, seized 
while on her way, not to a German port, not 
even to a European port, but actually when 
plying between New York and Norfolk, Vir- 
ginia, for coal, and taken to Halifax on 
October 31, 1915, is one of the blacklisted 
vessels. 

On November 20, within a month after the 
capture of the Hocking, the steamship Gen- 
esee of American registry, flying the Ameri- 
can flag, on her way from Norfolk to Monte- 
video, carrying a cargo of coal, was seized by 
a British cruiser and taken, in charge of a 
prize crew, to St. Lucia, British West Indies. 
The Genesee is owned by the American 
Transatlantic Company, and was one of the 
vessels placed on the British blacklist. The 
Genesee, according to E. G. Wagner, presi- 
dent of the Transatlantic Company, was 
built in England and was run under British 
registry as the Avristam; she was sold 
through a British shipping agency to a 
Greek company, which sold her to the Pin- 
land Steamship Company, of Copenhagen, 
which, in turn, last June sold her to the 
American owners. The Genesee was char- 
tered to C. G. Blake & Co., of Cincinnati, to 
take a cargo of 3,800 tons of coal to Monte- 
video. She cleared from Norfolk, October 
14, and no reason for the seizure was given. 

Because of the blacklisting of the Winne- 
conne by the British Admiralty, the cancel- 
lations of cargoes, according to P. H. Gra- 
ham & Co., charterers, amounted to $10,000. 
Mr. Graham, who is the son of an English 
baronet, Sir Bobert James Stuart Graham, 
was born in the United States. In an adver- 
tisement published in the New York Journal 
of Commerce, October 26th, Mr. Graham's 
company declared they had investigated the 
assertion of the British Government to the 
effect that the Winneconne was controlled by 
German capital and had found, to the con- 
trary, that the vessel is owned by a corpora- 
tion the stock of which is entirely held by 
citizens of the United States; that the vessel 
never flew the flag of any of the present bel- 
ligerent nations, and that all the regulations 
and laws for securing United States registry 
had been complied with. Mr. Graham an- 
nounced that the cargo of the ship had been 
examined and passed for shipment by repre- 
sentatives of the British consul in New 
York, for which service a fee had been paid 
by check for $250. Every box and package 
taken aboard had been inspected, the British 
authorities going so far as to X-ray goods 
packed in bales. The blacklisting of the 
ship by the British Admiralty not only 
caused cancellations of cargoes, but caused 
certain insurance companies to refuse to in- 
sure any part of the cargo, and others to in- 
crease the premium. 

By reason of the continued interference 



by Great Britain with cargo-carrying ships 
on the ground that Sweden would not guar- 
antee that goods shipped to Sweden would 
not be resold to Germany, the Norwegian- 
American line, according to a news despatch 
dated November 21, from Christiania, de- 
cided to abandon the transportation of 
freight from the United States. 

The liner Kristianiafjord arrived in Ber- 
gen with a cargo including 6,000 cases of 
American pork and 1,800 bags of coffee. Be- 
cause of the suspicion that the pork might 
not be consumed in Sweden or Norway, but 
might perhaps find its way into Germany, 
Great Britain issued orders that the goods 
must be returned to England. 

The list of ships printed on pp. 49 ff. in- 
clude only a portion of the vessels held. Be- 
cause of the reticence of shipping concerns, 
it is not possible to secure anything like a 
comprehensive list of detentions and seiz- 
ures. It has been likewise impossible to se- 
cure adequate data from manufacturers re- 
garding cargoes of merchandise detained 
and seized. British interference has had the 
effect of intimidating American business in- 
terests to the degree that these are afraid to 
complain lest they invite further hostility 
and persecution from the British authori- 
ties. Woolen manufacturers decline to talk 
about their difficulties in selling wool to 
Scandinavian customers for fear that Great 
Britain will shut off their import of raw 
products. Exporters of grain, cotton and 
copper refuse to complain publicly of the 
losses suffered for fear that their entire ex- 
port trade, such as it now is, may be an- 
nihilated. Fear of arousing British animos- 
ity bars them from uniting in vigorous 
complaint. 

There are certain classes of crimes con- 
cerning which it is next to impossible to 
procure evidence. Murder is said to be the 
safest of felonies because the victim, who is 
often a sole witness aside from the criminal, 
is silenced. Dishonored women do not com- 
monly make public their humiliation. Few 
indeed of the victims of English wrong-doing 
are willing to furnish the facts for publica- 
tion. As for protesting and appealing to the 
United States Government, few now do even 
that, either because they have learned that 
their protests and petitions are of no avail, 
or that the United States Government will 
do nothing more than possibly put the case 
in a memorandum and send a Trade Adviser 
over to the British Embassy to chat with 
Sir Eichard Crawford over it. 

The prostration of American enterprise 
before the domineering naval strength and 
commercial mercilessness of England, and 
acquiescence without hope of succor, are 
among the most discouraging features of the 
situation. 



IV 



THE CASE OF COTTON 



PEOBABLY more human beings are in- 
terested, from first to last, in the 
growth, movement, manufacture and 
use of cotton than in any other industry on 
earth. The cotton crop is the most valuable 
single crop produced from the soil of the 
United States. One-fourth of the total value 
of our exports is accounted for by cotton. 
In a large area of the United States all pros- 
perity depends on the sale of cotton. All 
other business interests in the South are de- 
pendent upon this staple, as is also the earn- 
ing power of thousands of miles of railway 
communicating with the South. Further- 
more, since the population of the cotton 
States rely upon this product to purchase 
other goods, the rest of the country feels im- 
mediately the pinch of any deficiency of 
growth, depreciation in price, or difficulty 
of sale. 

The successful marketing of the cotton 
crop is dependent on the foreign sales of 
the raw product. Two-thirds of the crop, in 
recent years, has been sold abroad. To pre- 
vent interference with the sale is, therefore, 
a matter of vital importance not only to the 
South but to the nation. Any hindrance to 
it inflicts more financial damage than a par- 
tial crop failure. Provided export trade is 
possible, high prices in foreign markets will 
offset the loss of a deficient crop. On the 
other hand, if foreign purchasers are lack- 
ing, ruinously low prices prevail. It will 
be of interest, therefore, to examine particu- 
larly into the influence which the trade re- 
strictive measures of the British Govern- 
ment have had upon this industry. That 
hardships have been inflicted and great 
financial loss brought about is obvious. 

Of our total exports of cotton, Great Brit- 
ain normally takes about one-third. Here- 
tofore, Germany and Austria have taken an- 
other third. The war, owing to the break 
down of foreign peace industries, the inter- 
ruption of commerce and the abrupt disor- 
ganization of credits, would inevitably have 
temporarily affected the cotton trade ad- 
versely. On the other hand, Germany and 
Austria formerly used a certain amount of 
Egyptian and Indian cotton ; the cutting off 
of this supply obliged those countries to look 
to the United States to make good the de- 
ficiency. Then, too, neutral European coun- 
tries that hitherto purchased cotton goods 



from German and Austrian manufacturers, 
found it necessary to increase their own 
manufactures, and therefore to increase 
their imports from America. Finally, the 
strain and waste of war caused increased 
consumption of the staple on the part of all 
belligerents. This demand should have 
meant increased prices and prosperity for 
the Southern planter. 

What actually happened is common 
knowledge. The average price per bale for 
the year ending July, 1915, was $41.04, 
against $68.06, for the previous year, accord- 
ing to the figures of H. G. Hester, Secre- 
tary of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange. 
The average price per pound in the same 
periods was 7.94 cents, against 13.49 cents. 
The crop for 1914-15 was 15,108,011 bales, 
but it brought only $593,432,978, while the 
crop for 1913-14 was only 14,882,493 bales, 
yet brought the huge price of $977,844,114. 
Why, with this increased prospective de- 
mand, this special market in Germany and 
Austria, these new markets in neutral Eu- 
rope, with plenty of cotton to meet all re- 
quirements, should cotton sell for less than 
it costs to raise it, which is about eight cents 
a pound? Why and how was this great in- 
dustry compelled to suffer a loss, compared 
with the previous year's business, of $400,- 
000,000? 

At the beginning of hostilities in Europe, 
in August, 1914, the New York and New 
Orleans Cotton Exchanges closed. Shipping 
was paralyzed. Nearly all our cotton was 
carried in English or German bottoms. 
These ships dared not sail for fear of cap- 
ture by enemy cruisers. Ordinary insurance 
did not protect against such capture, and 
war risk insurance became necessary. 

The German ships never left American 
ports, and their withdrawal meant a big loss 
in means of carriage. The British Govern- 
ment requisitioned certain ships, but the 
others were free to sail when, a short time 
after the war started, the British Govern- 
ment insured against war risk British ves- 
sels carrying for the United Kingdom, and 
when, after a fortnight, the British Admi- 
ralty declared the North Atlantic free of 
German cruisers. Transportation of cotton 
to England was thus assured ; but the prob- 
lem of getting the staple to Germany or to 



24 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



European neutrals was by no manner of 
means solved. More than a third of our 
cotton exports were thus cut off from their 
markets. 

This condition existed for several months 
— long enough to affect cotton prices disas- 
trously — before arrangements were effected 
whereby cotton could be sent to the neutrals 
and through Italy, Holland, Sweden and 
Denmark to Germany and Austria. 

Even after arrangements for shipping 
through neutrals had been devised, cotton 
movements were seriously hampered. Amer- 
icans feared that Great Britain would not 
allow cotton to be moved to Germany at 
all. The rumors would not die down that 
any day, while cargoes were in mid-ocean, 
cotton might be declared contraband. That 
Great Britain fostered this impression 
seems indubitable. In fact she took no 
steps to still them until forced to by Wash- 
ington. 

Cotton, as is known, as on the "free 
list," as unconditionally non-contraband, of 
the Declaration of London. Although this 
codification of international law affecting 
commerce in war time had never been for- 
mally ratified by all the Great Powers, 
Great Britain, in an Order in Council an- 
nounced August 20th, accepted the rulings 
of the Declaration of London, with certain 
exceptions. Cotton was not affected by these 
exceptions. 

However, cotton could not be carried to 
German ports in any but neutral bottoms. 
The use of other than American ships for 
this trade proved impossible, for the very 
simple reason that British capital con- 
trols the maritime insurance business of the 
whole world and British capital was not 
available for the aid in any way of Great 
Britain's enemies. Neutral vessels carrying 
cargoes to Germany could not get insurance, 
and could not sail without it. American 
marine insurance companies are closely as- 
sociated financially with the English com- 
panies and were in no position to jeopardize 
that association. Foreign neutral companies 
were in a similar position. The United 
States Government's War Bisk Insurance 
Bureau was limited by law to insuring 
American cargoes in American vessels, and 
to insuring them for a restricted amount. 
Unfortunately there was a plethora of Amer- 
ican cargoes, cotton particularly. But where 
were the American vessels adapted to trans- 
Atlantic cargo carrying? 

There was practically none, and the ob- 
vious thing to do was to buy the foreign ves- 
sels tied up in American ports and enter 
them under American registry, a step that 
had been rendered feasible by a law passed 
by Congress in 1914. The experiment proved 
unsuccessful. A Hamburg-American liner, 
the Georgia, was purchased by an American 



citizen and fitted out for the South Ameri- 
can trade, but since the British Government 
intimated that the validity of the transfer 
was questioned, the ship never left port. 

Of greater interest in the effort to increase 
the American merchant marine is the case 
of the Dacia. It will be recalled that this 
former Hamburg American liner was tied up 
at Port Arthur, Texas. Careful study had 
convinced lawyers that the validity of her 
transfer, where the sale was bona fide and 
the change of ownership absolute, could not 
be questioned. British precedents fully 
sanctioned such transfers. The Dacia was 
purchased outright by an American citizen, 
entered under American registry, equipped 
with American officers and an American 
crew and loaded at Galveston with Texas 
cotton consigned to Bremen. The validity of 
the transfer was acknowledged by the 
Department of State at Washington. Great 
Britain announced that she would cap- 
ture the ship. Its destination was then 
changed to Botterdam, a neutral port, 
and Washington endeavored to get the 
British Government to permit the vessel to 
make one trip. Great Britain would not com- 
mit herself, but it was thought that in view 
of her own precedents and her somewhat in- 
volved diplomatic relations and purposes 
with the United States she would hesitate to 
bring this matter to an issue. So the Dacia 
sailed. Then Great Britain showed that 
there are several ways to prevent unwelcome 
additions to the American merchant marine. 
The Dacia was captured by a French cruiser 
and thrown into a French prize court. 
France had never recognized the validity of 
the transfer of a ship of a belligerent nation 
to a neutral flag. The Dacia experiment had 
failed. 

The result was not much of a surprise to 
American shipping circles, whose manifest 
reluctance to undertake similar enterprises 
had impressed the Administration long be- 
fore the Dacia case ; as a solution of the dif- 
ficulty the Ship Purchase Bill had been in- 
troduced into Congress. This called for the 
organization of a steamship company the 
greater part of whose capital was to be con- 
tributed by the Government, thus giving the 
organization a quasi governmental standing. 
Of course everyone realized that the pur- 
pose of the bill was to provide bottoms to 
carry non-contraband to German ports and 
that the only available ships were the Ger- 
man liners tied up in various American 
ports. A powerful opposition soon mani- 
fested itself in Congress and in certain in- 
fluential newspapers. The underlying mo- 
tive in this opposition was consciously and 
unconsciously to aid Great Britain. Eng- 
land objected to the transfer because the 
money paid would undoubtedly be used to 
create credits in America. Again, it would 
be impossible for His Majesty's Government 



THE CASE OF COTTON 



25 



to exercise the "economic pressure" against 
a government-backed line that had already 
proved so successful against privately owned 
ships. The opposition was so vehement that 
the spokesmen for the bill were confused 
and endeavored to placate it by assurances 
that no step would be taken that would in- 
volve the United States with any belligerent. 
The situation was from one aspect humor- 
ous. Everyone thought of nothing but Ger- 
man ships and British opposition; but the 
adjectives "German" and "British" tem- 
porarily disappeared from the language. 
For a few weeks, these words became the 
great political taboo. The silence was elo- 
quent. And in it the Ship Purchase Bill 
was killed and laid to rest. But in many re- 
spects, the fate of the Bill is one of the most 
instructive examples that could be found 
of the British attitude towards America's 
legitimate aspirations for an American mer- 
chant marine, and is worthy of long and 
profound study. 

Before the fate of the Bill was decided, 
however, American cotton exporters to Ger- 
many perceived that it was hopeless to evade 
England's "economic pressure" on American 
shipping and sought to deliver their goods to 
Germany by neutral ships to neutral Euro- 
pean ports. But Great Britain was pre- 
pared and took powerful aggressive action 
at once. One means used was to bring pres- 
sure to bear on European neutrals to place 
re-export embargoes on cotton to Germany, 
and another to create a fear in the minds of 
shippers that, in spite of everything, Eng- 
land would declare cotton contraband and 
confiscate cargoes. 

Neutral Holland was first influenced and 
in the early days of the war placed an em- 
bargo on the re-exportation of cotton. 
Italy, also, under pressure of her economic 
interests and her peculiar situation of hav- 
ing all her overseas commerce at the mercy 
of the Franco-British fleets in control of the 
Mediterranean, also established a re-export 
embargo. Thus the two natural channels 
for the shipment of cotton into Germany 
were closed. Other neutrals protested at 
this course, basing their protest on the fact 
that the Declaration of London specified cot- 
ton as always "free," and that England had 
accepted this Declaration. That England 
fostered the rumors that she was about to 
rescind her action in this matter and de- 
clare cotton absolute contraband seems cer- 
tain. Whether or no, however, these rumors 
accomplished their purpose; neutral ship- 
owners were afraid to accept cotton cargoes 
and consistently refused to do so. 

The distress throughout the South had 
become acute. The current price of cotton 
was six cents a pound. The cotton growers 
of limited means were deeply in debt. Small 
wonder that thev began an agitation for the 



protection of their staple on the high seas, 
when they realized that they could obtain 
at least three times the price for their prod- 
uct in Germany that they could from Eng- 
lish purchasers. 

How the low prices for cotton affected the 
revenues of the South during this trying 
period, may be learned from the following 
extract from the "Annual Review of the 
American Cotton Crop, 1914-15," issued by 
H. G. Hester, Secretary of the New Orleans 
Cotton Exchange, on August 1st, of this 
year: 

The Commercial Cotton Crop of the United States 
for the year ending with the close of July, 1915, 
amounted to 15,108,011 bales, showing an increase over 
that of 1913-14 of 225,518 bales. The average price for 
middling cotton for the year was 7.94 cents per pound, 
comparing with 13.49 cents last year and 12.20 the year 
before. 

The average commercial value per bale was $41.04, 
against $68.06 last year, and $63.59 the year before. 

Mr. Hester then presents the following 
table, indicating the losses cotton growers 
had suffered during the trying period of the 
fiscal year 1915 : 

Total Value of Crop. 

Year. Bales. Value. 

1914-15 15,108,011 $593,432,978 

1913-14 14,882,115 $977,844,114 

1912-13 14,106,116 $866,185,562 

This showed that, with a record crop of 
more than 15,000,000 bales, Southern grow- 
ers had received $384,411,136 less money for 
it than for a crop of less than 15,000,000 
bales the year before. 

Among the palliatives for this condition 
suggested was the "buy a bale" movement. 
The purchaser was to buy a bale for $50, 
pay storage charges for a year, and sell his 
bale at a handsome profit when the year ex- 
pired. His cotton was thus to cost him ten 
cents a pound plus storage charges. The 
President of the United States purchased a 
bale and presented it to a hospital. The 
daughter of the Speaker of the House also 
bought a bale, as did many other individuals 
and organizations. Patriotic fervor took 
other forms. "Cotton Goods Bargain Days" 
were promoted throughout the country. The 
wearing of cotton clothes was urged to re- 
lieve the distress in the South. Judges, law- 
yers and officers of the Mississippi Supreme 
Court held a session, all clad in cotton shirts 
and overalls. The year has passed, and the 
average price of cotton has been 7.84 cents. 
It is pertinent to inquire what became of 
the President's bale, for instance, and what 
final good that and similar purchases did. 

As an outcome of the depression, the 
Louisville & Nashville Railroad reduced the 
annual dividend on its shares from 7 per 
cent, to 5 per cent. The Southern Railway 
suspended altogether dividend payments on 
its preferred shares. How the cotton crisis 
affected the railroads of the South may be 
learned from the figures of the reports is- 
sued by the following three most important 



26 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



roads in their annual statements, issued for 
the year ending June 30, 1915 : 

Losses in Operating Revenues. 

Illinois Central Railroad $4,173,327 

Southern Railway Company 8,551,487 

Louisville & Nashville 8,300,451 

In his report to the stockholders of the 
Illinois Central Railroad, for the year ended 
June 30th, C. H. Markham, the road's presi- 
dent, said: 

Your company during the past year has suffered from 
the depression in business prevalent throughout the 
country, and this has been most pronounced on the 
lines south of the Ohio River. The low price received 
by cotton growers for their product not only affected 
the revenues your company received from the transpor- 
tation of lumber, but also, in connection with both com- 
modities, had a depressing effect on the revenues from 
the transportation of general merchandise and on pas- 
senger travel. 

In his report for the fiscal year, Fairfax 
Harrison, President of the Southern Rail- 
way Company, said : 

It has been a difficult year. The flame of war which 
burst forth all over Europe at the beginning of August, 
1914, had a sudden and withering effect upon industry 
in the South. Preparing to market the largest crop in 
the history of cotton growing in the United States, the 
Southern people were looking forward to the profits 
from the sale of this, their chief staple, as a stimulus 
to their purchasing power. When, over night, they were 
apparently shut out by the war from the European 
market, which has always consumed a large part of the 
American cotton crop, the people of the South were 
thrown back upon their own resources with a disturb- 
ingly large proportion of their chief money crop on 
their hands and an inadequate market price in prospect. 
Despite several futile plans of assistance from without, 
the South practically suspended for a time its industrial 
activities. The result was a fall, as vertiginous as 
that of the price of cotton, in the revenues of the rail- 
ways at the South, and this lean diet was protracted, 
with the condition which caused it, throughout the 
year now under review. 

In the annual report of the Louisville & 
Nashville Railroad, the stockholders are in- 
formed that : 

This great shrinkage (in gross revenues) was due 
largely to the effect produced by the war in Europe 
upon the price and consumption of the products and 
manufactures of the territory served b3' the Louisville 
& Nashville Railroad Company, and to the consequent 
decrease in passenger travel. 

In view of the heavy losses they had al- 
ready sustained, and the need of the South 
for relief from the distress from which it 
was suffering, cotton shippers began to press 
the State Department in Washington for the 
adoption of measures to remedy the situa- 
tion. Senator Hoke Smith, of Georgia, in- 
troduced in the Senate on October 22d a res- 
olution providing for the appointment of a 
committee of five senators to take up the 
question of facilitating shipments of cotton 
to Europe. This committee was appointed, 
and immediately it entered upon conferences 
with the State Department and the British 
Ambassador. 

Congress had it in its power to adopt re- 
prisals against Great Britain ; it might have 
placed an embargo on the war material 
which England so sorely needed. The Brit- 
ish Government knew this full well, and in 
order to guard its interests, it was compelled 



to emerge from the mysterious and threaten- 
ing silence it had maintained and relieve the 
tension of uncertainty with which it had 
surrounded the question of its attitude con- 
cerning cotton shipments. Sir Cecil Spring- 
Rice, on October 26th, wrote to Mr. Lan- 
sing, then Acting Secretary of State, as fol- 
lows: 

Last night I received a reply from Sir Edward Grey. 
in which he authorizes me to give the assurance that 
cotton will not be seized. He points out that cotton has 
not been put in any of our lists of contraband, and, 
as your Department must be aware from the draft proc- 
lamation now in your possession, it is not proposed to 
include it in our new list of contraband. It is, there- 
fore, as far as Great Britain is concerned, in the free 
list, and will remain there. 

There was a world-wide feeling of relief 
at this definite announcement, for shippers 
felt that now all obstacles had been removed, 
and that the great American staple could 
move freely to all the countries of Europe, 
neutral and belligerent alike. How mis- 
taken was this confidence soon became man- 
ifest. 

Some days after Sir Cecil Spring-Rice's 
letter to Mr. Lansing was published, Den- 
mark declared an embargo on the exporta- 
tion of cotton. This closed the cotton trade 
routes to Germany by way of Copenhagen, 
after Rotterdam the most direct way to the 
Empire. Great difficulty, moreover, was ex- 
perienced in obtaining from France an as- 
surance on her part that she regarded cotton 
as being on the free list. It was not until 
December 17th, that Secretary Bryan could 
make this announcement. 

Hardly had the movement of cotton direct 
to Germany begun, when American shippers 
began to complain of the extraordinary pre- 
cautions England was taking against sus- 
pected concealment of contraband material, 
such as copper and rubber, in cotton cargoes 
destined for Germany. Cotton shippers in 
this country were compelled to submit their 
cargoes to the examination of British con- 
suls. The inspection became more rigid at 
a later demand from England that all bales 
of cotton be X-rayed, and that the photo- 
graphs must accompany the consular cer- 
tificates as further assurance that the cot- 
ton contained no hidden contraband. All 
these regulations, of course, caused much 
additional delay and expense to American 
shippers. But even this was no guarantee 
that the vessels would not be detained by 
British cruisers and subjected to search. 

The British Government, on November 
2nd, declared the North Sea a military area, 
and warned merchant craft that, owing to 
mines and other dangers threatening navi- 
gation, they must strictly follow the sailing 
directions of the Admiralty. These in- 
structed all vessels trading to and from 
Scandinavian countries and Holland, when 
inward bound, to move via the English Chan- 
nel and the Straits of Dover. This simpli- 



THE CASE OF COTTON 



27 



fied the English practice of seizing and de- 
taining neutral merchant vessels. 

The effect of this announcement was to 
cause renewed demoralization among cotton 
shippers. Owners of American vessels were 
reluctant to charter them for cotton exports 
to Germany and send them through the 
mined area of the North Sea (no Admiralty 
directions were given for getting through to 
Germany), and insurance on such craft 
again soared to prohibitive figures. 

Yet throughout this period when by in- 
direction the American cotton crop was be- 
ing forced to lower and lower price levels 
and its shipment to the eager and profitable 
markets of Germany prevented, England 
solemnly denied that she was interfering or 
had any intention of interfering with the 
movement of this staple. In fact, in a Brit- 
ish communication dated as late as February 
10th, the statement was made : 

Any decrease in American exports which is attrib- 
utable to the war is essentially due to cotton. Cotton 
is an article which cannot possibly have been affected by 
the exercise of our belligerent rights, for, as your Ex- 
cellency is aware, it has not been declared bv His Maj- 
esty's Government to be contraband of war, and the 
rules under which we are at present conducting our 
belligerent operations gives us no power in the absence 
of a blockade to seize or interfere with it when on its 
way to a belligerent country in a neutral ship. Conse- 
quently no cotton has been stopped. 

The latter statement was true as far as it 
went. To more adequately present the situ- 
ation might have been added — "because, ow- 
ing to various forms of indirect pressure, 
little or no cotton has started!" 

On the other hand, British merchants were 
not slow to perceive the advantage which 
their benevolent government was creating 
for them. With cotton at starvation prices, 
their agents began to acquire the staple in 
quantities far. beyond the normal British 
consumption. How England "stocked up" 
on cotton at these prices, is evident from 
the following table which appeared in "Cot- 
ton," the official journal of the Manchester 
Cotton Exchange, Manchester, England, on 
October 9, 1915 : 

In Bales. 

Season. . American. Total. 

1910-11 236,349 413,910 

1911-12 466,264 605,962 

1912-13 397,935 578,020 

1913-14 614,682 907.562 

1914-15 1,197,650 1,505,500 

England, by the end of the season, August 
31, 1911, had a stock in hand of 413,910 
bales ; the next season the stock amounted to 
605,962 bales; in 1913, she had 578,020 bales. 
These, therefore, represent the normal fig- 
ures. But by August 31, 1914, at the close 
of the first month of the war, she had hur- 
riedly begun to accumulate, not only Amer- 
ican, but also her Egyptian and Indian cot- 
ton. One year later, with this accumula- 
tion, carried on during the end of 1914 and 
the beginning of 1915, while the South was 
suffering from the effects of the low prices, 
she had a reserve stock of 1,505,500 bales, 



nearly three times her normal amount, on 
hand. 

This procedure aroused a storm of indig- 
nation throughout the South. The feeling 
in the Cotton Belt was set forth clearly and 
emphatically in the following resolution 
adopted by the State Farmers' Union of 
Louisiana (See Congressional Record, Feb- 
ruary 3, 1915, pp. 3232-3233) : 

Resolved, by the Louisiana State Farmers' Educa- 
tional and Co-operative Union of America, that we 
•hereby pledge ourselves to do all in our power to ob- 
tain for ourselves and our fellow-citizens and man- 
kind generally, the freedom and unhindered use of the 
seas and of the air, and we hereby respectfully petition 
our Federal Government to give due notice to all na- 
tions, in view of the losses sustained by the people of 
these United States, that in future we henceforth shall 
ship all of our products at all times and to our cus- 
tomers in any nation just as in the past; that this na- 
tion, being neutral, will not favor one over the other, 
but will treat all alike, as it ought to do, but that our 
government proposes to send its own ships, under its 
own flag, with the products of its own citizens, to its 
customers in any nations on earth, and will brook in- 
terference from no one in protecting the rights and the 
property and trade relations of its own people. 

From the day that cotton began to move 
to Germany, throughout England voices 
were raised in protest. How to find a real 
excuse for preventing shipments was a prob- 
lem, partly solved by Sir William Bamsay, 
the eminent British scientist who, in a let- 
ter to the London Times, advocated the plac- 
ing of cotton on the absolute contraband 
list because, he asserted, it was extensively 
used in the manufacture of explosives. Other 
British scientists, more distinguished for 
their work in the field of chemistry, flatly 
contradicted Sir William Ramsay's theories. 
W. F. Eeid, former President of the Society 
of Chemical Industry, spoke as follows be- 
fore that seciety in London : 

There is practically no cotton used in the manufac- 
ture of high explosives. The whole thing is a great 
fraud. There may be some trace of cotton in the ex- 
plosive, but the bulk of it is coal products. Eminent 
scientists have made erroneous statements on this sub- 
ject. If poople associated with science would speak only 
on the branches with which they are connected, the ad- 
vantages would be very great. 

The British press opposed this popular 
clamor. Great American interests were in- 
volved, and the fear of an embargo on the 
exports of ammunition as a retaliatory 
measure figured largely in the public mind. 
To declare cotton contraband would be a 
particularly drastic violation of the Declar- 
ation of London. Above all, the British 
Government, as a neutral, was on record as 
opposed to this step. 

During the Russo-Japanese War the Rus- 
sian Government had undertaken to place 
cotton on the list of contraband. The Rus- 
sian Government asserted in a note dated 
April 21, 1905, that raw cotton was used in 
the manufacture of explosives, and that, it 
being impossible to distinguish between 
cotton imported for this military purpose 
and cotton imported for ordinary peaceable 



28 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



use, it was necessary to prohibit its trans- 
portation altogether. 

The enforcement of this order would have 
shut off from British India its cotton trade 
with Japan, valued at approximately twenty 
million dollars annually. Under instruc- 
tion from Lord Lansdowne, the British 
Ambassador at St. Petersburg notified the 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affiairs that 
the Russian position was inadmissible. The 
British note said : 

The quantity of raw cotton that might be used for 
explosives would be infinitesimal in comparison with 
the bulk of the cotton exported from India to Japan 
for peaceful purposes, and to treat harmless cargoes of 
this latter description as unconditionally contraband 
would be to subject a branch of innocent commerce to 
a most unwarrantable interference. 

In the meantime, while the so-called "eco- 
nomic pressure" was being exerted on Ger- 
many, British shippers continued to accum- 
ulate large stocks of cotton at the low 
prices. Their representatives in the South 
bought and carried large quantities of the 
staple for the benefit of English spinners. 
When the freer movement of cotton began, 
the cargoes were in greater part composed 
of the staple which had been purchased 
earlier at nearly the very lowest prices by 
British representatives. 

This is made evident by the following 
table, which shows that, while the exports 
of the staple from the United States for the 
first seven months of 1915, ending July 
30 th, amounted to 5,937,400 bales, yet the 
amount of money obtained was but little 
greater than for the 3,713,300 bales shipped 
abroad during the same period in 1914 : 

Department of Commerce of the United States. 
• Monthly summary of Foreign Commerce of the 
United States July, 1915 : 
Total bales Seven months ended 
exported. July, 1914. 1915. 

Bales 3,713,321 5,937.436 

Value $235,102,634 $271,153,652 

It was obvious that if Great Britain 
wanted to put cotton on the contraband list, 
some other excuse must be found. The op- 
portunity soon came. The German Govern- 
ment, on February 4, 1915, declared the wa- 
ters about Great Britain a War Zone where- 
in enemy merchant vessels would not be 
safe. England promptly hinted at retalia- 
tion in the form of complete stoppage of our 
exports to Germany. The Premier, Mr. 
Asquith, speaking before the House of Com- 
mons on February 11th, said that the Brit- 
ish Government was about to adopt more 
stringent measures against German trade. 
He continued : 

The government is considering the question of taking 
measures against German trade, in view of the viola- 
tion by the enemy of the rules of war. I hope shortly 
to make an announcement of what those measures are 
to be. 

Practically, this announcement was a 
trying out of American public opinion. 
Some days later another test was made by 



means of a news dispatch from London 
which stated that "a blockade of German 
coast, or, at any rate, the prohibition of 
foodstuffs destined for Germany" was under 
consideration. Then, on March 1st, Mr. 
Asquith announced in Parliament the now 
famous March 11th Order in Council. It 
declared that the British and French Gov- 
ernments would hold themselves free to de- 
tain and take into port ships carrying goods 
of presumed enemy destination, ownership 
or origin. The effect of this was a virtual 
blockade of the neutral ports of Holland, 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, with the ex- 
ception of the ports of Norway and Sweden 
in the Baltic Sea. 

Vessels immediately refused to accept 
cotton or other shipments of German des- 
tination or origin. Insurance was with- 
drawn on all such shipments. A great vol- 
ume of cotton was lying in this country con- 
tracted for delivery to Germany, but had 
not yet moved. 

The British Ambassador was "requested" 
by an official of the United States Govern- 
ment to extend relief to the embarrassed 
shippers by adopting some rule that might 
permit such shippers, who had sold cotton 
to Germany before March 1st, to forward 
their cotton. 

In a communication issued by the British 
Embassy in Washington, on March 8, 1915, 
it was announced that the British Govern- 
ment would make the following concessions : 

1. All cotton for which contracts of sale and 
freight engagements had already been made before 
March 2, to be allowed free (or bought at contract 
price if stopped), provided ships sail not later than 
March 31. 

2. Similar treatment to be accorded to all cotton 
insured before March 2, provided it is put on board 
not later than March 16. 

3. All shipments of cotton claiming above pro- 
tection to be declared before sailing, and documents 
produced to and certificates obtained from consular of- 
ficers or other authority fixed by (Allied) Governments. 
Ships or cargoes consigned to enemy ports will not be 
allowed to proceed. 

This meant, therefore, that cotton con- 
tracted for Germany before March 1st, 
might be shipped to neutral countries up to 
March 31st, but not directly to Germany. 

The instance of the steamship Kina gives 
evidence of what the British Government de- 
scribed as a sympathetic consideration of the 
cotton interests. This vessel, which had a 
cargo of cotton contracted for before March 
1st, destined for Germany, found it impos- 
sible to load before the end of March. The 
State Department sought permission from 
the British Government for a time extension 
on this one ship. Great Britain accorded 
this favor in a cable despatch transmitted 
through the American Ambassador in Lon- 
don, dated March 29, 1915: 

I am informed by the Foreign Office on the 24th that 
the S. S. Keit (Kina), in view of the special circum- 
stances of the case, will be permitted to go forward on 
her prearranged trip from Savannah to Rotterdam, 



THE CASE OF COTTON 



29 



Goeteborg, and Copenhagen, provided, however, that 
her cargo of cotton is covered, with the exception of 
the date of sailing, by the terms of the agreement re- 
cently concluded concerning such shipments, and fur- 
ther provided that there shall be allowed no undue delay 
to occur in reloading this steamer on arrival at Savan- 
nah, and in the departure of the steamer from Savan- 
nah. 

Sir Edward Grey most earnestly requests that it be 
distinctly understood that this indulgence must not be 
used as a precedent for further exceptions from the 
provisions of the agreement above referred^ to. 

The Kina steamed from her port, but she 
never reached Rotterdam, for, notwithstand- 
ing the above promises, she was stopped and 
her cargo thrown into a British prize court. 
It was then evident that Great Britain would 
neither permit cargoes to go direct to a Ger- 
man port, nor allow cotton cargoes destined 
for Germany via neutral ports to reach their 
destination. On March 31st, a new Order 
in Council became known, empowering the 
British Government to requisition the car- 
goes of neutral vessels found in British 
ports. Since British cruisers could stop and 
bring into British ports any neutral vessels 
they encountered, it was evident that ships 
bound for neutral countries carrying car- 
goes of cotton, or any other commodities, 
could be taken into British ports and their 
cargoes requisitioned at England's whim. 

Many cotton cargoes destined for neutral 
countries and their legitimate needs, were 
seized and bought by England, but the com- 
pensation thus accorded by no means made 
good the loss sustained by the American 
shipper. His trade connections were broken 
off, for the foreign purchaser thereafter 
would give his orders to English cotton mer- 
chants rather than take the risk of further 
losses and delays when trading with Ameri- 
cans. It was a golden windfall to the Brit- 
ish manufacturer to find the neutral coun- 
tries of Europe restricted in their supplies 
of raw cotton. The Department of Com- 
merce in Washington, on August 5, 1915, 
stated that British exports of cotton goods 
a: 1 cotton yarns to Scandinavia and Hol- 
H nd in the first six months of 1915, showed 
.'. large increase over 1914. While our ex- 
porters were hampered in their shipments of 
raw cotton to European neutrals, Holland 
and Sweden each bought from England five 
times as much raw cotton in June, 1915, as, 
in June, 1914. 

Twenty-six cargoes of cotton, destined for 
neutral ports in Europe were detained in 
English ports during March and April, but 
despite the efforts of the unofficial Foreign 
Trade Advisers of the State Department, 
England did not begin to make payments 
on this cotton until the month of June. 
These detained cargoes amounted on July 
19 th, to sixty, and by that date only $3,500,- 
000 had been paid on the seized shipments. 
Finally, on July 20th, the British Board of 
Trade made a ruling that detained cotton 
cargoes, the ownership of which had passed 
to Germans, would be confiscated without 



payment. Meantime a form of "economic 
pressure" was being exerted on cotton 
dealers in the United States. Many of the 
latter are associate members of the Liver- 
pool Cotton Exchange, and these were in- 
structed to sign agreements not to deal di- 
rectly or indirectly with enemies of Great 
Britain. It was stated that those Avho so 
signed would have their names posted on the 
Liverpool Exchange and receive preference 
by the Liverpool members, which, in effect, 
was a blacklisting of such Americans who 
did not accede to the British demands. The 
agreement was as follows : 

I, , of an 

Associate Member of the Liverpool Cotton Association, 
do solemnly and sincerely declare that neither I nor 
my firm, nor any partner in the same, nor any branch 
house or other firm or firms in which I or any one of 
my partners may be directly or indirectly pecuniarily 
interested, will trade or have dealings with any person 
or a member or representative of any firm or person 
domiciled or carrying on business in any State at pres- 
ent at war with His Britannic Majesty until such time 
as peace may have been declared, and I further under- 
take when trading with subjects of neutral countries 
to make all necessary inquiries in order to satisfy myself 
as to the ultimate destination of the goods, and that 
none of them are intended for consumption in or for 
transit through any State at war with His Majesty. 
Declared this day of 

Witness 

Address of witness 

There was a renewal in England, toward 
the middle of July, of the agitation for mak- 
ing cotton contraband, and then the British 
Government announced its intention of re- 
stricting neutral countries to the amounts 
of cotton which they had annually imported 
in normal years. Any excess of this amount, 
thereupon, was promptly confiscated by Eng- 
land, despite the vehement and indignant 
protests of the neutrals. 

We have seen now how Great Britain, step 
by step, on one specious plea or another, has 
crippled the foreign trade of the United 
States in her most valuable commodity, cot- 
ton. And this cotton, be it remembered, is 
the basis of British trade supremacy. In 
detail, her methods to this end were as fol- 
lows : 

At the very commencement of the war, in 
unofficial warnings she allowed shippers to 
believe that she might at any moment seize 
all cotton shipments to Germany. Through 
her great marine insurance companies, she 
made insurance rates to enemy ports pro- 
hibitive. Refusing to recognize the transfer 
of foreign ships to the American flag, she 
seized American vessels purchased from for- 
eigners. 

Then England checked the attempt to 
create an American merchant marine, and 
caused the abandonment of the Ship Pur- 
chase Bill by her threats not to acquiesce in 
the purchase by the American Government 
of foreign-owned vessels. She exerted pres- 
sure on neutral countries adjacent to Ger- 
many, and compelled them to place re- 



30 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



export embargoes on cotton entering their 
ports. Having by these methods, caused a 
drop in the price of cotton to six cents a 
pound, less than one-half its normal price, 
impoverishing the South, her importers 
bought up, for the benefit of the British man- 
ufacturing trade, vast and unusual quanti- 
ties of the staple, which in future months 
was to be exported by the English in its 
raw and manufactured state to the benefit 
of British commerce and the detriment of 
America's foreign trade. 

Compelled by the indignant protests of 
American cotton growers and their repre- 
sentatives in Congress, to announce that cot- 
ton was still on the free list, Britain began 
a systematic course of imposing expensive 
and vexatious rules and regulations on 
American shippers, such as X-raying their 
bales of cotton and enforcing the submission 
of shipments to the examination of British 
consuls. 

England still further hampered the export 
of cotton by declaring the North Sea a mili- 
tary area, and forcing navigation into pre- 
scribed channels so that the seizure of neu- 
tral vessels was facilitated. On March 1st, 
of this year, England announced that she 
would stop and take into port ships carry- 
ing goods of presumed enemy destination. 

Great Britain then announced by an Or- 
der in Council that she would, if need arose, 
requisition the cargoes of neutral vessels 
brought to British ports. American cotton 
merchants who did not sign an agreement to 
deal exclusively with Great Britain and her 
Allies were blacklisted on the Liverpool Ex- 
change. 

But the final step was to come; Great 
Britain was to drop her mask and boldly de- 
clare that all these restrictions were but 
mere subterfuges, and that all along she had 
determined not to abide by her given word, 
so earnestly repeated, that she regarded cot- 
ton as being on the free list, in accordance 
with international usage and the provisions 
of the Declaration of London. 

Suddenly and shamelessly, the announce- 
ment was made in the House of Commons 
that Great Britain intended to declare cot- 
ton absolute contraband of war. This was 
on August 23rd, and on August 25th the 
formal notification reached the authorities 
at Washington. 

And this declaration of embargo on cotton 
was issued by the Government which had 
announced that it would abide by the pro- 



visions of the Declaration of London, and 
which even as late as October 26, 1914, had 
given this country the assurance, that, so 
far as Great Britain was concerned, cotton 
"is in the free list, and will remain there." 

If the British Government dealing with 
an interest of the magnitude of American 
cotton violates its promises formally made 
to another great power, what confidence can 
be felt in any assurances whatsoever that 
the British Government may make? 

Yet even this abandonment of her most 
solemn promises and pledges was not suffi- 
cient, England has gone further. On Oc- 
tober 12th, in the House of Commons, Sir 
Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
made this announcement in response to a 
question : 

Great Britain has declared raw cotton, cotton waste 
and cotton yarn all contraband. 

It is intended that every possible step shall be taken 
to prevent the supplies of these articles from reaching 
Germany. It is intended also to declare contraband 
cotton piece goods and other cotton products and to 
prohibit the exports to neutral countries contiguous to 
Germany and Austria of goods susceptible of being 
used in the manufacture of explosives. 

The end and aim of Great Britain's 
activities in restraint of the American cot- 
ton trade is fully reavealed by the follow- 
ing table taken from British sources, 
"Cotton," the official journal of the Man- 
chester (England) Cotton Association, Oc- 
tober 9, 1915, Page 16. They explain how, 
despite the war, and despite the fact that 
she has lost her best customer, Germany, 
England is exporting greatly increased 
quantities of cotton, while she is curtailing 
American shipments to neutral countries : 
LIVERPOOL STATISTICS. 
(In 1,000's of bales.) 

Actual export of Great Britain from August 1, pre- 
vious year, to nearest Friday to July 31 of named year: 

Year. American. Total. 

1912 315 507 

1913 233 429 

1914 177 342 

1915 249 519 

Here it may be seen that Great Britain 
exported 507,000 bales of cotton in 1911'; 
429,000 in 1913; 342,000 in 1914 (to Jul./ 
31st), and 519,000 for the twelve months, 
dating from the very beginning of the war. 
In the twelve months of the war, naturally, 
England was not sending her customary ex- 
ports of raw cotton to countries such as 
Germany, Belgium, Austria-Hungary. 

England's increased shipments of cotton 
can be accounted for only by the fa"ct that 
she has been selling to the neutral countries 
of Europe our own cotton which she does 
not allow us to sell them directly. 



V 



BRITAIN'S INDIRECT INTERFERENCE WITH 
AMERICAN TRADE 



DEPENDENT upon raw materials, im- 
ported from Great Britain, British 
colonies, or from nations whose out- 
put comes through British-controlled chan- 
nels and, above all, subject to the dominion 
which Great Britain ' arrogates to her- 
self over the merchant marine of the world, 
American manufacturers, in order to obtain 
these necessary raw materials, have been 
compelled to enter into agreements in re- 
straint of trade — agreements by which vir- 
tually and practically Great Britain, a for- 
eign power, assumes control of our great 
national industries. 

Those branches of industry vitally and 
seriously affected by British dominance and 
exactions include the rubber, textile and tin 
trades. By reason of sworn agreements 
which manufacturers must sign in order to 
obtain raw products, no sales can be made 
by American manufacturers to customers in 
any country outside of Great Britain and 
her allied nations. Sales to Germany, Aus- 
tria-Hungary and Turkey are absolutely pro- 
hibited. Sales to neutral nations, such as 
Holland, Norway, Sweden and even South 
American countries, can be effected only 
through agents in London. Shipments to 
United States possessions, including Porto 
Rico, the Philippines and Hawaii, can be 
made only by the gracious acquiescence of 
the British Consul at ports of shipment. 
Sales of manufactured, or even partly manu- 
factured, products even to merchants in the 
United States are restricted, wholesalers 
putting themselves under the obligation of 
guaranteeing that their own customers in 
turn will not make sales to the Germanic 
countries. The agreements into which rub- 
ber, wool and tin manufacturers are obliged 
to enter are specific and ironclad, and give 
to British commercial representatives in the 
United States unrestricted, unhindered and 
absolute control of these great and impor- 
tant industries. The agreements aforesaid 
are in violation of United State_s laws — spe- 
cifically of Section 73 of the Act of Feb- 
ruary 12, 1913 (CI. 40), and Section 3 of 
the Sherman Act of July 2, 1890 — and make 
of all merchants signing them violators of 
these laws and enforced criminals. 



Consider, as an example, what has hap- 
pened in the case of rubber. 

Great Britain declared rubber conditional 
contraband in September, 1914. She placed 
rubber on the absolute contraband list No- 
vember 12, 1914. Inasmuch as seventy per 
cent, of all rubber used in the United States 
comes from the Federated Malay States and 
Ceylon, and as the British policy threatened 
to shut off the delivery of Brazilian rubber, 
constituting thirty per cent of that used, and 
which could reach the United States only 
via England, or direct by the British Booth 
Line, delivering goods only consigned to the 
order of the British Consul-General, negotia- 
tions were begun in December, 1914, for the 
lifting of the embargo by a committee repre- 
senting the Rubber Club of America, Inc., 
and the Department of State. Told that the 
United States was helpless, the committee 
consulted with the British Ambassador, Sir 
Arthur Cecil Spring Rice, and later a repre- 
sentative— B. G. Worth, of the B. F. Good- 
rich Co. — went to London, where conditions 
for the import of rubber into the United 
States were agreed upon. The "Rubber Club 
of America" was designated to act as im- 
port agent for Great Britain, and Sir Rich- 
ard Crawford was sent to the United States 
as commercial attache of the British Em- 
bassy, to take charge of the situation. 

Under the terms of the agreement decided 
upon, an agreement to which each individual 
manufacturer must adhere under oath in 
order to obtain crude rubber, no rubber 
products whatever can be exported from the 
United States except to Great Britain and 
her allies, and no sales made to neutral non- 
belligerent countries except through British 
agents stationed in London, all shipments 
being made by way of and through London. 
The terms include a restricton in the disposi- 
tion even of Brazilian rubber, thus enabling 
Great Britain to tie up the entire rubber 
trade of the United States. The terms were 
first made known to rubber manufacturers 
by a circular sent to all members of the 
Rubber Club of America and the Rubber 
Trade Associaton of New York on January 
30, 1915. The specifications given were as 
follows : 



32 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



First — Manufacturers cannot export or sell to any 
one who might export crude rubber, waste rubber or 
reclaimed rubber, except to Great Britain or a British 
possession. They may not sell plantation rubber even 
to any one in the United States. A manufacturer may, 
however, sell Brazilian rubber to a customer in the 
United States, but for his own protection should as- 
sure himself that no exportation is intended. 

All plantation rubber must be used in the factory 
of the manufacturer for whom it is imported. 

Second — No direct shipments of partly manufactured 
goods may be made to a European neutral, like Sweden, 
Holland or Italy. Such orders can be filled only 
through an agent in London. For example, an order 
for automobile tires for Sweden cannot be shipped 
direct. You must appoint an agent in London, and he 
must get a permit from the British Government to ship 
the goods from London to Sweden. This having been 
arranged, you can forward the goods to your London 
agent. 

It is recognized that this mode of shipment is diffi- 
cult for those who have no London agent, and the 
embargo committee is endeavoring to secure the accept- 
ance of a plan which will greatly simplify it. 

To such manufacturers as have no London agents 
the secretary is prepared to recommend firms of for- 
warding agents with both New York and London 
houses who can attend to such business. 

Third — Bear in mind that the British Consul-Gen- 
eral at New York has no authority to modify these 
rulings. If you attempt to make a shipment direct _ to 
Sweden, and have the papers vised by the British 
Consul, you are still in violation of your obligation. 
Informing the consul that you are about to violate will 
not help you. His signature means only that he has 
been informed, not that your obligations have been 
modified by him. 

Fourth — No goods must be sold for delivery to an 
enemy of Great Britain. This is plain enough. If 
through intent, carelessness, or misfortune, your goods 
are found in transit to Germany, your permit will be 
cancelled. You must be sure. This does not mean, 
we are informed, that there must be an agreement not 
to export accompanying every tire you sell, but every 
reasonable precaution must be taken. You should have 
definite agreements from every customer who is likely 
to export, and we would suggest the use of a rubber 
stamp for all orders and invoices, stating that the goods 
are sold with the understanding that they are not to 
be exported, except to Great Britain, France or Rus- 
sia or to a European neutral by way of the United 
Kingdom or to a non-European neutral. 

Fifth — All goods exported to a non-European neu- 
tral, like the South American countries, Mexico or 
Cuba, must be reported to the British consul at the 
port of shipment. We recommend that this report state 
only of what the shipment consists and the port of des- 
tination. We do not understand that it is necessary 
to state prices or even the name of the consignee. 

Sixth — Pending further information we would also 
advise notifying the British consul of shipment to Porto 
Rico, the Philippine Islands and the Hawaiian Islands. 

Seventh — Tires which you export must bear adequate 
marks of identification. You must inform the British 
consul in writing, stating what these are. 

Eighth — The question has been raised whether or 
not rubber from the Dutch East Indies will come under 
these obligations. On this point we would strongly 
advise, pending further information, that Dutch rub- 
ber be regarded exactly the same as if it were planta- 
tion rubber; otherwise misunderstandings will almost 
surely arise, and the shipper would perhaps suffer can- 
cellation of his permits pending investigation. 

In general it is unquestionably the desire of Sir 
Francis Hopwood, who is in charge, that everything 
consistent with the protection of British interests shall 
be done for the convenience of the American industry 
and as rapidly as the organization can be perfected 
for handling it. If any part of the plan proves too 
cumbersome after trial, it is believed any reasonable 
relief can be secured. 

Sir Richard Crawford has just arrived and will be 
attached to the British Embassy as commercial attache. 
It will be a part of his duties to deal with the prob- 
lems arising in connection with the rubber situation, 
and it is promised that he will co-operate fully with 
this committee. 

Sir Francis Hopewood made it particularly clear to 
Mr. Work that the American industry could feel se- 



cure under the present plan unless numerous violations 
occurred. Emphatic warning was given that in case 
any manufacturer, importer or dealer came under sus- 
picion his permits should be immediately revoked. Re- 
instatement will be slow and difficult. The British Gov- 
ernment will cancel first and investigate afterward. 

The initial communication was signed by 
the Embargo Committee, consisting of Ar- 
thur H. Marks, of the B. F. Goodrich Com- 
pany; H. Stuart Hotchkiss, of the United 
States Kubber Company; George B. Hodg- 
man, of the Hodgman Rubber Company, and 
William E. Bruyn, of L. Littlejohn & Com- 
pany. 

American importers, in applying for rub- 
ber through the Rubber Club of America, are 
obliged to sign an agreement embodying the 
above requirements. The agreement exacted 
is as follows : 

His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at New York. 

In consideration of your consenting to the delivery 
to us of the rubber specified in the margin, we hereby 
give you the following undertaking, which shall remain 
in force so long as Great Britain is at war with any 
European Power : 

We will not export from the United States any raw 
rubber, reclaimed rubber, or waste rubber, whether the 
same has been imported from the British Dominions 
or not, otherwise than to the United Kingdom or to 
a British possession. 

We will not sell the rubber now delivered by you 
to any dealer or other person or persons in the United 
States, but will use it for our own manufacturing pur- 
poses. 

All orders received by us for manufactured or partly 
manufactured rubber goods to be sent to neutral Euro- 
pean countries shall be executed by shipments to the 
United Kingdom and reshipment from there under li- 
cense to be obtained for export therefrom. 

We will not execute any orders for manufactured or 
partly manufactured rubber goods to be sent either di- 
rectly or indirectly to any country or State at war with 
Great Britain. 

We will not sell any manufactured, or partly manu- 
factured, rubber goods to any person in the United 
States without satisfying ourselves that there is no 
intention on his part to export or resell the same for 
exportation to any countries in Europe other than 
Great Britain, France, Russia, or Italy, otherwise than 
by shipping to the United Kingdom and reshipping from 
there, under license to be obtained for export there- 
from. 

If we export any manufactured or partly manufac- 
tured rubber goods to a destination outside Europe not 
being in a British possession, we will, prior to or simul- 
taneously with the shipment, give you particulars of the 
goods so shipped and their destination. 

All rubber tires exported by us or sold by us for 
export shall bear a distinctive name or mark, which we 
will communicate to you, so as to identify them as 
being our manufacture. 

When he sells to an American purchaser, 
the importer himself is obliged to sign a 
guarantee, which is sent to the British Con- 
sular representative at New York, as fol- 
lows: 

RUBBER GUARANTEE 

His Britannic Majesty's Consul Gen- 
RUBBER. eral, New York. 

I beg to inform you that I have 
Ex. s. s -...sold the rubber specified in the mar- 
gin to 

Packages whose guarantee you will find on the 

back hereof. I will produce to you 

Weight at any time on demand the original 

contracts or other documents evi- 

Marks dencing the sale. 

In consideration of your consenting to the delivery 
to them of the said rubber, I undertake that I will not, 
directly or indirectly, at any time so long as the pres- 
ent war continues, export any raw rubber, reclaimed 



INDIRECT INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE 



33 



ruober, or waste rubber from the United States, ex- 
cept to the British dominions, and that I will not sell 
any raw rubber, reclaimed rubber or waste rubber for 
exportation without satisfying myself that it is not in- 
tended for exportation from the United States, except 
to the British dominions. 



Date 

(163-2) 

The intending purchaser of the consign- 
ment in turn signs a similar guarantee in his 
application for crude rubber. These appli- 
cation forms are turned over to the Rubber 
Club of America, which is required to stamp 
them with "Approved." The British Con- 
sulate at New York then forwards the appli- 
cation to the British Government, which per- 
mits the sending of rubber or forbids it, as 
it sees fit. 

Three large rubber concerns — the United 
States Rubber Company, the B. F. Goodrich 
Company and the Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company — are importing rubber through 
the British Government direct, on the same 
guarantees required of other importers. In 
addition, however, these firms were required 
to put up a bond of £50,000, to be forfeited 
in case of violations of their guarantees. 

A rubber manufacturing concern, which 
had done business with one of the countries 
to which sales are prohibted, endeavored to 
secure raw rubber from the B. F. Goodrich 
Company. In reply the concern received the 
following letter, which reveals the strin- 
gency of conditions imposed : 

THE B. F. GOODRICH COMPANY, 
1780-82 Broadway, 
New York City 
Dear Sirs : 

Without discussion as to the merits of the case, we 
beg to advise that our supply of crude gum is dependent 
on the actions of the English Government. Under cer- 
tain restrictions we are enabled to obtain our require- 
ments. This involves a heavy cash penalty for failure 
to observe the obligation we have assumed, far and 
away in excess of this is involved the good faith of our 
Company in absolutely complying with its pledges. We 
cannot afford for the sake of any one business to risk 
in the slightest this latter obligation. Necessity, there- 
fore, compels certain operations to protect the situation 
in both your and our interests. 

It will not permanently serve you to attempt in any 
way to violate the restrictions now surrounding the ex- 
port of rubber goods to foreign countries. On the con- 
trary, you would do a great harm to the domestic 
needs of this country. If for any reason the Amer- 
ican manufacturers of rubber goods are prevented from 
executing their pledges, the supply of gum would cease, 
hundreds of thousands be thrown out of employment, 
prices for all classes of rubber goods reach unheard- 
of figures, all to the hurt of the domestic buyer here 
at home. 

We feel, therefore, we will not be misunderstood in 
asking that before we quote or sell you, you execute 
the attached form of agreement. On its return signed 
by an official of your company, and acknowledged be- 
fore a notary, we will be pleased to sell you in accord- 
ance with the terms therein. 
Very truly yours, 
THE B. F. GOODRICH COMPANY. 

With the letter was enclosed the following 
agreement : 



AGREEMENT. 
THE B. F. GOODRICH COMPANY. 



We hereby agree that any quotation asked for, and 
any purchases made by us from you or another of 
any of your products, shall be in each and every case 
only for domestic use or shipment to Great Britain, 
France or Russia, unless accompanied by permit satis- 
factory to you. We pledge ourselves in this fact, and 
agree that the execution of this document shall be bind- 
ing on us for such length of time as you shall consider 
it to be effective, and cancellable only by you. 

We further agree to submit to any and all investiga- 
tions that may be necessary on your part, and to give 
free access to any and all of our books, if called on so 
to do, to establish the fact of our non-exporting, or 
selling to another to export, in violation of this agree- 
ment. 

And further, we agree that any order, even though 
accepted by you, may be cancelled without redress on 
our part at your option for any cause whatsoever, dur- 
ing the period that a state of war exists abroad, be- 
tween Great Britain and any other country. 

In case we tender any order that is for shipment 
out of this country, we will in each instant state thereon 
its destination. 

Signed 

Dated 

Per 

Inscribed and sworn to before 

me this day 

of '. 



Notary Public. 

To summarize the situation as Great Brit- 
ain's policy affects American rubber manu- 
facturers : In order to obtain crude rubber, 
from British possessions as well as from 
neutral Brazil, every manufacturer must 
sign an agreement whereby he relinquishes 
his right to sell manufactured goods to cus- 
tomers in any and every country outside of 
Great Britain and her Allies, and takes oath 
that he will not do so; intending purchasers 
of manufactured, or partly manufactured, 
products must themselves make a similar 
guarantee. No rubber can, therefore, be sold 
to customers in any of the neutral, non- 
belligerent European countries. Shipments 
even to South American countries are pro- 
hibited except where the goods are sold 
through London agents and shipped far out 
of their way to London, and thence to 
South America. To cite an illustrative 
instance: 

A concern located in New York, with a 
branch house in New Orleans, gave an order 
July, 1915, for rubber tires to the Goodrich 
Tire and Rubber Company, for shipment to 
Cartegena, Columbia, South America. This 
house carried on an extensive trade with 
South and Central American countries. The 
Goodrich company sent to the trading con- 
cern a copy of the embargo affidavit, asking 
them to sign it in accordance with the in- 
structions imposed by the British Govern- 
ment. The concern in its reply declared that 
the goods ordered were for shipment to Car- 
tegena, were positively not to be used for any 
other purpose, and that the Goodrich con- 
cern might give the details to the British 
Consul at New York in order to obtain a 



36 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



shipper "Textile Alliance, Inc.," and must be consigned 
in one of two ways, namely : — 

(1) "To Messrs. Freshfield, 31 Old Jewry, London, 

E. C, account of Messrs (Name 

of recipient)." In this case the shipper must send all 
of the original Bills of Lading, and one memorandum 
copy to the Textile Alliance, Inc., 120 Milk Street, Bos- 
ton, or 45 E. 17th Street, New York, with notice that 
all requirements have been complied with. This will 
enable the Alliance to transmit the Bills of Lading to 
Messrs. Freshfield with proper notification to enable 
them to release the shipment. The Alliance will not 
accept documents unless free from notice of lien. 

(2) "To Messrs (name of ap- 
proved Custodian bankers) for account of Messrs. 

Freshfield. Notify Messrs (name 

of recipient.)" Shippers must send us in each case one 
memorandum copy Bill of Lading to enable us to notify 
the War Trade Department that their requirements 
have been complied with, and furnish Messrs. Fresh- 
field with the necessary information that they may au- 
thorize the custodian bankers to release the merchan- 
dise to the recipient. 

The Custodian bankers approved by the British Gov- 
ernment are : 

Messrs. Baring Bros. & Co., Ltd. 

Messrs. Brown, Shipley & Co. 

Messrs. Higginson & Co. 

Messrs. Morgan, Grenfell & Co. 

Standard Bank of- South Africa, Ltd. (London 
ofifice). 

Hong Kong & Shanghai Banking Corp. (London of- 
fice). 

Third : The name of the person in the United King- 
dom to whom the Bill of Lading is to be released by 
Messrs. Freshfield, must appear in the notice that the 
shippers send to the Textile Alliance, Inc., with the 
Bill of Lading. 

Fourth : The Alliance charge to cover their expenses 
is 1 per, cent, of the total selling price of the merchan- 
dise, including all charges, but not including prepaid 
freight and prepaid insurance, if any. This charge is 
payable at the time of shipment and remittance should 
accompany Bills of Lading sent to the Alliance. It is 
understood that on the expiry of the Agreement between 
the Textile Alliance, Inc., and the British Government 
-any balance or fund created for the services and ex- 
penses of the Alliance, shall be returned pro rata. 

Fifth : Shipments made under the foregoing condi- 
tions may be sent via all routes and to all destinations 
in the United Kingdom. 

Sixth : The granting of licenses and permits to ship 
rests solely with the British Government. Interested 
parties must bear in mind that licenses and permits will 
be granted only in so far as may be to the interest ol 
Great Britain and her allied countries, and furthermore, 
that the granting of licenses does not insure that the 
merchandise upon arrival in the - United Kingdom is 
necessarily to be delivered to the intended recipient. 

Seventh : Consignors must pay all charges imposed 
toy the Custodian Bankers and should make their bank- 
ing and shipping arrangements independently of the 
Textile Alliance, Inc. 

Eighth : Messrs. Freshfield will make suitable provi- 
sion for releasing shipments in the United Kingdom 
upon receipt of advice from the Textile Alliance, Inc., 
that all requirements have been complied with. 

Ninth : Persons attempting to export by irregular 
channels will not only risk detention, but will disqualify 
themselves as exporters of Tops and Yarns and import- 
ers of Wool, etc., from all parts of the British Empire. 

Tenth : The President and the Textile Alliance, Inc., 
assume no responsibility in regard to financial or other 
arrangements. Buyers, sellers and importers must in- 
demnify and agree to hold harmless the Textile Alli- 
ance, Inc., and A. M. Patterson, individually and as 
an officer of the Alliance, and Messrs. Freshfield from 
ALL liability. 

Under existing conditions, as has been 
shown, American manufacturers do not suf- 
fer alone by the detention of ships and the 
seizure of cargoes by Great Britain. The 
restrictions placed upon various" industries 
within the United States by illegal trade 
agreements affects business with neutral na- 
tions not only at present, or so long as the 



British sea policy continues, but threaten to 
alienate customers in non-belligerent coun- 
tries for years to come. 

With rubber declared contraband by 
Great Britain, shipments of rubber goods 
cannot be made by an American manufac- 
turer to any customer in Holland, Denmark, 
Norway, Sweden or any neutral country. If 
shipments are made, they will be seized in 
all probability by Great Britain. On the 
other band, shipments can, however, be made 
through British agents, the goods being sent 
to England and reshipped thence by the 
agent, who collects a commission. Thus the 
rubber trade of the world, outside of the 
United States, is practically, and to all pur- 
poses, thrown entirely into the hands of 
British agents, who can seize the trade re- 
lations broken by England's policy between 
American sellers and European buyers and 
establish themselves in all countries where 
American trade is ousted. And the imposi- 
tions placed upon the textile industry have 
absolutely wiped out our export trade with 
neutral European nations in wool. 

An American manufacturer desiring to 
import raw wool into the United States must 
make application to the president of the 
Textile Alliance, signing an agreement not 
to sell any woolen products, manufactured 
or partly manufactured, to a customer in 
any country except Great Britain. Like- 
wise shipments of manufactured, or partly 
manufactured, goods to Great Britain can 
also be made only through an arrangement 
with the Textile Alliance. It is absolutely 
impossible for American exporters to ship 
yarns, etc., direct to customers in Sweden, 
Norway, Holland, Denmark or any neutral 
country. 

Even American manufacturers who buy 
their raw products in the United States suf- 
fer from these conditions. American raw 
wool, yarns, and "tops" cannot be shipped 
to a customer in Sweden, Norway, Holland 
or Denmark. Any wool shipped except 
through the Textile Alliance and to Great 
Britain alone is liable to confiscation. Ex- 
cept through the Textile Alliance, or 
through the British Embassy, no guaran- 
tees of delivery of American woolen goods 
to customers abroad can be obtained. 

And yet, despite the restrictions to which 
American manufacturers subject them- 
selves, entangled as they are by a network 
of agreements, legal clauses and prohibi- 
tions, all acting to the advantage of Great 
Britain alone, American manufacturers, 
when they come to the point of selling 
to customers in neutral countries, find that 
the guarantees are quite ineffectual and 
worthless. Goods may be sold to British 
customers direct — even then the delivery is 
not guaranteed by British authorities. 

Goods may be consigned to customers in 
neutral countries through British brokers, 



INDIRECT INTERFERENCE WITH TRADE 



37 



but then the Textile Alliance takes the po- 
sition that it cannot guarantee the safe 
conduct of shipments even to the Lon- 
don brokers. Thus tied up as they are by 
agreements and trade entanglements, Amer- 
ican manufactures enjoy no recompense, in- 
asmuch as all the guarantees work out so 
as to be absolutely worthless, and in the end 
they find themselves helpless in the arbitrary 
hands of Great Britain's naval authorities. 
What is the result of this bottling-up of 
legitimate American commerce and the re- 
striction of its export trade to Great Britain 
alone? British woolen manufacturers and 
agents — to whom the entire export trade of 
the United States is diverted — can them- 
selves sell to whomsoever they will. They 
can — and do — take over the trade with all 
the concerns in Holland, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, as well as in any other country, 
who have hitherto dealt with American man- 
ufacturers, and they can — and do — prevent 
American manufacturers from securing new 
customers forced by the war to look in this 
direction. 

Taking advantage of the fact that nearly 
all of the tin, tin ore and chloride of tin 
used by American manufacturers is im- 
ported from Great Britain and her depend- 
encies, conditions quite as rigid as those im- 
posed for the use of rubber and wool govern 
this trade. That Great Britain has assumed 
to control the tin industry of the world is 
shown in a letter sent by the United States 
Steel Products Company — which is closely 
allied with the United States Steel Corpora- 
tion — of which James A. Farrell and El- 
bert T. Gary are directors, to all of its ex- 
porters and customers. Guarantees that 
sales of tin products shall not be made to 
countries other than Great Britain and her 
allies must be made to obtain raw material. 
The letter sent out by the United States 
Steel Products Company is as follows : 

The tin plate sold by us is manufactured by the 
American Sheet and Tin Plate Company, and the sup- 
plies of pig tin which are used by them in the manu- 
facture of said tin plate are imported from Great Brit- 
ain and possessions. 

In order to obtain such supplies of pig tin we are 
obliged to sign an undertaking, which has been put into 
effect by the British authorities, known as the "tin 
guarantee," a complete copy of which is given herewith 
for your information. 

In order to carry out the terms of this guarantee, 
notice is hereby given that all sales and shipments made 
by this company on and after this date are made sub- 
ject to the following conditions: 

"It is understood and agreed that the within men- 
tioned tin plate, or tin canisters and tin boxes suitable 
for food packing made therefrom, is sold subject to the 
terms of the guarantee as promulgated by the British 
government authorities, which requires (a) that orders 
for such materials will not be executed to be sent, either 
directly or indirectly, to any country or state at war 
with Great Britain ; (b) that no sales of such materials 
will be made without obtaining satisfactory assurances 
from the buyer that there is no intention on his part 
to export or resell the same for exportation to any 
country in Europe other than Great Britain, France, 
Italy or Russia, otherwise than by shipping to the United 
Kingdom and reshipping from there under license to 



be obtained for export therefrom ; (c) if any exporta- 
tion of such materials are made to a destination out- 
side of Europe not being in British possessions, full 
particulars of same are to be reported to his Brittanic 
Majesty's consul-general at New York prior to or si- 
multaneously with the shipment, giving particulars of 
the goods so shipped and their destination." 

This notice is issued with the understanding that the 
terms and conditions . under which sales of tin plate 
shall hereafter be made to this company may be altered 
or changed in accordance with any changes or modifi- 
cations that may be required by the British government 
authorities. 

Accompanying the letter was the follow- 
ing copy of the agreement which the United 
States Steel Products Company had entered 
into: 

In consideration of your consenting to the delivery 
to us of the tin, chloride of tin, tin ore, specified in 
the margin, we hereby give you the following undertak- 
ing, which shall continue in force so long as Great Brit- 
ain is at war with any European power : 

We will not export from the United States any tin, 
chloride of tin or tin ore, whether the same has been 
imported from the British dominions or not, otherwise 
than to the United Kingdom or to a British possession. 

We will not sell the tin, chloride of tin, tin ore now 
delivered by you to any dealer or other person or per- 
sons in the United States, but will use it for our own 
manufacturing purposes. 

All orders received by us for tin plates or tin can- 
isters and tin boxess suitable for food packing made 
therefrom, or for tin foil, solder, Babbitt's metal, type 
metal or any metallic alloys containing tin, to be sent 
to neutral European countries, shall be executed from 
stocks maintained by us in the United Kingdom, or be 
executed by shipments to the United Kingdom and re- 
shipment from there, under license to be obtained for 
export therefrom. 

We will not execute any orders for tin plates, or tin 
canisters and tin boxes suitable for food packing made 
therefrom, or for tin foil, solder, Babbitt's metal, type 
metal or any metallic alloys containing tin, to be sent, 
either directly or indirectly, to any country or state 
at war with Great Britain. 

We will not sell any tin plates, or tin canisters and 
tin boxes suitable for food packing made therefrom, or 
for tin foil, solder, Babbitt's metal, type metal or any 
metallic alloys containing tin to any person in the 
United States without satisfying ourselves that there is 
no intention on his part to export, or resell the same 
for exportation, to any countries in Europe other than 
Great Britain, France, Italy or Russia, otherwise than 
by shipping to the United KingdonO and reshipping 
from there under license to be obtained for export 
therefrom. 

If we export any tin plates or tin canisters and tin 
boxes suitable for food packing made therefrom, or tin 
foil, solder, Babbitt's metal, type metal or any metallic 
alloys containing tin, to a destination outside of Europe 
not being in British possessions, we will, prior Jo or si- 
multaneously with the shipment, give you particulars of 
the goods so shipped and their destination. 

The Special Committee of the Metal Ex- 
change of New York sent out a letter — 
signed by C. Mayer, Secretary — specifically 
revealing the conditions imposed by Great 
Britain upon tin manufacturers. The let- 
ter was occasioned by the belief that certain 
manufacturers were not observing the exac- 
tions required. It is as follows : 

NEW YORK METAL EXCHANGE, 

New York, Sept. 1, 1915. 
To the Trade : 

TIN. 
Certain transactions coming to the knowledge of the 
Tin Committee lead it to believe that arrangements 
with the British Government governing the importation 
of tin are not fully understood. 

Importations are permitted only for the purpose of 
supplying domestic requirements. 

The jobber is required to use all due diligence in the 
carrying out of the agreement thus entered into, when 
selling the metal, and thereafter to stamp his invoices 



38 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



with a notice calling attention to the fact that the tin 
is sold with the distinct understanding that it shall not 
be exported, but must be sold or used only for the 
purpose of supplying domestic requirements. 

With the circular are three forms of 
guarantees. One to be signed by the im- 
porter, one by the manufacturer, and one by 
the purchaser from the manufacturer, each 
binding himself not to sell or trade with 
any countries not countenanced by the Brit- 
ish Empire. They are almost identical in 
form. The first is as follows : 

Issued by the NEW YORK METAL EXCHANGE. 

TIN GUARANTEE 

His Britannic Majesty's Consul-Gen- 
TIN eral, New York. 

Ex. s. s In consideration of your consent- 
ing to the delivery to us of the tin, 
chloride of tin, tin ore (a), specified 
in the margin, we, 

Packages hereby give you the following un- 
dertaking, which shall remain in 

Weight force so long as Great Britain is at 

war with any European power. 

Quality We will not export from the United 

States any tin, chloride of tin, or tin 
ore, whether the same has been im- 
ported from the British Dominions 
or not, otherwise than to the United 
Kingdom or a British possession. 



Marks. 



.We will not sell the tin, chloride of 
tin, or tin ore (a) now delivered by 
you to any dealer, or other person 
or persons, in the United States, but 
will use it for our own manufactur- 
ing purposes. 



Date. 



(a) Strike out the words which are inapplicable. 
(421) 

In regard to the impositions made by 
Great Britain and executed through her offi- 
cial representatives upon American indus- 
tries, it is not only germain, but urgently 
important, to remember that these exactions 
are in violation of United States laws. 

Shall the United States, by submitting to 
impositions and requirements now made 
upon American manufacturers by a foreign 
power, establish the precedent that — for all 
time — she shall, whenever the expediency of 
a foreign policy dictates, servilely and tin- 
protestingly submit to an interference with 
her trade, domestic as well as foreign, in 
siross violation of her own statutes? 



Here are exactions forced by Great Brit- 
ain upon American manufacturers : 

Article 1 of the rubber agreement : 

"Manufacturers cannot export or sell to any one who 
might export crude rubber, waste rubber or reclaimed 
rubber except to Great Britain or a British possession. 
They may not sell plantation rubber even to any one in 
the United States." 

Fourth section of the rubber agreement: 

"No goods must be sold for delivery to an enemy ot 
Great Britain ... If through intent, carelessness, 
or misfortune, your goods are found in transit to Ger- 
many your permit will be canceled. . . You should 
have definite agreements from every customer who is 
likely to export, and we would suggest the use of a 
rubber stamp for all orders and invoices, stating that 
the goods are sold with the understanding that they are 
not to be exported, except to Great Britain, France or 
Russia or to a European neutral by way of the United 
Kingdom or to a non-European neutral." 

Article 6 of the guarantee made by pur- 
chasers of wool with the Textile Alliance : 

"That no part of the merchandise subject to this 
agreement, nor any wool, tops, noils, or yarn produced 
therefrom, shall be exported to any destination from 
the United States of America except to Canada." 

Pledge made to "His Britannic Majesty's 
Consul-General at New York" by manufac- 
turers desiring to obtain tin : 

"We will not export from the United States any tin, 
chloride of tin, or tin ore, whether the same has been 
imported from the British Dominions or, not, otherwise 
than to the United Kingdom or to a British Possession. 

"We will not export from the United States any tin, 
delivered by you to any dealer or other person or per- 
sons in the United States, but will use it for our own 
manufacturing purposes." 



And here are the tables of our laws : 
Section 73 of the Act of February 12, 1913 
(CI. 40) : 

Section 73 of the Act of February 12, 1913 (CI. 40) : 
"That every combination, conspiracy, trust, agree- 
ment or contract is hereby declared to be contrary 
to public policy, illegal and void when the same is 
made by or between two or more persons or cor- 
porations either of whom as agent or principal is 
engaged in importing any article from any foreign 
country into the United States, and where such 
combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement or contract 
is intended to operate in restraint of lawful trade or 
free competition in lawful trade or commerce, or to 
increase the market price in any part of the United 
States of any article or articles imported or intended 
to be imported, into the United States, or of any 
manufacture into which said imported article centers 
or is intended to center." 

Sherman Act of July 2, 1890 : 

"Every contract, combination in form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce in any Territory of the United States or 
of the District of Columbia, or in restraint of com- 
merce between any such Territory and another or 
between any such Territory or Territories and any 
State or States or the District of Columbia, or with 
foreign nations or between the District of Colum- 
bia and any State or States or foreign nations, is 
hereby declared illegal. Every person who shall 
make any such contract or engage in any such com- 
bination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of 
a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof, shall be 
punished by fine not exceeding $5,000 or by imprison- 
ment not exceeding one year, or by both said pun- 
ishments in the discretion of the court." 



VI 



INTERFERENCE WITH COMMUNICATION 



IN times of peace many thousand com- 
mercial and private messages pass 
every day over the cables connecting 
the United States and the other countries 
of the world. Even in war times the num- 
ber of submarine telegrams is over five 
thousand per day. Our commercial and 
financial relations with the world are de- 
pendent on cables. The wires beneath the 
sea are our international trade arteries. 
Great Britain has it in her power to cut 
those arteries, because of certain physical 
facts and of geographical advantages which 
she possesses. 

Today practically all commercial and 
personal telegrams from the United States 
to foreign countries pass through the hands 
of the British censor. Great Britain's right 
in time of war to censor dispatches is un- 
questioned. The International Telegraph 
Convention and the International Kadio- 
Telegraph Convention, to which all the 
Powers are signatories, expressly grants 
to any government "the power to in- 
terrupt the system of international tele- 
graphs for an indefinite period, if it judges 
it necessary, either generally, or only upon 
certain lines and for certain kinds of mes- 
sages, upon the condition that it immedi- 
ately advises each of the other contracting 
parties." (See Article VIII of the Tele- 
graph Convention, applying also to wireless 
dispatches.) Great Britain has complied 
with the stipulations of this article. She 
merely exercises the same rights that the 
United States Government exercises today 
in regard to wireless dispatches. 

But in actual practice the British censor 
has adopted and continues a policy which 
has proved exacting beyond the needs of war, 
onerous in the extreme, and one which has 
caused and is today causing American com- 
merce financial losses running into millions 
of dollars. In many instances the action of 
the censor has been unreasoning, arbitrary 
and practically despotic. As a result, buy- 
ers of American goods in neutral countries 
have been and are unable to make purchases 
from American exporters. In import- 
ant deals involving the exchange of many 
. cables, vitally important messages in a series 
have been suppressed altogether. The Brit- 
ish censor has it in his power to suppress 
messages for any reason, or for no reason at 



all. He does so, under the specious and 
spacious excuse of "war measures." He does 
not notify the sender of the non-delivery of 
stopped messages. Errors made in retrans- 
mission after passing the censor are not cor- 
rected, and the censor is not liable for dam- 
ages. All corrections must be made by a 
private message between addressee and 
sender. The censor alters messages to suit 
himself. He cuts out words that displease 
him. Although all messages, other than 
those sent in the limited specified codes and 
so marked, are written in plain English, the 
censor, suspicious of private codes, pur- 
posely alters messages to see whether a 
secret code is in use. 

In certain cases the contents of sup- 
pressed American commercial cablegrams to 
neutral countries have formed the basis for 
commercial propositions to the addressees 
from British firms. 

In brief, American cables passing through 
the hands of the British censor, except mes- 
sages between the Department of State and 
our envoys abroad, are at the censor's mercy. 
No business secrets can escape his eye. 

Great Britain wields this tremendous 
power by reason of her control of the great 
cable line centers and junctions. A glance 
at the map on page 40, on which the chief 
American cable routes are indicated, will 
show this clearly. 

The heavy lines show the only cables 
which terminate on American territory or in 
territory not belonging to or controlled by 
Great Britain and her allies — the only lines 
by means of which an American message 
can be depended upon to reach the foreign 
world. All the cables crossing the Atlantic, 
except the French cable to Brest, and the 
German cable, now out of commission, ter- 
minate in England or Ireland, or the Azores, 
belonging to Great Britain's ally, Portugal. 
On the way south, American cables reach 
Cuba, Porto Bico and Hayti ; from Havana 
a line extends across Panama, along the 
west coast of South America, and overland 
to Buenos Ayres. The Atlantic coast cables 
of South America are all British owned. 
The United States Government owns the 
cable from Seattle to Sitka. American cap- 
ital owns the cable from San Francisco to 
Hawaii and Manila and thence to Shanghai 
and Tokio. Since Shanghai is British and 



40 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 




INTERFERENCE WITH COMMUNICATIONS 



41 



Tokio Japanese, this cable is indicated by 
dotted lines from American to Allied ports. 

Business with the west coast of South 
America is not as yet a heavy item in Amer- 
ican trade. In the East, the lines beyond 
Shanghai are owned by the British, and the 
lines beyond Tokio by the Japanese, largely 
financed by British capital. 

All American communications affecting 
our great coffee and rubber trade with Bra- 
zil must pass over British lines. 

Not only commercial, but official cables, 
army dispatches and consular dispatches, 
have been held up. The British Govern- 
ment, upon protest from the Department of 
State, has "explained" interference with 
United States Government business, but 
for the financial loss suffered by our mer- 
chants no redress is available. Specific 
charges of loss are innumerable, and from 
a mass of data the following are selected : 

In several cases New York merchants do- 
ing business with Greek houses assert that 
cablegrams between New York and Athens 
have been intercepted and suppressed, and 
that within a few days' time British firms 
have approached these same Greek houses 
with propositions exactly duplicating those 
contained in the suppressed American 
cables. One firm, which had conducted for 
many years a very profitable trade in dried 
fruits with Greece, has abandoned that trade 
altogether, because of British interference. 

In another case, an order from a Scan- 
dinavian to a New York house for 48,000 
pounds of coffee was suppressed by the Brit- 
ish censor; the loss sustained by this firm, 
which otherwise has suffered severely, in 
this one transaction amounted to f 3,000. A 
grain exporting house offered a cargo of 
grain to a house in Denmark for $ 1.07 a 
bushel; the British censor delayed the mes- 
sage and when it was finally delivered to the 
Danish house the price per bushel had be- 
come $1.03. The American firm had to stand 
a loss of about $10,000. An American ex- 
porting firm offered a quantity of ammuni- 
tion from a manufacturer to the Russian 
Government; the cablegram got no further 
than London — but several days later J. P. 
Morgan & Company approached the manu- 
facturer in the case directly and the profits 
in the transaction went to the credit of the 
official purchasing agents of the British 
Government. 

Protests against this condition of affairs 
have been laid before the Department of 
State by organizations and individuals. The 
Merchants Association of New York, the 
Western Union Telegraph Company, the 
Swiss People's Bank of Berne, the American 
Trade Agency at Eome, Spanish cotton im- 
porters at Barcelona, Danish firms, the 
Chamber of Commerce at Naples, the New 
Orleans Cotton Exchange, the Galveston 



Cotton Exchange, the Manila Chamber of 
Commerce, coffee exporting houses in Bio 
de Janeiro— these and many others have 
made formal complaint. These protests 
have been of little avail. 

To a formal protest from the Swiss Gov- 
ersment, the British General Post Office, un- 
der whose administration the direction of 
the censorship falls, stated that "in order to 
avoid the inconvenience which would have 
arisen from a total stoppage of communica- 
tion it was decided as an act of grace (so 
underlined in the original communication 
made by the British Government, 1 to accept 
telegrams for transmission on the under- 
standing that they were to be accepted at the 
senders' risk and subject to censorship by 
the British authorities; that is, that they 
might be stopped, delayed, or otherwise 
dealt with by the censors, and that no claim 
for reimbursement could be entertained." 

The mere "acceptance of telegrams at the 
owner's risk" is "an act of grace." Only as 
an act of grace, therefore, are American ex- 
porters permitted to send telegrams which 
remain undelivered to merchants in Greece, 
while British firms later offer the same prop- 
osition to the same Greek concerns to whom 
the suppressed cables were addressed. Only_ 
as an act of grace, again, is an American 
grain exporter permitted to sell a cargo of 
grain for four cents less a bushel than he 
had quoted it, thereby sustaining a loss of 
$10,000. Only an act of grace, is the propo- 
sition of an American firm to Bussia, Great 
Britain's ally, suppressed, and the transac- 
tion diverted into the hands of J. P. Mor- 
gan & Company. 

The extent of the loss caused by this act 
of grace is not readily computable, but in 
known specific cases it already amounts to 
many millions of dollars. 

Specific instances of interference which 
have formed the basis of representations 
from the Department of State to Downing 
Street will illustrate England's absolute con- 
trol of American commercial messages to 
neutral European countries and Brazil. 2 

On November 15, 1914, the director of 
the Swiss People's Bank at Berne, through 
the American Minister to Switzerland, 
Pleasant A. Stovall, complained to the De- 
partment of State that telegrams to New 
York from Swiss financial institutions were 
never delivered. Messages between Berne 
and New York could be routed in several 
ways : overland to Brest and thence by the 
French cable (Compagnie Francaise des 
Cables Telegraphiques ) to New York, pass- 
ing through the French censor's hands at 
Brest; or overland and by cable to London, 
thence to an Irish or English cable station, 



'See Department of State Publication, "Diplomatic 
Correspondence with Belligerent Governments," p. 77. 
2 Ibid, p. 93. 



42 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



thence to Newfoundland or Nova Scotia and 
thence to New York, passing through the 
British censor's hands at London. It is im- 
possible to reach Switzerland without pass- 
ing the British or the French censor. In the 
case of the Swiss People's Bank, the mes- 
sages never got beyond the censor. And 
nothing could be done about it. 

The same conditions govern communica- 
tions with Italy, Greece and all Mediteran- 
ean countries. It is impossible to cable these 
countries without encountering the French 
or British censor. He must read all mes- 
sages, and he can and does suppress at will, 
without notification of stoppage. In case 
of protest, he blandly answers that he has 
no records of his activity, 1 and that is all 
that there is to it. If he chooses to hand a 
message to a British competitor of an Amer- 
ican firm, he can. He has no records. Cable 
communication is permitted only as an act 
of grace, anyway. 

The particular case in which the British 
censor was unable to trace suppressed mes- 
sages illustrates our difficulties in handling 
a valuable part of our South American trade 
— Brazil's coffee and rubber. Nine tele- 
grams between March 12, 1915, and April 
20 th, from L. C. Fallon & Company, New Or- 
leans, routed over the Postal Telegraph Com- 
pany to New York, thence to the Azores by 
the Commercial Cable Company, thence to 
Rio de Janeiro by the Western Pacific Cable 
Company, a British concern, never reached 
their destination. Another telegram from 
C. A. Fairchild & Co., New York, to the 
same address, "Ornstein, Rio de Janeiro," 
also vanished. "Ornstein" is a German ap- 
pearing name. These cables were probably 
promptly sent to the London General Post 
Office. One of them was found. The rest 
vanished as utterly as though they had been 
smoke. There were no records, nothing — 
and no liability. 

The following items serve to show Amer- 
ican dependence on British lines in the East : 
On August 21st and August 22, 1914, two 
code telegrams from the Colonel command- 
ing the United States forces at Tientsin to 
the Commanding General in the Philippines 
were detained by the British censor at Hong 
Kong. The messages were signed "Tilson" 
and "Rowell," and despatched to a code ad- 
dress. The decoding of this address was a 
matter of a moment; but not a moment's 
effort was made. The telegrams were sup- 
pressed. And for two days, the commander 
of the United States forces in China was 
left out of touch with his superiors in the 
Philippines because of the act of the Brit- 
ish censor. 

On another occasion, in December, 1914, 
a code message from the American Minister 
to China at Peking, Paul S. Renisch, to the 
Amer ican Consul-General in the British pos- 

'"Diplomatic Correspondence with Belligerent Govern- 
ments," page 94. 



session at Hong Kong, G. E. Anderson, was 
held up — though subsequently allowed to 
pass. 

In both instances the reason advanced was 
the use of a cipher, not permitted by the 
regulations laid down by the British. The 
United States Government accepted the reg- 
ulation, but the incident illustrates the sway 
of the British censor and the dependence of 
this nation upon Great Britain for tele- 
graphic communication with the world. Our 
direct relations with our possessions in the 
East are dependent upon a single line, which 
is crossed by the British line from Van- 
couver to Australia and New Zealand. The 
point of junction of these two lines, readily 
found, offers the exact location at which to 
intercept communications with Manila, if 
this was not done to the island of Van- 
couver. 

If occasion were to arise, the United 
States could be immediately isolated. All 
our trans-Atlantic lines pass through Brit- 
ish territory or that of her allies. The Ger- 
man cable is out of commission. The French 
cable might or might not be available. Pana- 
ma, Porto Rico, Hawaii and the Philippines 
could be detached from us by a few snaps of 
the cable cutter. 

Wireless telegraphy and telephony are not 
so readily blocked. But as a means of com- 
munication they are uncertain, subject to 
weather conditions, and, above all, they are 
non-secretive. Privacy in communication is 
impossible ; theoretically attainable in slight 
measure by the use of codes, it is never safe. 

Yet in view of the present circumstances 
and the losses so far sustained by American 
business firms, the project of allowing 
greater freedom in the commercial uses of 
the wireless stations might seem advisable. 
Within a short time, in addition to the wire- 
less routes already in use, direct communica- 
tions between the Cape Cod coast and Nor- 
way will be established. By the exercise of 
a judicious but intelligent censorship, by 
granting the use of specified codes, Ameri- 
can firms doing business with Europe might 
be assured of greater freedom and con- 
venience in their communications with their 
European correspondents. Despite protests 
innumerable, the British Government has 
been unwilling to grant to reputable Ameri- 
can merchants and associations privileges 
which they should have and reasonable im- 
munity from the activities of a not too intel- 
ligent censor. 

A study of the map of undersea com- 
munications, makes one thing convincingly 
clear: Great Britain not only dominates 
trade at sea, she practically controls all 
means of quick communication between the 
United States and Europe, Asia, Africa, 
Australia and South America. We are com- 
pletely at the mercy of the British Govern- 
ment in this respect. 



VII 



OUR LARGER INTERESTS 



WILL the positions which the present 
Administration has taken, during 
the progress of the European war, 
with reference to maritime warfare, bear in- 
spection in the cool light of the best inter- 
ests of the United States? To raise the 
question is to make no reflection upon the 
patriotism of the Administration. What- 
ever may have been the ruling motives which 
determined them, there is some reason to be- 
lieve that, from one cause or another, the 
Government of the United States has taken 
a series of positions which, when scrutinized 
in the light of commercial and political pos- 
sibilities of the future, work precisely the 
wrong way, so far as the interests of Amer- 
ica are concerned. 

Consider : 

Should the United States ever become in- 
volved in war, the war would be one of de- 
fense on our part. The American people 
would not sanction a war of aggression 
abroad. No one contemplates aggression. 
We entertain no ideas of aggrandizement 
that suggest an aggressive policy. The most 
pronounced advocates of a big army and a 
big navy dare not urge more than a policy 
of "preparedness" against attack. 

What, then, would be the effect of the poli- 
cies of the present Administration upon the 
ability of the United States to defend itself 
in a foreign war? 

The foreign wars in which we might pos- 
sibly become involved fall into the following 
general classes : 

(1) A war with some other Power or 
Powers on the American Continent. 

(2) A war with a European Power or 
a European alliance. 

(3) A war with an Asiatic Power or an 
Asiatic alliance. 

(4) A war with allied European and 
American, allied European and Asiatic, or 
allied American and Asiatic Powers. 

1. Suppose we were engaged in war with 
another American Power. 

We have taken the ground that it is legiti- 
mate for the manufacturers of any nation to 
supply the armies of another nation with 
arms and ammunition. We have gone fur- 
ther than this; we have taken the position 
that for a Power to deny the armies of an- 
other Power arms and ammunition would be 



unneutral; that is to say, that it is the duty 
of the people of one country to supply the 
armies of a belligerent Power with muni- 
tions of war. In a war between the United 
States and another American Power, it 
would consequently be the duty of European 
and Asiatic arms and ammunition manufac- 
turers to supply our opponent with weapons 
with which to fight against us. But this is 
opposed to the interests of the United States. 

2. The case would be still worse in the 
event of a war between the United States 
and a European Power. Under the prece- 
dents established by Mr. Wilson's Adminis- 
tration, it would be the duty of all European 
and Asiatic manufacturers to furnish arms 
and ammunition to the Power combating us. 
True, it would be their duty likewise to sup- 
ply us with arms and ammunition. But 
these would never be delivered to us. For, 
while the manufacturers of the various 
European and Asiatic countries would have 
no difficulty in transporting munitions of 
war overland to the army and navy of the 
European Power at war with us, they could 
by no means send them across the seas. We 
have acceded, practically, to the proposition 
that a blockade may be laid anywhere ; it is 
no longer necessary, under our admissions, 
that a blockade be laid before particular 
ports or that it be actually maintained by 
ships. A torpedo boat or two in the Strait 
of Gibraltar, a few mines in the English 
Channel and the North Sea, and the Atlantic 
seaboard of the United States would be in a 
state of blockade. Not only no ammunition, 
but nothing else, could get through. We 
should have all the ammunition makers of 
Europe and Asia furnishing our opponent 
with guns and shells, while we ourselves 
would be thrown upon our own resources. 

3. In the event of a war with an Asiatic 
Power, that Pow 7 ei* could procure overland 
from Europe all the munitions of war she 
desired, and it would be the duty of Euro- 
pean Powers to furnish her with these in- 
struments of combat. But it would be 
opposed to the interests of the United States 
to have Japan, for instance, supplied from 
Europe with arms to be used against us. 

4. In the event of an alliance between 
European and Asiatic Powers — and this is 
precisely the combination of Powers most 
likely to envisage us — the situation would 



44 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 




OUR LARGER INTERESTS 



45 



be far worse. All the arms manufactories 
in the rest of the world would be combined 
against the United States. We should prob- 
ably not be able to get anything overseas 
into our ports. 

The biggest navy we shall ever, by any 
possibility, build would be none too big to 
guard our own extensive coasts. We have — 
or Mr. Wilson's Administration has — made 
the submarine impossible as a weapon of 
defense, to say nothing of attack. Other- 
wise by far the most potent weapon of mari- 
time defense thus far invented, we have de- 
clared it an illegitimate weapon. The sub- 
marine, we say, must visit and search be- 
fore it acts. But a submarine cannot visit 
and search; a single shot from the lightest 
gun of a merchantman can sink a submarine. 

Furthermore, we have taken the position 
that a neutral vessel carrying ammunition 
may not be sunk if it happens to have a neu- 
tral citizen or subject on board. 

The truth of the matter is there is noth- 
ing which more vitally concerns the well- 
being, indeed the very existence, of the 
United States, more than the maintenance of 
the laws of war at sea as enunciated by the 
Declaration of London. Being isolated alike 
from Europe and Asia, our great defense is 
the sea. We have little interest in land war- 
fare, but we have the deepest interest in sea 
warfare. And it is not the naval battles, 
spectacular as these are, that concern us. 
For us the important matters are the laws 
of contraband, blockade and coast defense. 

The rules concerning blockade in whieh 
we are most interested are those laid down 
in articles 1, 2 and 18 of the Declaration of 
London, 1909 : 

1. A blockade must not extend beyond the ports 
and coasts belonging to or occupied by the enemy. 

2. In accordance with the Declaration of Paris of 
18S6, a blockade, in order to be binding, must be effec- 
tive — that is to say, it must be maintained by a force 
sufficient really to prevent access to the enemy coast 
line. 

18. The blockading forces must not bar access to 
neutral ports or coasts. 

The British Order in Council of March 
11, while not using the word blockade, prac- 
tically declared a blockade of the German 
coasts and of the coasts of the neutral coun- 
tries contiguous to Germany. As a matter of 
fact, there is no blockade at all. By the 
simple expedient of planting mines in the 
Strait of Dover and between the Orkney 
and Shetland Islands and the coast of Nor- 
way, neutral ships are compelled to enter 
British ports in order to obtain pilots 
through the mine fields. The waters north 
of Scotland are patrolled by small boats. 
Battleships and cruisers are safe in British 
harbors, keeping out of the way of German 
submarines. 

Contraband is denned by the British 
memorandum attached to the report of the 



London Conference on the Rules of Warfare 
at Sea as "neutral property on board ship 
on the high seas or in the territorial waters 
of either belligerent which (1) is by nature 
capable of being able to assist in, and (2) 
is on its way to assist in the naval or mili- 
tary operations of the enemy." When these 
two elements are combined, the capture of 
the goods by a belligerent is permissible. By 
the second simple expedient of considering 
that all merchandise on the way to Germany, 
or to countries adjacent to Germany, is ca- 
pable of assisting in the naval or military 
operations of Germany, and by the further 
assumption that it is on its way actually to 
assist in such naval or military operations, 
the whole distinction between contraband 
and innocent goods has been obliterated by 
Great Britain. 

In consequence of this new kind of block- 
ade, and of the new, all-embracing definition 
of "contraband," our entire commerce to and 
from Europe is surrendered to the control 
of any Power which has a predominant 
naval strength or which has a predominant 
geographical position. 

Against no country could these admis- 
sions work more harm than against the 
United States, separated as it is from Eu- 
rope by two oceans, and, moreover and espe- 
cially, commanded as are its coasts by. the 
British naval stations, whose iron ring 
around us must appall the stoutest heart 
that contemplates the map. 

While the Government of the United 
States allows its people to be plundered by 
the new definition of contraband enunciated 
by Great Britain, it takes, with regard to 
goods of an actual and always admitted con- 
traband character, namely, arms and ammu- 
nition, a position of peculiar contrast to its 
meek admissions Avith regard to goods here- 
tofore always considered innocent. 

There has been some difference of opinion 
among nations and among authorities on in- 
ternational law as to the duty of a neutral 
government to prevent its subjects engaging 
in contraband trade, some contending that 
such a duty exists; others, including the- 
United States, holding that the neutral State 
is under no duty to stop contraband ex- 
ports, the punishment being in the hands, 
of the belligerent adversely affected thereby.. 
But probably never has a nation undertaken 
to protect its citizens in the contraband 
trade and to claim (what the United States 
Government claimed in its recent notes to 
Austria) that contraband trade is legiti- 
mate, and that the United States Govern- 
ment has no control over it, or that the at- 
tempt to exercise such control would be un- 
neutral, and therefore impermissible. 

The net result of the positions we have 
taken, or acceded to with very mild protests, 
is the preposterous one that, while the Gov- 



46 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



ernment of the United States has no control 
over its own trade, even its contraband 
trade, with belligerents, any belligerent 
that is physically able to exercise it enjoys 
complete control over our trade, even in the 
most innocent articles. 

Take again our position with regard to the 
activity of submarines. We assert that a 
submarine may not sink merchant vessels 
belonging to the enemy without "visit and 
search." But visit and search is a right and 
not a duty ; a right, moreover, the assertion 
of which on the part of Great Britain the 
United States combatted for many years, 
finally going to war largely in its contention 
against it. Visit and search, furthermore, 
applies only to neutral vessels. It was an 
unheard of thing until the United States 
Department of State invented it, that a belli- 
gerent was compelled to visit and search an 
enemy ship before dealing with it. Visit 
and search was a privilege claimed with re- 
gard to a neutral vessel ; never a duty incum- 
bent upon a warship with regard to a bellig- 
erent vessel. Its purpose was that of ascer- 
taining whether the suspected craft carried 
contraband. But there is no longer a neces- 
sity for that, because all vessels leaving our 
shores for Europe carry contraband — under 
the new all-inclusive definitions. 

We insist also that all merchant ships 
carrying contraband shall be free from at- 
tack until after it is ascertained that no 
neutral citizen or subject is on board. We 
have asserted that the life of this hypotheti- 
cal neutral citizen or subject, who may be 
or may not be aboard, and who really has 
no right to be on board, is more vital than 
the right of the submarine commander to 
defend the lives of the soldiers of his coun- 
try who are beyond all question in the 
trenches where they will be attacked by the 
ammunition whicli the spared ship is carry- 
ing. 

Now no question is raised at this point 
regarding the justice of these claims. It is 
merely pointed out that their effect would 
be utterly to destroy the efficiency of any 
submarines of our own commission to de- 
fend our coast against attack or to prevent 
ammunition from reaching any enemies we 
might have. 

Considerable sentiment has been devel- 
oped in the United States in favor of a 
larger army and navy by way of prepared- 



ness for future wars. But the increase of 
our army to half a million men and the doub- 
ling or tripling of the size of our navy will 
not serve to overcome the disadvantage we 
shall labor under in consequence of the 
precedents we are allowing Great Britain to 
pile up against us in her interpretation of 
the laws of the sea, and the precedents we 
are piling up against Germany in our inter- 
pretation of the laws of the sea. 

We shall probably never send an army 
abroad, at least not to the other hemisphere. 
Our soldiers will stay at home to defend our 
own territory. But suppose a European or 
an Asiatic enemy obtains a foothold in 
America, or an American Power undertakes 
to invade us; his munitions of war, in his 
own merchant ships even, cannot be attacked 
by our submarines, provided he brings a neu- 
tral passenger with him. 

And as for our great navy, what good is 
a great navy unless it be the greatest navy? 
Great Britain maintains the right to have a 
navy equal to the sum of the two next largest 
navies in the world, plus ten per cent, Is it 
proposed to build a navy greater than the 
British navy? Is it for a moment believed 
that England would permit that? And even 
if England were to permit it, one need only 
take a glance at a map of the world on which 
is displayed Britain's widely-scattered and 
artfully-disposed naval stations to realize 
how very much greater indeed an American 
navy would have to be to hope to cope suc- 
cessfully even with a British navy consider- 
ably smaller. But, of course, our navy 
would not go abroad on aggressive expedi- 
tions. Its primary work would be to defend 
our territory — work that a navy of sub- 
marines could better do, if we had not ruled 
submarines out of warfare. We might, in- 
deed, do some blockade work, but it is we 
ourselves who would be the chief victims of 
the blockade. Great Britain, for instance, 
by her control of the narrow passages 
through which the commerce of the world 
is forced to pass, could practically, without 
moving a ship, cut us off from all connection 
with the rest of the world. Because, remem- 
ber, everything is contraband now, and a 
blockade may be thousands of miles away 
from the ports against which it is directed. 
And not England alone, but any other Euro- 
pean naval Power could cut us off from Eu- 
rope; while in conjunction with an Asiatic 
naval Power our enemy could absolutely 
close our ports. 



VIII 



LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 



Note. — It is impossible, for reasons explained on page 22, to obtain anything like a full list of ships de- 
tained and cargoes seized by Great Britain on their voyages between the United States and other neutral coun- 
tries, but the following list of carefully verified cases may serve to illustrate the methods by which the British 
Government is strangling American commerce. 

The first list includes the cases of 155 vessels brought into British ports or otherwise detained for ex- 
amination. Of these 40 were forced to discharge their cargoes, which were held for prize court proceedings. 
Thirty more were subjected to protracted detention, at great loss. One American vessel carrying oil to Copen- 
hagen was run aground by the English prize crew aboard her off the coast of Scotland. 

It will be noted that this list does not include cases like that of fhe WILHELMINA, which, when seized 
by the British, was bound for Hamburg with an innocent cargo, and the DACIA, which was seized by the French 
navy under British instructions. 

Nor does this list include the vessels, 273 in number, recorded by the Government of the United States 
in an appendix to its note of October 21st, as having been detained in the port of Kirkwall alone, between 
March nth and June 17th. The Government list is appended, bringing this merely illustrative record of ships 
detained up to a total of 428: 



LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 

S.S. KUMERIC, British. 

Sailed from Galveston, July 17, 1914, (via Newport News, July 24), for Bremen. 

Cargo — 49,000 bushels of grain. 

Taken to Queenstown, August 2. Detained at Liverpool, August 19. 
S.S. BERWINDMOOR, British. 

Sailed from New Orleans, July 21, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 196,000 bushels of grain. 

Diverted to Falmouth, August S. At London, August 21. 
S.S. CAMFANELLO, British. 

Sailed from New York. July 30, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Sent to Cardiff, August 12. Detained. 
S.S. SPENSER, British. 

Sailed from New York, July 31, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Sent to Liverpool. 
S.S. SAINT HELENA, British. 

Sailed from Galveston, July 16, 1914 (via Norfolk, Virginia, July 24), for Bremen and Hamburg. 

Cargo — Phosphate rock, wheat and cotton. 

Diverted to Manchester. Cargo seized August 12. Phosphate rock released as well as part of cotton. 
Large quantity of cotton and the wheat not released, including SO bales of cotton shipped by Alex- 
ander Spunt & Company, of Houston, Texas, and Bremen; claimed belonging to neutral subjects and as 
such not subject to seizure, also on ground that contract of sale between American citizens dated May 
8, 1914. 

These goods, including wheat, condemned in Prize Court. 
S.S. PENLOVER, British. 

Sailed from Galveston, July 18, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 264,000 bushels of grain. 

Diverted to Falmouth and ordered to London, August IS. 
S.S. KALOMO, British. 

Sailed from New Orleans, July 24, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 64,000 bushels of grain. 

Detained at Falmouth. At London, August IS. 
S.S. ANDIJK, Dutch. 

Sailed from New Orleans, July 30, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 136,000 bushels grain. 

Sent to Falmouth for orders. Arrived at Rotterdam, August 16. 
S.S. NORUEGA, Norwegian. 

Sailed from Galveston, July 30, 1914, for Christiania. 

Cargo — 40,000 bushels grain. 

Diverted to Falmouth. Arrived at Christiania, August 26. 
S.S. ORTERIC, British. 

Sailed from Galveston, July 27, 1914. (Newport News, August 4.) 

Detained at Queenstown, August 17. Arrived at Liverpool, August 21. Cargo for Bremen and Hamburg 
seized 
S.S. NITONIAN, British. 

Sailed from New Orleans, July 31, 1914, for Antwerp. 

Cargo — 142,000 bushels grain. 

Diverted to Falmouth. Arrived at London, August 22. At Antwerp, September S. 
S.S. GLENFINLAS, British. 

Sailed from New Orleans, August 1, 1914 (via Norfolk, August 7), for Rotterdam. 

Cargo— 108,000 bushels grain. 

Diverted .to Falmouth, August 26. At London, September 1. 
S.S. ST. DUNSTAN, British. 

Sailed from Galveston, August 4, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 122,400 bushels grain. 

Diverted to Cork for orders. At Liverpool, August 27. At Manchester, September S. 
S.S. MIRAMICHI, British. 

Sailed from New York, July 3, 1914 (via Galveston, July 23), for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — 16,000 bushels of wheat (part of cargo) shipped by Muir & Company for Rotterdam to-be de- 
livered to George Fries & Company in Colmar, Germany, and Gebrueder Zimmern & Company, Mannheim, 
Germany. Vessel not permitted to proceed to Rotterdam. Taken to Eastham and cargo consigned to 
Germany seized. 

Prize Court decided that goods seized were property of the American claimants and not subject to seizure. 

Ordered released to claimants (December, 1914). 
S.S. KLOSTERFOS, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, August 28, 1914, for Christiania. 

Cargo — Flour in barrels. 

Vessel stopped and boarded by British officers off the north coast of Scotland and ordered to Aberdeen. 

Held several days until neutral ownership of cargo was established. Arrived at Christiania, September 17. 
S.S. VITALIA, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, August 19, 1914, to Rotterdam. 

Cargo— Meat. 

Detained at Falmouth, September 7. 
S.S. LORENZO, American, (New York and Porto Rico Line). 

Chartered on August 2, 1914, by Gans S.S. Line. 

Sailed from New York, August 6, 1914, for Buentos Ayres. 

Cargo — Coal. 

Captured by British and taken to St. Lucia, September 12. 

October 16— Cargo condemned. 

October 30 — Vessel condemned. 
S.S. HEINA, Norwegian. 

Sailed from Philadelphia, August 7, 1914, for St. Thomas. , 

Cargo — Coal. 

Seized September 13, off St. Thomas, by French cruiser CONDE. 

Detained six months, released at Fort de France, March 20, 1915, reached New York, April IS, 1915. 



50 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

S.S. VESTFOS, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, August 28, 1914, for Christiania. 
Cargo — Flour in barrels. 
Stopped and boarded by British officers. 

Taken to Kirkwall. Left September 14. Arrived Christiania, September 17. 
S.S. RYNDAM, Dutch (Holland-America Line). 

Sailed from New York, September 8, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Seized by British warship and brought into Cork Harbor, September 17. Released September 20, at Queens- 
town. 
Again held up and ordered by British cruiser (September 21) to enter Falmouth. Arrived at Rotterdam, 
September 24. 
S.S. AMSTELDYK, Dutch (Holland-America Line). 

Sailed from Philadelphia, September 10, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Captured by British cruiser and taken to Queenstown, September 25. Released. Arrived at Rotterdam, 
October 12. 
S.S. ROTTERDAM, Dutch. 

Sailed from New York, September 15, 1914, for Rotterdam. 
Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers: American Smelting and Refining Company. 
United Metals Selling Company. 
American Can Metal Company. 
L. Vogelstein & Company. 
Norfolk Smelting and Refining Company. 
Seized September 26. En route while copper was made conditional contraband (absolute contraband only 

since October 29). 
Copper bought by Great Britain. 
Arrived Rotterdam, October 12. 
S.S. SLOLERDIJK, Dutch. 

Sailed from New York, September 9, 1914, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : American Metal Company, Ltd. 

L. Vogelstein & Company. 
Seized September 26. En route while copper was made conditional contraband (absolute contraband only 

since October 29). 
Copper bought by British Government. 
Arrived Rotterdam, October 6, 1914. 
S.S. POTSDAM, Dutch. 

Sailed from New York, September 22, 1914, for Rotterdam. 
Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. 
United Metals Selling Company. 
American Metal Company, Ltd. 
L. Vogelstein & Company. 
Seized October 9. 

Copper bought by British Government. 
Arrived Rotterdam, October 15. 
S.S. WESTERDYK, Dutch. 

Sailed from Baltimore, September 21, 1914, for Rotterdam. 
Cargo — Copper. 

Shipper: American Smelting and Refining Company. 
Seized October 9. 

Copper bought by British Government. 
Arrived Rotterdam, October 18. 
S.S. BETA, Swedish. 

Sailed from Philadelphia, September 23, 1914, for Helsmgborg and Oscarshamn. 
Detained and taken to Kirkwall for examination, October 12. 
■ Arrived at Helsingborg, October 21. 
S.S. AQUILA, Norwegian. . . 

Sailed from New York, September 23, 1914, for Christiansand, Korsoer and Copenhagen. 
Detained at Kirkwall, October 12, for examination. 
Arrived at Copenhagen, October 24. 
S.S. NICHOLAS CUNEO, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, September 26, 1914, for Christiania. 
Detained and taken to Kirkwall for examination, October 12. 
Arrived at Christiania, October 19. 
S.S. NOORDAM, Dutch .(Holland- America Line). 

Sailed from New York, October 6, 1914, for Rotterdam. 
Cargo of about 13,000 tons consigned to Dutch Government. 
Wheat, flour, foodstuffs diverted to Falmouth, October 15. 
S.S. LEANDER, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, September 25, 1914, for Copenhagen. 
Cargo — Grain. 

Arrived at Kirkwall, October 16. 
Detained for general inspection. 
Left October 17. 
S.S. BRINDILLA, Under American Flag. 

Sailed from Bayonne, New Jersey, on October 13, 1914. 
Cargo — Kerosene for Alexandria, Egypt. 

Steamer bought by Standard Oil Company from Riedermann Line and. transferred from German to Ameri- 
can registry under Underwood Amendment to the Panama Canal Act of 1914. 
Seized by British cruiser CARONIA just outside three-mile limit off Sandy Hook, October 18, and taken to 

Halifax, Nova Scotia. Submitted to Prize Court. 
Released. Left Halifax, October 30. 
S.S. DANIA, Danish (Scandinavian- American Line). 

Sailed from Philadelphia, September 26, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Detained about one week at Kirkwall. 



LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 51 

S.S. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, American. 

Sailed from Philadelphia, September 27, 1914, for Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Captured and taken to Orkney Islands. At Kirkwall, October 17. 
Released upon protest by United States after considerable delay. 
S.S. PRINZ DER NEDERLANDEN, Dutch (Royal Dutch West India Mail). 

Sailed from New York, September 4, 1914, for Havre and Amsterdam by way of West Indian and Venez- 
uelan ports. 
Taken at Falmouth on October 21. Arrived at Amsterdam, October 26. 
S.S. SAN, American, oil tank (Sun Oil Company, Philadelphia). 
Sailed from Philadelphia, October 8, 1914, for Amsterdam. 

Diverted, to Falmouth and released on October 25, at request of American Government. Arrived at Amster- 
dam, October 29. 
S.S. MARENGO, British. 

Sailed October 10, 1914, for Sweden. 
Cargo— Copper. 

Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Company. 
Held at Hull, October 25. 
S.S. ASCOT, British. 

Sailed from New York, October 10, 1914, for Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper. Consigned to order, but intended for delivery to Brown, Borari & Company, in Baden, 
Switzerland. 

Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company 450 Tons 

United Metals Selling Company 500 " 

American Metal Company, Ltd 300 " 

L. Vogelstein & Co 50 " 

Norfolk Smelting and Refining Company 40 " 

Total 1,340 " 

Held at Gibraltar, October 26, and seized. 
To Prize Court. 
S.S. SAN GIOVANNI, Italian. 

Sailed from New York, October 14, 1914, for Naples. 
Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. 

Held at Gibraltar, October 26. Cargo suspected to be intended for re-export to Germany. 
Arrived Naples, November 5. 
S.S. REGINA D'lTALIA, Italian. 

Sailed from New York, October 15, 1914, for Naples and Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper. 200 tons consigned to order, but intended for delivery to U. Vedorelli, Milan, Italy. 

Seized on October 26, at Gibraltar, and held for Prize Court. Cargo suspected to be intended for re-export 

to Germany. 
Arrived Genoa, November 11. 
S.S. JOHN D. ARCHIBALD, American Tank Steamer (Standard Oil Company). 
Sailed from New York, September 23, 1914, for Italy. 
Cargo — Oil. 

Held up by French cruiser and convoyed to Antibes, France. 
Detained two days pending decision as to whether cargo was contraband. 
Finally released and allowed to proceed. 
S.S. PROSPER III, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, October 3, 1914, for Copenhagen and Gothenburg. 

Cargo — Copper. 1,343,895 pounds of copper, valued at $166,649 for Copenhagen ; 246,361 pounds, valued at 

$30,559 for Gothenburg ; also foodstuffs and crude rubber. Arrived at Leith, October 27. 
Detained at Scottish port and placed before the Prize Court, copper being suspected for re-export to Ger- 
many. 
Arrived at Copenhagen, November 12. 
S.S.. SECURITY, American (Standard Oil Company Tug). 

On or about October 27, 1914, boarded and searched at St. John, N. B., by Canadian soldiers, who detained 

three German members of the crew. 
Upon protest of Captain, men were released, but not allowed to leave Canada. 
S.S. TYR, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, October 29, 1914, for Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. 

L. Vogelstein & Company. 
Held at Glasgow, November 2. 
Arrived Gothenburg, December 17. 
S.S. FRANCISCO, British. 

Sailed from New York, October 17, 1914, for Sweden. 
Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Company. 
Held at Hull, November 2. 
S.S. ULLER, Norwegian. 

Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, October 26, 1914, for Gothenburg. 
Cargo — Cotton. 

Detained for inspection at Kirkwall and allowed to proceed. 
S.S. ITALIA, Italian. 

Sailed from New York, October 24, 1914, for Italy. 
Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. 
United Metals Selling Company. 
Norfolk Smelting and Refining Company. 
Held at Gibraltar, November 8. - 
S.S. VERONA, Italian. 

Sailed from New York, October 24, 1914, for Naples, Genoa, and Palermo. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. 

United Metals Selling Company. 
Held at Gibraltar, November 8. 



52 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

S.S. PALERMO, Italian. 

Sailed from Boston, October 20, 1914, to Naples and Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : American Metal Company, Ltd. 300 tons. 

200 tons of copper consigned to order, but intended for Schweizer Metallwerke, Thonne, Switzerland. 

Held at Gibraltar, November 2. To Prize Court. 

Arrived November 7, at Naples. 
S.S. SAN GUGLIELMO, Italian. 

Sailed from New York, October 21, 1914, for Naples. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. 

Held at Gibraltar, November S. 
S.S. DUCA DI GENOA, Italian. 

Sailed from New York, October 17, 1914, for Naples and Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. 

Held at Gibraltar, November 8. 
S.S. ANTARES, Norwegian. 

Sailed October 22, 1914, for Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. 
L. Vogelstein & Company. 

Held at Liverpool. 

Arrived at Ardrossan, November 9, for Gothenburg. 
S.S. KROONLAND, American. 

Sailed from New York, October IS, 1914, for Italy. 

Cargo — Copper and rubber. 

Copper Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. 
United Metals Selling Company. 

Held November 8, at Gibraltar. 

Ordered before Prize Court. 

Arrived Naples, November 11. 
S.S. PLATURIA, American (entered under American Registry in October, 1914, Standard Oil Company). 

Belonged formerly to Deutsch Amerikanische Petroleum Gesellschaft (controlled by Standard Oil Company). 

Sailed from New York, October 5, 1914, for Aarhus, Denmark. 

Cargo — Illuminating Oil. 

Seized and taken to Stornoway, Lewis Islands, Scotland. 
S.S. KIRUNA, Swedish (Scandinavian-American Line) 

Sailed from New York, October 25, for Swedish ports. 

Cargo — General. 

Detained four days at Kirkwall. 
S.S. EUROPA, Italian (La Veloce Line). 

Sailed from New York, October 28, 1914, for Naples and Genoa. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Company. 

Detained at Gibraltar, November 9. 

Alleged contraband. Arrived at Naples, November 13. 
S.S. BJORNSTJERNE BJORNSON, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). 

Sailed from New York, October 28, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken into Kirkwall, November 10. 

Left Kirkwall, November 15. 

Ordered to Leith, November 16. 

Cargo discharged and seized, December 21. 

Steamer detained till May 25, 1915. 
S.S. FRIDLAND, Swedish. 

Sailed from New York, October 28, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General, including meat. 

Taken into Kirkwall, November 10. 

Left Kirkwall, November 27. 

Ordered to Newcastle, November 29. 

Cargo discharged, January 5, 1915. 

Steamer detained till early in May, 1915. 
S.S. IDAHO, British. 

Sailed from New York, October 24, 1914, for Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Company. 

Held at Hull, November 10. 

Left Hull, November 30, for New York. 
S.S. PERUGIA, British. 

Sailed from New York, November 8, 1914, for Italy. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. 

Held at Gibraltar, November 13. 
S.S. FRAM, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). 

Left Charleston, South Carolina, October 22, 1914, for Danish ports. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Taken into Aberdeen, November 13. Ordered to Hull. 

Left Newcastle, December 8. 

Arrived at Nyborg, December 18. 
S.S. JOS. W. FORDNEY, American (American Exporters' Line). 

Sailed from New York, November 7, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken into Falmouth and detained two days, then allowed to proceed. 
S.S. TAURUS, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, November 1, 1914, for Italy. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. 

Held at Glasgow, November 13. 



LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 53 

S.S. TABOR, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, October 26, 1914, for Italy. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. 

Norfolk Smelting and Refining Company. 

Held at Gibraltar, November 13. 

To Prize Court. 

Left Gibraltar, November 29. 
S.S. ALFRED NOBEL, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). 

Sailed from New York, October 20, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General, including meat 

At Lerwick, November 7. 

Left Lerwick, November 14. 

Ordered to Liverpool, cargo discharged, and seized November 17. 

Prize Court. 

Released May 13, 1915. 
S.S. TORONTO, British. 

Sailed from New York, October 31, 1914, for Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Company. 

Held at Hull, November 15. 
S.S. SIF, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, October 30, 1914, for Gothenburg. 

Cargo— Copper. 400 tons sold and consigned to B. Ursells' Successors, Stockholm, in order to meet objec- 
tions to consignments "to order." 

Held at Glasgow, November 18, for Prize Court. 

Arrived at Gothenburg, December 17. 
S.S. NORHEIM, Norwegian. 

Sailed October 17, 1914, for Italy. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : United Metals Selling Company. 
L. Vogelstein & Company. 

Held at Gibraltar, November 18. 
S.S. SIGRUN, Norwegian. 

Left New York, November 9, 1914, for Gothenburg and Malmoe. 

Seized November 26, and taken into Newport, England, December 2. 

Vessel detained pending search for suspected contraband. 

Cargo held for Prize Court included, for Gothenburg 560,894 pounds of copper valued at $/0,047; 222 pack- 
ages crude rubber valued at $21,414; 1,596 barrels lubricating oil valued at $8,778. For Malmoe: 1,009,53*. 
pounds copper valued at $126,871 ; 600 barrels lubricating oil valued at $3,300. For balance of cargo, con- 
sisting of oilcake, paraffine, cornoil, oats, cocoa, feed, tea, furs, engines and machinery, sewing machines and 
oleo, reshipment allowed. 

Sailed for Gothenburg, January 15, 1915. 

Arrived Gothenburg, January 25. 

Arrived Malmoe, February 16. 
S.S. GALILEO, British. 

Sailed from New York, November 7, 1914, for Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : L. Vogelstein & Co. 

Held at Hull, November 26. 

Left Hull, December 13, for New York. 
S.S. KIM, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). 

Sailed from New York, November 11, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General, including meat. 

Taken into Falmouth, November 27; left December 4. 

Ordered to Newcastle, December 8; cargo discharged and seized January 5, 1915. 

March 27, Prize Court ordered payment for cargo. 

Steamer detained until May 23, 1915. 
S.S. TANCRED, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). 

Left Port Arthur, Texas, November 13, 1914, for Danish ports. 

Cargo — Cotton 

Arrived at Falmouth. Detained for inspection, November 28. 

Left November 30. Arrived at Aarhus, Denmark, December 10, where cargo discharged. 
S.S. STRINDA, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). 

Sailed from New York, November 14, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken into Falmouth, November 29. After inspection allowed to proceed. 

Left December 3. 
S.S. RAN, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, November 13, 1914, for Liverpool and Sweden. 

Cargo — Cotton-seed products, copper and leather ; part for Liverpool, balance for Gothenburg and Malmoe. 

Taken into custody by British authorities, November 29,- and held as a prize. Released December 26. 
S.S. SANDEFJORD, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, November 27, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Prize crew put on board outside of Sandy Hook. 

Arrived at Halifax, November 30. 

Cargo partly discharged, suspected contraband. 

Arrived at Kirkwall, January 15, 1915. 

Sailed, January 16. 

Arrived at Copenhagen, January 19. 
S.S. GEORGE HAWLEY, American (American Exporters' Line. C. H. Sprague & Son, Boston). 

Sailed from New York, November 15, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken into Falmouth, November 30 : gave up ship's papers voluntarily for examination. 
Reason for detention : None given to Master officially. 

Released January 2, 1915, and proceeded with full cargo to destination. 

Other circumstances : Master protested in writing on December 5, 1914. Master was verbally informed by 
Customs Officers that they would have to hold the vessel on account of the flour, wheat and oil on 



54 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

board. Later Master was simply informed verbally that trouble was because the consignee of the SSO 
barrels of oil was at that time under suspicion by the British Government. On January 1, 1915, Master 
was told to proceed with his full cargo on board and no excuse or reason given for the thirty-three days' 
detention at Falmouth. Damage for detention at charter rates, etc., etc., amounted to $14,000. 
S.S. CANTON, Swedish. 

Sailed from New York, November 17, 1914, for Stockholm and Gothenburg. 

Cargo — Copper, 375 tons. 

Shipper : American Smelting and Refining Co. 

Held December 1, The Tyne. 
S.S. EDWARD PIERCE, American (American Exporters' Line. C. H. Sprague & Son, Boston). 

Sailed from New York, November 24, 1914, for Gothenburg and Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Taken into Falmouth, December 8. On December 13, proceeded with full cargo. 

Master was told verbally he was detained on account of flour and peas on board, although both were 
consigned direct to parties in Copenhagen. No excuse or reason given for delay. Master was shown 
a telegram to Customs Officers reading, "American S.S. Edward Pierce with suspected cargo from New 
York expected Falmouth about 6th inst. If she comes in send her immediately into harbor (Signed) 
F. C. December 3, 6 p. m." Detention premeditated days ahead on mere suspicion. 

Damage for detention at charter rates, etc., etc., amounted to $7,000. 
S.S. HERM, Norwegian (Gans S.S. Line). 

Sailed from New York, November 12, 1914, for Bilbao, Oporto, Lisbon, Genoa and Barcelona. 

Cargo — General. 

Stopped outside Lisbon ; ordered to Gibraltar, December 8. 

Released and sailed, December 14. 
S.S. MARACAS, American. 

Sailed from New York December 9, 1914, for Genoa, via Gibraltar and Naples. 

Brought into Halifax, N. S., by Prize Crew from British warship, December 12. 

No reason given for detention by officer in charge. 

Later allowed to proceed to destination upon assurance that cargo not destined to enemy ports. 

Arrived Genoa, January 10, 1915. 
S.S. BRINDILLA, American (Standard Oil Company). 

Sailed from Alexandria,, Egypt, on or about November 26, 1914. 

Arrived at St. Michaels, Azores, to take an oil cargo from a German steamer on December' 12. 

Reported leaving St. Michaels, December 20, for Copenhagen. 

Intercepted off the coast of Scotland and taken to Aberdeen. (Second seizure.) 
S.S. TELLUS, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, November 18, 1914, for Genoa. 

Cargo — 200 tons of copper, sold and consigned to U. Vedorelli, Milan. 

Seized and held at Gibraltar. 

Arrived Genoa, December 28. 
S.S. A. A. RAVEN, American. 

Sailed from Wilmington, Delaware, December 5, 1915, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

(First steamer since war to reach Dutch port with cotton for Germany.) 

Arrived at Rotterdam, December 24, 1914. 

Held up by British warship in Channel, delayed twenty-four hours for examination of papers. 
S.S. MIRJAM, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, November 24, 1914, to Copenhagen. 

Detained at Kirkwall, December 16. 

Released January 15, 1915. 
S.S. SORLAND, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, November 27, 1914, for Gothenburg. 

Cargo — 600 tons copper. 

Arrived at Leith, December 27. 

Detained. 

Arrived at Gothenburg, January 22, 1915. 
S.S. NEW SWEDEN, Swedish. • 

Sailed from New York, December 6, 1914, for Sweden. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Shippers : American Smelting and Refining Co. 

Arrived at Kirkwall, December 21. Held at Shields, December 28. 

Sailed January 10, 1915. 

Arrived Gothenburg, January 13. 
S.S. RAMSDAL, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, November 28, 1914, for Christiania. 

Taken to Kirkwall, December 21. 

Arrived at Leith, December 24, in charge of a Prize Crew. 

Arrived at Christiania, February 8, 1915. 
S.S. ZAMORA, Swedish. 

Sailed from New York, December 8, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Copper. 

Arrived at Kirkwall, December 29. 

Arrived at Copenhagen, January 11, 1915. 
S.S. KENTUCKY, Danish. 

Sailed from Baltimore, November 24, 1914, via New York for Copenhagen.. 

Detained at Kirkwall, December 16. 

Arrived at Leith, December 29. 714 tons of meat consigned to Denmark thrown into Prize Court. 

Arrived at Copenhagen, February 2, 1915. 
S.S. VIRGINIA, Danish. 

Sailed from Philadelphia, December 3, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

At Kirkwall. December 23. 

Arrived at Shields, December 30, 1914. 
S.S. GREENBRIER, American (C. L. Dimon, New York). 

Sailed from New Orleans, December 11, 1914 (via Norfolk, December 17), for Bremen. 

Cargo— Cotton, under certificate of British Consul at New York. 

Stopped on December 30, by British cruiser, boarded and searched. 

British flag hoisted and taken to Kirkwall. 

Detained three days and then taken to Leith and allowed to proceed to Bremen. 

Arrived at Bremen, January 9, 1915. 



LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 55 

S.S. TULA, American (Crucible Steel Company). 

Sailed from New York, December 1, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Grain and flour. 

Seized by the British and detained at Leith. 

Upon investigation as to ultimate destination of cargo permitted to proceed on December 31. 

Sailed January 7, 1915, and arrived at Copenhagen, January 11. 
S.S. HELIG OLAV, Danish (Scandinavian- American Line). 

Sailed from New York, December 3, 1914, for Christiansand and Copenhagen. 

Boarded at Kirkwall by British marines and detained eight days pending investigation as to character of 
cargo. 

Arrived at Copenhagen, December 23, 1914. 
S.S. ARKANSAS, Danish (chartered by Gans S.S. Company). 

Sailed from New York, December 11, 1914, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Meat. 

Arrived at Shields in charge of a Prize Crew, January 2, 1915. 

Arrived at Copenhagen, January 22. 
S.S. AUGUSTA, Swedish. 

Sailed from New York, December 9, 1914, for Gothenburg and Malmoe. 

Taken to Kirkwall. 

Arrived at Newcastle, January 4, 1915, in charge of a Prize Crew. 

At Hartlepool, January 10. 

Arrived at Gothenburg, February 1. 
S.S. ONEKA, British. 

Sailed from New York, January 2, 1915, for Piraeus, Greece. 

Cargo — American oil. (Standard Oil Company.) Partly for Bulgaria and Greece. 

Detained at Malta, being suspected delivery to Turkey. 
S.S. DENVER, American (Mallory S.S. Company, New York). 

Sailed from Norfolk, December 23, 1914, for Bremen. 

Cargo — Cotton. Loaded under supervision of British Consul at Norfolk. 

Detained January 6, 1915, at Kirkwall. 

Released on representation. 
S.S. GOVERNOR. American (Pacific Coast Company, New York). 

Detained by Canadian Customs Officials, January 13, 1915, at Vancouver, B. C. 

Cargo — Hides for San Francisco, California. 

Released after unloading hides. 
S.S. OSCAR II, Danish. 

Sailed from New York, February 4, 1915, for Christiania and Copenhagen. 

Taken into Kirkwall and held for examination as to her cargo. 

Arrived at Copenhagen, February 20. 
S.S. VITALIA, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, February 3, 1915, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Packing products. 

Taken into Falmouth, February 20. 

Released after cargo was consigned to Netherlands Oversea Trust. 
S.S. ANTILLA, American (New York and Cuba Mail S.S. Company). 

Sailed from New York, February 9, 1915, for Malmoe and Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Cattle food of various kinds. 

On February 24, stopped by British cruiser when in Lat. 59-58 N, Long. 9-14 W. 

No reason given. British cruiser ordered vessel to proceed to Kirkwall with a Prize Crew on board after 
four hours' detention while examining ship's papers. On March 9 was taken by British Prize Crew to 
Dundee. March 23, Admiralty discharged part of cargo in Dundee and reloaded the balance. On April 
27, vessel was allowed to proceed with remainder of cargo. 

Alleged damage to vessel for detention, etc., amounted to $98,000. 

Certified to both by Danish and British Consuls. 
S.S. PLATURIA, American Registry (Controlled by Standard Oil Company). 

Sailed from Philadelphia, February 13, 1915, for Malmoe and Helsingborg. 

Detained at Kirkwall, March 2. 
S.S. PASS OF BALMHA, American. 

Sailed from New York, January 30, 1915, for Bremen. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Detained at Kirkwall, March 8. 

Released after inspection. 

Arrived at Bremen, March 31. 
S.S. VIGILANCIA, American (Walker, Armstrong and Company, Savannah). 

Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, February 22, 1915, for Bremen. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Intercepted at sea by British cruiser, taken into Kirkwall. 

Arrived at Kirkwall, March 8. 

Arrived at Bremen, March 15. 
S.S. GREKLAND, Swedish. 

Sailed from New York, February 18, 1915, for Gothenburg. 

Cargo — American meat products. 

Held in Kirkwall from March 10, because destination of cargo suspected. 

Released and sailed April 1 for Gothenburg. 
S.S. A. A. RAVEN, American. 

Sailed from New York, February 13, 1915, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Meat. 

Held at Deal, March 12. 

Reconsigned to the Netherlands Oversea Trust. 

Arrived Rotterdam, April 2. 
S.S. SPYROS VALLIANOS, Greek. 

Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, March 10, 1915, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo — Cotton. 

Detained at Falmouth. 
S.S. LIVONIA, Danish. " ' 

Sailed from Galveston, March 20, 1915, for Aalborg and Copenhagen. 
Held at Falmouth, April 14. Bristol, May 6, pending settlement of price of cotton cargo. 



56 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

S.S. SEGURANCA, American. 

Sailed from New York on March 9, for Holland. 
Cargo — General. 

Consigned to consignees in Holland. 
Detained by the British in April. 

The Department of State protested against the detention of the Seguranca, stating that the shipper's manifest 
showed that the entire cargo was consigned to Dutch consignees and was accompanied by a certificate 
from the British Consul-General at New York, and that the loading of the vessel, moreover, had been 
supervised by the British Consul-General's inspector. The United States Government could not admit the 
right of the British Government to require that this cargo be reconsigned to the Netherlands Oversea 
Trust. 
S.S. OGEECHEE, American. 

Sailed from Bremen, April 4, 1915, for New York. 
Arrived at Sharpness, April 18. 
Cargo confiscated as being of German origin. 
Sailed for New York, May 1. 
Arrived May 18. 
S.S. SOUTHERNER, Danish. 

Sailed from Charleston, S. C, March 31, 1915, for Rotterdam. 
Cargo — Cotton. 

Detained at Falmouth, pending negotiations by Great Britain for the purchase of cotton on board. 
Arrived at Rotterdam, April 28. 
S.S. GIOVANNIG, Italian. 

Detained, but allowed to proceed on April 20, 1915, without discharging her cargo. 
S.S. KELBERGEN, Dutch. 

Sailed from New York, April 26, 1915, for Rotterdam. 
Taken into Kirkwall. 

Innocence of cargo established and released. 
S.S. MARIE, Swedish. 

Sailed from Galveston, Texas, March 13, 1915, for Malmoe, Sweden. 
Arrived at Clyde in charge of Prize Crew. 
Was stopped on suspicion regarding destination of cargo. 
S.S. ATHINAL, Greek. 

Sailed from New York, May 16, 1915, for Palermo and Piraeus. 
Arrived, and seized, at Gibraltar, May 29. 

Permitted to proceed after discharging 400 bales of cotton and 1,200 reels of barbed wire. 
Placed before Prize Court, charge being destination for Germany. 
S.S. GARGOYLE, American (Vacuum Oil Company). (Changed from German to American Registry.; 
Sailed from New York, May 10, 1915, for Alexandria. 
Cargo — Bulk oil. 
Reported at Malta, May 31. 

Seized by British authorities and Prize Court writ issued. 
S.S. F. J. LISMAN, American. 

Sailed from New York, May 23, 1915, for Rotterdam. 
General cargo consigned to Netherlands Oversea Trust. 

Held at London, June 8, and 1,000 barrels of phosphate removed for disposition by Prize Court. 
S.S. PORTLAND, American. 

Sailed from San Francisco, April 25, 1915, for Stockholm (via New York). 
Cargo — General. 
Detained at Kirkwall, June 16. 

Taken to Blyth, June 19, where 34 tons of dried fruit were sent to Prize Court. 
Arrived at Stockholm, July 8. 
S.S. VARING, Swedish. 

Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, May 30, 1915, for Swedish ports. 
Cargo — General. 
Detained at Kirkwall, June 19. 
S.S. BERGENSFJORD, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, June 12, 1915, for Bergen. 
Cargo — General. 
Taken to Kirkwall, June 21. 
Arrived at Bergen, June 24. 
S.S. NOR, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, June 5, 1915, for Rotterdam. 
Held in the Downs for examination of cargo, June 28. 
S.S. MUSKOGEE, American. 

Sailed from New Orleans, June 7, 1915 (Newport News, June 14), for Gothenburg. 
Taken into Kirkwall, July 5, and released July 7, for Gothenburg. 
Arrived July 9. 
S.S. BRATLAND, Norwegian. 

Sailed from Baltimore, June 15, 1915, for Aalborg, Denmark. 
Taken into Kirkwall, July 6. 
Arrived at Aalborg, July 12. 
S.S. JANNA, Norwegian. 

Sailed from San Francisco, March 4, 1915, for Bergen, Norway. 
Cargo — Grain. 

Taken into Kirkwall, July 8. 
Arrived at Bergen, July 19. 
S.S. GURRE, Danish. 

Sailed from Baltimore, July 1, 1915, for Aalborg, Denmark. 
Taken into Kirkwall, July 19. 

Released July 23, and sailed for Aalborg and Randers. 
S.S. HULDA MAERSK, Danish. 

Sailed from Savannah, Georgia, July 10, 1915 (Norfolk, July 13), for Malmoe. 

Cargo — Cottonseed. 

Detained at Kirkwall. 

Arrived at Malmoe, August 12. 



LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 57 

S.S. NECHES, American. 

Sailed from Rotterdam to the United States. 

Cargo — General. 

Detained at the Downs and brought to London, where cargo was discharged. 

The United States Government, July IS, 1915, made vigorous protest against the detention of the vessel and 
the unloading of the cargo, which was the property of American citizens, at London. 
S.S. BUFFALO, British. 

Sailed from New York, August 18, 1915, for Christiania. 

Cargo — Hacksaws. 

Arrived at Hull, September 5. 

Thrown into Prize Court on the assertion that cargo was bound for Germany. 
S.S. VITALIA, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, August 19, 1915, for Rotterdam. 

Cargo— Meat. 

Detained at Falmouth, September 7, and thrown into Prize Court, the British Government's contention 
being that there were fats and oils in the cargo not consigned to the Netherlands Oversea Trust. 
S.S. CORNING, American (Standard Oil Company). 

Sailed from Baton Rouge, La., August 17, 1915, to Malmoe. 

Cargo — Refined petroleum and naphtha. 

Detained at Kirkwall, September 7. 

Standard Oil Company placed the case in the hands of the American Government. 

Released. 

Arrived at Malmoe, September 28. 
S.S. OSCAR II, Swedish. 

Sailed from New York, September 9, 1915, for Christiansand. 

Taken to Kirkwall. 

Sailed September 21. 
S.S. LOUISIANA, Danish. 

Sailed from New York, September 15, 1915, for Copenhagen. 

Arrived at Kirkwall "prior to October 1, 1915," and sent to Aberdeen to discharge part of her cargo. 
S.S. UNITED STATES, Danish. 

Sailed from New York, August 26, 1915, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — General. 

Had unloaded at Copenhagen, when British Government ordered her to reload and to take cargo back to 
England under penalty of seizure. 
S.S. HELSINGBORG, Swedish. 

Sailed from Port Arthur, Texas, August 28, 1915, via Norfolk, for Aarhus, Denmark. 

Cargo — Cottonseed. 

Detained at Kirkwall, September 28. 

Arrived at Blyth, October 3. 
S.S. CALIFORNIA, Danish. 

Sailed from New York, August 31, 1915, for Christiania. 

Cargo — General. 

Detained September 29, at Leith. 
S.S. ABSALOM, Danish. 

Sailed from Philadelphia, September 12, 1915, for Copenhagen. 

Detained at Kirkwall. 
S.S. ORIGIN, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, September 14, 1915, for Kirkwall and Vallo. 

Detained at Kirkwall. 
S.S. PETROLITE, American (Standard Oil Company). 

Sailed from Philadelphia, September 15, 1915, for Copenhagen. 

Detained at Kirkwall, September 29. 

Arrived at Copenhagen^ October 8. 

(Had been previously detained by British authorities and released, August 17, 1915.) 
S.S. ST. JOHN, Swedish. 

Sailed from Baltimore, September 12, 1915, for Gothenburg. 

Detained at Kirkwall. 

Arrived at Gothenburg, October 8. 
S.S. ESTER, Swedish. 

Sailed from Port Tampa, Fla., September 5, 1915, for Newport News and Malmoe. 

Detained at Kirkwall, September 30. 
S.S. FREDERICK VIII, Danish. 

Sailed from New York, September_22,1915, for Copenhagen. 

Cargo — Bacon. 

Ordered to unload at Kirkwall, September 30. 
S.S. OSMAN, Swedish. 

Sailed from New Orleans, September 11, 1915, via Norfolk, for Copenhagen. 

Arrived at Kirkwall, Oct. 6. 

Released. 

Arrived at Copenhagen, October 12, 1915. 
S.S. CONRAD MOHR, Norwegian. 

Sailed from Baton Rouge, La., September 15, 1915, via Norfolk, for Bergen. 

Arrived at Kirkwall, October 7. 

Released. 

Arrived at Bergen, October 11. 
S.S. FRAM, Norwegian. 

Sailed from Baltimore, September 18, 1915, for Vaksdal. 

Arrived at Kirkwall, October 7. 

Released. 

Arrived at Bergen, October 11, 1915. 

Second seizure. 
S.S. ALADDIN, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New York, September 21, 1915, for Stockholm. 

Brought to Kirkwall, October 7. 

Released. 



58 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

S.S. ORION, Swedish. 

Sailed from Philadelphia, September 22, 1915, for Stockholm. 
Cargo — Coal. 

Brought into Kirkwall, October 10. 
Released October 14. 
S.S. VIGINIA, Danish. 

Sailed from New York, September 25, 1915, for Christiania and Copenhagen. 
Cargo — General. 

Taken to Kirkwall, October 10. 
Taken to Grimsby, October 19. 
To Prize Court. 
S.S. MEXICANO, Norwegian. 

Sailed from New Orleans, September 24, 1915, for Christiania and Copenhagen. 
Cargo — General. 
Detained at Kirkwall. 
Sailed October 12, 1915, for Christiania. 
S.S. HOCKING, American. 

(Formerly Danish, purchased and transferred by American Transatlantic Steamship Company to American 

Registry, July 31, 1915.) 
Objected to by British alleging that she was purchased with German capital. 
Sailed from New York, October 29, 1915, for Norfolk. 
Seized by British cruiser and taken to Halifax, N. S., October 31, in charge of Prize Crew convoyed by 

British warships. 
In charge of Admiralty Court. 
S.S. HAMBORN, Dutch (Munson Line). 

Sailed from New York, October 27, 1915, for Cuba. 
Cargo — General. 

Halted eighty-five miles from New York by British cruiser. 

Taken to Halifax, N. S., October 31, by Prize Crew, convoyed by British warships. 
In charge of Admiralty Court. 
S.S. LLAMA, American (Standard Oil Company). 

(Formerly German, transferred to American Registry.) 
Sailed from New York, October 14, 1915, for Copenhagen. 
Cargo — Oil. 

Seized by British Prize Crew and afterward run aground (October 31) on Skae Skerries, Westray Firth, 
Scotland. 
S.S. ATHAMAS, Greek. 

Sailed from Galveston October 15th, 1915 (Norfolk, October 24th), for Rotterdam. 
Seized and taken into British port, November 18th. 
ANDREW WELCH, American bark, George W. McNear, San Francisco. 
Sailed from San Francisco, August 19th, 1915, for Halstad, Sweden. 
Cargo — beans. 

Boarded by British prize crew off the Shetland Islands and ordered into Lerwick. 

On account of storms carried towards Norway and towed into Christiansand by S.S. "Russland," Novem- 
ber 17th. 
S.S. ZEALANDIA, American, sailed from Tampa Sept. 15, 1915, cargo: rosin, hides, rubber for Sweden, 
arrived at Pensacola Sept. 27th, left for Tampico Oct. 3rd, arrived at Progresso Oct. 25th bound for Malmoe, 
Sweden, boarded and searched by British crew, according to Captain, within three miles limit. Steamer still 
remains at Progresso on account of fear of capture. 
S.S. KRISTIANIAFJORD, Norwegian, sailed from New York November 6, 1915 for Bergen and Chris- 
tainia, general cargo, detained at Kirkwall, arrived at Bergen November 21st. Compelled to return to England 
6,000 cases of American pork, 1,800 bags of coffee, the ultimate destination of which having been questioned 
by British authorities. 
S.S. GENESEE, American, owned by American Tran satlantic Co., New York, sailed from New York Oc- 
tober 11, 1915, left Norfolk October 14 with cargo of coal for Montevideo, seized and boarded by British 
Prize crew, ordered to St. Lucia, November 20. 



On the following pages is an incomplete list of vessels carrying American cargoes 
which, sailing in practically all instances from American to Scandinavian ports, were di- 
verted by British authorities to the port of Kirkwall, or called at that port under instruc- 
tions from owners, between March 11, 1915, and June 17, 1915 : 



DETENTION RECORD OF A SINGLE BRITISH PORT 



Name of vessel. 

ELSA; part cargo put in prize court; 

ordered Sunderland discharge. 
MARACAS; cargo put in prize court; 

ordered Hull to discharge. 
GUDRUN; bound from Europe to the 

United States. 

AMPHITRITE 

JENS BANG; bound from Europe to 

the United States. 

RODFAZE 

RAN 

LISKEN ...: 

ABSALON 

WICO 

TORV1G 

GREEN BRIAR 

EINAR JARL 

OGEECHEE 

TANCRED 

JOHN BLUMMER . . . . 

SUTRA 

FROGNER 

HJORTHOLM 

CALIFORNIA 

UFFE; bound from Europe to United 

States via Ardrossan. 

CARL HENCKEL 

HELGA 

NEWA 

HAVET 

TERNO 

UNITED STATES 

TEXAS 

HAAKON VII 

VARING 

SINSEN 

OXELOSUND 

SIGURD 

MYRDAL 

SARK 

BORGLAND 

VARD 

NIKE: sailed for Newcastle 

GULFAXE 



Date of arrival Date of leaving 

Cargo. in British ports. British ports. 

'. March 11, 1915 March IS, 1915 



Cottonseed cake March 12 

March 12 

Maize March 12 

Maize and rye March 12 

Maize and rye March 12 

'■ March 12 

Oil March 13 

Cottonseed cake March 13 

March 13 

Cotton March 13 

•. • March 14 

Cotton March 14 

Oilcake March 14 

Cotton March 14 

General Vlarch 15 

March 17 

General March 17 

March 19 



. March, 11, 1915 March 16 

.March 11, 1915 March 11 



Cottonseed cake 
Cottonseed cake 
Cottonseed cake 



Maize . . 
General 
General 
Cotton . 
Oilcake 



Wheat 



NEW SWEDEN; prize crew to New- 
castle. 

STIKELSTAD 

KORSFJORD; whole cargo put in 
prize court; ordered Grimsby to dis- 
charge. 

CYGNUS : cargo put in prize court; 
ordered West Hartlepool to discharge 

INDIANIC; bound from Europe to 
United States. 

VESTA 

CARMELINA 

HENRIK; part cargo put in prize 
court; ordered to Leith to discharge. 

UNITA 

THORSDAL 

DROTT 

KARMA 

STRINDA 

IRIS 

LARGO 

VINCENT; bound from Europe to 
United States. 

RAN 

TERTE VIKEN ■ 

BRETAGNE 

BODEN 

AVONA 

HELMER MORCH 

CENTRIC 



General 

Maize and barley ....... 

Cotton 

Grain, oilcake and starch 

Maize 

Wheat, maize, rye and 

barley. 
General 



March 20. 

March 20. 

March 20, 

March 20 

March 20 

March 21 

March 21 

March 21 

March 21 

March 21 

March 21 

March 21 

March 22 

March 22 

■ March 22 

March 23. 

• March 23 

March 23 

. March 23 



General March 23 

Lard March 24, 



1915 March 14 

1915 March 12 ; 

1915 March 14 

1915 March 14 

1915 March 12 

1915 March 13 

1915 March 31 

1915 March 15 

1915 March 16 

1915 March 16 

1915 March 16 

1915 March 16 

1915 March 16 

1915 March 15 

1915 March 18 

1915 March 18 

1915 March 23 

1915 March 19 

1915 March 25 

1915 March 31 

1915 March 26 

1915 March 23 

1915 March 23 

1915 March 24 

1915 March 24 

1915 March 23 

1915 March 26 

1915 March 23 

1915 March 23 

1915 March 22 

1915 March 24, 

1915 March 28, 

1915 March 24 

1915 March 25 

1915 April 1 

1915 March 25 

1915 March 29 

1915 April A, 

1915 March 28 



1915 

1915 

1915 
1915 

1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 

1915 

1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 
1915 

1915 

1915 
1915 



General March 24, 1915 March 31, 1915 

March 24, 1915 March 24, 1915 

. . . March 24, 1915 March 25, 1915 

Cotton March 25, 1915 March 27, 1915 

General March 25, 1915 April 14, 1915 



Maize March 25, 

Maize March 25, 

Oilcake March 26, 

March 26, 

Cotton March 26, 

Cottonseed cake March 26, 

Rye March 26, 

March 26, 

Maize March 27, 

General March 27, 

Barley March 27, 

Wheat March 27, 

Cottonseed cake March 27, 

Oil cake March 27, 

Cotton March 28, 



1915 March 29, 1915 

1915 March 27, 1915 

1915 March 28, 1915 

1915 March 28, 1915 

1915 March 28, 1915 

1915 March 28, 1915 

1915 March 28, 1915 

1915 March 28, 1915 

1915 March 30, 1915 

1915 April 29, 1915 

1915 March 31, 1915 

1915 March 30, 1915 

1915 March 30, 1915 

1915 March 30, 1915 

1915 March 30, 1915 



60 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



Name of vessel. 

STAVN; part cargo put in prize court; 
sailed Leith to discharge. 

CLITRA 

ATHENS; cleared at Ardrossan 

DANMARK; cleared at Ardrossan.... 
BERGENSFJORD 



Date of arrival 
Cargo. in British ports. 

General March 28, 1915 . 



SIRIUS; bound from Europe to United 

States. 
BIA; whole cargo put in prize court; 

sailed to Manchester to discharge. 
OSCAR TRAPP; bound from Europe 

to United States. 

FIONIA 

SVERRE 

HILDING; part cargo put in prize 

court; sailed Leith to discharge. 

LIGURIA 

NYLAND 

ANTWERPEN 

CAPELLA 

ELLEN 

ATLAND 

DORTE JENSEN 

NORDLAND 

ALEXANDRA 

UTO; whole cargo put in prize court; 

steamer ordered to Hull to discharge. 
ROMSDALFJORD; part cargo put in 

prize court; ordered Sunderland to 

discharge. 

SVERIGE ....- 

HAMMERSHUS; cargo put in prize 

court; ordered to discharge at Glas- 
gow. 

ULRICK HOLM 

TESSIE 

ROMSDAL 

AVANCE 

HANS JENSEN 

KRONSTAD 

NEDENES 

STEINSTAD 

ALBIS; whole cargo put in prize 

court; ordered Middlesboro to dis- 
charge. 

LALY 

MAUD ; part cargo put in prize court; 

ordered Fleetwood to discharge. 

WALDIMIR REITZ 

KRONSPRINS OLAF 

ELSE 

CHUMPON 

LLAMA ". . = 

SORLAND; part cargo put in prize 

court; ordered West Hartlepool to 

discharge. 

MUSKOGEE ■. 

NAVAGO : 

ANNUM; part cargo put in prize court; 

ordered Hull to discharge. 

ALBERT W. SELMER 

SILJESTAD 

LEANDER 

MARIE; prize crew to Greenock 

JOSEPH W. FORDNEY; prize crew 

to Wallow Bay. 

IMO 

ARKANSAS 

VIRGINIA 

LAPLAND; part cargo put in prize 

court; ordered to Barrow to dis- 
charge. 
ZAMORA; part cargo |put in prize 

court; ordered to Barrow to discharge 

SELMA 

HELLIG OLAF 

PACIFIC; part cargo put in prize 

court; ordered Leith to discharge. 

SONGELV 

LEJRE; part cargo put in prize court; 

ordered Sharpness to discharge. 
MAGDALENE; ordered Manchester to 

discharge. 

DROT 

THOLMA 



Maize March 28 

March 29 

March 29 

General, mail and pas- March 30, 

sengers. 
March 30 : 

Cotton, March 30. 

March 30 

Barley and general March 31 

Barley March 31 

General March 31 



Cotton April 

Oats April 

April 

Oil cake April 

Maize April 

Wheat April 

Maize April 

Maize April 

General April 

Cottonseed cake April 

General April 

Wheat and rye April 

Rum, hides April 



Grain April 

Cottonseed cake April 

April 

Cottonseed cake April 

Maize April 

April 

Maize April 

Maize and rye April 

General April 



Cotton and tobacco April 

Cotton and flour April 

Oilcake April 

Cotton and oil cake April 

Maize April 

Cotton April 

Oil April 

General April 



April 

General -^Pnl 

General April 

Rye A P"1 

Maize April 

April 

Cotton'..' April 

April 

Cottonseed cake April 

General April 

Rye April 

General April 



Grain and copper April 

April 

General " ' April 

General April 



Cottonseed cake April 

Cotton April 



Cotton April 12 

April 12 

April 12 



1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 



Date of leaving 
British ports. 

..April 1, 1915 

.April 2, 1915 

..April 29, 1915 

..April 29, 1915 

..April 6, 1915 



1915 March 30, 1915 

1915 April 7, 1915 

1915 March 31, 1915 

1915 April 6, 1915 

1915 April 13, 1915 

1915 April 7, 1915 



1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 



1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 



1915. 
1915. 

1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 



1915. 
1915. 
1915. 

1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 

1915. 
1915. 
1915. 
1915. 



1915. 

1915. 
1915. 
1915. 

1915. 
1915. 

1915. 



April 


4, 


1915 


April 


3, 


1915 


April 


2, 


1915 


April 


3, 


1915 


April 


3, 


1915 


April 


2 


1915 


April 


4, 


1915 


April 


4, 


1915 


April 


4, 


1915 


April 


11, 


1915 



1915 April 12, 1915 

1915 April 4, 1915 

1915 April 17, 1915 



. April 
.April 
.April 
.April 
.April 
.April 
. April 
. April 
.April 



6, 1915 

7, 1915 
4, 1915 
7, 1915 
7, 1915 



1915 
1915 



. April 
. April 

.April 
.April 
.April 
.April 
. April 
. April 



. April 
. April 
. April 

. April 
. April 
. April 
.May 
. April 

. April 
. April 
.April 
. April 



9, 1915 
11, 1915 



13, 1915 

17, 1915 

7, 1915 

13, 1915 

20, 1915 

13, 1915 

13, 1915 

10, 1915 



14, 1915 

11, 1915 

11, 1915 

10, 1915 

10, 1915 

10, 1915 
3, 1915 

19, 1915 

11, 1915 
14, 1915 
11, 1915 
13, 1915 



.April 16, 1915 



.April 
. April 
. April 



13, 1915 

15, 1915 

16, 1915 



April 19, 1915 
April 20, 1915 



....May 2, 1915 

1915 ..April 14, 1915 

1915 April 14, 1915 



LIST OF SHIPS DETAINED 61 

Date of arrival Date of leaving 

Name of vessel. Cargo. in British ports. British ports. 

AMERICA; part cargo put in prize General April 12, 1915 April 16, 1915 

court; ordered Sunderland to dis- 
charge. 

N. F. HOLDING Grain ■. April 12, 1915 April 14, 1915 

GEORGIA; prize crew to Sharpness. .. Cotton ..' April 12, 1915 April 20 1915 

TOHAN SIEM Cottonseed cake April 13, 1915 April 15 1915 

HANS BROGE: cleared at Ardrossan.. Rye April 13,1915 April 13 1915 

TORDIS Cottonseed cake April 13,1915 April 15 1915 

BALTIC; ship ordered to Hull to dis- Cotton April 13, 1915 May 13, 1915 

charge. 

BRAKER Maize April 13,1915 April 18,1915 

ROMA .. Lubricating oil April 13, 1915 April 17, 1915 

L. H. CARL; cleared at Ardrossan April 13, 1915 April 13, 1915 

HERO Maize April 14, 1915 April 16, 1915 

MIRJAM Rye ■ A.pril 14, 1915 April 16, 1915 

KONG HAAKON Maize April 14,1915 April 27,1915 

DICIDO; prize crew to Fleetwood Cotton April 14. 1915 May 1 1915 

LARS KRUSE Maize ...April 14, 1915 April 16, 1915 

TALAVERA Maize Vpril 14,1915 April 17,1915 

FALKA Cottonseed cake April 15, 1915 April 17, 1915 

CAROLINA; ordered Grimsby to dis- Cotton April 15, 1915 May 2, 1915 

charge. 

LOUISIANA; ordered Hull to dis- General \pril 16, 1915 April 23, 1915 

charge part cargo. 

MEXICANO; ordered Greenock with General April 16, 1915 April 18, 1915 

prize crew. 

ANGLIA; prize crew to Dundee Cotton and resin April 16, 1915.. .. April 24 1915 

JUNGSHEVD April 16, 1915 April 18^ 1915 

ORN; cleared at Ardrossan April 16, 1915 April 16 1915 

BRETAGNE ■ April 17, 1915 April 19' 1915 

STORAKER Maize April 18,1915 April 21,1915 

OLAF KYRRE; ordered Grimsby to Cotton April 19, 1915 May 5, 1915 

discharge cotton. 

HEROS ' Wheat and rye April 20, 1915 April 22 1915 

BERTHA Maize April 21,1915 April 23 1915 

WILH COLDING; cleared at Ardros- April 21, 1915 April 21, 1915 

san. 

KRISTIANIAFJORD General cargo, mail "and April 21, 1915 April 22, 1915 

passengers. 

GOTHARD Cottonseed cake April 21,1915 April 23 1915 

CHRISTIAN MICHELSEN General April 21,1915 April 24 1915 

EIDSWA Cottonseed cake April 21, 1915 April 24, 1915 

TOMSK April 22, 1915 April 27, 1915 

REGINA Cottonseed cake April 22,1915 April 24 1915 

RUSS Cottonseed cake April 22,1915 April 24,1915 

HOGLAND; bound from Europe to April 23, 1915 April 23, 1915 

United States. 

RANDULF HANSEN Maize April 23, 1915 April 25, 1915 

ST. CROIX Cottonseed cake April 23,1915 April 25 1915 

RINGHORN Rye April 24,1915 April 25 1915 

PIONEER Petroleum April 24, 1915 April 26, 1915 

CARL HENKEL; via Newcastle for April 24, 1915 April 24 1915 

bunkers. 

HERO ; cleared at Ardrossan April 24, 1915 April 24 1915 

LOCKSLEY Wheat April 24, 1915 April 27 1915 

KENTUCKY General April 24, 1915 April 27, 1915 

SOBORG Maize and barley April 25,1915 April 27,1915 

ARTEMIS; prize crew to Avonmouth. . General April 25 1915 April '8 1915 

GROINTOFT Maize and barley April 25^ 1915 April 26, 1915 

HANS JENSEN; via Ardrossan for April 25, 1915 April 25,1915 

bunkers. 

KONGSFES Oil cake April 26, 1915 April 28, 1915 

BRYNH1LD; cleared at Ardrossan April 26, 1915 April 26, 1915 

DRONNING OLGA; prize crew to Wheat, lard, etc April 27, 1915 April 30, 1915 

Leith. 

KRANSPRINS FREDERICK Barley April 27, 1915 April 29, 1915 

SALINA Rye and Maize \pril 28, 1915 April 29, 1915 

IVAR; cleared at Ardrossan Maize April 28,1915 April 28 1915 

NERBOTTEN Coal and lubricating oil. .April 28,1915 April 30,1915 

FREDERICIA; cleared at Ardrossan April 29, 1915 April 29 1915 

WICO; cleared at North Shields Ballast April 29] 1915.' ......... April 30^ 1915 

CAROLYN; prize crew to Leith Cotton and turpentine April 29, 1915 May 3', 1915 

VARING; via Newcastle for bunkers April 30, 1915 May 1, 1915 

INLAND; cleared at Ardrossan May 1 1915 May l' 1915 

UNITED STATES Mails and passengers .... May 2, 1915 May 4 1915 

JENS BANG Maize May 2, 1915 May 4, 1915 

LUDVIG PEYRON Wheat May 4, 1915 May 5, 1915 

MINERVA; prize crew to Newcastle. . General May 4, 1915. May 7 1915 

HATHOLMEN Cottonseed cake May 4,1915 May 6^ 1915 

BUR Wheat May 6, 1915 May 8, 1915 

PETROLITE Petroleum lubricating oil. May 7,1915 May 9,1915 

AUGUSTA : prize crew to Leith General May 7, 1915 May 10, 1915 

GERD; prize crew to Leith General May 7,1915 May 10 1915 

THEKLA Linseed cake May 7,1915 May 10,1915 

ORION Maize May 8,1915 May 10,1915 

PARIS; cleared at Ardrossan Lubricating oil May 8,1915 May 8,1915 

OTTERSTAD Cottonseed cake May 8,1915 May 10,1915 



62 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



Name of vessel. 

SIGYN; prize crew to Ipswich. 

GUDRUN 

OSCAR II 



Cargo 



LONDON: prize crew to Barrow 

MARICOPA 

GUNBORG; prize crew to Dundee... 

LIV 

LOCH TAY 

NORDIC; prize crew to Manchester. 

INDIANIC; prize crew to Leith 

VINLAND 

SVEN; prize crew to King's Lynn.... 

SKINFAXE 

OOMAN 

PROSPER III; cleared at Ardrossan. 

DANIA 

JOHN BLUMER 

GURTH 

SOMMERSTAD 

SYDLAND; prize crew to West 

Hartlepool. 

UFFE ; cleared at Ardrossan 

REDFAXE 

EXCELLENCE PLESKE 

VULCAN; cleared by customs on June 

5, but detained by Admiralty. 

ESTER 

SIGURD: cleared at Ardrossan. 

DRAMMENSFJORD 

GLENDOOM 

PYTHIA; prize crew to Immingham. . 



Date of arrival 
in British ports. 

. Wheat, rye and maize. . . . May 

, Maize May 

General cargo, mail and May 
passengers. 

Lubricating oil May 

. Gas oil May 

General May 

Rye May 

General May 

General May 

General May 

•Maize May 

fRock, phosphate May 

, Maize May 

Maize ■ May 

May 

General May 

Maize May 

Wheat May 

Maize May 

General May 



8, 1915 May 

8, 1915 May 

9, 1915 May 



Date of leaving 
British ports. 

14, 1915 

9, 1915 

10, 1915 



10, 1915 May 13, 1915 

10, 1915 May 19, 1915 

10, 1915 May 12, 1915 

11, 1915 May 12, 1915 

11, 1915 May 19, 1915 

12, 1915 May 15, 1915 

12, 1915 May 17, 1915 

13, 1915 May 15, 1915 

13, 1915 May 24, 1915 

14, 1915 May 16, 1915 

14, 1915 May 16, 1915 

14, 1915 May 14, 1915 

14, 1915 May 19, 1915 

15, 1915 May 18, 1915 

15, 1915 May 17, 1915 

18, 1915 May 20, 1915 

18, 1915 May 21, 1915 



SOPHIE 

ALDEBARAN 

KIRUNA 

FREDERICK VIII. 



JUSTENSEN; cleared at Ayr 

ROMANOFF 

TYR; cleared by customs on 25th 

AMPHITRITE 

OLAF; cleared at Ardrossan 

EINAR JARL; prize crew to Sunder- 
land. 

LLAMA 

EDDERSIDE 

H. V. FIEKER 

MARIETTA DI GIORGIO 



LYEGLINT 

SYDIC 

VIDAR 

LEELANAW; cleared for Archangel. 

BRETAGNO; Tyne for bunkers 

POLSTAD 

GULFAXE 

ROS 

M. J. MANDAL- cleared at Ayr 

WHINLATTER; detained 

NARVIK 

BEDEN 

NORDKYN; prize crew to Leith 

POLARINE; detained 

CARL HENCKEL 

JEMTLAND; prize crew to Leith 



PLATURIA: detained 

CALIFORNIA 

DJURSLAND 

CUSHING 

ABSALON 

LISA; detained 

WICO 

BALTO 

NORDHAVET; prize crew to Gribsby 

NEW SWEDEN 

OSCAR TRAPP 

HANS JENSEN 

SIGNE; cleared by customs; taking 
bunkers: expect sail July 2, 1915. 

DORTE JENSEN; cleared at Ardros- 
san. 

PORTLAND; prize crew to Blyth 



21, 1915 May 21, 1915 

22, 1915 May 25, 1915 

23, 1915 May 27, 1915 

23, 1915 June 9, 1915 

23, 1915 May 25, 1915 

23, 1915 May 24, 1915 

25, 1915 May 27, 1915 

25, 1915 May 27, 1915 

27, 1915 May 30, 1915 

27, 1915- May 29, 1915 

28, 1915 May 30, 1915 

28, 1915 May 30, 1915 

28, 1915 May 29, 1915 

28, 1915 May 28, 1915 

28, 1915 June 30, 1915 

29, 1915 June 29, 1915 

29, 1915 June 1, 1915 

29, 1915 May 29, 1915 

29, 1915 June 11, 1915 

29, 1915 June 5, 1915 

30, 1915 June 1, 1915 

31, 1915 May 31, 1915 

1, 1915 June 18, 1915 

1, 1915 June 3, 1915 

1, 1915 June 3, 1915 

2, 1915 June 6, 1915 

2, 1915 June 26, 1915 

3, 1915 June 5, 1915 

3, 1915 June 6, 1915 

3, 1915 June 5, 1915 

6, 1915 June 8, 1915 

6, 1915 June 6, 1915 

6, 1915 

6, 1915 June 8, 1915 

6, 1915 June 10, 1915 

8, 1915 June 17, 1915 

8, 1915 

9, 1915 June 11, 1915 

9, 1915 June 12, 1915 

10, 1915 

11, 1915 June 19, 1915 

11, 1915 June 17, 1915 

12, 1915 June 13, 1915 

13, 1915 June 13, 1915 

13, 1915 

13, 1915 June 14, 1915 

14, 1915 June 15, 1915 

14, 1915 June 19, 1915 

14, 1915 June 15, 1915 

14, 1915 June 14, 1915 

14, 1915 June 16, 1915 

14, 1915 June 30, 1915 



SEACONNET; prize crew to New- 
castle. 



. Oil cake May 

. Rye May 

. Cottonseed cake May 

Oil May 

.Cottonseed cake May 

Oil cake May 

. General May 

. Cottonseed cake May 

. Cotton and cottonseed May 
cake. 

. Cottonseed cake May 

. Maize May 

. Wheat May 

.General mail and pas- May 
sengers. 

, Maize May 

.Barley May 

General May 

Rye May 

Cottonseed cake May 

Cottonseed cake May 

Gas oil May 

Oil cake May 

Maize May 

Gas oil and lubricating Tune 

oil. 

Oil cake June 

Wheat June 

.Cottonseed cake June 

Cotton June 

Maize June 

.Cottonseed cake June 

.Maize June 

.Rye June 

Maize June 

Barley and oil cake June 

Rye June 

Coal June 

Maize June 

Petroleum and naphtha. . . June 

Cottonseed cake June 

Resin, cotton, cottonseed June 

cake oil. 

Oil June 

General June 

Oil cake June 

Petroleum June 

Lubricating Oil June 

Resin Tune 

Oil June 

Coal June 

Agricultural implements . . June 

Gas coal June 

Pitch pine wood Tune 

Maize June 

General June 

Maize June 15,1915 June 15,1915 

Barley, beans, dried fruit June 15, 1915 June 18, 1915 

and oil cake. 
General June 16,1915 June 19,1915 



IX 



QUOTATIONS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE 



THE PATRIOTIC PRESS OF A CENTURY AGO 



ENGLAND AND THE LAW OF 
NATIONS 

From The General Advertiser, Philadelphia, 
Dec. 16, 1793 

The law of nations is the tacit acquies- 
cence of nations, in those rules by which 
they consent to be governed in their transac- 
tions, with respect to each other. This law 
must therefore vary as civilization softens 
and improves the general mass of manners, 
among those nations whose mutual inter- 
course subjects them to similar laws. Thus 
it was anciently held that the conqueror had 
the power of life and death over the con- 
quered — and from thence was deduced the 
practice of holding prisoners in a state of 
slavery. The humanity of modern nations 
has exploded this doctrine, and the law of 
nations limits the power of the conqueror to 
a temporary confinement. The ancient law 
of nations declared, that an enemy's prop- 
erty, or even the subject of a power at war, 
might be taken from a neutral ship, provid- 
ed that freight and demurrage were paid ; so 
that the neutral vessel lost nothing by the 
capture. The violence and inconveniences 
that this law, even thus qualified, gave birth 
to, induced the Empress of Russia to pro- 
pose during the last war, an alteration of it, 
whereby neutral vessels should be inviolate, 
except ivlien carrying contraband goods, and 
to prevent any misapprehensions on that 
subject, she enumerated the contraband 
goods — to this law all Europe (with one ex- 
ception) and the United States formally ac- 
ceded. Britain, the exception alluded to, 
not being willing to relinquish her piratical 
system, did not formally acknowledge the 
rule — however, she respected it so far, as to 
confine her aggressions to the weaker states, 
and those aggressions produced here were 
with the United Netherlands. But as one 
individual of a community cannot prevent 
the operation of a law which the majority 
impose, the law of nations has by their con- 
sent been changed, notwithstanding the dis- 
sent of Britain ; and that this is the opinion 
of the President, appears from his appealing 
to the modern law of nations in his procla- 
mation. It follows, therefore, that every 
seizure and detainer of our vessels; every 
condemnation of their cargoes, under pre- 
tense of their belonging to an enemy, is an 
open and gross violation of the modern law 
of nations. But why do we talk of modern 



law? There is no law either ancient or mod- 
em — no law either human or divine — that 
confines her usurpations, that sets bounds 
to her violence. By a late proclama- 
mation of the British King, every vessel 
carrying the produce of our own country, of 
any kind, to any port of France, is made 
liable to seizure: she must suffer the insol- 
ence of British cruisers, and be compelled to 
dispose of her cargo at such rates as they 
choose to give. In what law of nations has 
this usurpation upon the rights of a neutral 
power ever been found? Injury does not stop 
her — it goes further and declares, that when- 
ever any place shall be declared to be in a 
state of siege, that every vessel going towards 
it shall be lawful prize — so that the Royal 
Proclamation alters the nature of things, 
and makes that a state of siege, which is not 
so actually; and that contraband which no 
law of usage ever declared to be such. 



ENGLAND AND THE RIGHTS OF 
NEUTRALS 
From The Aurora, Philadelphia, 
May 30, 1801 
Who is there that can regard the great 
laws which connect society and establish the 
rights of property, that will assert the legiti- 
macy of a seizure upon the property of a 
traveler on shore? Is the character of prop- 
erty changed, or the title of the proprietor 
changed, by the accident of my rice or to- 
bacco being on board a ship instead of being 
in my store or on my plantation? 



From The Aurora, June 17, 1801. 
We shall put the case in a simple point of 
view. Mr. Higginson, at Boston, plans a 
voyage to Canton. The ship on her outward 
passage is met by the English frigate Bos- 
ton, but, not satisfied with her papers, or 
obtaining information from a vindictive sea- 
man, or a person sent by the British Captain 
to ship as a seaman in the American vessel 
that the cargo was French property, or 
contraband, the vessel is carried into Provi- 
dence or Halifax; there she is libelled — 
lawyers of course are engaged and fees given 
in proportion to the value of the ship and 
the cargo, and the ship after a few months' 
detention is delivered up, after an expendi- 
ture of from five to six thousand dollars, 
court fees, and lawyers' fees ; beside the de- 
lay of the voy r age, the expense of the crew, 



QUOTATIONS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE 



65 



and the interest upon the value of the whole 
— even if the cargo has escaped pillage — 
this is only a case in the mildest form, thou- 
sands of which have occurred since the 
British treaty. 

(From The Aurora, December 13, 1805.) 
As war itself is an outrage of moral jus- 
tice, and indifferent nations are not allowed 
to interfere in their disputes, so neither are 
indifferent nations to be involved in the con- 
sequences of their dispute; for a vice or 
crime, that is war, is itself sufficiently afflict- 
ing to those who are engaged in it ; the prin- 
ciples of universal justice demand then that 
those who are not concerned or involved in 
it, should be exempted from its effects. This 
was, in fact, the principle of the armed neu- 
trality of 1780. The object was to secure 
peaceable nations from the injuries and 
wrongs of nations arrogant and despotic, and 
who being themselves at war, would not suf- 
fer any other nation to be at peace. 

We infer, therefore, that if the moral law 
— of which Christians and Christian nations 
boast so much — is to be the standard of right 
and wrong, that it cannot be maintained, 
that the peace, property, liberty, rights, and 
independence of free, peaceable nations, can, 
consistently with the moral law, be inter- 
rupted or injured; and that if the moral law 
is to prevail (and if it does not there is an 
end of all law), that the peaceable nation 
has the right to the full latitude of the 
treaties quoted to trade with all the world 
unmolested. 



( From The Aurora, December 16, 1805. ) 

A dollar at sea is 100 cents on shore — a 
robbery of my ship of five or ten thousand 
dollars is as much a robbery and a wrong 
done to me as the robbing of my house in 
town or country of the like amount. 

If the law of nations is to be decided by 
coercion — then let Britain plunder on the 
ocean until she once more incenses and com- 
bines all nations against her. We cannot 
meet her in a line of battle at sea — for her 
fleets cover it ; we must, therefore, make war 
where we can, sequester first; and if that 
does not procure justice, embargo; if that 
fails, confiscate; and then we cannot be 
worse treated than we have been and are 
daily. 



(From The Aurora, December 17, 1805.) 

It is time then that we do not submit to 
the reproach of conniving at a total change 
of the usages of civilized nations — it is time 
that we rescued ourselves from the disgrace 
of an abandonment of the principles of the 
armed neutrality of 1780, in which the true 
principles of neutral national right were as- 
serted. These principles . . . cannot 
be but constantly kept in view, "a nation in- 



dependent and neutral, does not lose by the 
war of others, the right which they had be- 
fore the war, because peace exists between 
her and all the belligerent powers." Without 
receiving or being obliged to follow the laws 
of either of these she has a right to follow, 
in all places (contraband excepted) the traf- 
fic which she would have a right to carry on 
if peace existed between all other nations, 
as it existed here. 

That neutral vessels have a right to navi- 
gate freely from port to port, even on the 
coasts of the powers at war. 

That the effects of the subjects of the pow- 
ers at war shall be free in neutral vessels on 
the high sea, except such as are acknowl- 
edged by all nations to be contraband. 

That as the blockade of a port is to be un- 
derstood only where a vessel cannot enter 
without evident danger, on account of vessels 
of war stationed there to form an effectual 
blockade. . . . 

But moral justice does not enter into the 
English interpretation of the law of nations. 
Her principles and her practices are anal- 
agous to those of the highway robber, who, 
because he carries a pair of pistols, forbids 
the unarmed and innocent travelers, whom 
he meets on the road, from passing till he has 
plundered them. . . The right of search, 
which was at first a qualified right, subject 
to restrictions within the bounds of reason- 
ableness, has been extended to a search the 
most vexatious and injurious to the cargo, 
on the high seas; to the disregard of papers, 
and to breaking open of hatches and pack- 
ages. 

The next step was, from the right of car- 
rying into port upon strong and palpable 
suspicion of contraband, to carrying in at 
discretion. 

From this followed the extension of the 
principle of contraband to articles not 
actually war-like, such as timber and metals, 
because they MIGHT be used in war. After 
this extension, the principle of contraband 
was enlarged to food, and even to the vul- 
gar luxury of tobacco. After flour and to- 
bacco had been determined to be contraband 
of war, it was not at all surprising that Eng- 
land should believe she had befooled or dis- 
mayed mankind; and having involved Hol- 
land in war, and commanded Genoa and 
Tuscany to declare war, when they wished 
to be, and it was their interest to be, at 
peace; it was not at all wonderful to find 
England attempting to accomplish by a 
proclamation what she could not effect by 
her fleets, the blockade of the whole coast. 

The blockade of the whole world, however, 
suitably succeeded, for in fact such is the 
effect of the orders, decrees and decisions of 
the English privy council and courts. 

Take the new principles, or rather the vio- 
lation of all just principles, held up by the 
English concerning the navigation of neu- 



66 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



trals, and it amounts to this : That the ports 
of a nation at war with England and the 
ports of the colonies of that nation are in a 
state of blockade, when England chooses to 
publish an Order in Council; and whenever 
she does not choose to issue such an order, 
it is to be considered that she relaxes from 
the straight rule, and this, of course, is con- 
sidered as an indulgence! If the law of na- 
tions and the laws of war were to be regu- 
lated in this way, it would be absurd in the 
last degree to talk of national independence. 
Not only the United States, but every nation 
on earth would be no better than the vassals 
of England. 

The neutral nation is not surely bound to 
lie still and suffer ! . . . England says : 
"No ! I am at war in defense of all order and 
all religion, and all government — have I not 
stood up for the Pope in 1795, and the Turk 
in 1805 — have I not taken the Mogul and the 
Mahattahs under my protection — and shall 
I not take the golden bull and the Republic 
of Genoa under my effective protection 
now?" Extravagant and ludicrous as this 
personification of England is — it furnishes 
as coherent argument as any that can be set 
up in support of its oppression of neutrals. 



(From The Aurora, Dec. 5, 1805.) 

Britain boasts that her present greatness 
is owing to her navigation laws — let the 
United States form theirs also. 



(From The Aurora, Dec. 18, 1805.) 
It has been too long the fashion to esteem 
other countries before our own .... 
and it is time that the fashion of loving our 
country should once more resume its benefi- 
cent and cheering influence. Our situation 
is original in the annals of the world; our 
youth do not sufficiently appreciate the 
superiority of our country over other na- 
tions, in every particular that has been con- 
sidered meritorious and worthy of historical 
celebrity and the imitation of great and 
noble minds. It is time that our youth should 
begin to feel this honor and to act upon it. It 
is time that we think with a boldness and 
dignity suited to the originality and glory of 
their condition, and that they learn to pre- 
serve sacred and to hand down to their suc- 
cessors the glorious gifts which the virtues 
of their forefathers have secured for them by 
the sacrifice of so much blood — -those sacri- 
fices should be constantly kept in sight— and 
every invasion of our national rights should 
be deemed an invocation on us to rise, reas- 
sert and defend them under every peril. 



Note. — The "Aurora" was the most in- 
fluential newspaper in the United 8tates in 
the .beginning of the nineteenth century. 
Founded by Benjamin Franklin Bache, son- 
in-law and heir of Benjamin Franklin, is- 
sued from the Franklin printing house at 
No. 15 Franklin Court, Philadelphia, and 
carried on by William Duane after Bache's 
death, the "Aurora" teas the chief single 
agency that wrought the election of Jeffer- 
son and framed the policies of the Govern- 
ment after the Republican party had begun 
its fifty-year lease of power. 

To the printing office of the "Aurora" 
early in the nineteenth century came a 
young immigrant, James Wilson, grand- 
father of the twenty-eighth President of the 
United States. James Wilson became chief 
compositor on the "Aurora," and as such 
worked for a number of years. He was de- 
voted to his chief, even naming his first son 
William Duane Wilson. In 1812, the name 
of James Wilson went up as owner of the 
"Aurora.", 

In reading extracts like those above 
(which might be multiplied many fold), one 
is constrained to ask himself whether, dur- 
ing the past hundred years, civilization has 
advanced or retreated. Have manners soft- 
ened, or grown more barbarous? Have 
peaceable populations maintained their 
rights in fuller degree, or have they yielded 
those they had already achieved? Are the 
patriotic sentiments which these idols of 
their day — Bache and Duane — penned, and 
which the young Irish immigrant (not being 
afraid of a hyphen more or less, he called 
himself a Scots-Irish-American) put into 
type — are they uncongenial to the minds of 
Americans today? Were those sentiments 
mistaken, were they inhumane, toere they 
unenlightened? Or, are they merely too vig- 
orous? 

In short, why are not the views which 
James Wilson put into type a century ago 
appropriate to the pen of his grandson to- 
day? 



QUOTATIONS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE 67 

THOMAS JEFFERSON ON NEUTRAL RIGHTS 

[Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, to Mr. C. Pinckney, United States Minister in London, 
September 7, 1793.] 



The state of war existing between Great 
Britain and France furnishes no legitimate 
right either to interrupt the agriculture of 
the United States or the peaceable exchange 
of its produce with all nations, and conse- 
quently the assumption of it will be as law- 
ful hereafter as now, in peace as in war. No 
ground, acknowledged by the common rea- 
son of mankind, authorizes this act now, 
and unacknowledged ground may be taken 
at any and at all times. 

We see then a practice begun, to which 
no time, no circumstances, prescribe any 
limits, and which strikes at the root of our 
agriculture, that branch of industry which 
gives food, clothing and comfort to the great 
mass of the inhabitants of these States. If 
any nation whatever has a right to shut up 
to our produce all the ports of the earth, 
except her own and those of her friends, she 
may shut up these also, and so confine us 
within our own limits. No nation can sub- 
scribe to such pretensions; no nation can 
agree, at the mere will or interest of another, 
to have its peaceable industry suspended and 
its citizens reduced to idleness and want. 
The loss of our produce, destined to foreign 
markets, or that loss which would result 
from an arbitrary restraint of our markets, 
is a tax too serious for us to acquiesce in. 



It is not enough for a nation to say we 
and our friends will buy your produce. We 
have a right to answer that it suits us bet- 
ter to sell to their enemies as well as their 
friends. Our ships do not go to France to 
return empty; they go to exchange the sur- 
plus of our produce which we can spare for 
surpluses of other kinds which they can 
spare and we want; which they can furnish 
on better terms, and more to our mind, than 
Great Britain or her friends. 

We have a right to judge for ourselves 
what market best suits us, and they have 
none to forbid to us the enjoyment of the 
necessaries and comforts which we may ob- 
tain from any other independent country. 

Were we to withhold from her (France) 
supplies of provisions, we should in like 
manner be bound to withhold them from her 
enemies also, and thus shut to ourselves all 
the ports of Europe where corn is in demand 
or make ourselves parties in the war. This 
is a dilemma which Great Britain has no 
right to force upon us, and for which no pre- 
text can be found in any part of our con- 
duct. She may, indeed, feel the desire of 
starving an enemy nation, but she can have 
no right of doing it at our loss nor of mak- 
ing us the instruments of it. 



Thomas Jefferson to Baronne de Stael Holstein, May 24, 1813. 



England is in principle the enemy of all 
maritime nations. The object of England is 
the permanent dominion of the ocean, and 
the monopoly of the trade of the world. To 
do this she must keep a larger fleet than her 
resources will maintain. The resources of 
other nations then must be impressed to 
supply the deficiency of her own. This 
is sufficiently developed and evidenced by 
her successive strides towards the usurpa- 
tion of the sea. Mark them after her first 
war, after William Pitt, the little, came in- 
to her administration. She first forbade 
neutrals all trade with her enemies in time 
of war, which they had not in time of peace. 
Then she forbade them to trade from the 
port of one nation to that of another at war 
with her, although a right fully exercised in 
time of peace. Next instead of taking ves- 
sels only entering a blockaded port, she took 
them over the whole ocean, if destined to 
that port, although ignorant of the blockade, 



and without intention to violate it. Then 
she took them returning from that port, as 
if infected by previous infraction of block- 
ade. Then came her paper blockades, by 
which she might shut up the whole world 
without sending a ship to sea, except to take 
all those sailing on it, as they must, of 
course, be bound to some port. And these 
were followed by her orders of Council, for- 
bidding every nation to go to the port of an- 
other nation without coming first to some 
port of Great Britain, there paying a trib- 
ute to her, regulated by the cargo, and tak- 
ing from her a license to proceed to the port 
of destination; which operation the vessel 
was to repeat with the return cargo on its 
return. And finally that her views may not 
longer rest in inference, in a recent debate, 
her minister declared in open parliament 
that the object of the present war is a 
monopoly of commerce. 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



PRESIDENT MADISON ON PAPER BLOCKADES 

(From President Madison's Message to Congress, June 18, 1812.) 



Under pretended blockades, without the 
presence of an adequate force, and some- 
times without the practicability of applying 
one, our commerce has been plundered in 
every sea; the great staples of our country 
have been cut off from their legitimate mar- 
kets; and a destructive blow aimed at our 
agricultural and maritime interests. In ag- 
gravation of these predatory measures, they 
have been considered as in force from the 
dates of their notification; a retrospective 
effect being thus added, as has been done in 
other important cases, to the unlawfulness 
of the course pursued. And to render the 
outrage the more signal, these mock block- 
ades have been reiterated and enforced in 
the face of official communications from the 
British Government, declaring, as the true 
definition of a legal blockade, "that particu- 
lar ports must be actually invested, and 
previous warning given to vessels bound to 
them not to enter." 

Not content with these occasional expedi- 
ents for laying waste our neutral trade, the 
Cabinet of Great Britain resorted at length 



to the sweeping system of blockades, under 
the name of Orders in Council, which has 
been moulded and managed as might best 
suit its political views, its commercial 
jealousies, or the avidity of British cruisers. 
To our remonstrances against the com- 
plicated and transcendent injustice of this 
innovation, the first reply was that the or- 
ders were reluctantly adopted by Great 
Britain as a necessary retaliation on decrees 
of her enemy proclaiming a general block- 
ade of the British Isles, at a time when the 
naval force of that enemy dared not to issue 
from his own ports. She was reminded 
without effect that her own prior blockades, 
unsupported by an adequate naval force, 
actually applied and continued, were a bar 
to this plea; that executed edicts against 
millions of our property could not be re- 
taliation on edicts confessedly impossible 
to be executed; that retaliation, to be just, 
should fall on the party setting the guilty 
example, not on an innocent party which 
was not even chargeable with an acquies- 
cence in it. 



PRESIDENT GRANT'S IDEA OF AN "UNFRIENDLY ACT" 

[Mr. Fish. Secretary of State, to Mr. Washburn, Minister at Paris, October 4, 
1870. (See For. Rel. 3rd S. Jflst C, Executive Documents I, Franco-German War, 37.)]. 

marine league. But of this there is no posi- 
tive evidence. She has entered the port of 
New York, as claimed by some, for the pur- 
pose of watching a German steamer about 
to sail thence. Three of them have put into 
the harbor of New London, which looks out 
upon Long Island Sound, the eastern en- 
trance to the New York Harbor, avowedly 
for small repairs. One recently asked per- 
mission, which was granted, to make some 
repairs at the Norfolk navy yard, near the 
entrance of Chesapeake Bay. 

All this may be consistent with an inten- 
tion of perfect observance of the neutral 
character of our waters and jurisdiction and 
with an entire absence of undertaking any 
hostile movement against the vessels of 
north Germany from those waters or that 
jurisdiction. 

A large trade has been carried on from the 
ports of the United States approached by 
the waters in which these vessels have thus 
appeared by vessels belonging to north Ger- 
many. 

The appearance of French vessels in these 
immediate neighborhoods in such numbers 
and force does not fail to excite the alarm 
of these vessels and must have the effect to 
a greater or less degree of diminishing that 
trade. 

The United States is not prepared at pres- 
ent to say that any actual violation of in- 



This government desires and intends to 
maintain a perfect and strict neutrality be- 
tween the two powers now unfortunately en- 
gaged in war. It desires also to extend to 
both the manifestation of its friendly feel- 
ing in every possible way and will allow to 
the vessels of war of each power equally the 
hospitality of its ports and harbors for all 
proper and friendly purpose. 

But this hospitality is liable to abuse, and 
circumstances have arisen to give rise in 
the minds of some persons to the apprehen- 
sion that attempts at such abuse have taken 
place. 

I am not in possession of facts to justify 
me in saying that such has been the case, 
but I have deemed myself justified in call- 
ing the attention of M. Berthemy, the 
French representative at this capital, to the 
current rumors, sustained as they are by the 
presence of a number of French vessels upon 
the coast of the United States. These ves- 
sels have appeared at or near the entrance 
of the harbor of New York, off Sandy Hook ; 
at the entrance of the Long Island Sound 
and at or near the entrance of Chesapeake 
Bay. One or more is represented to have 
been anchored not far from Sandy Hook, the 
main entrance to New York Harbor, and 
there is a difference of statement as to the 
precise distance at which she lay from 
shore; some claiming that she was within a 



QUOTATIONS PERTINENT TO THE ISSUE 



69 



ternational law has been committed or that 
the hospitality of these waters has been posi- 
tively abused. But the hovering of the ves- 
sels of war of a belligerent on the coast near 
the entrance of the principal ports of a 
friendly power does interfere with the trade 
of the friendly power. 

The interruption of the regular communi- 
cation with you by reason of the investment 
of Paris has led me to represent to M. 
Berthemy our views on this subject and to 



say that, although the vessels of either bel- 
ligerents may not actually shelter within the 
jurisdiction of the United States and pro- 
ceed thence against the vessels of its enemy, 
this government would regard as an un- 
friendly act the hovering of such vessels 
upon the coast of the United States near to 
its shores in the neighborhood of its ports 
and in the track of the ordinary commerce 
of these ports with intent to intercept the 
vessels of trade of its enemy. 



THE BRITISH 



AND GERMAN WAR ZONES 

(Special to the New York Times.) 



COMPARED 



Washington. Feb. 7, 1915. — Develop- 
ments to-day with respect to the German 
war zone proclamation indicate that the 
American Government is not likely at this 
time to file any protest or make representa- 
tions to the German Government respecting 
the enforcement of the German order. The 
long memorandum delivered by the German 
Foreign Office to Ambassador Gerard, ex- 
plaining the proclamation, has been received 
at the State Department, and perusal of its 
text, which was cabled to American news- 
papers this morning, convinced officials here 
that at present no issue could be raised with 
Germany over the creation of the projected 
war zone without at the same time raising 
identically the same issue with Great 
Britain. 

The German memorandum transmitted by 
Ambassador Gerard emphasizes the fact — 
a vitally important one in the present sit- 
uation — that Great Britain has declared 
the entire Worth Sea to be a tour area, and 
that if England has not made impossible the 
passage of neutral shipping through the sea 
between Scotland and Norway she has ren- 
dered "it so difficult and so dangerous that 
she has to a certain extent effected a block- 
ade of neutral coasts and neutral ports, in 
violation of all international laws." 

The fact that the British Government has 
done identically the same thing with re- 
spect to the establishment of war zones in 
the open seas beyond the three-mile terri- 
torial limit, has been officially certified to 
the State Department by Sir Cecil Spring- 
Rice, the British Ambassador. This was 
dove three months ago, and no protest has 
en r been made by the United States against 
the action of Great Britain in establishing 
such a war zone. Since the American Gov- 
ernment has not protested against nor ques- 
tioned the right of Great Britain to estab- 
lish its war zone, it is evident that it would 
be impossible for the United States^ without 
a violation of its attitude of strict neutral- 
ity, to attack or even question the German 
war zone proclamation at this or any other 
time, without similarly questioning the Brit- 
ish war zone order. 



Trump Card for Germany. 

It dawned upon officials here today that 
the German Government had executed a 
rather neat and clever counter-diplomatic 
stroke in notifying the world of its inten- 
tion to create a war zone around the Brit- 
ish Isles by taking a leaf out of the British 
book, and doing the very thing that the Brit- 
ish Government had done. The British and 
German war zone orders, as officially com- 
municated to the State Department, were 
compared and closely studied today. This 
comparison was not found to be to the dis- 
advantage of the Germans. 

The situation resolves itself something 
after this fashion : For England the official 
date of the beginning of the war was August 
1th. England waited until three months of 
the war had been fought and then served 
notice on the neutral powers of the world of 
her intention to establish a war zone. The 
British war zone teas set up on November 
•5th. The Germans watted an additional 
three months, twice as long as did Great 
Britain, or until February Jfth, exactly six 
months from the official British beginning of 
the icar, and then announced its decision to 
establish a war zone, very similar to that of 
Great Britain, although someiohat more- ex- 
tensive. However, the principle involved 
with respect to both war zones is the same, 
since each is extensive enough to cover the 
high seas outside of the three-mile territor- 
ial limit, and the two war zones differ in im- 
portance only in degree, and the character 
of the operations to be conducted in them. 

War Zones Compared. 

A comparison of the British and German 
war zone orders disclosed these striking 
facts : 

First. — The British Government on Nov. 
4th, notified the United States Government 
that its war zone would be effective from 
Nov. 5th — one day's notice. 

Second. — The German Government issued 
its war zone proclamation on Feb. 4th, and 
communicated it to Ambassador Gerard on 
the same day, announcing that the German 
war zone around the British Isles would be 



70 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



effective after Feb. 18th — fifteen days' 
notice. 

Third. — The British war zone covers the 
whole of the North Sea. 

Fourth. — The German war zone covers 
the entire English Channel and all the ter- 
ritorial and high sea waters around the Brit- 
ish Isles. 

Fifth. — The British war zone order 
sought to close the north of Scotland route 
around the British Isles to Norway, the Bal- 
tic, Denmark and Holland. 

Sixth. — The German war zone seeks to 
close the southern or English Channel route 
around the British Isles to Holland, Nor- 
way, Sweden, Denmark and the Baltic. 

Seventh. — The British war zone decree 
drew an arbitrary line from the Hebrides 
Islands along the Scottish coast to Iceland, 
and warned neutral shipping that it would 
cross this line at its risk, but that ships of 
neutral nations might go to Holland and 
other neutral nations along the eastern lit- 
toral of the North Sea by taking the Eng- 
lish Channel and Straits of Dover route. 

Eighth. — The German war zone declares 
that neutral vessels will be exposed to dan- 
ger in the English Channel, but routes of 
navigation around the north of Scotland Is- 
lands in the eastern part of the North Sea 
and in a strip thirty miles wide along the 
Dutch coast are not open to the danger zone. 

Ninth. — The Germans make the south- 
ern channel route dangerous, and declare the 
north of Scotland route safe, while the Brit- 
ish declare the north of Scotland route dan- 
gerous and the English Channel route safe, 
the effect of this being that neither the north- 
ern nor the southern routes around England 
will be safe for neutral vessels. 



Tenth. — The British war zone order was 
based on the discovery of mines in the North 
Sea, while the German decree is based on 
England's attitude toward contraband, the 
Wilhelmina case and England's establish- 
ment of a war zone. 

The British Proclamation. 

Here is the text of the communication in 
which the British Ambassador three months 
ago notified the American State Department 
of the establishment of the British war zone : 

Owing to the discovery of mines in the North Sea 
the whole of that sea must be considered a military 
area. Within this area merchant shipping of all 
kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all 
other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dan- 
gers from mines, which it has been necessary to 
lay from warships, searching vigilantly by night 
and day for suspicious craft. 

All merchant and fishing vessels of every descrip- 
tion are hereby warned of the dangers they encoun- 
ter by entering this area except in strict accordance 
with Admiralty decisions. Every effort will be made 
to convey this warning to neutral countries and to 
vessels on the sea, but from the Sth of November 
onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships pass- 
ing a line drawn from the northern point of the 
Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland do 
so at their own peril. 

Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from 
Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland are ad- 
vised to come, if inward bound, by the English Chan- 
nel and Straits of Dover. There they will be given 
sailing directions which will pass them safely so far as 
Great Britain is concerned, up the East Coast of Eng- 
land to Faroe Island, whence safe route will, if pos- 
sible, be given to Lindesnaes Lightship. From this 
point they should turn north or south, according to 
their destination, keeping as near the coast as possible. 
Converse applies to vessels outward bound. 

By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of 
all countries will be able to reach its destination in 
safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any 
straying, even for a few miles, from the course thus 
indicated may be followed by serious consequences. 



X 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 



DECLARATION OF PARIS 

April 16, 1856. 

Declaration respecting maritime law signed by the plenipotentiaries of Great Bri- 
tain, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia- and Turkey, assembled in Congress at 
Paris, April 16, 1856. 

Article 2 
The neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the- exception of contraband of war. 

Article 3 
Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to cap- 
ture under the enemy's flag. 

Article 4 

Blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective, that is to say, maintained 
by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coasts of the enemy. 



DECLARATION OF LONDON* 

Feb. 26, 1909. 

Preliminary Provision. 

The Signatory Powers are agreed that the rules contained in the following Chapters 
correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law. 



BLOCKADE. 



Article 1 — A blockade must not extend beyond the ports and coasts belonging to or 
occupied by the enemy. 

Article 2 — In accordance with the Declaration of Paris of 1856, a blockade, in order 
to be binding, must be effective — that is to say, it must be maintained by a force sufficient 
really to prevent access to the enemy coastline. 

Article 3 — The question whether a blockade is effective is a question of fact 

Article 5 — A blockade must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations 

Article 17 — Neutral vessels may not be captured for breach of blockade except 
within the area of operations of the warships detailed to render the blockade effective. 

Article 18 — The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts. 

Article 19 — Whatever may be the ulterior destination of a vessel or of her cargo, 
she cannot be captured for breach of blockade if, at the moment, she is on her way to a 
non-blockaded port. 

CONTRABAND OF WAR. 

Article 22. 

The following articles may, without notice, be treated as contraband of war, under 
the name of absolute contraband:— 

( 1 ) Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive 
component parts. 

(2) Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive compo- 
nent parts. 

(3) Powder and explosives especially prepared for use in war. 

(4) Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and their 
distinctive component parts. 

( 5 ) Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character. 

(6) All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 

(7) Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war. 

(8) Articles of camp equipment, and their distinctive component parts. 

(9) Armour plates. 

(10) War-ships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such a 
nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war. 

(.11) Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of muni- 
tions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land or sea. 



* The Declaration of London Concerning the Laws of Naval Warfare was made at a Conference initi- 
ated by the British Government in a circular to the Powers. The British Government suggested the subjects 
to be discussed, the invitations were accepted, and the Conference met on the 4th of December, igo8. For the 
assistance of the Conference the British Government had collected material into a volume which became known 
as the Red Book and which served as a basis for the deliberations of the Conference. All the Powers convened 
in the Conference {namely: the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Japan, Italy, Germany, Austria- 
Hungary, Spain and Holland) were signatory to the Declaration, which, however, on account of various circum- 
stances, failed to receive the formal ratification of the Powers. The authority^ of the Declaration of London, 
nevertheless, rests upon the Preliminary Provision, which declares that the principles enunciated in the Declara- 
tion are those which are in substance recognized principles of international law. There is in international law 
no authority higher than this. 



74 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

Article 23. 

Articles exclusively used for war may be added to the list of absolute contraband 
by a declaration which must be notified. 

Such notification must be addressed to the Governments of other Powers, or to their 
representatives accredited to the Power making the declaration. A notification made 
after the outbreak of hostilities is addressed only to neutral Powers. 

Article 24. 

The following articles, susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace, 
may, without notice, be treated as contraband of war, under the name of conditional con- 
traband : — 

(1) Foodstuffs. 

(2) Forage and grain, suitable for feeding animals. 

(3) Clothing, fabrics for clothing, an i boots and shoes, suitable for use in war. 

(4) Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money. 

(5) Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war, and their component parts, 

(6) Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks and their 
component parts. 

(7) Eailway material, both fixed and rolling-stock, and material for telegraphs, 
wireless telegraphs, and telephones. 

(8) Balloons and flying machines and their distinctive component parts, together 
with accessories and articles recognisable as intended for use in connection with balloons 
and flying machines. 

(9) Fuel; lubricants. 

(10) Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war. 

(11) Barbed wire and implements for fixing and cutting the same. 

(12) Horseshoes and shoeing materials. 

(13) Harness and saddlery. 

(14) Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments. 

Article 25. 
Articles susceptible of use in war as well as for purposes of peace, other than those 
enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, may be added to the list of conditional contraband by a 
declaration, which must be notified in the manner provided for in the second paragraph of 
Article 23. 

Article 26. 
If a Power waives, so far as it is concerned, the right to treat as contraband of 
war an article comprised in any of the classes enumerated in Articles 22 and 24, such in- 
tention shall be announced by a declaration, which must be notified in the manner pro- 
vided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. 

Article 27. 
Articles which are not susceptible of use in war may not be declared contraband of 
war. 

Article 28. 
The following may not be declared contraband of war : — 

(1) Raw cotton, wool, silk, jute, flax, hemp, and other raw materials of the textile 
industries, and yarns of the same. 

(2) Oil seeds and nuts; copra. 

(3) Eubber, resins, gums, and laces; hops. 

(4) Eaw hides and horns, bones and ivory. 

(5) Natural and artificial manures, including nitrates and phosphates for agricul- 
tural purposes. 

(6) Metallic ores. 

(7) Earths, clays, lime, chalk, stone, including marble, bricks, slates, and tiles. 

(8) Chinaware and glass. 

(9) Paper and paper- making materials. 

(10) Soap, paint and colours, including articles exclusively used in their manufac- 
ture, and varnish. 

(11) Bleaching powder, soda, ash, caustic soda, salt cake, ammonia, sulphate of 
ammonia, and sulphate of copper. 

(12) Agricultural, mining, textile, and printing machinery. 

(13) Precious and semi-precious stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and coral. 

(14) Clocks and watches, other than chronometers. 

(15) Fashion and fancy goods. 

(16) Feathers of all kinds, hairs, and bristles. 

(17) Articles of household furniture and decoration; office furniture and requisites. 

Article 29. 
Likewise the following may not be treated as contraband of war: — 
(1) Articles serving exclusively to aid the sick and wounded. They can, however, 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 75 

in case of urgent military necessity and subject to the payment of compensation, be requi- 
sitioned, if their destination is that specified in Article 30. 

(2) Articles intended for the use of the vessel in which they are found as well as 
those intended for the use of her crew and passengers during the voyage. 

Article 30. 
Absolute contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined to territory 
belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or to the armed forces of the enemy. It is imma- 
terial whether the carriage of the goods is direct or entails transhipment or a subsequent 
transport by land. 

Article 31. 
Proof of the destination specified in Article 30 is complete in the following cases : — 

( 1 ) When the goods are documented for discharge in an enemy port, or for delivery 
to the armed forces of the enemy. 

(2) When the vessel is to call at enemy ports only, or when she is to touch at an 
enemy port or meet the armed forces of the enemy before reaching the neutral port for 
which the goods in question are documented. 

Article 32. 
When a vessel is carrying absolute contraband, her papers are conclusive proof as 
to the voyage on which she is engaged, unless she is found clearly out of the course indi- 
cated by her papers and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such deviation. . 

Article 33.* 

Conditional contraband is liable to capture if it is shown to be destined for the use 
of the armed forces or of a government department of the enemy State, unless in this lat- 
ter case the circumstances show that the goods cannot in fact be used for the purposes of 
war in progress. This latter exception does not apply to a consignment coming under 
Article 24 (4). 

Article 34.t 

The destination referred to in Article 33 is presumed to exist if the goods are con- 
signed to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established in the enemy country who, as 
a matter of common knowledge, supplies articles of this kind to the enemy. A similar pre- 
sumption arises if the goods are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or 
other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the enemy. No such presumption, 
however, arises in the case of a mechant vessel bound for one of these places if it is sought 
to prove that she herself is contraband. 

In cases where the above presumptions do not arise, the destination is presumed 
to be innocent. 

The presumptions set up by this Article may be rebutted. 

Article 35. 
Conditional contraband is not liable to capture, except when found on board a ves- 
sel bound for territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of 
the enemy, and when it is not to be discharged in an intervening neutral port. 

* The Drafting Committee of the Conference prepared a general report on the Declaration, in the course 
of which it says, discussing Article 33 : 

"There is no question of destination for the enemy in general, but of destination for the use-of his 
armed forces or government departments." . . . 

t Discussing Article 34, the Drafting Committee said: 

"Contraband articles will not usually be directly addressed to the military authorities or to the govern- 
ment departments of the enemy state. Their true destination will be more or less concealed, and the captor 
must prove it in order to justify their capture. But it has been thought reasonable to set up presumptions 
based on the nature of the person to whom, or place for which, the articles are destined. It may be an enemy 
authority or a trader established in an enemy country who, as a matter of common knowledge, supplies the enemy 
Government with articles of the kind in question. It may be a fortified place belonging to the enemy or a place 
used as a base, whether of operations or of supply, for the armed forces of the enemy." 

"In the absence of the above presumptions, the destination is presumed to be innocent. That is the ordi- 
nary law, according to which the captor must prove the illicit character of the goods which he claims to capture." 

Considerable discussion took place in the Press, and several questions were asked in the House of Com- 
mons with reference to this Article, both with regard to the translation of commercant by "contractor," and as 
to whether ennemi meant "enemy government." The Report in discussing the destination of conditional contra- 
band says, "It may be an enemy authority or a trader established in an enemy country who as a matter of com- 
mon knowledge, supplies the enemy Government with articles of the kind in question." The Under-Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Mackinnon Wood) stated in the House of Commons on the 29th March, 1909, that 
the word commergant in this Article "cannot possibly apply to a mere merchant who supplies goods to the gen- 
eral public," and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Sir Edward Grey) on the 5th April, 1909, in 
answer to a question on the divergence between the terms of Article 34 and the General Report, replied as fol- 
lows : "For the reasons already given, I cannot admit that there is any ambiguity as to the meaning of Article 
34. It is made clear, both by Article 33, on which Article 34 is dependent, and by the general official report 
of the Conference, that the word ennemi in Article 34 can only mean the enemy government. It is evident, how- 
ever, that if the point had been raised at the time it would have been made perfectly clear in the drafting, and 
we therefore propose to make a declaration, at the time of the ratification, that the word ennemi in Article 34 
means the government of the enemy." {The Times, 6th April, 1909.) 



76 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

The ship's papers are conclusive proof both as to the voyage on which the vessel is 
engaged and as to the port of discharge of the goods, unless she is found clearly out of the 
course indicated by her papers, and unable to give adequate reasons to justify such 
deviation. 

Article 36. 

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35, conditional contraband, if shown to 
have the destination referred to in Article 33, is liable to capture in cases where the enemy 
country has no seaboard. 

Article 37. 

A vessel carrying goods liable to capture as absolute or conditional contraband may 
be captured on the high seas or in the territorial waters of the belligerents throughout the 
whole of her voyage, even if she is to touch at a port of call before reaching the hostile des- 
tination. 

Article 38. 

A vessel may not be captured on the ground that she has carried contraband on a 
previous occasion if such carriage is in point of fact at an end. 

Article 39. 

Contraband goods are liable to condemnation. 

Article 40. 

A vessel carrying contraband may be condemned if the contraband, reckoned either 
by value, weight, volume, or freight, forms more than half the cargo. 

Article 41. 

If a vessel carrying contraband is released, she may be condemned to pay the costs 
and expenses incurred by the captor in respect of the proceedings in the National Prize 
Court and the custody of the ship and cargo during the proceedings. 

Article 42. 

Goods which belong to the owner of the contraband and are on board the same ves- 
sel are liable to condemnation. 

Article 43. 

If a vessel is encountered at sea while unaware of the outbreak of hostilities or of 
the declaration of contraband which applies to her cargo, the contraband cannot be con- 
demned except on payment of compensation ; the vessel herself and the remainder of the 
cargo are not liable to condemnation or to the costs and expenses referred to in Article 41. 
The same rule applies if the master, after becoming aware of the outbreak of hostilities, 
or of the declaration of contraband, has had no opportunity of discharging the contra- 
band. 

A vessel is deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war, or of a declara- 
tion of contraband, if she left a neutral port subsequently to the notification to the Power 
to .which such port belongs at the outbreak of hostilities or of the declaration of contra- 
band respectively, provided that such notification was made in sufficient time. A vessel 
is also deemed to be aware of the existence of a state of war if she left an enemy port after 
the outbreak of hostilities. 

Article 44. 

A vessel which has been stopped on the ground that she is carrying contraband, and 
which is not liable to condemnation on account of the proportion of contraband on board, 
may, when the circumstances permit, be allowed to continue her voyage if the master is 
willing to hand over the contraband to the belli gerent warship. 

The delivery of the contraband must be entered by the captor on the logbook of the 
"vessel stopped, and the master must give the captor duly certified copies of all relevant 
papers. 

The captor is at liberty to destroy the contraband that has been handed over to him 
under these conditions. 

TRANSFER TO A NEUTRAL FLAG. 

Article 56. 

The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, effected after the outbreak of hos- 
tilities, is void unless it is proved that such transfer was not made in order to evade the 
consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed. 

There is, however, an absolute presumption that a transfer is. void — 

(1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a blockaded port. 

(2) If a right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to the vendor. 

(3) If the requirements of the municipal law governing the right to fly the flag 
under which the vessel is sailin°', have not been fulfilled. 



INSTRUCTIONS TO BRITISH DELEGATION TO THE 
SECOND PEACE CONFERENCE, THE HAGUE 



Sir Edward Grey to Sir Edward Fry 

Foreign Office, June 12, 1907. 

25. His Majesty's Government recognize to the full the desirability of freeing neu- 
tral commerce to the utmost extent possible from interference by belligerent Powers, and 
they are ready and willing for their part, in lieu of endeavoring to frame new and more 
satisfactory rules for the prevention of contraband trade in the future, to abandon the 
principle of contraband of war altogether, thus allowing the oversea trade in neutral ves- 
sels between belligerents on the one hand and neutrals on the other, to continue during 
war without any restriction, subject only to its exclusion by blockade from an enemy's 
port. They are convinced that not only the interest of Great Britain, but the common in- 
terest of all nations will be found, on an unbiased examination of the subject, to be served 
by the adoption of the course suggested. 

26. In the event of the proposal not being favourably received, an endeavor should 
be made to frame a list of the articles that are to be regarded as contraband. Your ef- 
forts should then be directed to restricting that definition within the narrowest possible 
limits and upon lines which have the point of practical extinction as their ultimate aim. 

27. If a definite list of contraband cannot be secured, you should support and, if 
necessary, propose regulations intended to insure that nations shall publish, during peace, 
the list of articles they will regard as contraband during war, and that no change shall be 
made in the list on the outbreak of or during hostilities. 

28. A list might be prepared and submitted for adoption by the Conference, speci- 
fying the articles which in no event shall fall within the enumeration of contraband, e.g., 
mails, foodstuffs destined for places other than beleaguered fortresses, and any raw ma- 
terials required for the purposes of peaceful industry. It is essential to the interest of 
Great Britain that every effective measure necessary to protect the importation of food 
supplies and raw materials for peaceful industries should be accompanied by all sanc- 
tions which the law of nations can supply. 

29. His Majesty's Government would further be glad to see the right of search 
limited in every practiable way, e.g., by the adoption of a system of Consular certificates 
declaring the absence of contraband from thf cargo, and by the exemption of passenger 
and mail steamers upon defined routes, etc. 



THE ORDERS IN COUNCIL 



ORDER IN COUNCIL 

August 20, 19 14 



Directing the Adoption and Enforcement During the Present Hostilities of the Conven- 
tion Known as the Declaration of London, Subject to Additions and Modifications. 

At the court at Buckingham Palace, the 20th day of August, 1914. Present, The King's 
Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas during the present hostilities the naval forces of His Majesty will cooperate 

with the French and Russian naval forces ; and 
Whereas it is desirable that the naval operations of the allied forces so far as they affect 

neutral ships and commerce should be conducted on similar principles; and 
Whereas the Governments of France and Russia have informed His Majesty's Government 

that during the present hostilities it is their intention to act in accordance with the 

provisions of the convention known as the Declaration of London, signed on the 26th 

day of February, 1909, so far as may be practicable. 

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased 
to order, and it is hereby ordered, that during the present hostilities the convention known 
as the Declaration of London shall, subject to the following additions and modifications, 
be adopted and put in force by His Majesty's Government as if the same had been ratified 
by His Majesty: 

The additions and modifications are as follows : 

( 1 ) The lists of absolute and conditional contraband contained in the proclamation 
dated August 4, 1914, shall be substituted for the lists contained in Articles 22 and 24 of 
the said declaration. 

(2) A neutral vessel which succeeded in carrying contraband to the enemy with 
false papers may be detained for having carried such contraband if she is encountered 
before she has completed her return voyage. 

(3) The destination referred to in Article 33 may be inferred from any sufficient 
evidence, and (in addition to the presumption laid down in Article 34) shall be presumed 
to exist if the goods are consigned to or for an agent of the enemy State or to or for a 
merchant or other person under the control of the authorities of the enemy State. 

(4) The existence of a blockade shall be presumed to be known — 

(a) To all ships which sailed from or touched at an enemy port a sufficient 
time after the notification of the blockade to the local authorities to have enabled the 
enemy Government to make known the existence of the blockade; 

( b ) To all ships which sailed from or touched at a British or allied port after 
the publication of the declaration of blockade, 

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of the said Declaration, condi- 
tional contraband, if shown to have the destination referred to in Article 32, is liable to 
capture, to whatever port the vessel is bound and at whatever port the cargo is to be dis- 
charged. 

(6) The General Report of the Drafting Committee on the said Declaration pre- 
sented to the Naval Conference and adopted by the conference at the eleventh plenary 
meeting on February 25, 1909, shall be considered by all Prize Courts as an authoritative 
statement of the meaning and intention of the said Declaration, and such courts shall 
construe and interpret the provisions of the said Declaration by the light of the commen- 
tary given therein. 

And the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners 
of the Admiralty, and each of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, the President 
of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, all other 
judges of His Majesty's Prize Courts, and all governors, officers, and authorities whom it 
may concern are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively ap- 
pertain. 

Almeric Fitzeoy. 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 79 

ORDER IN COUNCIL 

October 29, 1914 

At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 29th day of October, 1914. Present, The King's 

Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas by an Order in Council dated the 20th day of August, 1914, His Majesty 
was pleased to declare that during the present hostilities the Convention known as the 
Declaration of London should, subject to certain additions and modifications therein 
specified, be adopted and put in force by His Majesty's Government ; and 

Whereas the said additions and modifications were rendered necessary by the special 
conditions of the present war; and 

Whereas it is desirable and possible now to reenact the said Order in Council with 
amendments in order to minimize, so far as possible, the interference with innocent neu- 
tral trade occasioned by the war : 

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased 
to order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows : 

1. During the present hostilities the provisions of the Convention known as the Dec- 
laration of London shall, subject to the exclusion of the lists of contraband and noncon- 
traband, and to the modifications hereinafter set out, be adopted and put in force by His 
Majesty's Government. 

The modifications are as follows : 

(i) A neutral vessel, with papers indicating a neutral destination, which, not- 
withstanding the destination shown on the papers, proceeds to an enemy port, 
shall be liable to capture and condemnation if she is encountered before the 
end of her next voyage, 
(ii) The destination referred to in Article 33 of the said Declaration shall (in ad- 
dition to the presumptions laid down in Article 34) be presumed to exist if the 
goods are consigned to or for an agent of the enemy State. 

(iii) Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 35 of the said Declaration, condi- 
tional contraband shall be liable to capture on board a vessel bound for a 
neutral port if the goods are consigned "to order," or if the ship's papers do 
not show who is the consignee of the goods, or if they show a consignee of the 
goods in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy. 

(iv) In the cases covered by the preceding paragraph (iii) it shall lie upon the 
owners of the goods to prove that their destination was innocent. 

2. Where it is shown to the satisfaction of one of His Majesty's Principal Secre- 
taries of State that the enemy Government is drawing supplies for its armed forces from 
or through a neutral country, he may direct that in respect of ships bound for a port in 
that country, Article 35 of the said Declaration shall not apply. Such direction shall be 
notified in the "London Gazette" and shall operate until the same is withdrawn. So long 
as such direction is in force, a vessel which is carrying conditional contraband to a port 
in that country shall not be immune from capture. 

3. The Order in Council of the 20th August, 1914, directing the adoption and enforce- 
ment during the present hostilities of the Convention known as the Declaration of Lon- 
don, subject to the additions and modifications therein specified, is hereby repealed. 

4. This Order may be cited as "the Declaration of London Order in Council, No. 2 
1914." 

And the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissioners 
of the Admiralty, and each of His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, the President 
of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, all other 
Judges of His Majesty's Prize Courts, and all Governors, Officers, and Authorities whom 
it may concern, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respectively ap- 
pertain. . „ 

Almekic Fttzroy. 



ORDER IN COUNCIL 
March 11, 1915 
At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 11th day of March, 1915. Present, The King's 
Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 
Whereas the German Government has issued certain orders which, in violation of 
the usages of war, purport to declare the waters surrounding the United Kingdom a mili- 
tary area, in which all British and allied merchant vessels will be destroyed, irrespective 
of the safety of the lives of passengers and crew, and in which neutral shipping will be 
exposed to similar danger in view of the uncertainties of naval warfare ; and 

Whereas in a memorandum accompanying the said orders neutrals are warned 
against entrusting crews, passengers, or goods to British or allied ships : 



80 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

Whereas such attempts on the part of the enemy give to His Majesty an unquestion- 
able right of retaliation : 

And whereas His Majesty has therefore decided to adopt further measures in order 
to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, though such meas- 
ured will be enforced without risk to neutral ships or to neutral or noncombatant life 
and in strict observance of the dictates of humanity; 

And whereas the allies of His Majesty are associated with him in the steps now to be 
announced for restricting further the commerce of Germany; 

His Majesty is therefore pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to 
order, and it is hereby ordered as follows : 

1. No merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the first March, 
1915, shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage to any German port, 

Unless the vessel receives a pass enabling her to proceed to some neutral or allied 
port to be named in the pass, goods on board any such vessel must be discharged in a 
British port and placed in the custody of the marshal of the pi'ize court. Goods so dis- 
charged, not being contraband of war, shall, if not requisitioned for the use of His 
Majesty, be restored by order of the court, upon such terms as the court may in the cir- 
cumstances deem to be just, to the person entitled thereto. 

2. No merchant vessel which sailed from any German port after the first March, 1915, 
shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage with any goods on board laden at such port. 

All goods laden at such port must be discharged in a British or allied port. Goods 
so discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize 
court, and, if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, shall be detained or sold un- 
der the direction of the prize court. The proceeds of goods so sold shall be paid into court 
and dealt with in such manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just. 

Provided, that no proceeds of the sale of such goods shall be paid out of court until 
the conclusion of peace, except on the application of the proper officer of the Crown, un- 
less it be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this or- 
der. 

Provided also, that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property laden 
at such enemy port on the application of the proper officer of the Crown. 

3. Every merchant vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the first of 
March, 1915, on her way to a port other than a German port, carrying goods with an 
enemy destination, or which are enemy property, may be required to discharge such 
goods in a British or allied port. Any goods so discharged in a British port shall be 
placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court, and, unless they are contraband 
of war, shall, if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, be restored by order of the 
court, upon such terms as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just to the per- 
son entitled thereto. 

Provided, that this article shall not apply in any case falling within articles 2 or 1 
of this order. 

4. Every merchant vessel -which sailed from a port other than a German port after 
the first of March, 1915, having on board goods which are of enemy origin or are enemy 
property may be required to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Goods so 
discharged in a British port shall be placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize 
court, and if not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty shall be detained or sold under 
the direction of the prize court. The proceeds of goods so sold shall be paid into court 
and dealt with in such manner as the court may in the circumstances deem to be just. 

Provided, that no proceeds of sale of such goods shall be paid out of court imtil the 
conclusion of peace except on the application of the proper officer of the Crown, unless it 
be shown that the goods had become neutral property before the issue of this order. 

Provided, also, that nothing herein shall prevent the release of neutral property of 
enemy origin on the application of the proper officer of the Crown. 

5. Any person claiming to be interested in, or to have any claim in respect of, any 
goods (not being contraband of war) placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize 
court under this order, or in the proceeds of such goods, may forthwith issue a writ in 
the prize court against the proper officer of the Crown and apply for an order that the 
goods should be restored to him, or that their proceeds should be paid to him, or for 
such other order as the circumstances of the case may require. 

The practice and procedure of the prize court shall, so far as applicable, be followed 
mutatis mutandis in any proceedings consequential upon this order. 

6. A merchant vessel which has cleared for a neutral port from a British or allied 
port, or which has been allowed to pass, having an ostensible destination to a neutral 
port, and proceeds to an enemy port, shall, if captured on any subsequent voyage, be lia- 
ble to condemnation. 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 81 

7. Nothing in this order shall be deemed to affect the liability of any vessel or goods 
to capture or condemnation independently of this order. 

8. Nothing in this order shall prevent the relaxation of the provisions of this order 
in respect of the merchant vessels of any country which declares that no commerce in- 
tended for or originating in Germany or- belonging to German subjects shall enjoy the 
protection of its flag. 

Almeric Fitzroy. 



ORDER IN COUNCIL 

March 23, 1915 

At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 231 day of March, 1915. Present, The King's 
Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas by section 3 of the prize courts act, 1894, His Majesty in Council is author- 
ized to make rules of court for regulating, subject to the provisions of the naval prize 
act, 1864, and the said act, the procedure and practice of prize courts within the meaning 
of the naval prize act, 1864, and the duties and conduct of the officers of the courts and of 
the practitioners therein, and for regulating the fees to be taken by the officers thereof, 
and the costs, charges, and expenses to be allowed to the practitioners therein : 

And whereas in pursuance of the prize courts act, 1894, certain rules were made by 
the order of His Majesty in Council, dated the 5th day of August, 1914, and amended by 
the Orders of His Majesty in Council of the 30th day of September, 1914, and the 28th 
day of November, 1914, respectively, which said rules and amended rules were by the 
said orders in council directed to take effect provisionally in accordance with the provi- 
sions of section 2 of the Kules Publication Act, 1893, from the dates of the said Orders 
in Council respectively: 

And whereas the provisions of section 1 of the rules publication act, 1893, were duly 
complied with in respect of the said rules and amended rules, and the same were finally 
made by the orders of His Majesty in Council, dated respectively, the 17th day of Sep- 
tember, 1914, the 28th day of November, 1914, and the 3d day of February, 1915. 

And whereas it is expedient that the said rules and amended rules should be further 
amended. 

And whereas on account of urgency this order should come into immediate opera- 
tion. 

Now, therefore, His Majesty, by virtue of the powers in this behalf by the said act 
or otherwise in him vested, is pleased, by aid with the advice of His Privy Council, to 
order, and it is hereby ordered, as follows: 

1. That in Order IX (discovery, inspection, and admission of documents and facts) 
of the said rules : 

In rule 1, the words "upon filing an affidavit" shall be omitted. 
In rule 1, instead of the words "any other party" there shall be substituted the 
words "any party other than the proper officer of the Crown." 

2. That in Order XI (sale, appraisement, safe custody, and inspection of prize) of 
the said rules, in rule 1, the following words shall be omitted : "on account of the condi- 
tion of a ship, or on application of a claimant, and on or after condemnation." 

3. That in Order XV (evidence and hearing) of the said rules, the following rule 
shall be added : 

"21. Nothwithstanding anything contained in these rules the proper officer of the 
Crown may apply to the judge for leave to administer interrogatories for the examina- 
tion of any person whether a party to the cause or not." 

4. That order XXIX (requisition by admiralty) of the said rules, as amended by 
His Majesty's Order in Council dated the 28th day of November, 1914, shall be, and the 
same is hereby revoked, and in lieu thereof the following order shall have effect : 

'•'order xxix— requisition. 

"1. Where it is made to appear to the judge on the application of the proper officer of 
the Crown that it is desired to requisition on behalf of His Majesty a ship in respect of 
which no final decree of condemnation has been made, he shall order that the ship shall 
be appraised, and that upon an undertaking being given in accordance with rule 5 of 
this order, the ship shall be released and delivered to the Crown. 

"2. Where a decree for the detention of a ship has been made in accordance with 
Order XXVIII, the proper officer of the Crown may file a notice (Appendix A, Form 
No. 55) that the Crown desires to requisition the same, and thereupon a commission (Ap- 
pendix A, Form No. 56) to the marshal directing him to appraise the ship shall issue. 
Upon an undertaking being given in accordance with rule 5 of this order the ship shall 
be released, and delivered to the Crown. Service of this notice shall not be required be- 



82 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

fore filing, but copies thereof shall be served upon the parties by the proper officer of the 
Crown as soon thereafter as possible. 

"3. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the 
judge on behalf of the Crown that the ship is required for the service of His Majesty 
forthwith, the judge may order the same to be forthwith released and delivered to the 
Crown without appraisement. 

"4. In any case where a ship has been requisitioned under the provisions of this or- 
der and whether or not an appraisement has been made, the court may, on the applica- 
tion of any party, fix the amount to be paid by the Crown in respect of the value of the 
ship. 

"5. In every case of requisition under this order an undertaking in writing shall 
be filed by the proper officer of the Crown for payment into court on behalf of the Crown 
of the appraised value of the ship, or of the amount fixed under Rule 4 of this order, as 
the case may be, at such time or times as the court shall declare by order that the same 
or any part thereof is required for the purpose of payment out of court. 

"6. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the 
judge on behalf of the Crown that the Crown desires to requisition the ship temporarily, 
the court may, in lieu of an order of release, make an order for the temporary delivery 
of the ship to the Crown, and subject as aforesaid the provisions of this order shall ap- 
ply to such a requisition; provided that, in the event of the return of the ship to the 
custody of the court, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the release of the 
undertaking given on behalf of the Crown or the reduction of the amount undertaken to 
be paid thereby, as the case may be ; and provided also that, where the ship so requisi- 
tioned is subject to the provisions of Order XXVIII, rule 1, relating to detention, the 
amount for which the Crown shall be considered liable in respect of such requisition 
shall be the amount of the damage, if any, which the ship has suffered by reason of such 
temporary delivery as aforesaid. 

"7. The proceedings in respect of a ship requisitioned under this order shall conti- 
nue notwithstanding the requisition. 

"8. In any case of requisition of a ship in respect of which no cause has been in- 
stituted, any person interested in such ship may, without issuing a writ, provided he 
does not intend to make a claim for restitution or damages, apply by summons for an 
order that the amount to be paid in respect of such ship be fixed by the court, and the 
judge may, on the hearing of such summons, order the ship to be appraised or to be val- 
ued, or give such other directions for fixing the amount as he may think fit." 

5. That in Form 4 in Appendix A to the said rules there shall be omitted the words 
"commander of our ship of war" and the words "taken and seized as prize by our said 
ship of war." 

6. This order shall take effect provisionally in accordance with the provisions of Sec- 
tion 2 of the rules publication act, 1893, from the date hereof. 

Almeric Fitzroy. 



ORDER IN COUNCIL 
October 20, 1915 
At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 20th clay of October, 1915. . Present, The King's 
Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

"Whereas by the Declaration of London, Order in Council, Number 2, 1914, His 
Majesty was pleased to declare that during the present hostilities the provisions of the 
said Declaration of London should, subject to certain exceptions and modifications 
therein specified, be adopted and put in force by His Majesty's Government; and 

"Whereas by article 57 of the said Declaration, it is provided that the neutral or ene- 
my character of' a vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly ; and 

"Whereas it is no longer expedient to adopt the said article : 

"Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased 
to order, and it is hereby ordered, that from and after this date article 57 of the Declara- 
tion of London shall cease to be adopted and put in force. 

"In lieu of the said article, British prize courts shall apply the rules and principles 
formerly observed in such courts. 

"This order may be cited as 'The Declaration of London Order in Council, 1915.' 

"And the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commission- 
ers of the Admiralty, and each of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, the presi- 
dent of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, all 
other judges of His Majesty's prize courts, and all governors, officers, and authorities 
whom it may concern, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respect- 
ively appertain." 

Almeric Fitzroy 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 83 

ORDER IN COUNCIL 

November io, 19 15 

Restrictions on British Merchant Shipping. Licenses Necessary to Trade Between For- 
eign Ports. 

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 10th day of November, 1915. Present, The 
King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas, A state of war exists between His Majesty and the German Emperor, the 
Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, the Sultan of Turkey and the King of the 
Bulgarians : 

And whereas, His Majesty holds it to be his prerogative duty as well as his pre- 
rogative right to take all steps necessary for the defense and protection of the realm : 

And whereas, It has been made to appear to His Majesty that it is essential to the 
defense and protection of the realm that, in the exercise of his prerogatives as afore- 
said, he should prohibit as from and after the first day of December, 1915, the carrying 
of cargo from any foreign port to any other foreign port by any British steamship reg^ 
istered in the United Kingdom exceeding 500 tons gross tonnage — and whether or not 
such ship while carrying such cargo calls at any intermediate port within His Majesty's 
dominions — unless the owner or charterer of such steamship has been granted exemp- 
tion by license as hereinafter provided : 

Now, therefore, His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, 
and in exercise of his prerogatives as aforesaid and of all other powers him thereunto 
enabling, to order and it is hereby ordered that, from and after the first day of Decem- 
ber, 1915, no British steamship registered in the United Kingdom exceeding 500 tons 

gross tonnage shall carry any cargo from any foreign port to any other foreign port 

and whether or not such ship while carrying such cargo calls at any intermediate port 
within His Majesty's dominions — unless the owner or charterer of such steamship has 
been granted exemption by license as hereinafter provided. 

And His Majesty doth hereby declare that the expression "foreign port" herein 
used shall mean and include any port outside His Majesty's dominions. 

And His Majesty, by and with the advice aforesaid, and in exercise of his preroga- 
tives and powers as aforesaid, is further pleased to authorize and direct the president 
of the Board of Trade to appoint a committee of persons to carry out and give effect to 
the provisions hereof, and that the said committee shall have power to grant licenses of 
exemption therefrom to or in favor of owners and charterers of such steamships as afore- 
said, which licenses may be general in reference to classes of ships or their voyages or 
special. 

And His Majesty is further pleased to authorize the president of the Board of 
Trade from time to time to add other persons as members of such committee, and to 
substitute as members thereof other persons for such members as may from' time to 
time die, resign, or be or become incapable of acting thereon. 

And the president of the Board of Trade is to act and to give instructions and 
directions accordingly. 

Almeeic Fitzroy 



ORDER IN COUNCIL 

November 10, 1915 

Poioers to Requisition Tonnage. Vessels for Carriage of Foodstuffs. 

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 10th day of November, 1915. Present, 
The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas, A state of war exists between His Majesty and the German Emperor, the 
Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, the Sultan of Turkey, and the King of the Bul- 
garians : 

And whereas, His Majesty holds it to be his prerogative duty as well as his pre- 
rogative right to take all steps necessary for the defense and protection of the realm : 

And whereas, It has been made to appear to His Majesty that it is essential to the 
defense and protection of the realm that all British ships registered in the United King- 
dom should be made liable to requisition in manner hereinafter appearing for the car- 
riage of foodstuffs and of any other articles of commerce: 



82 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

fore filing, but copies thereof shall be served upon the parties by the proper officer of the 
Crown as soon thereafter as possible. 

"3. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the 
judge on behalf of the Crown that the ship is required for the service of His Majesty 
forthwith, the judge may order the same to be forthwith released and delivered to the 
Crown without appraisement. 

"4. In any case where a ship has been requisitioned under the provisions of this or- 
der and whether or not an appraisement has been made, the court may, on the applica- 
tion of any party, fix the amount to be paid by the Crown in respect of the value of the 
ship. 

"5. In every case of requisition under this order an undertaking in writing shall 
be filed by the proper officer of the Crown for payment into court on behalf of the Crown 
of the appraised value of the ship, or of the amount fixed under Eule 4 of this order, as 
the case may be, at such time or times as the court shall declare by order that the same 
or any part thereof is required for the purpose of payment out of court. 

"6. Where in any case of requisition under this order it is made to appear to the 
judge on behalf of the Crown that the Crown desires to requisition the ship temporarily, 
the court may, in lieu of an order of release, make an order for the temporary delivery 
of the ship to the Crown, and subject as aforesaid the provisions of this order shall ap- 
ply to such a requisition ; provided that, in the event of the return of the ship to the 
custody of the court, the court may make such order as it thinks fit for the release of the 
undertaking given on behalf of the Crown or the reduction of the amount undertaken to 
be paid thereby, as the case may be ; and provided also that, where the ship so requisi- 
tioned is subject to the provisions of Order XXVIII, rule 1, relating to detention, the 
amount for which the Crown shall be considered liable in respect of such requisition 
shall be the amount of the damage, if any, which the ship has suffered by reason of such 
temporary delivery as aforesaid. 

"7. The proceedings in respect of a ship requisitioned under this order shall conti- 
nue notwithstanding the requisition. 

"8. In any case of requisition of a ship in respect of which no cause has been in- 
stituted, any person interested in such ship may, without issuing a writ, provided he 
does not intend to make a claim for restitution or damages, apply by summons for an 
order that the amount to be paid in respect of such ship be fixed by the court, and the 
judge may, on the hearing of such summons, order the ship to be appraised or to be val- 
ued, or give such other directions for fixing the amount as he may think fit." 

5. That in Form 4 in Appendix A to the said rules there shall be omitted the words 
"commander of our ship of war" and the words "taken and seized as prize by our said 
ship of war." 

6. This order shall take effect provisionally in accordance with the provisions of Sec- 
tion 2 of the rules publication act, 1893, from the date hereof. 

Almeric Fitzroy. 



ORDER IN COUNCIL 
October 20, 1915 
At the Court of Buckingham Palace, the 20th day of October, 1915. . Present, The King's 
Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

"Whereas by the Declaration of London, Order in Council, Number 2, 1914, His 
Majesty was pleased to declare that during the present hostilities the provisions of the 
said Declaration of London should, subject to certain exceptions and modifications 
therein specified, be adopted and put in fopce by His Majesty's Government; and 

"Whereas by article 57 of the said Declaration, it is provided that the neutral or ene- 
my character of' a vessel is determined by the flag which she is entitled to fly; and 

"Whereas it is no longer expedient to adopt the said article : 

"Now, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, is pleased 
to order, and it is hereby ordered, that from and after this date article 57 of the Declara- 
tion of London shall cease to be adopted and put in force. 

"In lieu of the said article, British prize courts shall apply the rules and principles 
formerly observed in such courts. 

"This order may be cited as <The Declaration of London Order in Council, 1915.' 

"And the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commission- 
ers of the Admiralty, and each of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, the presi- 
dent of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, all 
other judges of His Majesty's prize courts, and all governors, officers, and authorities 
whom it may concern, are to give the necessary directions herein as to them may respect- 
ively appertain." 

Almeric Fitzroy 



OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 83 

ORDER IN COUNCIL 

November io, 1915 

Restrictions on British Merchant Shipping. Licenses Necessary to Trade Between For- 
eign Ports. 

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 10th day of November, 1915. Present, The 
King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas, A state of war exists between His Majesty and the German Emperor, the 
Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, the Sultan of Turkey and the King of the 
Bulgarians : 

And whereas, His Majesty holds it to be his prerogative duty as well as his pre- 
rogative right to take all steps necessary for the defense and protection of the realm : 

And whereas, It has been made to appear to His Majesty that it is essential to the 
defense and protection of the realm that, in the exercise of his prerogatives as afore- 
said, he should prohibit as from and after the first day of December, 1915, the carrying 
of cargo from any foreign port to any other foreign port by any British steamship reg- 
istered in the United Kingdom exceeding 500 tons gross tonnage — and whether or not 
such ship while carrying such cargo calls at any intermediate port within His Majesty's 
dominions — unless the owner or charterer of such steamship has been granted exemp- 
tion by license as hereinafter provided : 

Now, therefore, His Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, 
and in exercise of his prerogatives as aforesaid and of all other powers him thereunto 
enabling, to order and it is hereby ordered that, from and after the first day of Decem- 
ber, 1915, no British steamship registered in the United Kingdom exceeding 500 tons 
gross tonnage shall carry any cargo from any foreign port to any other foreign port — 
and whether or not such ship while carrying such cargo calls at any intermediate port 
within His Majesty's dominions — unless the owner or charterer of such steamship has 
been granted exemption by license as hereinafter provided. 

And His Majesty doth hereby declare that the expression "foreign port" herein 
used shall mean and include any port outside His Majesty's dominions. 

And His Majesty, by and with the advice aforesaid, and in exercise of his preroga- 
tives and powers as aforesaid, is further pleased to authorize and direct the president 
of the Board of Trade to appoint a committee of persons to carry out and give effect to 
the provisions hereof, and that the said committee shall have power to grant licenses of 
exemption therefrom to or in favor of owners and charterers of such steamships as afore- 
said, which licenses may be general in reference to classes of ships or their voyages or 
special. 

And His Majesty is further pleased to authorize the president of the Board of 
Trade from time to time to add other persons as members of such committee, and to 
substitute as members thereof other persons for such members as may from time to 
time die, resign, or be or become incapable of acting thereon. 

And the president of the Board of Trade is to act and to give instructions and 
directions accordingly. 

Almeeic Fitzroy 



ORDER IN COUNCIL 

November 10, 19 15 
Poioers to Requisition Tonnage. Vessels for Carriage of Foodstuffs. 

At the Court at Buckingham Palace, the 10th day of November, 1915. Present, 
The King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. 

Whereas, A state of war exists between His Majesty and the German Emperor, the 
Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, the Sultan of Turkey, and the King of the Bul- 
garians : 

And whereas, His Majesty holds it to be his prerogative duty as well as his pre- 
rogative right to take all steps necessary for the defense and protection of the realm : 

And whereas, It has been made to appear to His Majesty that it is essential to the 
defense and protection of the realm that all British ships registered in the United King- 
dom should be made liable to requisition in manner hereinafter appearing for the car- 
riage of foodstuffs and of any other articles of commerce: 



84 . AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

Now, therefore, His Majesty is pleased by and with the advice of His Privy Council, 
and in exercise of his prerogatives as aforesaid and of all other powers him thereunto en- 
abling, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that any British ship registered in the 
United Kingdom may until further order be requisitioned by and on behalf of His 
Majesty for the carriage of foodstuffs and of any other articles of commerce, and such 
requisition is to take effect upon notice of requisition being served as hereinafter pro- 
vided on the owner of any such ship : 

And His Majesty is further pleased, by and with the advice aforesaid, to authorize 
and direct the President of the Board of Trade to give effect to this order by causing 
notice of requisition to be served on the owner of any such ship. 

And His Majesty is further pleased, by and with the advice aforesaid, to declare 
that service of notice of requisition on an owner shall be deemed sufficient and effective 
if served in the case of an individual owner by being addressed to such individual owner 
and left at his last-known place of business or abode, and in case of joint owners by 
being addressed to such joint owners and left at the last-known business addresses or 
places of abode of such joint owners, and in the case of a company or corporation by 
being addressed to such company or corporation and left at the registered or other ad- 
dress of such company or corporation, or in any of the aforesaid cases by being ad- 
dressed to the managing owner, ship's husband, or other the person to whom the man- 
agement of the ship is by law entrusted by or on behalf of the owners, and left at the 
registered or other last-known address or place of abode of such managing owner, ship's 
husband, or other such person, as the case may be. 

And His Majesty is further pleased, by and with the advice aforesaid, to declare 
that any notice of requisition which the President of the Board of Trade may cause to' 
be served hereunder, may be signed by any person or persons from time to time author- 
ized for such purpose either generally or specially by the President of the Board of 
Trade. 

And the President of the Board of Trade is to give instructions and directions 
accordingly. 

Almekic Fitzroy. 



XI 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 



The following papers are believed to contain all the important communications exchanged between the Gov- 
ernment of the United States and that of Great Britain, with respect of the rights of neutral trade, so far as 
these are at present accessible. In addition are included salient communications exchanged with the German 
Government. 

When not otherwise indicated, the text of the papers is that appearing in the two volumes, dated respect- 
ively May 27 and October 21, 1915, and other memoranda, published by the Department of State. For the text 
of documents which the Department of State has not seen tit to include in its publications, the only resource has 
been the daily press; but only communications officially allowed to become public have been noticed. 



INDEX TO DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 



Date 



From Whom and to Whom 



Contents 



1914 

London, 
August 5 . 



Washington, 
August 6 . . 



Berlin, 
August 22 . . 

London, 
August 27 . . 



Berlin, 

September 4 . 

London, 

September 30. 



Washington, 
October 22 . . 

Washington, 
October 22 . . 



Washington, 
October 24 . . . 



London, 

November 2. . 



London, 

November 3. 



London, 

November 17 

Berlin, 

November 19 



Berlin, 

November 23 



Berlin, 

November 23 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the 
Secretary of State 

The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 

Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Sec- 
retary of State 



Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the Sec- 
retary of State 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Sec- 
retary of State 

The German Ambassador to the 
Secretary of State 

The Acting Secretary of State to Am- 
bassador W. H. Page 



The Acting Secretary of State to 
Ambassador J. W. Gerard 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the 
Secretary of State 

Consul-General R. P. Skinner to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 



Transmits proclamation of British Govern- 
ment specifying articles to be treated as 
contraband of war 

Ascertain if British Government is willing to 
observe provisions of Declaration of London 
as applied to naval warfare 

German Government will observe provisions 
of Declaration of London , . . . . 

Transmits note from Foreign Office defining 
attitude of British Government as to De- 
claration of London and copies of memoran- 
dum mentioning exceptions to provisions of 
Declaration 

Transmits Declaration of German Government 
relative to contraband 

Transmits proclamation of British Government 
specifying certain additional articles to be 
treated as contraband 

Says German Government will treat copper and 
lead as conditional contraband 

Inform British Government that suggestion re- 
garding Declaration of London is withdrawn, 
and the United States resumes its rights un- 
der existing international law and the treaties 
of the United States, irrespective of the pro- 
visions of the Declaration of London 

Inform German Government that suggestion 
relative to Declaration of London is with- 
drawn, as some belligerents refuse to agree 
without modification 

British Admiralty's Proclamation of the North 
Sea as a military area 

Transmits proclamation of the British Govern- 
ment containing a revised list of absolute 
and conditional contraband 

Says cotton-seed cake is conditional contra- 
band 

Says German Government' will treat lumber, 
rough or un worked, etc., as conditional 
contraband 

Transmits additional list of articles which Ger- 
man Government will treat as conditional 
contraband 

Transmits notes from Foreign Office containing 
notice of additions to original German con- 
traband lists I 97 



INDEX TO DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 



87 



Date 



From Whom and to Whom 



Contents 



1914 

Washington, 
November 23 

London, 

November 25 

Berlin, 
December 3 . . 



Berlin, 

December 8 . 



Berlin, 

December 15 

London, 

December 24 

Washington, 
December 26 



1915 
London, 
January 7 . 



London, 
January 22 . 



Berlin, 

February 6 . 



Washington, 
February 10. 



Washington. 
February 10. 



London, 
Feburary 10. 



Washington, 
February 15. 



Berlin, 

February 15. 



Berlin, 

February 15. 



The German Ambassador to the 
Secretary of State 

Consul-General R. P. Skinner to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 

Consul-General R. P. Skinner to the 
Secretary of State 

The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



The British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs to Ambassador W. 
H. Page 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador J. W. Gerard 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



The British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs to Ambassador 
W.H.Page 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



Protests British violations of Declaration of 
London 

Says British Government considers Toluene 
and Toluol as contraband 

Transmits note from Foreign Office stating 
that German Government will treat que- 
bracho wood as conditional contraband 

Transmits proclamation of German Govern- 
ment making additions to conditional con- 
traband list 

Says German Government will treat aluminum 
and nickel as conditional contraband 

Transmits proclamation of British Government 
containing radically amended contraband list 

Transmits statement to be communicated to 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs pro- 
testing against seizures and detentions of 
American cargoes 

Explains reasons for seizures and detentions of 
American cargoes. Says British Government 
is ready to enter into an arrangement by 
which mistakes can be avoided 

Gives interpretation of British Government of 
the terms "copper" and "lubricants" in 
contraband list 

Transmits proclamation of German Admiralty 
of February 4, 1915, declaring waters around 
Great Britain and Ireland as within the seat 
of war. Copy of memorial on subject 

Transmits note for communication to German 
Government protesting against proclamation 
of German Admiralty of February 4, 1915 . . . 

Instructed to point out to British Government 
the serious consequences which may result 
if the use of neutral flags on British merchant 
vessels in order to avoid capture is authorized. 

Transmits full reply of British Government to 
protest of Department of State dated De- 
cember 28, 1914, protesting against seizures 
and detentions of American cargoes destined 
for European ports 

Instructed to bring to the attention of the 
British Government certain points in con- 
nection with the cargo of the Wilhelmina 
which would make her seizure unjustifiable. . 

Note from German Foreign Office explaining 
that Federal Council's provisions as to grain 
importation applies to civilian population 
exclusively 

Protest from German Foreign Office against 
the use by British merchant ships of neutral 
flags, arming merchant ships, and the mining 
of the war zone 



88 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



Date 



From Whom and to Whom 



Contents 



1915 
Berlin, 

February 16. 



London, 

February 19. 



London, 

February 19. 



Washington, 
February 20. 



Berlin, 
March 1 . 



Washington, 
March 1 . . 



Washington, 
March 5 . . 



London, 
March 9 . 



Washington, 
March 10 . 



London, 
March 15 . 

London, 
March 15 . 



London, 
March 16 . . 



Washington, 
March 20 . . 



Washington, 
March 20. 



Washington, 
March 23 . 



The German Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to Ambassador J. W. 
Gerard 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the 
Secretary of State ." 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the 
Secretary of State 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 



The British Ambassador to the Sec- 
retary of State 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



Consul-General R. P. Skinner to the 
Secretary of State 

The British Ambassador to the Sec- 
retary of State 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the 
Secretary of State 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the 
• Secretary of State 

The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 

The Secretary of State to I. N. Mor- 
ris, Minister to Sweden 

The British Ambassador to the Sec- 
retary of State 



German Government says measures respecting 
theater of war in waters surrounding Great 
Britain necessary because of England's 
method of conducting maritime warfare. . . . 

Transmits reply of British Government rel- 
ative to proclamation of German Admiralty 
and use of neutral flags on British merchant 
ships 

Transmits reply of British Government to De- 
partment's protest regarding the seizure of 
the Wilhelmina 

Transmits note for communication to the 
Foreign Office regarding war-zone declaration 
by Germany and use of neutral flags by 
British Government, and suggests certain 
agreement to be entered into by belligerents. 

Transmits reply of German Government to 
American identic note of February 20, 1915, 
to Great Britain and Germany 

Refers to war-zone declaration of German 
Government. Says British Government will 
be forced to take measures to prevent com- 
modities of any kind from reaching or leaving 
Germany 

Transmits statement for communication to 
Foreign Office pointing out difficulty of 
determining action regarding retaliatory 
measures against German commerce 

Gives views of British Government regarding 
cotton contracts 

Transmits list enumerating certain oils which 
British Government will treat as conditional 
contraband 

Transmits reply of British Government to 
American identic note of February 20, 1915. 

Transmits reply of British Government to 
American note of March 5, and text of 
British Order in Council setting forth meas- 
ures retaliatory against Germany 

Transmits proclamation of British Govern- 
ment making additions to lists of articles of 
contraband 

Instructed to inform British Government of 
protest against the detention of the Ameri- 
can steamship Wico 

Says that American protest against detention 
of steamship Wico has been presented to 
British Government 

Says he will give Department definite in- 
formation regarding "castor oil," etc., as 
soon as received 



INDEX TO DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 



Date 



From Whom and to Whom 



ents 



Page 



1915 

Washington, 
March 30 . 



Washington, 
April 4 



London, 
April 7. 

London, 
April 8 . 



London, 
April 8 . . . . 

Washington, 
April 9 . . . . 



Washington, 
April 10. . 



Washington, 
April 12. . 



Washington, 
April 21 . . 



Berlin, 
April 26 . 



London, 
April 28 . 



Washington, 
May 6 . . . . 



Washington, 
May 13 . . , 



London, 
May 18 . 



London, 
May 20 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



The German Ambassador to the 
Secretary of State 

Consul-General R. P. Skinner to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Sec- 
retary of State 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Sec- 
retary of State 

The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 

The British Ambassador to the 
Secretary of State 

The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 

The Secretary of State to the Ger- 
man Ambassador 

Ambassador J. W. Gerard to the 
Secretary of State 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Sec- 
retary of State 

The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador J. W. Gerard 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Sec- 
retary of State 



Transmits note for communication to British 
Government explaining United States atti- 
tude regarding purposed retaliatory meas- 
ures against German commerce and British 
Order in Council 

Transmits memorandum regarding the matter 
of German-American trade and the question 
of delivery of arms 

Transmits copy of British Order in Council . . . 



Reports British terms of settlement in Wil- 
helmina case and says attorneys strongly 
recommend acceptance 

Says that Foreign Office has decided to allow 
steamship Wico to proceed 

Instructed to present protest to Foreign Office 
of British Government against seizure of 
American merchant ship Seguranca 

Transmits list of "lubricants" which the 
British Government now considers absolute 
contraband 

Says that United States reserves right to take 
action direct with Germany in regard to 
German capture of American ships 

Gives views of United States regarding trade 
between the United States and Germany 
and exportation of arms 

Transmits notice of German Government rel- 
ative to amendments to contraband list — 

Says that American merchant ship Seguranca 
has been released and allowed to resume 
voyage under certain agreements 

Instructed to inform Foreign Office of British 
Government that United States does not 
recognize Netherlands Oversea Trust and 
finds no legal justification for the detention 
of non-contraband cargoes consigned to 
other firms or individuals 

Transmits note for communication to the 
German Government protesting against vio- 
lation by the German authorities of American 
rights on the high seas which culminated in 
the torpedoing and sinking of the Lusitania. 

Transmits note from Foreign Office of British 
Government disclaiming any intention of 
interference with commerce between neutrals. 

Memorandum from British Foreign Office re- 
garding detention of American vessels bound 
for neutral countries. States that British 
Government feels justified in assuming that 
"abnormal" imports by neutral countries in- 
dicate ultimate enemy destination 



135 



138 
139 



139 



140 



140 



141 



141 



141 



142 



144 



144 



145 



146 



147 



90 



AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 



Date 



1915 

Washington, 
May 21 . . . 



Washington, 
May 21 . . 



London, 
June 22 . 



Berlin, 
July 8. 



Washington, 
July 14... 



Washington, 
July 15... 



Washington, 
July 21... 



London, 
July 24. 



London, 
July 31 



London, 
August 21 . 

Washington, 
October 21 . 



From Whom and to Whom 



The Secretary of State to American 
Press 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Sec- 
retary of State ad Interim 



The German Minister for Foreign 
Affairs to Ambassador J. W. 
Gerard 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador J. W. Gerard 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Sec- 
retary of State 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Sec- 
retary of State 



Contents 



The Secretary of State to Ambas- 
sador W. H. Page 



Denies that trade arrangements made between 
industries and British Embassy are in any 
way official or binding upon the Government 
of the United States 

Statement of British Embassy in regard to 
character of trade agreements made with 
American industries 

Transmits note from Foreign Office of British 
Government explaining method of procedure 
in the case of American vessels detained in 
British court and provisions made for ex- 
amination of such vessels 

Suggests arrangement of passenger ships carry- 
ing non-contraband cargoes under American 
flag in which American travelers may cross 
the ocean in perfect safety 

Instructed to inform British Government that 
United States will insist upon rights of cit- 
izens under the principles and rules of in- 
ternational law governing neutral trade in 
times of war 

Instructed to protest to the British Govern- 
ment against the seizure of the American 
steamship Neches traveling from a neutral 
port to the United States as an infraction of 
the rights and privileges of American citizens. 

Directed to transmit note to German Minister 
for Foreign Affairs stating that repetition of 
submarine attacks which injure American 
citizens will be regarded as deliberately un- 
friendly 

Transmits note from British Foreign Office 
defending new method of blockade and de- 
fining doctrine of " continuous passage " as of 
American origin 156 

Transmits note from British Foreign Office 
suggesting that United States, if protests 
against Orders in Council are sustained in 
British courts, may have recourse to inter- 
national tribunal of arbitration and refuses 
to modify determined procedure 

Proclamation declaring cotton contraband of 
war ; 

Transmits note of protest against hardships 
inflicted on American vessels and trade by 
British and declares alleged "blockade "illegal. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 

Ambassador Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

American Embassy, 
London, August 5, 1914- 

Mr. Page reports that he has received from the Foreign Office list of articles which 
the British Government have declared to be absolute contraband and conditional contra- 
band, respectively, during the present war : 

PROCLAMATION. 

August 4, 1914. No. 1250. 
Specifying the articles to be treated as contraband of war. 
GEORGE R. I. 

Whereas a state of war exists between us on the one hand and the German Empire on the other: 
And whereas it is necessary to specify the articles which it is our intention to treat as contraband of war : 
Now, therefore, we do hereby declare, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, that during the continu- 
ance of the war or until we do give further public notice the articles enumerated in Schedule I hereto will be 
treated as absolute contraband, and the articles enumerated in Schedule II hereto will be treated as conditional 
contraband : 

SCHEDULE I. 

The following articles will be treated as absolute contraband : 

1. Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts. 

2. Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts. 

3. Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war. 

4. Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and their distinctive component parts. 

5. Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character. 

6. All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 

7. Saddle, draft, and pack animals suitable for use in war. 

8. Articles of camp equipment and their distinctive component parts. 

9. Armor plates. 

10. Warships, including boats, and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be 
used on a vessel of war. 

11. Aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and air craft of all kinds, and their component parts, together with acces- 
sories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and air craft. 

12. Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manu- 
facture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land and sea. 

SCHEDULE 11. 

The following articles will be treated as conditional contraband : 

1. Foodstuffs. 

2. Forage and grain suitable for feeding animals. 

3. Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war. 

4. Gold and silver in coin or bullion ; paper money. 

5. Vehicles of all kinds available for use in war and their component parts. 

6. Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds ; floating docks, parts of docks, and their component parts. 

7. Railway material, both fixed and rolling stock, and materials for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs and tele- 
phones. 

8. Fuel ; lubricants. 

9. Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war. 

10. Barbed wire, and implements for fixing and cutting the same. 

11. Horseshoes and shoeing materials. 

12. Harness and saddlery. 

13. Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments. 

Given at our court at Buckingham Palace, this fourth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand 
nine hundred and fourteen, etc., etc. 



92 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 1 

[Telegram— Paraphrase.] 

Department of State, 
Washington, August 6, 1914, 1 P- m - 
Mr. Bryan instructs Mr. Page to inquire whether the British Government is willing 
to agree that the laws of naval warfare as laid down by the Declaration of London of 1909 
shall be applicable to naval warfare during the present conflict in Europe provided that 
the Governments with whom Great Britain is or may be at war also agree to such appli- 
cation. Mr. Bryan further instructs Mr. Page to state that the Government of the United 
States believes that an acceptance of these laws by the belligerents would prevent grave 
misunderstandings which may arise as to the relations between neutral powers and the 
belligerents. Mr. Bryan adds that it is earnestly hoped that this inquiry may receive 
favorable consideration. 



Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, August 22, 1914, 12 midnight. 
Mr. Gerard refers to Department's August 19, 4 p. m., and says his August 20, 1 a. m., 
by way of Copenhagen, states that the German Government will apply the Declaration of 
London, provided its provisions are not disregarded by other belligerents. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

American Embassy, 
London, August 27, 1914- 
Sir: I have the honor to transmit herewith inclosed a copy of the note from the 
Foreign Office I telegraphed you on the 26th instant (No. 483) defining the attitude of 
the British Government with regard to the so-called Declaration of London, 1909, to- 
gether with a copy of a memorandum which accompanied the note, and a copy of the 
King's Order in Council of the 20th instant relating to this matter. 

There will also be found attached a copy of a circular note I have just received from 
the Foreign Office relating to the same order in council and to the rules governing the 
proceedings in the British prize courts. Another copy of the King's Order in Council of 
the 20th instant, which accompanied the circular note, is inclosed herewith, and there will 
be found as well, in the pouch which accompanies this dispatch, six copies of the Prize 
Court Eules. 

I have, etc., 

Walter Hikes Page. 



[Inclosure 1.] 

The Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

Foreign Office, 
London, August 22, 1914- 

Your Excellency : On the 7th instant you were so good as to address to me a note 
inquiring, pursuant to instructions from the Secretary of State at Washington, whether 
His Majesty's Government were willing to agree that the laws of naval warfare, as laid 
down by the Declaration of London, 1909, should be applicable to naval warfare during 
the present European conflict, provided that the Governments with whom Great Britain 
is at war, or with whom her relations are not normal, also agree to such application. 

Your Excellency added that it was the belief of your Government that the acceptance 
of these laws by the belligerents would prevent the possibility of grave misunderstandings 
as to the relations between belligerents and neutrals. 

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, who at- 
tach great importance to the views expressed in Your Excellency's note and are animated 
by a keen desire to consult so far as possible the interests of neutral countries, have given 
this matter their most careful consideration and have pleasure in stating that they have 
decided to adopt generally the rules of the declaration in question, subject to certain 
modi fications and additions which they judge indispensable to the efficient conduct of their 

l(Same mutatis mutandis to: The American Embassies at St. Petersburg, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, and the American Lega- 
tion at Brussels.) 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 93 

naval operations. A detailed explanation of these additions and modifications is con- 
tained in the inclosed memorandum. 

The necessary steps to carry the above decision into effect have now been taken by the 
issue of an Order in Council, of which I have the honor to inclose copies herein for Your 
Excellency's information and for transmission to your Government. 

I may add that His Majesty's Government, in deciding to adhere to the rules of the 
Declaration of London, subject only to the aforesaid modifications and additions, have 
not waited to learn the intentions of the enemy Governments, but have been actuated by 
a desire to terminate at the earliest moment the condition of uncertainty which has been 
prejudicing the interests of neutral trade. 
I have, etc., 

E. A. Crewe. 



[Enclosure 2.] 
MEMORANDUM. 

1. The lists of contraband already published by His Majesty are substituted for those contained in Articles 
22 and 24 of the Declaration of London. Lists similar to those published by His Majesty have been issued by the 
French Government. 

2. His Majesty's Government do not feel able to accept in its entirety the rule laid down in .Article 38 of 
the Declaration. It has been the practice of the British Navy to treat, as liable to capture a vessel which 
carried contraband of war with false papers if she was encountered on the return voyage, and to this exception 
His Majesty's Government feel it necessary to adhere. 

3. The peculiar conditions in the present war due to the fact that neutral ports such as Rotterdam are the 
chief means of access to a large part of Germany and that exceptional measures have been taken in the enemy 
country for the control by the Government of the entire supply of foodstuffs have convinced His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment that modifications are required in the applications of Articles 34 and 35 of the Declaration. These 
modifications are contained in paragraphs 3 and 5 of the accompanying Order in Council. 

4. Article 15 of the Declaration contains a provision as to presumptive knowledge of the blockade in certain 
cases if the vessel has sailed from a neutral port. No mention is made of British or allied enemy ports. These 
omissions are supplied by Article 4 of the Order in Council. 

5. The Order in Council also provides for the acceptance of the very valuable commentary on the Declara- 
tion which was embodied in the General Report prepared by Monsieur Renault. 



Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, September If, 191J/- 
I repeat my August tenth a. m. 

The Foreign Office sends me a list of the articles which the German Government in- 
tends to treat as contraband of war in pursuance of the German prize ordinance printed 
in Reichgesetzblatt, 1914, No. 4. I find the list agrees exactly with article 22, Nos. 1 to 
11, of the Declaration of London, in respect of absolute contraband and to article 24, Nos. 
1 to 14, in respect of conditional contraband. The German Government state that the or- 
dinance embodies the substance of the Declaration and that they will apply its provisions 
if they are not disregarded by other belligerents. They request to be informed what at- 
titude the other powers have assumed. 

Copies of the ordinance have been mailed to you and to the London Embassy. 

Gerard. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, September 30, 191Jf. 
Following proclamation regarding contraband of war has been received from the 
Foreign Office. 

Page. 

PROCLAMATION. 

September 21, 1914. No. 1410. 
Specifying certain additional articles which are to be treated as contraband of war. 
George R. I. 

Whereas on the 4th day of August last, we did issue our royal proclamation specifying the articles which it 
was our intention to treat as contraband of war during the war between us and the German Emperor. 

And whereas on the 12th day of August last we did by our royal proclamation of that date extend our proc- 
lamation afore-mentioned to the war between us and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary. 



96 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

Whereas on the twenty-first day of September, 1914, We did by Our Royal Proclamation of that date make 
certain additions to the list of articles to be treated as contraband of war ; and 

Whereas it is expedient to consolidate the said lists and to make certain additions thereto: 
Now, therefore, We do hereby declare, by and with the advice of Our Privy Council, that the lists of contra- 
band contained in the schedules to Our Royal Proclamations of the fourth day of August and the twenty-first 
day of September aforementioned are hereby withdrawn, and that in lieu thereof during the continuance of the 
war or until We do give further public notice the articles enumerated in Schedule I. hereto will be treated as 
absolute contraband, and the articles enumerated in Schedule II. hereto will be treated conditional contraband. 

schedule 1. 

1. Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts. 

2. Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts. 

3. Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war. 

4. Sulphuric acid. 

5. Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges and their distinctive component parts. 

6. Range-finders and their distinctive component parts. 

7. Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character. 

8. Saddle, draft, and pack animals suitable for use in war. 

9. All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 

10. Articles of camp equipment and their distinctive component parts. 

11. Armor plates. 

12. Haematite iron ore and haematite pig iron. 

13. Iron pyrites. 

14. Nickel ore and nickel. 

15. Ferrochrome and chrome ore. 

16. Copper, unwrought. 

17. Lead, pig, sheet, or pipe. 

18. Aluminium. 

19. Ferro-silica. 

20. Barbed wire, and implements for fixing and cutting the same. 

21. Warships, including boats and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be 
used on a vessel of war. 

22. Aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and aircraft of all kinds, and their component parts, together with acces- 
sories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and aircraft. 

23. Motor vehicles of all kinds and their component parts. 

24. Motor tires ; rubber. 

25. Mineral oils and motor spirit, except lubricating oils. 

26. Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manu- 
facture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land and sea. 

SCHEDULE II. 

1. Foodstuffs. 

2. Forage and feedings stuff for animals. 

3. Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes suitable for use in war. 

4. Gold and silver in coin or bullion ; paper money. 

5. Vehicles of all kinds, other than motor vehicles, available for use in war, and their component parts. 

6. Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds; floating docks, parts of docks, and their component parts. 

7. Railway materials, both fixed and rolling stock, and materials for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and 
telephones. 

8. Fuel, other than mineral oils. Lubricants. 

9. Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use .in war. 

10. Sulphur. 

11. Glycerine. 

12. Horseshoes and shoeing materials. 

13. Harness and saddlery. 

14. Hides of all kinds, dry or wet; pigskins, raw or dressed; leather, undressed or dressed, suitable for 
saddlery, harness, or military boots. 

15. Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments. 

Given at our court at Buckingham Palace, this twenty-ninth day of October, in the year of our Lord one 
thousand nine hundred and fourteen, etc., etc. 



Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State. 

[ Telegram — Extract. ] 

American Consulate General, 
London, November 17, 1914 — 6 p. m. 
Foreign Office states: "Cottonseed cake, being feeding stuff for cattle, is conditional 
contraband and will be treated in strict accordance with Order in Council, article 1, sub- 
article 3." 

Skinner. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 97 

Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, November 19, 1911^. 
Proclamation of November 17th defines all rough or unworked lumber as conditional 
contraband under number nine or article twenty-three of German prize ordinance because 
susceptible of use as fuel. Exceptions are lignum vitse, palisander, ebony, and similar 
woods and all woods greatly enhanced in value through working by hand or machine. 

Gerard. 



Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, November 23, 191k- 
German Government has added following to list of conditional contraband : 
No. 17. Woods of all kinds, rough or worked, that is hewn, sawed, planed, grooved, 
etc. ; cylinder tar. 

No. 18. Sulphur, crude or refined, and sulphuric acid. 

Gerard. 



Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, November 23, 1914- 
Sir: I have the honor to transmit to you herewith translations of two notes received 
from the imperial foreign office conveying notification of additions to the original lists of 
articles regarded as contraband by the German Government, which, as reported in my tele- 
gram of August 10, 1 p. m., corresponded in all respects with articles 22 and 24 of the Dec- 
laration of London. 
I have, etc., 

James W. Gerard. 



[Inclosure 1— Translation.] 
NOTE VERBAL6. 

In supplement to its note verbale of August 6, 1914, IIIa.9222, the foreign office has the honor to inform the 
embassy of the United States of America that during the present hostilities the following materials will be con- 
sidered as conditional contraband by Germany in addition to the articles and materials designated under No. 11, 
1-14: 

15. Copper (unworked) and 

16. Lead in blocks, plates or tubes. 

The foreign office begs that the embassy of the United States of America will kindly inform its Government 
of the above as soon as possible. 
Berlin, October 22, 1914. 

[Inclosure 2 — -Translation.] 

NOTE VERBALE. 

In supplement to its notes verbales of August 6, 1914, and October 22, 1914, IIIa.9222 and 17064, the foreign 
office has the honor to inform the embassy of the United States of America that during the present hostilities the 
following will be considered by Germany as conditional contraband in addition to the articles and materials desig- 
nated under II, 1-16: 

17. Woods of all kinds, rough or treated (in particular hewn, sawed, planed, grooved), charcoal, cyclinder tar. 

18. Sulphur, crude or refined, sulphuric acid. 

The foreign office begs that the embassy will kindly notify its Government of the above as soon as possible. 
Berlin, November 23, 1914. 



The German Ambassador to the Secretary of State* 

According to an Order in Council of August 20, 1914, the British Government in- 
tends to act, during the present hostilities, in accordance with the provisions of tbe Dec- 
laration of London relative to the law of naval warfare of February 26, 1909, subject to 
some additions and modifications. However, these additions and modifications are of 
such a nature that they obliterate the said declaration in several vital points and, at the 

* Not printed in Diplomatic Correspondence, etc. The New York Times, November 24, 1914. 



98 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

same time, encroach on the accepted rules of international law. Further modifications of 
great consequence are contained in the proclamation of September 21, 1914. 

First. The most vital modifications of the Declaration of London are contained in 
the rule concerning conditional contraband under Nos. 3 and 5 of the above-mentioned Or- 
der in Council. 

Article 33 of the Declaration of London defines that there can be no question of 
conditional contraband except in the case where cargo is destined for the use of the ad- 
ministrative departments or the military forces of the hostile power. Moreover, according 
to Article 35 the question whether goods are conditional contraband or not can under no 
circumstances arise when the vessel is sailing for a neutral port. 

The above provisions which are, in the main, in accordance with the accepted rules 
of international law and represent the outcome of the just weighing of the interests of 
the belligerents on the one side and of the neutral countries on the other side, are as good 
as annulled by the said Order in Council, for, according to its No. 3 the hostile destina- 
tion of the cargo is to be presumed in every case where the consignee of the cargo is under 
the control of the authorities of the hostile State. This, however, means nothing else but 
that each and every cargo shipped to the hostile country is liable to be seized because all 
inhabitants of that country are under the control of the authorities. This rule is supple- 
mented by No. 5 of the said Order, which sets forth that all vessels on the voyage for neu- 
tral ports are liable to be seized for having conditional contraband on board. Thus, the 
rule of the continuous voyage, applicable only in the case of absolute contraband, is de- 
clared applicable also with regard to conditional contraband in contravention of Article 
35 of the Declaration of London. In this manner the more lenient regulations with regard 
to conditional contraband, established by the Declaration of London, are simply set aside 
with the result that conditional contraband is virtually on the same footing as absolute 
contraband. In consequence the supply by neutrals of objects of conditional contraband, 
especially of foodstuffs, destined only for the consumption of the inhabitants of a bellig- 
erent country, which is universally considered legitimate in international law, is practi- 
cally rendered illusory, whereby the interests of the belligerents as well as neutrals are 
violated in a manner contrary to the law of nations. 

As events at the theatres of naval warfare prove, England proceeds in this respect 
in the most high-handed manner, even enforcing a control over supplies destined for the 
countries adjacent to Germany, and thereby endangering their victualing. 

Second. The British Government considers itself at liberty to totally disregard the 
lists of absolute contraband, and of merchandise not to be declared contraband (free list) 
contained in articles XXII, XXIV and XXVIII of the Declaration of London. In its defi- 
nition of contraband of August 5, 1914, specially upheld by No. 1 of the said Order in 
Council, it has declared airships and parts thereof absolute contraband, while according 
to No. 8 of Article XXIV of the Declaration of London, such objects can only be regarded 
as conditional contraband. Above all, by proclamation of September 21, 1914, it has de- 
clared rubber, hides and skins, as well as various kinds of iron ore, to be conditional con- 
traband, although these articles are not at all, or only in an indirect way, suitable for pur- 
poses of warfare, and were therefore placed in the free list. (Article XXVIII, Nos. 3, 4 
and 6.) In this manner the universally accepted principle of international law that neu- 
tral trade with objects for exclusively peaceful use must not be disturbed by the bellig- 
erents is wantonly set aside. 

Third. No. 2 of the said Order in Council contains a further aggravation of the 
rules concerning contraband. For Article 3S of the Declaration of London, in accordance 
with the accepted principle of international law, permits the seizure of a vessel for carry- 
ing contraband only as long as such is on board the vessel ; whereas the British Govern- 
ment claims the right of seizing the vessel during its entire voyage, if carriage of contra- 
band has taken place under false shipping documents. In this manner neutral shipping 
with the belligerent territory is exposed to constant chicane, since vessels may be seized 
not only by reason of evident facts, viz., the existence of contraband on board, but also by 
reason of a frequently not provable affirmation with regard to their previous acts. 

Fourth. By the rule established under No. 4 of the said Order in Council the 
right of seizure on account of blockade running is unduly extended, since according there- 
to knowledge of the blockade is to be assumed even in the case that, after a certain time 
since the notification of the blockade of an enemy port to the local authorities has elapsed, 
a vessel has sailed from another enemy port. By this rule, the British Government at- 
tempts, beyond the limits drawn by international law, to put the authorities of the hostile 
country into the service of the British naval forces, and to enforce this service by the cap- 
ture of neutral vessels. 

Fifth. According to an acknowledged principle of international law confirmed by 
the Declaration of London, only such persons traveling on board of merchant vessels are 
liable to be made prisoners of war as have already incorporated in the hostile military 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 99 

forces. This rule is clearly established by Article 45, No. 2, in conjunction with Article 
47 of the Declaration of London, and is, moreover, treated in detail in the general report 
of the drafting committee of the Conference of London, in the first paragraphs to notes to 
45. As it is set forth in the general report, for judicial reasons as well as for practical 
considerations, it was agreed at the conference that persons belonging to the active mili- 
tary forces, exclusively, shall be liable to be made prisoners of war when traveling on neu- 
tral ships, not, however, persons who, in order to fulfil their military services, are return- 
ing to their country, as in the case of members of the reserve. Although the said Order in 
Council has acknowledged as binding the above-mentioned two articles, as well as the 
notes of the general report, the British naval forces have, nevertheless, seized on merchant 
vessels, sailing under the Dutch, Norwegian, or Italian flag, German subjects liable to do 
military service, but not yet incorporated in the military forces, and made them prisoners 
of war. In this manner they have not only gravely violated the established principles of 
international law, as expressed in the Declaration of London, but also infringed on an act 
of their own legislation, i.e., the said Order in Council. 

According to a decree of the President of the French Eepublic, published in the 
Journal Officiel of August 6, 1914, France has taken the same stand as Great Britain in 
the said Order in Council. Moreover, in the same manner as the British naval forces, 
the French naval forces have captured German persons liable to do military service, on 
neutral vessels, notably on Dutch and Spanish vessels. 

It is thus evident that the regulations issued by Great Britain and France, and even 
more so their respective naval forces, are disregarding in the most wanton way the pro- 
visions embodied in the Declaration of London relative to the law of naval warfare. 

It is Great Britain's acknowledged aim to hit not only the military but also the 
commercial power of their adversaries, by way of paralyzing neutral trade, and in pur- 
suing this purpose they encroach in an unjustifiable manner, not only upon the legiti- 
mate commerce between the neutrals and the enemy, but also upon the commerce among 
the neutral countries themselves. It is true that, thus far, the Declaration of London has 
not been ratified. However, in its preamble it has been specially acknowledged by the dele- 
gates of all its signatory powers, including those of Great Britain and France, that, in 
the main, the provisions of the Declaration of London are in accordance with the generally 
acknowledged principles of international law, which must be considered much more seri- 
ous, because in the course of former wars in which she was neutral, notably in the Russo- 
Japanese War, Great Britain has always protested most emphatically against violations 
of international law of the indicated order. (See the British Blue Book, Russia No. 1, 1903, 
correspondence respecting contraband of war, page 8, etc. ) 

The Imperial German Government has thus far strictly observed the Declaration 
of London and has embodied the contents of its provisions in the German prize court regu- 
lations of September 30, 1914, (cf. Reichsgesetzblatt, 1914, page 275). It has not changed 
this attitude even in view of the flagrant violations of law committed by its adversaries. 

However, The Imperial German Government must now study the question whether 
it will be able to continue to maintain the above attitude if the enemy powers abide by 
the procedure observed by them, and if the neutral powers allow such violations of the 
principles of neutrality to go on to the detriment of German interest. 

The Imperial German Government considers it, therefore, of interest to learn 
which position the neutral powers intend to take toward the attitude adopted by Great 
Britain and France contrary to international law, and particularly whether it is their in- 
tention to take measures against the acts of violence committed on board their merchant 
vessels against German subjects and German property. 



Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Consulate General, 

London, November 25, 191Jf. 
British authorities inform me to-day in their view toluene and toluol are contraband. 

Skinner. 



100 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, December 3, 1914- 
Sir : With reference to my dispatch No. 280, dated November 23, 1914, I have the 
honor to transmit to you herewith a copy, in translation, of a note received from the 
imperial German foreign office, dated November 30, 1914, in reply to an inquiry addressed 
by me to the foreign office to ascertain whether Germany regards quebracho wood in logs 
as contraband of war. It appears from the note of the foreign office that quebracho 
wood is held by the German Government to fall under the order of the imperial chancel- 
lor of November 23, 1914, and to be considered as conditional contraband. 
I have, etc. 

James W. Gerard. 



[ Inclosure — Translation.] 
NOTE VERBALE. 

The foreign office has the honor to inform the embassy of the United States of America, in reply to the note 
verbale of the 20th instant (F. O. No. 1165), that quebracho wood is not to be considered as fuel within the mean- 
ing of article 23, No. 9, of the German prize ordinance, nor to be deemed contraband for this reason. 

However, by an order of the imperial chancellor, dated November 23, 1914, Reichs-Gesetzblatt, page 481, all 
kinds of woods have been expressly declared to be conditional contraband, and quebracho wood in logs is includ- 
ed in such declaration. 

Berlin, November 30, 1914. 



Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, December 8, 1914. 
Sir : With reference to the department's cable, No. 749, of December 3, 1914, and to 
my dispatch, No. 280, of November 23, 1914, I have the honor to transmit to you here- 
with three copies of the Reichs-Gesetzblatt, 1914, No. 101, containing the proclamation 
of the German Government relative to the treatment of wood, cylinder tar, sulphur, and 
sulphuric acid as conditional contraband. 

I have, etc. James W. Gerard. 

[ Inclosure— ^Translation. ] 
Reichs-Gesetzblatt. Year 1914. No. 101. 
(No. 4S49-) Addition to the prize ordinance of September 30, 1909 (Reichs-Gesetzblatt, 1914, p. 275) of 
November 23, 1914. 

I hereby prescribe in addition to the ordinance of October 18, 1914 (Reichs-Gesetzblatt, p. 441), that in the 
prize list of September 30, 1909, under the numeral 23, the following two further numbers be subjoined: 

17. Woods of every kind, in the rough or manufactured (especially also cut, sawn, planed, grooved), wood- 



tar. 



18. Sulphur, raw or refined, sulphuric acid. 

Berlin, November 23, 1914. Delbruck. 

Vice Imperial Chancellor, 



Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, December 15, 1914- . 
Sir: With reference to my telegram of even date, I have the honor to transmit to 
you herewith five copies of a proclamation of the German Government, dated December 
14, 1914, declaring aluminum and nickel to be conditional contraband. A translation of 
the proclamation is likewise appended. 

I have, etc. James W. Gerard. 

[Inclosure 1 — Translation.] 

Supplement to the prize ordinance of September 30, 1909- {Reichsgesetzblatt, 1914, page 275.) 
In supplement to the order of November 23, 1914 (Reichsgesetzblatt, page 481), I hereby order that the fol- 
lowing two numbers shall be added to article 23 of the prize ordinance of September 30, 1909: 

19. Aluminum. 

20. Nickel . 

Berlin, December 14, 1914. 

Vice Imperial Chancellor. (Signed) Delbruck. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 101 

[Inclosure 2 — Translation.] 
NOTE VERBALE. 

The foreign office has the honor to inform the embassy of the United States of America, in supplement to 
the notes verbale of August 6, October 22, and November 23, 1914, Nos. IIIa9222, 17064, and 19785 that during 
the present hostilities the following articles will be considered as conditional contraband by Germany, in addition 
to those recited in the notes verbale mentioned, Nos. 1-18: 

19. Aluminum.- 

20. Nickel. 

The foreign office begs that the embassy would be good enough to inform its Government of the above as 
soon as possible. 

Berlin, December 14, 1914. 



Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

American Consulate General, 

London, December 24, 1914- 
Mr. Skinner states that radically amended contraband list is promulgated by procla- 
mation of December 23, 1914, as follows : 

PROCLAMATION. 

December 23, 1914. 
Revising the List of Articles to be Treated as Contraband of War. 
George R. I. 

Whereas on the 4th day of August, 1914, we did issue our royal proclamation specifying the articles which it 
was our intention to treat as contraband of war during the war between us and the German Emperor; and 

Whereas on the 12th day of August, 1914, we did by our royal proclamation of that date extend our proclama- 
tion aforementioned to the war between us and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary ; and 

Whereas on the 21st day of September, 1914, we did by our royal proclamation of that date make certain ad- 
ditions to the list of articles to be treated as contraband of war; and 

Whereas on the 29th day of October, 1914, we did by our royal proclamation of that date withdraw the said 
lists of contraband and substitute therefor the lists contained in the schedules to the said proclamation ; and 

Whereas it is expedient to make certain alterations in and additions to the said lists : 

Now, therefore, we do hereby declare, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, that the lists of con- 
traband contained in the schedules to our royal proclam tion of the twenty-ninth day of October aforementioned 
are hereby withdrawn, and that in lieu thereof during the continuance of the war or until we do give further 
public notice the articles enumerated in Shedule I heret) will be treated as absolute contraband, and the articles 
enumerated in Schedule II hereto will be treated as conditional contraband. 

schedule 1. 

1. Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts. 

2. Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds and their distinctive component parts. 

3. Powder and explosives specially prepared for ise in war. 

4. Ingredients of explosives, viz, nitric acid, sulphuric acid, glycerine, acetone, calcium acetate and all other 
metallic acetates, sulphur, potassium nitrate, the fractions of the distillation products of coal tar between benzol 
and cresol, inclusive, aniline, methylaniline, dimethylaniline, ammonium perchlorate, sodium perchlorate, sodium 
chlorate, barium chlorate, ammonium nitrate, cyanamide, potassium chlorate, calcium nitrate, mercury. 

5. Resinous products, camphor, and turpentine (oil and spirit). 

6. Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and their distinctive component parts. 

7. Range-finders and their distinctive component parts. 

8. Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character. 

9. Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war. 

10. All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 

11. Articles of camp equipment and their distinctive component parts. 

12. Armour plates. 

13. Ferro alloys, including ferro-tungsten, ferro-molybdenum, ferro-manganese, ferro-vanadium, ferro-chrome. 

14. The following metals : Tungsten, molybdenum, vanadium, nickel, selenium, cobalt, haematite pig-iron, 
manganese. 

15. The following ores : Wolframite, scheelite, molybdenite, manganese ore, nickel ore, chrome ore, haematite 
iron ore, zinc ore, lead ore, bauxite. 

16. Aluminum, alumina, and salts of aluminium. 

17. Antimony, together with the sulphides and oxides of antimony. 

18. Copper, unwrought and part wrought, and copper wire. 

19. Lead, pig, sheet, or pipe. 

20. Barbed wire, and implements for fixing and cutting the same. 

21. Warships, including boats and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be 
used on a vessel of war. 

22. Submarine sound signaling apparatus. 

23. Aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and aircraft of all kinds, and their component parts, together with acces- 
sories and articles recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and aircraft. 



102 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

24. Motor vehicles of all kinds and their component parts. 

25. Tires for motor vehicles and for cycles, together with articles or materials especially adapted for use 
in the manufacture or repair of tires. 

26. Rubber (including raw, waste, and reclaimed rubber) and goods made wholly of rubber. 

27. Iron pyrites. 

28. Mineral oils and motor spirit, except lubricating oils. 

29. Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manu- 
facture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land and sea. 

SCHEDULE II. 

Foodstuffs. 

Forage and feeding stuffs for animals. 

Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes suitable for use in war. 

Gold and silver in coin or bullion; paper money. 

Vehicles of all kinds, other than motor vehicles, available for use in war, and their component parts. 

Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds ; floating docks, parts of docks, and their component parts. 

Railway materials, both fixed and rolling stock, and materials for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and 
telephones. 

Fuel, other than mineral oils. Lubricants. 

Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war. 

Horseshoes and shoeing materials. 

Harness and saddlery. 

Hides of all kinds, dry or wet ; pigskins, raw or dressed ; leather, undressed or dressed, suitable for 
saddlery, harness, or military boots. 

13. Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments. 

Given at our court at Buckingham Palace, this Twenty-third day of December, in the year of our Lord 
one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, etc., etc. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 
Washington, December 26, 1914- 

The present condition of American foreign trade resulting from the frequent seiz- 
ures and detentions of American cargoes destined to neutral European ports has be- 
come so serious as to require a candid statement of the views of this Government in 
order that the British Government may be fully informed as to the attitude of the 
United States toward the policy which has been pursued by the British authorities dur- 
ing the present war. 

You will, therefore, communicate the following to His Majesty's principal secretary 
of state for foreign affairs, but in doing so you will assure him that it is done in the 
most friendly spirit and in the belief that frankness will better serve the continuance of 
cordial relations between the two countries than silence, which may be misconstrued 
into acquiescence in a course of conduct which this Government can not but consider 
to be an infringement upon the rights of American citizens. 

The Government of the United States has viewed with growing concern the large 
number of vessels laden with American goods destined to neutral ports in Europe, 
which have been seized on the high seas, taken into British ports and detained some- 
times for weeks by the British authorities. During the early days of the war this Gov- 
ernment assumed that the policy adopted by the British Government was due to the un- 
expected outbreak of hostilities and the necessity of immediate action to prevent contra- 
band from reaching the enemy. For this reason it was not disposed to judge this policy 
harshly or protest it vigorously, although it was manifestly very injurious to American 
trade with the neutral countries of Europe. This Government, relying confidently upon 
the high regard which Great Britain has so often exhibited in the past for the rights of 
other nations, confidently awaited amendment of a course of action which denied to 
neutral commerce the freedom to which it was entitled by the law of nations. 

This expectation seemed to be rendered the more assured by the statement of the 
foreign office early in November that the British Government were satisfied with guaran- 
tees offered by the Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish Governments as to nonexportation 
of contraband goods when consigned to named persons in the territories of those Govern- 
ments, and that orders had been given to the British fleet and customs authorities to 
restrict interference with neutral vessels carrying such cargoes so consigned to verifica- 
tion of ship's papers and cargoes. 

It is therefore a matter of deep regret that, though nearly five months have passed 
since the war began, the British Government have not materially changed their policy 
and do not treat less rigorously ships and cargoes passing between neutral ports in the 
peaceful pursuit of lawful commerce, which belligerents should protect rather than in- 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 103 

terrupt. The greater freedom from detention and seizure which was confidently 
expected to result from consigning shipments to definite consignees, rather than "to 
order," is still awaited. 

It is needless to point out to His Majesty's Government, usually the champion of the 
freedom of the seas and the rights of trade, that peace, not war, is the normal relation 
between nations and that the commerce between countries which are not belligerents 
should not be interfered with by those at war unless such interference is manifestly an 
imperative necessity to protect their national safety, and then only to the extent that it 
is a necessity. It is with no lack of appreciation of the momentous nature of the pres- 
ent struggle in which Great Britain is engaged and with no selfish desire to gain undue 
commercial advantage that this Government is reluctantly forced to the conclusion that 
the present policy of His Majesty's Government toward neutral ships and cargoes ex- 
ceeds the manifest necessity of a belligerent and constitutes restrictions upon the rights 
of American citizens on the high seas which are not justified by the rules of international 
law or required under the principle of self-preservation. 

The Government of the United States does not intend at this time to discuss the 
propriety of including certain articles in the lists of absolute and conditional contraband, 
which have been proclaimed by His Majesty. Open to objection as some of these seem to 
this Government, the chief ground of present complaint is the treatment of cargoes of 
both classes of articles when bound to neutral ports. 

Articles listed as absolute contraband, shipped from the United States and consigned 
to neutral countries, have been seized and detained on the ground that the countries to 
which they were destined have not prohibited the exportation of such articles. Unwar- 
ranted as such detentions are, in the opinion of this Government, American exporters 
are further perplexed by the apparent indecision of the British authorities in applying 
their own rules to neutral cargoes. For example, a shipment of copper from this coun- 
try to a specified consignee in Sweden was detained because, as was stated by Great 
Britain, Sweden had placed no embargo on copper. On the other hand, Italy not only 
prohibited the export of copper, but, as this Government is informed, put in force a de- 
cree that shipments to Italian consignees or "to order," which arrive in ports of Italy can 
not be exported or transshipped. The only exception Italy makes is of copper which 
passes through that country in transit to another country. In spite of these decrees, 
however, the British Foreign Office has thus far declined to affirm that copper shipments 
consigned to Italy will not be molested on the high seas. Seizures are so numerous and 
delays so prolonged that exporters are afraid to send their copper, to Italy, steamship 
lines decline to accept it, and insurers refuse to issue policies upon it. In a word, a legiti- 
mate trade is being greatly impaired through uncertainty as to the treatment which it 
may expect at the hands of the British authorities. 

We feel that we are abundantly justified in asking for information as to the manner 
in which the British Government propose to carry out the policy which they have adopt- 
ed, in order that we may determine the steps necessary to protect our citizens, engaged 
in foreign trade, in their rights and from the serious losses to which they are liable 
through ignorance of the hazards to which their cargoes are exposed. 

In the case of conditional contraband the policy of Great Britain appears to this 
Government to be equally unjustified by the established rules of international conduct. 
As evidence of this, attention is directed to the fact that a number of the American car- 
goes which have been seized consist of foodstuffs and other articles of common use in 
all countries which are admittedly relative contraband. In spite of the presumption of 
innocent use because destined to neutral territory, the British authorities made these 
seizures and detentions without, so far as we are informed, being in possession of facts 
which warranted a reasonable belief that the shipments had in reality a belligerent desti- 
nation, as that term is used in international law. Mere suspicion is not evidence and 
doubts should be resolved in favor of neutral commerce, not against it. The effect upon 
trade in these articles between neutral nations resulting from interrupted voyages and 
detained cargoes is not entirely cured by reimbursement of the owners for the damages 
which they have suffered, after investigation has failed to establish an enemy destination. 
The injury is to American commerce with neutral countries as a whole through the haz- 
ard of the enterprise and the repeated diversion of goods from established markets. 

It also appears that cargoes of this character have been seized by the British authori- 
ties because of a belief that, though not originally so intended by the shippers, they will 
ultimately reach the territory of the enemies of Great Britain. Yet this belief is fre- 
quently reduced to a mere fear in view of the embargoes which have been decreed by 
the neutral countries, to which they are destined, on the articles composing the cargoes. 

That a consignment "to order" of articles listed as conditional contraband and 
shipped to a neutral port raises a legal presumption of enemy destination appears to be 



104 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

directly contrary to the doctrines previously held by Great Britain and thus stated by 
Lord Salisbury during the South African War: 

Foodstuffs, though having a hostile destination, can be considered as contraband of war only if they are for 
the enemy's forces ; it is not sufficient that they are capable of being so used, it must be shown that this was in 
fact their destination at the time of their seizure. 

With this statement as to conditional contraband the views of this Government are 
in entire accord, and upon this historic doctrine, consistently maintained by Great Brit- 
ain when a belligerent as well as a neutral, American shippers were entitled to rely. 

The Government of the United States readily admits the full right of a belligerent 
to visit and search on the high seas the vessels of American citizens or other neutral 
vessels carrying American goods and to detain them ivhen there is sufficient evidence to 
justify a belief that contraband articles are in their cargoes; but His Majesty's Govern- 
ment, judging by their own experience in the past, must realize that this Government can 
not without protest permit American ships or American cargoes to be taken into British 
ports and there detained for the purpose of searching generally for evidence of contra- 
band, or upon presumptions created by special municipal enactments which are clearly 
at variance with international law and practice. 

This Government believes, and earnestly hopes His Majesty's Government will come 
to the same belief, that a course of conduct more in conformity with the rules of inter- 
national usage, which Great Britain has strongly sanctioned for many years, will in the 
end better serve the interests of belligerents as well as those of neutrals. 

Not only is the situation a critical one to the commerical interests of the United 
States, but many of the great industries of this country are suffering because their products 
are denied long-established markets in European countries, which, though neutral, are 
contiguous to the nations at war. Producers and exporters, steamship and insurance 
companies are pressing, and not without reason, for relief from the menace to trans- 
Atlantic trade which is gradually but surely destroying their business and threatening 
them with financial disaster. 

The Government of the United States, still relying upon the deep sense of justice of 
the British Nation, which has been so often manifested in the intercourse between the two 
countries during so many years of uninterrupted friendship, expresses confidently the 
hope that His Majesty's Government will realize the obstacles and difficulties which their 
present policy has placed in the way of commerce between the United States and the neu- 
tral countries of Europe, and will instruct its officials to refrain from all unnecessary 
interference with the freedom of trade between nations which are sufferers, though not 
participants, in the present conflict ; and will in their treatment of neutral ships and car- 
goes conform more closely to those rules governing the maritime relations between bel- 
ligerents and neutrals, which have received the sanction of the civilized world, and which 
Great Britain has, in other wars, so strongly and successfully advocated. 

In conclusion, it should be impressed upon His Majesty's Government that the 
present condition of American trade with the neutral European countries is such that, 
if it does not improve, it may arouse a feeling contrary to that which has so long existed 
between the American and British peoples. Already it is becoming more and more the 
subject of public criticism and complaint. There is an increasing belief, doubtless not 
entirely unjustified, that the present British policy toward American trade is responsible 
for the depression in certain industries which depend upon European markets. The .at- 
tention of the British Government is called to this possible result of their present policy 
to show how widespread the effect is upon the industrial life of the United States and to 
emphasize the importance of removing the cause of complaint. 

Bryan. 



The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

Foreign Office,, January 7, 1915. 

Your Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of the 
28th of December. 

It is being carefully examined and the points raised in it are receiving consideration, 
as the result of which a reply shall be addressed to Your Excellency, dealing in detail with 
the issues raised and the points to which the United States Government have drawn at- 
tention. This consideration and the preparation of the reply will necessarily require some 
time, and I therefore desire to send without further delay some preliminary observations 
which will, I trust, help to clear the ground and remove some misconceptions that seem to 
exist. 

Let me say at once that we entirely recognize the most friendly spirit referred to by 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 105 

Your Excellency, and that we desire to reply in the same spirit and in the belief that, as 
Your Excellency states, frankness will best serve the continuance of cordial relations be- 
tween the two countries. 

His Maesty's Government cordially concur in the principle enunciated by the Govern- 
ment of the United States that a belligerent, in dealing with trade between neutrals, 
should not interfere unless such interference is necessary to protect the belligerent's na- 
tional safety, and then only to the extent to which this is necessary. We shall endeavor 
to keep our action within the limits of this principle on the understanding that it admits 
our right to interfere when such interference is not with "bona fide" trade between the 
United States and another neutral country but with trade in contraband destined for 
the enemy's country, and we are ready, whenever our action may unintentionally exceed 
this principle, to make redress. 

We think that much misconception exists as to the extent to which we have, in 
practice, interfered with trade. Your Excellency's note seems to hold His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment responsible for the present condition of trade with neutral countries, and it is 
stated that, through the action of His Majesty's Government, the products of the great 
industries of the United States have been denied long established markets in European 
countries which, though neutral, are contiguous to the seat of war. Such a result is far 
from being the intention of His Majesty's Government, and they would exceedingly re- 
gret that it should be due to their action. I have been unable to obtain complete or con- 
clusive figures showing what the state of trade with these neutral countries has been 
recently, and I can therefore only ask that some further consideration should be given 
to the question whether United States trade with these neutral countries has been so 
seriously affected. The only figures as to the total volume of trade that I have seen are 
those for the exports from New York, for the month of November, 1914, and they are as 
follows, compared with the month of November, 1913 : 

Exports from New York for November, 1913 [and} November, 1914, respectively. 

Denmark $558,000 $7,101,000 

Sweden 377,000 2,858,000 

Norway : 477,ooo 2,318,000 

Italy 2,971,000 4,781,000 

Holland 4,389,000 3,960,000 

It is true that there may have been a falling off in cotton exports, as to which New 
York figures would be no guide, but His Majesty's Government have been most careful not 
to interfere with cotton, and its place on the free list has been scrupulously maintained. 

We do not wish to lay too much stress upon incomplete statistics ; the figures above 
are not put forward as conclusive; and we are prepared to examine any further evidence 
with regard to the state of trade with these neutral countries which may point to a dif- 
ferent conclusion, or show that it is the action of His Majesty's Government in particular, 
and not the existence of a state of war and consequent diminution of purchasing power 
and shrinkage of trade, which is responsible for adverse effects upon trade with the neu- 
tal countries. 

That the existence of a state of war on such a scale has had a very adverse effect up- 
on certain great industries, such as cotton, is obvious ; but it is submitted that this is due 
to the general cause of diminished purchasing power of such countries as France, Ger- 
many, and the United Kingdom, rather than to interference with trade with neutral 
countries. In the matter of cotton, it may be recalled that the British Government gave 
special assistance through the Liverpool Cotton Exchange to the renewal of transactions 
in the cotton trade of not only the United Kingdom but of many neutral countries. 

Your Excellency's note refers in particular to the detention of copper. The figures 
taken from official returns for the export of copper from the United States for Italy for 
the months during which the war has been in progress up to the end of the first three 
weeks of December are as follows : 

Nineteen thirteen : Fifteen million two hundred two thousand pounds. Nineteen four- 
teen : Thirty-six million two hundred eight-five thousand pounds. Norway, Sweden, Den- 
mark, and Switzerland are not shown separately for the whole period in the United States 
returns but are included in the heading "Other Europe" (that is, Europe other than the 
United Kingdom, Russia, France, Belgium, Austria, Germany, Holland, and Italy). The 
corresponding figures under this heading are as follows ; 

Nineteen thirteen : Seven million two hundred seventy-one thousand pounds. Nine- 
teen fourteen : Thirty-five million three hundred forty-seven thousand pounds. 

With such figures the presumption is very strong that the bulk of copper consigned 
to these countries has recently been intended, not for their own use, but for that of a bel- 
ligerent who can not import it direct. It is therefore an imperative necessity for the 
safety of this country while it is at war that His Majesty's Government should do all in 



106 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

their power to stop such part of this import of copper as is not genuinely destined for 
neutral countries. 

Your Excellency does not quote any particular shipment of copper to Sweden, which 
has been detained. There are, however, four consignments to Sweden at the present time 
of copper and aluminium which, though definitely consigned to Sweden, are, according to 
positive evidence in the possession of His Majesty's Government, definitely destined for 
Germany. 

I can not believe that, with such figures before them and in such cases as those just 
mentioned, the Government of the United States would question the propriety of the 
action of His Majesty's Government in taking suspected cargoes to a prize court, and we 
are convinced that it can not be in accord with the wish either of the Government or of 
the people of the United States to strain the international code in favor of private in- 
terests so as to prevent Great Britain from taking such legitimate means for this purpose 
as are in her power. 

With regard to the seizure of foodstuffs to which Your Excellency refers, His Ma- 
jesty's Government are prepared to admit that foodstuffs should not be detained and put 
into a prize court without presumption that they are intended for the armed forces of the 
enemy or the enemy government. We believe that this rule has been adhered to in prac- 
tice, hitherto, but if the United States Government have instances to the contrary, we are 
prepared to examine them, and it is our present intention to adhere to the rule, though we 
can not give an unlimited and unconditional undertaking in view of the departure by those 
against whom we are fighting from hitherto accepted rules of civilization and humanity 
and the uncertainty as to the extent to which such rules may be violated by them in 
future. 

From the 4th of August last to the 3d of January the number of steamships proceed- 
ing from the United States for Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Italy has been 
seven hundred and seventy-three. Of these there are forty-five which have had consign- 
ments or cargoes placed in the prize court while of the ships themselves only eight have 
been placed in the prize court and one of these has since been released. It is, however, 
essential under modern conditions that where there is real ground for suspecting the pres- 
ence of contraband, the vessels should be brought into port for examination : in no other 
way can the right of search be exercised, and but for this practice it would have to be 
completely abandoned. Information was received by us that special instructions had been 
given to ship rubber from the United States under another designation to escape notice, 
and such cases have occurred in several instances. Only by search in a port can such cases, 
when suspected, be discovered and proved. The necessity for examination in a port may 
also be illustrated by a hypothetical instance, connected with cotton, which has not yet 
occurred. Cotton is not specifically mentioned in Your Excellency's note, but I have seen 
public statements made in the United States that the attitude of His Majesty's Govern- 
ment with regard to cotton has been ambiguous, and thereby responsible for depression 
in the cotton trade. There has never been any foundation for this allegation. His Ma- 
jesty's Government have never put cotton on the list of contraband; they have through- 
out the war kept it on the free list ; and, on every occasion when questioned on the point, 
they have stated their intention of adhering to this practice. But information has 
reached us that precisely because we have declared our intention of not interfering with 
cotton, ships carrying cotton will be specially selected to carry concealed contraband ; 
and we have been warned that copper will be concealed in bales of cotton. Whatever sus- 
picions we have entertained, we have not so far made these a ground for detaining any 
ship carrying cotton, but, should we have information giving us real reason to believe in 
the case of a particular ship that the bales of cotton concealed copper or other contra- 
band, the only way to prove our case would be to examine and weigh the bales ; a process 
that could be carried out only by bringing the vessel into a port. In such a case, or if 
examination justified the action of His Majesty's Government, the case shall be brought 
before a prize court and dealt with in the ordinary way. 

That the decisions of British prize courts hitherto have not been unfavorable to neu- 
trals is evidenced by the decision in the MiramicM case. This case, which was decided 
against the Crown, laid down that the American shipper was to be paid even when he had 
sold a cargo c. i. f. and when the risk of loss after the cargo had been shipped did not 
apply to him at all. 

It has further been represented to His Majesty's Government, though this subject is 
not dealt with in Your Excellency's note, that our embargoes on the export of some 
articles, more especially rubber, have interfered with commerical interests in the United 
States. It is, of course, difficult for His Majesty's Government to permit the export of 
rubber from British Dominions to the United States at a time when rubber is essential 
to belligerent countries for carrying on the war, and when a new trade in exporting 
rubber from the United States in suspiciously large quantities to neutral countries has 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 107 

actually sprung up since the war. It would be impossible to permit the export of rubber 
from Great Britain unless the right of His Majesty's Government were admitted to sub- 
mit to a prize court cargoes of rubber exported from the United States which they believe 
to be destined for an enemy country, and reasonable latitude of action for this purpose 
were conceded. But His Majesty's Government have now provisionally come to an ar- 
rangement with the rubber exporters in Great Britain which will permit of licenses being 
given under proper guaranties for the export of rubber to the United States. 

"We are confronted with the growing danger that neutral countries contiguous to the 
enemy will become on a scale hitherto unprecedented a base of supplies for the armed 
forces of our enemies and for materials for manufacturing armament. The trade figures 
of imports show how strong this tendency is, but we have no complaint to make of the 
attitude of the Governments of those countries, which so far as we are aware have not 
departed from proper rules of neutrality. We endeavor in the interest of our own national 
safety to prevent this danger by intercepting goods really destined for the enemy without 
interfering with those which are ''bona fide" neutral. 

Since the outbreak of the war the Government of the United States have changed 
their previous practice and have prohibited the publication of manifests till 30 days after 
the departure of vessels from the United States ports. We have no "locus standi" for 
complaining of this change, and did not complain. But the effect of it must be to in- 
crease the difficuhy of ascertaining the presence of contraband and to render necessary 
in the interests of our national safety the examination and detention of more ships than 
would have been the case if the former practice had continued. 

Pending a more detailed reply, I would conclude by saying that His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment do not desire to contest the general principles of law, on which they understand 
the note of the United States to be based, and desire to restrict their action solely to 
interferences with contraband destined for the enemy. His Majesty's Government are 
prepared, whenever a cargo coming from the United States is detained, to explain the 
case on which such detention has taken place and would gladly enter into any arrange- 
ment by which mistakes can be avoided and reparation secured promptly when any injury 
to the neutral owners of a ship or cargo has been improperly caused, for they are most 
desirous in the interest both of the United States and of other neutral countries that Brit- 
ish action should not interfere with the normal importation and use by the neutral coun- 
tries of goods from the United States. 

I have, etc., E. Gkey. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, January 22, 1915. 
British Government now informs me that the heading "Copper unwrought" was in- 
tended to include all copper in such form as to render it usable for manufacturing pur- 
poses. This description being vague, the former heading will be changed in new lists to 
read "Copper, unwrought and part wrought and copper wire." This is intended to in- 
clude copper sheets, circles, slabs, bars, pipes, ingots, scrap, rods, plates, solid drawn, 
tubes, etc., and all grades of copper wire. The word copper is deemed to include alloys 
in which copper is the main ingredient. 

Page. 



Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, February- 6, 1915. 
Sir : I have the honor to transmit to you herewith two copies of the proclamation of 
the German Admiralty of February 4, 1915, declaring the waters surrounding Great 
Britain and Ireland to be comprised within the seat of war, as well as two copies each in 
German and French of the memorial of the Imperial Government on this subject and an 
English translation of the same. 

I have, etc., James W. Gerard. 



[Inclosure 1 — Translation.] 
PROCLAMATION. 

1. The waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland including the whole English 
channel are hereby declared to be war zone. On and after the 18th of February, 1915, 



108 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

every enemy merchant ship found in the said war zone will be destroyed without its be- 
ing always possible to avert the dangers threatening the crews and passengers on that 
account. 

2. Even neutral ships are exposed to danger in the war zone as in view of the mis- 
use of neutral flags ordered on January 31 by the British Government and of the acci- 
dents of naval war, it can not always be avoided to strike even neutral ships in attacks 
that are directed at enemy ships. 

3. Northward navigation around the Shetland Islands, in the eastern waters of the 
North Sea and in a strip of not less than 30 miles width along the Netherlands coast is 
in no danger. 

von Pohl, 
Chief of the Admiral Staff of the Navy, 
Berlin, February 4, 1915. 



[Inclosure 3 — Translation.] 

MEMORIAL OF THE IMPERIAL GERMAN GOVERNMENT RESPECTING RETALIATORY MEASURES RENDERED NECESSARY BY THE 
MEANS EMPLOYED BY ENGLAND CONTRARY TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN INTERCEPTING NEUTRAL MARITIME TRADE WITH 
GERMANY. 

Since the commencement of the present Avar Great Britain's conduct of commercial 
warfare against Germany has been a mockery of all the principles of the law of nations. 
While the British Government have by several orders declared that their naval forces 
should be guided by the stipulations of the Declaration of London, they have in reality 
repudiated this Declaration in the most essential points, notwithstanding the fact that 
their own delegates at the Maritime Conference of London acknowledged its acts as 
forming part of existing international law. The British Government have placed a num- 
ber of articles on the contraband list which are not at all, or only very indirectly capa- 
ble of use in warfare, and consequently can not be treated as contraband either under 
the Declaration of London or under the generally acknowledged rules of international 
law. In addition, they have in fact obliterated the distinction between absolute and con- 
ditional contraband by confiscating all articles of conditional contraband destined for Ger- 
many, whatever may be the port where these articles are to be unloaded, and without re- 
gard to whether they are destined for uses of war or peace. They have not even hesi- 
tated to violate the Declaration of Paris, since their naval forces have captured on 
neutral ships German property which was not contraband of war. Furthermore, they 
have gone further than their own orders respecting the Declaration of London and caused 
numerous German subjects capable of bearing arms to be taken from neutral ships and 
made prisoners of war. Finally, they have declared the North Sea in its whole extent 
to be the seat of war, thereby rendering difficult and extremely dangerous, if not impos- 
sible, all navigation on the high seas between Scotland and Norway, so that they have 
in a way established a blockade of neutral coasts and ports, which is contrary to the 
elementary principles of generally accepted international law. Clearly all these measures 
are part of a plan to strike not only the German military operations, but also the eco- 
nomic system of Germany, and in the end to deliver the whole German people to reduc- 
tion by famine, by intercepting legitimate neutral commerce by methods contrary to 
international law. 

The neutral powers have in the main acquiesced in the measures of the British Gov- 
ernment ; in particular they have not been successful in securing the release by the Brit- 
ish Government of the German subjects and German merchandise illegally taken from 
their vessels. To a certain extent they have even contributed toward the execution of the 
measures adopted by England in defiance of the principle of the freedom of the seas by 
prohibiting the export and transit of goods destined for peaceable purposes in Germany, 
thus evidently yielding to pressure by England. The German Government have in vain 
called the attention of the neutral powers to the fact that Germany must seriously ques- 
tion whether it can any longer adhere to the stipulations of the Declaration of London, 
hitherto strictly observed by it, in case England continues to adhere to its practice, and 
the neutral powers persist in looking with indulgence upon all these violations of neutral- 
ity to the detriment of Germany. Great Britain invokes the vital interest of the British 
Empire which are at stake in justification of its violations of the law of nations, and 
the neutral powers appear to be satisfied with theoretical protests, thus actually admit- 
ting the vital interests of a belligerent as a sufficient excuse for methods of waging war 
of whatever description. 

The time has come for Germany also to invoke such vital interests. It therefore 
finds itself under the necessity, to its regret, of taking military measures against Eng- 
land in retaliation of the practice followed by England. Just as England declared the 
whole North Sea between Scotland and Norway to be comprised within the seat of war, 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 109 

so does Germany now declare the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland includ- 
ing the whole English Channel to be comprised within the seat of war, and will prevent 
by all the military means at its disposal all navigation by the enemy in those waters To 
this end it will endeavor to destroy, after February 18 next, any merchant vessels of the 
enemy which present themselves at the seat of war above indicated, although it may not 
always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace persons and merchandise 
" Neutral powers are accordingly forewarned not to continue to entrust their crews pas- 
sengers, or merchandise to such vessels. Their attention is furthermore called to the fact 
that it is of urgency to recommend to their own vessels to steer clear of these waters. It 
is true that the German Navy has received instructions to abstain from all violence 
against neutral vessels recognizable as such; but in view of the hazards of war, and of 
the misuse of the neutral flag ordered by the British Government, it will not always be 
possible to prevent a neutral vessel from becoming the victim of an attack intended to 
be directed against a vessel of the enemy. It is expressly declared that navigation in the 
waters north of the Shetland Islands is outside the danger zone, as well as navigation 
m the eastern part of the North Sea and in a zone thirty marine miles wide along the 
Dutch coast. 

The German Government announces this measure at a time permitting enemy and 
neutral ships to make the necessary arrangements to reach the ports situated at the 
seat of war. They hope that the neutral powers will accord consideration to the vital 
interests of Germany equally with those of England, and will on their part assist in 
keeping their subjects and their goods far from the seat of war; the more so since they 
likewise have a great interest in seeing the termination at an early day of the war now 
ravaging. 

Berlin, February 4, 1915. 

The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard. 

[Telegram.] 

Department Of State, 
Washington, February 10, 1915. 

Please address a note immediately to the Imperial German Government to the fol- 
lowing effect. 

The Government of the United States, having had its attention directed to the pro- 
clamation of the German Admiralty issued on the fourth of February, that the waters 
surrounding Great Britain and Ireland, including the whole of the English Channel, 
are to be considered as comprised within the seat of war ; that all enemy merchant ves- 
sels found in those waters after the eighteenth ins cant will be destroyed, although it 
may not always be possible to save crews and passengers ; and that neutral vessels ex- 
pose themselves to danger within this zone of war because, in view of the misuse of neu- 
tral flags said to have been ordered by the British Government on the thirty-first of Jan- 
uary and of the contingencies of maritime warfare, it may not be possible always to ex- 
empt neutral vessels from attacks intended to strike enemy ships, feels it to be its duty 
to call the attention of the Imperial German Government, with sincere respect and the 
most friendly sentiments but very candidly and earnestly, to the very serious possibili- 
ties of the course of action apparently contemplated under that proclamation. 

The Government of the United States views those possibilities with such grave con- 
cern that it feels it to be its privilege, and indeed its duty in the circumstances, to re- 
quest the Imperial German Government to consider before action is taken the critical 
situation in respect of the relations between this country and Germany which might 
arise were the German naval forces, in carrying out the policy foreshadowed in the Ad- 
miralty's proclamation, to destroy any merchant vessel of the United States or cause 
the death of American citizens. 

It is of course not necessary to remind the German Government that the sole right of 
a belligerent in dealing with neutral vessels on the high seas is limited to visit and 
search, unless a blockade is proclaimed and effectively maintained, which this Govern- 
ment does not understand to be proposed in this case. To declare or exercise a right to 
attack and destroy any vessel entering a prescribed area of the high seas without first 
certainly determining its belligerent nationality and the contraband character of its car- 
go would be an act so unprecedented in naval warfare that this Government is reluctant 
to believe that the Imperial Government of Germany in this case contemplates it as 
possible. The suspicion that enemy ships are using neutral flags improperly can create 
no just presumption that all ships traversing a prescribed area are subject to the same 
suspicion. It is to determine exactly such questions that this Government understands 
the right of visit and search to have been recognized. 

This Government has carefully noted the explanatory statement issued by the Im- 



110 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

perial German Government at the same time with the proclamation of the German 
Admiralty, and takes this occasion to remind the Imperial German Government very re- 
spectfully that the Government of the United States is open to none of the criticisms for 
unneutral action to which the German Government believe the governments of certain of 
other neutral nations have laid themselves open; that the Government of the United 
States has not consented to or acquiesced in any measures which may have been taken 
by the other belligerent nations in the present war which operate to restrain neutral 
trade, but has, on the contrary, taken in all such matters a position which warrants it 
in holding those governments responsible in the proper way for any untoward effects 
upon American shipping which the accepted principles of international law do not jus- 
tify; and that it, therefore, regards itself as free in the present instance to take with a 
clear conscience and upon accepted principles the position indicated in this note. 

If the commanders of German vessels of war should act upon the presumption that 
the flag of the United States was not being used in good faith and should destroy on the 
high seas an American vessel or the lives of American citizens, it would be difficult for 
the Government of the United States to view the act in any other light than as an inde- 
fensible violation of neutral rights which it would be very hard indeed to reconcile with 
the friendly relations now so happily subsisting between the two Governments. 

If such a deplorable situation should arise, the Imperial German Government can 
readily appreciate that the Government of the United States would be constrained to 
hold the Imperial German Government to a strict accountability for such acts of their 
naval authorities and to take any steps it might be necessary to take to safeguard Ameri- 
can lives and property and to secure to American citizens the full enjoyment of their 
acknowledged rights on the high seas. 

The Government of the United States, in view of these considerations, which it 
urges with the greatest respect and with the sincere purpose of making sure that no 
misunderstanding may arise and no circumstance occur that might even cloud the inter- 
course of the two Governments, expresses the confident hope and expectation that the 
Imperial German Government can and will give assurance that American citizens and 
their vessels will not be molested by the naval forces of Germany otherwise than by visit 
and search, though their vessels may be traversing the sea area delimited in the procla- 
mation of the German Admiralty. 

It is added for the information of the Imperial Government that representations 
have been made to His Britannic Majesty's Government in respect to the unwarranted 
use of the American flag for the protection of British ships. 

Bryan. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 
Washington, February 10, 1915. 

The department has been advised of the Declaration of the German Admiralty on 
February fourth, indicating that the British Government had on January thirty-first 
explicitly authorized the use of neutral flags on British merchant vessels presumably 
for the purpose of avoiding recognition by German naval forces. The department's 
attention has also been directed to reports in the press that the captain of the Lusi- 
tania, acting upon orders or information received from the British authorities, raised 
the American flag as his vessel approached the British coasts, in order to escape antici- 
pated attacks by German submarines. To-day's press reports also contain an alleged 
official statement of the Foreign Office defending the use of the flag of a neutral country 
by a belligerent vessel in order to escape capture or attack by an enemy. 

Assuming that the foregoing reports are true, the Government of the United States, 
reserving for future consideration the legality and propriety of the deceptive use of the 
flag of a neutral power in any case for the purpose of avoiding capture, desires very 
respectfully to point out to His Britannic Majesty's Government the serious conse- 
quences which may result to American vessels and American citizens if this practice is 
continued. 

The occasional use of the flag of a neutral or an enemy under the stress of imme- 
diate pursuit and to deceive an approaching enemy, which appears by the press reports 
to be represented as the precedent and justification used to support this action, seems 
to this Government a very different thing from an explicit sanction by a belligerent 
government for its merchant ships generally to fly the flag of a neutral power within 
certain portions of the high seas which are presumed to be frequented with hostile war- 
ships. The formal declaration of such a policy of general misuse of a neutral's flag 
jeopardizes the vessels of the neutral visiting those waters in a peculiar degree by rais- 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 111 

ing the presumption that they are of belligerent nationality regardless of the flag which 
they may carry. 

In view of the announced purpose of the German Admiralty to engage in active 
naval operations in certain delimited sea areas adjacent to the coasts of Great Britain 
and Ireland, the Government of the United States would view with anxious solicitude 
any general use of the flag of the United States by British vessels traversing those 
waters. A policy such as the one which His Majesty's Government is said to intend to 
adopt would, if the declaration of the German Admiralty is put in force, it seems clear, 
afford no protection to British vessels, while it would be a serious and constant menace 
to the lives and vessels of American citizens. 

The Government of the United States, therefore, trusts that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment will do all in their power to restrain vessels of British nationality from the decep- 
tive use of the flag of the United States in the sea area defined in the German declara- 
tion, since such practice would greatly endanger the vessels of a friendly power navi- 
gating those waters and would even seem to impose upon the Government of Great 
Britain a measure of responsibility for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of 
an attack by a German naval force. 

Please present a note to Sir Edward Grey in the sense of the foregoing and impress 
him with the grave concern which this Government feels in the circumstances in regard 
to the safety of American vessels and lives in the war zone declared by the German 
Admiralty. 

You may add that this Government is making earnest representations to the Ger- 
man Government in regard to the danger to American vessels and citizens if the decla- 
ration of the German Admiralty is put into effect. 

Bryan. 



The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

Foreign Office, Feourary, 10, 1915. 

Your Excellency : Your Excellency has already received the preliminary answer, 
which I handed to you on the 7th January, in reply to your note of the 28th December 
on the subject of the seizures and detentions of American cargoes destined for neutral 
European ports. 

Since that date I have had further opportunity of examining into the trade statis- 
tics of the United States as embodied in the customs returns, in order to see whether the 
belligerent action of Great Britain has been in any way the cause of the trade depression 
which Your Excellency describes as existing in the United States, and also whether the 
seizures of vessels or cargoes which have been made by the British Navy have inflicted 
any loss on American owners for which our existing machinery provides no means of 
redress. In setting out the results of my investigation I think it well to take the oppor- 
tunity of giving a general review of the methods employed by His Majesty's Government 
to intercept contraband trade with the enemy, of their consistency with the admitted right 
of a belligerent to intercept such trade, and also of the extent to which they have endeav- 
ored to meet the representations and complaints from time to time addressed to them on 
behalf of the United States Government. 

Toward the close of your note of the 28th December Your Excellency describes the 
situation produced by the action of Great Britain as a pitiful one to the commercial in- 
terests of the United States, and said that many of the great industries of the country 
were suffering because their products were denied long-established markets in neutral 
European countries contiguous to the nations at war. 

It is unfortunately true that in these days, when trade and finance are cosmopolitan, 
any war — particularly a war of any magnitude — must result in a grievous dislocation 
of commerce, including that of the nations which take no part in the war. Your Excel- 
lency will realize that in this tremendous struggle for the outbreak of which Great Britain 
is in no way responsible, it is impossible for the trade of any country to escape all injury 
and loss, but for such His Majesty's Government are not to blame. 

I do not understand the paragraph which I have quoted from Your Excellency's note 
as referring to these indirect consequences of the state of war, but to the more proximate 
and direct effect of our belligerent action in dealing with neutral ships and cargoes on 
the high seas. Such action has been limited to vessels on their way to enemy ports or 
ports in neutral countries adjacent to the theater of war, because it is only through such 
ports that the enemy introduces the supplies which he requires for carrying on the war. 

In my earlier note I set out the number of ships which had sailed from the United 
States for Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Italy, and I there stated that only 
8 of the 773 had been placed in the prize court, and that only 45 had been temporarily 
detained to enable particular consignments of cargo to be discharged for the purpose of 



112 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

prize-court proceedings. To measure the effect of such naval action it is necessary to 
take into consideration the general statistics of the export trade of the United States dur- 
ing the months preceding the outbreak of war and those since the outbreak. 

Taking the figures in millions of dollars, the exports of merchandise from the United 
States for the seven months of January to July, 1914, inclusive, were 1,201, as compared 
with 1,327 in the corresponding months of 1913, a drop of 126 millions of dollars. 

For the months of August, September, October, and November, that is to say, for the 
four months of the war preceding the delivery of your Excellency's note, the figures of the 
exports of merchandise were (again in millions of dollars) 667 as compared with 923 in 
the corresponding months of 1913, a drop of 256 millions of dollars. 

If, however, the single article of cotton be eliminated from the comparison, the figures 
show a very different result. Thus the exports of all articles of merchandise other than 
cotton from the United States during the first seven months of 1914 were 966 millions of 
dollars, as against 1,127 millions in 1913, a drop of 161 millions of dollars, or 14% per 
cent. On the other hand, the exports of the same articles during the months August to 
November amounted to 608 millions of dollars as compared with 630 millions in 1913, 
a drop of only 22 millions, or less than 4 per cent. 

It is therefore clear that, if cotton be excluded, the effect of the war has been not to 
increase but practically to arrest the decline of American exports which was in progress 
earlier in the year. In fact, any decrease in' American exports which is attributable to 
the war is essentially due to cotton. Cotton is an article which can not possibly have 
been affected by the exercise of our belligerent rights, for, as Your Excellency is aware, it 
has not been declared by His Majesty's Goverment to be contraband of war, and the rules 
under which we are at present conducting our belligerent operations give us no power in 
the absence of a blockade to seize or interfere with it when on its way to a belligerent 
country in neutral ships. Consequently no cotton has been touched. 

Into the causes of the decrease in the exports of cotton I do not feel that there is any 
need for me to enter, because, whatever may have been the cause, it is not to be found in 
the exercise of the belligerent rights of visit, search, and capture, or in our general right 
when at war to intercept the contraband trade of our enemy. Imports of cotton to the 
United Kingdom fell as heavily as those to other countries. No place felt the outbreak 
of war more acutely than the cotton districts of Lancashire, where for a time an immense 
number of spindles were idle. Though this condition has now to a large extent passed 
away, the consumption of the raw material in Great Britain was temporarily much dim- 
inished. The same is no doubt true of France. 

The general result is to show convincingly that the naval operations of Great Britain 
are not the cause of any diminution in the volume of American exports, and that if the 
commerce of the United States is in the unfavourable condition which your Excellency 
describes, the cause ought in fairness to be sought elsewhere than in the activities of His 
Majesty's naval forces. 

I may add that the circular issued by the Department of Commerce at Washington 
on the 23rd January admits a marked improvement in the foreign trade of the United 
States, which we have noted with great satisfaction. The first paragraph of the circular 
is worth quoting verbatim : 

A marked improvement in our foreign trade is indicated by the latest reports issued by the Department of 
Commerce through its Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, sales of foodstuffs and certain lines of manu- 
factures having been unusually large in November, the latest period for which detailed information is at hand. 
In that month exports aggregated 206,000,000 dollars, or double the total for August last, when, by reason of the 
outbreak of war, our foreign trade fell to the lowest level reached in many years. In December there was 
further improvement, the month's exports being valued at 246,000,000 dollars, compared with 233,000,000 in Decem- 
ber, 1913, and within 4,000,000 of the high record established in December, 1912. 

A better view of the situation is obtained by looking at the figures month by month. 
The exports of merchandise for the last five months have been (in millions of dollars) : 
August 1 10 

September T 56 

October : 194 

November 20 S 

December 2 46 

The outbreak of war produced in the United States, as it did in all neutral countries, 
an acute but temporary disturbance of trade. Since that time there seems to have been a 
steady recovery, for to-day the exports from the United States stand at a higher figure than 
on the same date last year. 

Before passing away from the statistics of trade, and in order to demonstrate still 
more clearly if necessary that the naval operations of Great Britain and her allies have 
had no detrimental effect on the volume of trade between the United States and neutral 
countries, it is worth while to analyse the figures of the exports to Europe since the out- 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 113 

break of hostilities. For this purpose the European countries ought to be grouped under 
three heads : Great Britain and those fighting with her, neutral countries, and enemy 
countries. It is, however, impossible for me to group the countries in this way satisfac- 
torily, as the figures relating to the export trade of the United States with each country 
have not yet been published. In the preliminary statement of the export trade of the United 
States with foreign countries only principal countries are shown, and various countries 
which are tabulated separately in the more detailed monthly summary of commerce and 
finance are omitted. Those omitted include not only the Scandinavian countries, the 
exports to which are of peculiar importance in dealing with this question, but also Aus- 
tria. 

So far as it is possible to distribute the figures under the headings which I have in- 
dicated above (all the figures being given in thousands of dollars) the results are as 
follows : 

Total exports to Europe from the 1st August to the 30th November, 413,995, as 
against 597,342 in 1913. Of these, Great Britain and her allies took 288,312, as against 
316,805 in 1913. Germany and Belgium took 1,881 as against 177,136 in 1913; whereas 
neutral countries (among which Austria-Hungary is unavoidably included) took 123,802, 
as against 103,401 in 1913. 

The general complaint in Your Excellency's note was that the action of Great Britain 
was affecting adversely the trade of the United States with neutral countries. The naval 
operations of Great Britain certainly do not interfere with commerce from the United 
States on its way to the United Kingdom and the allied countries, and yet the exports 
to Great Britain and her allies during those four months diminished to the extent of over 
28,000,000 dollars, whereas those to neutral countries and Austria increased by over 
20,000,000 dollars. 

The inference may fairly be drawn from these figures, all of which are taken from the 
official returns published by the United States Government, that not only has the trade of 
the United States with the neutral countries in Europe been maintained as compared 
with previous years, but also that a substantial part of this trade was, in fact, trade in- 
tended for the enemy countries going through neutral ports by routes to which it was 
previously unaccustomed. 

One of the many inconveniences to which this great war is exposing the commerce of 
all neutral countries is undoubtedly the serious shortage in shipping available for ocean 
transport, and the consequential result of excessive freights. 

It cannot fairly be said that this shortage is caused by Great Britain's interference 
with neutral ships. At the present time there are only seven neutral vessels awaiting ad- 
judication in the prize courts in this country, and three in those in the British dominions. 
As Your Excellency is aware, I have already instructed our ambassador at Washington to 
remind the parties who are interested in these vessels that it is open to them to apply to 
the court for the release of these ships on bail, and if an application of this sort is made 
by them it is not likely to be opposed by the Crown. There is therefore no reason why 
such an application should not be favourably entertained by the court, and, if acceded 
to, all these vessels will again be available for the carriage of commerce. Only one neutral 
vessel is now detained in this country in addition to those awaiting adjudication in the 
prize court. 

Every effort has been made in cases in which it has been found necessary to institute 
proceedings against portions of the cargo to secure the speedy discharge of the cargo and 
the release of the ship, so as to enable it to resume work. Great Britain is suffering from 
the shortage of shipping and the rise in freights as acutely as, if not more than, other 
nations and His Majesty's Government have taken every step that they could consistently 
with their belligerent interests to increase the tonnage available for the transport of sea- 
borne commerce. The enemy ships which have been condemned in the prize courts in this 
country are being sold as rapidly as possible in order that they may become available for 
use ; and those which have been condemned in the prize courts oversea are being brought 
to this country in order that they may be disposed of here, and again placed in active 
employment. 

The difficulties have been accentuated by the unforseen consequences of the con- 
vention which was signed at The Hague in 1907 relative to the status of enemy mer- 
chant vessels at the outbreak of war. This convention was a well-intentioned effort to di- 
minish the losses which war must impose upon innocent persons, and provided that enemy 
merchant ships seized by a belligerent in whose ports they lay at the outbreak of war 
should not be condemned, but should merely be detained for the period of the war, unless 
they were liberated in the days of grace. We could come to no arrangement with the 
German Government for the reciprocal grant of days of grace, and the German merchant 
vessels lying in British ports when the war broke out have therefore been sentenced to 
detention in lieu of condemnation. The normal result would have been still further to 



114 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

reduce the volume of shipping available for the commerce of the world. To ease the situa- 
tion, however, His Majesty's Government are resorting to the power of requisitioning 
which is given by the convention, so that these ships may again be placed in active 
service. 

Your excellency will see therefore that His Majesty's Government are doing all 
in their power to increase the volume of shipping available. I hope it will be realized 
that the detention of neutral ships by His Majesty's Government with a view to the cap- 
ture of contraband trade on its way to the enemy has not contributed nearly so much to 
the shortage of shipping as has the destruction of neutral vessels by submarine mines in- 
discriminately laid by the enemy on the high seas, many miles from the coast, in the track 
of merchant vessels Up till now 25 neutral vessels have been reported as destroyed by 
mines on the high seas; quite apart from all questions of the breach of treaties and the 
destruction of life, there is far more reason for protest on the score of belligerent interfer- 
ence with innocent neutral trade through the mines scattered by the enemy than through 
the British exercise of the right of seizing contraband. 

I trust that what I have said above will be sufficient to convince your Excellency's 
Government that the complaints that the naval policy of Great Britain has interfered 
with the shipments of American products to long-established markets in neutral Eu- 
ropean countries is founded on a misconception. 

In justice to the peoples of both countries, I feel that this opportunity should be 
taken to explain the lines on which His Majesty's Government have been acting hitherto, 
so as to show that the line they have followed is in no way inconsistent with the general 
fundamental principle of international law and to indicate the care with which they 
have endeavored to meet the representations which have been made by the United 
States Government from time to time during the war on these questions. 

No one in these days will dispute the general proposition that a belligerent is entitled 
to capture contraband goods on their way to the enemy ; that right has now become con- 
secrated by long usage and general acquiescence. Though the right is ancient, the means 
of exercising it alter and develop with the changes in the methods and machinery of 
commerce. A century ago the difficulties of land transport rendered it impracticable 
for the belligerent to obtain supplies of sea-borne goods through a neighboring neutral 
country. Consequently the belligerent actions of his opponents neither required nor 
justified any interference with shipments on their way to a neutral port. This principle 
was recognized and acted on in the decisions in which Lord Stowell laid down the lines 
on which captures of such goods should be dealt with. 

The advent of steam power has rendered it as easy for a belligerent to supply him- 
self through the ports of a neutral contiguous country as through his own and has there- 
fore rendered it impossible for his opponent to refrain from interfering with commerce 
intended for the enemy merely because it is on its way to a neutral port. 

No better instance of the necessity of countering new devices for despatching con- 
traband goods to an enemy by new methods of applying the fundamental principle of 
the right to capture such contraband can be given than the steps which the Government 
of the United States found it necessary to take during the American Civil War. It was 
at that time that the doctrine of continuous voyage was first applied to the capture of 
contraband, that is to say, it was then for the first time that a belligerent found himself 
obliged to capture contraband goods on their way to the enemy, even though at the time of 
capture they were en route for a neutral port from which they were intended subse- 
quently to continue their journey. The policy then followed by the United States Govern- 
ment was not inconsistent with the general principles already sanctioned by internation- 
al law, and met with no protest from His Majesty's Government, though it was upon 
British cargoes and upon British ships that the losses and the inconvenience due to this 
new development of the application of the old rule of international law principally fell. 
The criticisms which have been directed against the steps then taken by the United 
States came, and come, from those who saw in the methods employed in Napoleonic 
times for the prevention of contraband a limitation upon the right itself, and failed to 
see that in Napoleonic times goods on their way to a neutral port were immune from cap- 
ture, not because the immediate destination conferred a privilege, but because capture 
under such circumstances was unnecessary. 

The facilities which the introduction of steamers and .railways have given to a bel- 
ligerent to introduce contraband goods through neutral ports have imposed upon his 
opponent the additional difficulty, when endeavoring to intercept such trade, of distin- 
guishing between the goods which are really destined for the commerce of that neutral 
country and the goods which are on their way to the enemy. It is one of the many diffi- 
culties with which the United States Government found themselves confronted in the 
days of the Civil War, and I cannot do better than quote the words which Mr. Seward, 
who was then Secretary of State, used in the course of the diplomatic discussion arising 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 115 

out of the capture of some goods on their way to Matamoros which were believed to be 
for the insurgents: 

Neutrals engaged in honest trade with Matamoros must expect to experience inconvenience from the existing 
blockade of Brownsville and the adjacent coast of Texas. While this Government unfeignedly regrets this in- 
convenience, it cannot relinquish any of its belligerent rights to favour contraband trade with insurgent territory. 
By insisting upon those rights, however, it is sure that that necessity for their exercise at all, which must be 
deplored by every friendly commercial Power, will the more speedily be terminated. 

The opportunities now enjoyed by a belligerent for obtaining supplies through neu- 
tral ports are far greater than they were fifty years ago, and the geographical conditions 
of the present struggle lend additional assistance to the enemy in carrying out such im- 
portation. We are faced with the problem of intercepting such supplies when arranged 
with all the advantages that flow from elaborate organisation and unstinted expendi- 
ture. If our belligerent rights are to be maintained, it is of the first importance for us 
to distinguish between what is really bona fide trade intended for the neutral country 
concerned and the trade intended for the enemy country. Every effort is made by organ- 
izers of this trade to conceal the true destination, and if the innocent neutral trade is to 
be distinguished from the enemy trade it is essential that His Majesty's Government 
should be entitled to make, and should make, careful enquiry with regard to the destina- 
tion of particular shipments of goods even at the risk of some slight delay to the parties 
interested. If such enquiries were not made, either the exercise of our belligerent rights 
would have to be abandoned, tending to the prolongation of this war and the increase of 
the loss and suffering which it is entailing upon the whole world, or else it would be 
necessary to indulge in indiscriminate captures of neutral goods and their detention 
throughout all the period of the resulting prize court proceedings. Under the system now 
adopted it has been found possible to release without delay, and consequently without 
appreciable loss to the parties interested, all the goods of which the destination is shown 
as the result of the enquiries to be innocent. 

It may well be that the system of making such enquiries is to a certain extent a new 
introduction, in that it has been practised to a far greater extent than in previous wars ; 
but if it is correctly described as a new departure, it is a departure which is wholly to 
the advantage of neutrals, and which has been made for the purpose of relieving them so 
far as possible from loss and inconvenience. 

There was a passage in a note which the State Department addressed to the British 
ambassador at Washington on the 7th November to which I think it may be well to re- 
fer: 

In the opinion of this Government, the belligerent -right of visit and search requires that the search should 
be made on the high seas at the time of the visit, and that the conclusion of the search should rest upon the evi- 
dence found on the ship under investigation, and not upon circumstances ascertained from external sources. 

The principle here enunciated appears to me to be inconsistent with the practice in 
these matters of the United States Government, as well as of the British Government. It 
certainly was not the rule upon which the United States Government acted either during 
the Civil War or during the Spanish- American War, nor has it ever been the practice of 
the British Government, nor so far as I am aware, of any other Government which has 
had to carry on a great naval war ; as a principle I think it is impossible in modern times. 
The necessity for giving the belligerent captor full liberty to establish by all the evi- 
dence at his disposal the enemy destination with which the goods were shipped was re- 
cognized in all the leading decisions in the prize courts of the United States during the 
Civil War. 

No clearer instance could be given than the reporter's statement of the case of the 
Bermuda (3 Wallace, 514) : 

The final destination of the cargo in this particular voyage was left so skilfully open * * * that it was 
not quite easy to prove, with that certainty which American courts require, the intention, which it seemed plain 
must have really existed. Thus to prove it required that truth should be collated from a variety of sources, 
darkened and disguised; from others opened as the cause advanced, and by accident only; from coincidences 
undesigned, and facts that were circumstantial. Collocations and comparisons, in short, brought largely their 
collective force in aid of evidence that was more direct. 

It is not impossible that the course of the present struggle will show the necessity 
for belligerent action to be taken in various ways which may at first sight be regarded 
as a departure from old practice. In my note of the 7th January, I dealt at some length 
with the question of necessity of taking vessels into port for the purpose of carrying out 
an effective search, where search was necessary; to that subject I feel that I need not 
again recur. 

The growth in the size of steamships necessitates in many cases that the vessels 
should go into calm water, in order that even the right of visit, as apart from the right 
of search, should be exercised. In modern times a steamer is capable of pursuing her 
voyage irrespective of the conditions of the weather. Many of the neutral merchantmen 
which our naval officers are called upon to visit at sea are encountered by our cruisers in 



116 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

places and under conditions which render the launching of a boat impossible. The con- 
ditions during winter in the North Atlantic frequently render it impracticable for days 
together for a naval officer to board a vessel on her way to Scandinavian countries. If 
a belligerent is to be denied the right of taking a neutral merchantman, met with under 
such conditions, into calm water in order that the visiting officer may go aboard, the 
right of visit and of search would become a jiullity. 

The present conflict is not the first in which this necessity has arisen. As long ago as 
the Civil War the United States found it necessary to take vessels to United States ports 
in order to determine whether the circumstances justified their detention. 

The same need arose during the Russo-Japanese War and also during the second 
Balkan War, when it sometimes happened that British vessels were made to deviate 
from their course and follow the cruisers to some spot where the right of visit and of 
search could be more conveniently carried out. In both cases this exercise of belligerent 
rights, although questioned at first by His Majesty's Government, was ultimately ac- 
quiesced in. 

No Power in these days can afford during a great war to forego the exercise of the 
right of visit and search. Vessels which are apparently harmless merchantmen can be 
used for carrying and laying mines and even fitted to discharge torpedoes. Supplies 
for submarines can without difficulty be concealed under other cargo. The only protec- 
tion against these risks is to visit and search thoroughly every vessel appearing in the 
zone of operations, and if the circumstances are such as to render it impossible to carry 
it out at the spot where the vessel was met with the only practicable course is to take 
the ship to some more convenient locality for the purpose. To do so is not to be looked 
upon as a new belligerent right, but as an adapation of the existing right to the modern 
conditions of commerce. Like all belligerent rights, it must be exercised with due regard 
for neutral interests, and it would be unreasonable to expect a neutral vessel to make 
long deviations from her course for this purpose. It is for this reason that we have done 
all we can to encourage neutral merchantmen on their way to ports contiguous to the 
enemy country to visit some British port lying on their line of route in order that the 
necessary examination of the ship's papers, and, if required, of the cargo, can be made 
under conditions of convenience to the ship herself. The alternative would be to keep 
a vessel which the naval officers desired to board waiting, it might be for days together, 
until the weather conditions enabled the visit to be carried out at sea. 

No war has yet been waged in which neutral individuals have not occasionally suffer- 
ed from unjustified belligerent action; no neutral nation has experienced this fact more 
frequently in the past than Great Britain. The only method by which it is possible to 
harmonise belligerent action with the rights of neutrals is for the belligerent nation to 
provide some adequate machinery by which in any such case the facts can be investigat- 
ed and appropriate redress can be obtained by the neutral individual. In this country 
such machinery is provided by the powers which are given to the prize court to deal not 
only with captures, but also with claims for compensation. Order V, rule 2, of the 
British prize court rules, provides .that where a ship has been captured as prize, but has 
been subsequently released by the captors, or has by loss, destruction, or otherwise ceased 
to be detained by them, without proceedings for condemnation having been taken, 
any person interested in the ship (which by Order I, rule 2, includes goods) wishing 
to make a claim for costs and damages in respect thereof, shall issue a writ as provided 
by Order II. A writ so issued will initiate a proceeding, which will follow its ordinary 
course in the prize court. 

This rule gives the prize court ample jurisdiction to deal with any claim for com- 
pensation by a neutral arising from the interference with a ship or goods by our naval 
forces. The best evidence that can be given of the discrimination and the moderation . 
with which our naval officers have carried out their duties is to be found in the fact that 
up to this time no proceedings for the recovery of compensation have been initiated un- 
der the rule which I have quoted. 

It is the common experience of every war that neutrals whose attempts to engage 
in suspicious trading are frustrated by a belligerent are wont to have recourse to their 
Government to urge that diplomatic remonstrances should be made on their behalf, and 
that redress should be obtained for them in this way. When an effective mode of redress 
is open to them in the courts of a civilized country by which they can obtain adequate 
satisfaction for any invasion of their rights which is contrary to the law of nations, the 
only course which is consistent with sound principle is that they should be referred to 
that mode of redress, and that no diplomatic action should be taken until their legal 
remedies have been exhausted, and they are in a position to show prima facie denial of 
justice. 

The course adopted by His Majesty's Government during the American Civil 
War was in strict accordance with this principle. In spite of remonstrances from many 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 117 

quarters, they placed full reliance on the American prize courts to grant redress to the 
parties interested in cases of alleged wrongful capture by American ships of war, and 
put forward no claims until the opportunities for redress in those courts had been ex- 
hausted. The same course was adopted in the Spanish-American War, when all British 
subjects who complained of captures or detentions of their ships were referred to the 
prize courts for relief. 

Before leaving the subject may I remind Your Excellency of the fact that at your 
request you are now supplied immediately by this department with particulars of every 
ship under American colors which is detained, and of every shipment of cargo in which 
an American citizen appears to be the party interested. Not only is the fact of deten- 
tion notified to Your Excellency, but so far as is practicable the grounds upon which 
the vessel or cargo has been detained are also communicated to you; a concession which 
enables any United States citizen to take steps at once to protect his interests. 

His Majesty's Government have also done all that lies in their power to insure rapid 
action when ships are reported in British ports. They realize that the ship and cargo 
owners may reasonably expect an immediate decision to be taken as to whether the ship 
may be allowed to proceed, and whether her cargo or any part of it must be discharged 
and put into the prize court. Realizing that the ordinary methods of interdepartmental 
correspondence might cause delays which could be obviated by another method of proced- 
ure, they established several months ago a special committee, on which all the depart- 
ments concerned are represented. This committee sits daily, and is provided with a spe- 
cial clerical staff. As soon as a ship reaches port full particulars are telegraphed to 
London, and the case is dealt with at the next meeting of the committee, immediate 
steps being taken to carry out the action decided upon. By the adoption of this proce- 
dure it has been found possible to reduce to a minimum the delays to which neutral 
shipping is exposed by the exercise of belligerent rights, and by the necessity, imposed 
by modern conditions, of examining with care the destination of contraband articles. 

Particular attention is directed in Your Excellency's note to the policy we are 
pursuing with regard to conditional contraband, especially foodstuffs, and it is there 
stated that a number of American cargoes have been seized without, so far as Your Ex- 
cellency's Government are informed, our befiig in possession of facts which warranted a 
reasonable belief that the shipments had in reality a belligerent destination, and in 
spite of the presumption of innocent use due to their being destined to neutral territory. 
The note does not specify any particular seizures as those which formed the basis of this 
complaint, and I am therefore not aware whether the passage refers to cargoes which 
were detained before or since the Order in Council of the 29th October was issued. 

Your excellency will no doubt remember that soon after the outbreak of war an Or- 
der of His Majesty in Council was issued under which no distinction was drawn in the ap- 
plication of the doctrine of continuous voyage between absolute contraband and condi- 
tional contraband, and which also imposed upon the neutral owner of contraband some- 
what drastic conditions as to the burden of proof of the guilt or innocence of the ship- 
ment. 

The principle that the burden of proof should always be imposed upon the captor 
has usually been admitted as a theory. In practice, however, it has always been other- 
wise, and any student of the prize courts decisions of the past or even of modern wars 
will find that goods seldom escape condemnation unless their owner was in a position to 
prove that their destination was innocent. An attempt was made some few years ago, 
in the unratified Declaration of London, to formulate some definite rules upon this sub- 
ject, but time alone can show whether the rules there laid down will stand the test of 
modern warfare. 

The rules which His Majesty's Government published in the Order in Council of the 
20th August, 1914, were criticised by the United States Government as contrary to the 
generally recognized principles of international law, and as inflicting unnecessary hard- 
ship upon neutral commerce, and Your Excellency will remember the prolonged discus- 
sion which took place between us through the month of October with a view to finding 
some new formulae which should enable us to restrict supplies to the enemy forces, and 
to prevent the supply to the enemy of materials essential for the making of munitions of 
war, while inflicting the minimum of injury and interference with neutral commerce. It 
was with this object that the Order in Council of the 29th October was issued, under the 
provisions of which a far greater measure of immunity is conferred upon neutral com- 
merce. In that Order the principle of noninterference with conditional contraband on 
its way to a neutral port is in large measure admitted ; only in three cases is the right 
to seize maintained, and in all those cases t^e opportunity is given to the claimant of 
the goods to establish their innocence. 

Two of those cases are where the ship's papers afford no information as to the per- 
son for whom the goods are intended. It £3 only reasonable that a belligerent should be 



118 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

entitled to regard as suspicious cases where the shippers of the goods do not choose to 
disclose the name of the individual who is to receive them. The third case is that of goods 
addressed to a person in the enemy territory. In the peculiar circumstances of the pres- 
ent struggle, where the forces of the enemy comprise so large a proportion of the popu- 
lation, and where there is so little evidence of shipments on private as distinguished 
from Government account, it is most reasonable that the burden of proof should rest up- 
on the claimant. 

The most difficult questions in connection with conditional contraband arise with 
reference to the shipment of foodstuffs. No country has maintained more stoutly than 
Great Britain in modern times the principle that a belligerent should abstain from in- 
terference with the foodstuffs intended for the civil population. The circumstances 
of the present struggle are causing His Majesty's Government some anxiety as to wheth- 
er the existing rules with regard to conditional contraband, framed as they were with the 
object of protecting so far as possible the supplies which were intended for the civil 
population, are effective for the purpose, or suitable to the conditions present. The 
principle which I have indicated above is one which His Majesty's Government have 
constantly had to uphold against the opposition of continental powers. In the absence 
of some certainty that the rule would be respected by both parties to this conflict, we feel 
great doubt whether it should be regarded as an established principle of international 
law. 

Your Excellency will, no doubt, remember that in 1885, at the time when His 
Majesty's Government were discussing with the French Government this question of 
the right to declare foodstuffs not intended for the military forces to be contraband, and 
when public attention had been drawn to the matter, the Kiel Chamber of Commerce ap- 
plied to the German Government for a statement of the latter's views on the subject. 
Prince Bismarck's answer was as follows: 

In answer to their representation of the 1st instant, I reply to the Chamber of Commerce that any disad- 
vantage our commercial and carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as contraband of war does 
not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on a foreign war. Every 
war is a calamity, which entails evil consequences not only on the combatants, but also on neutrals. These 
evils may easily be increased by the interference of a neutral power with the way in which a third carries on the 
war, to the disadvantage of the subjects of the interfering power, and by this means German commerce might 
be weighted with far heavier losses than a transitory prohibition of the rice trade in Chinese waters. The meas- 
ure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of the enemy, and is a 
justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships. 

His Majesty's Government are disposed to think that the same view is still main- 
tained by the German Government. 

Another circumstance which is now coming to light is that an elaborate machinery 
has been organized by the enemy for the supply of foodstuffs for the use of the German 
army from overseas. Under these circumstances it would be absurd to give any definite 
pledge that in cases where the supplies can be proved to be for the use of the enemy 
forces they should be given complete immunity by the simple expedient of dispatching 
them to an agent in a neutral port. 

The reason for drawing a distinction between foodstuffs intended for the civil popu- 
lation and those for the armed forces or enemy Government disappears when the distinc- 
tion between the civil population and the armed forces itself disappears. 

In any country in which there exists such a tremendous organization for war as now 
obtains in Germany there is no clear division between those whom the Government is re- 
sponsible for feeding and those whom it is not. Experience shows that the power to re- 
quisition will be used to the fullest extent in order to make sure that the wants of the 
military are supplied, and however much goods may be imported for civil use it is by 
the military that they will be consumed if military exigencies require it, especially now 
that the German Government have taken control of all the foodstuffs in the country. 

I do not wish to overburden this note with statistics, but in proof of my statement as 
to the unprecedented extent to which supplies are reaching neutral ports I should like to 
instance the figures of the exports of certain meat products to Denmark during the months 
of September and October. Denmark is a country which in normal times imports a 
certain quantity of such products, but exports still more. In 1913, during the above two 
months, the United States exports of lard to Denmark were nil, as compared with 22,- 
652,598 pounds in the same two months of 1914. The corresponding figures with regard 
to bacon were: 1913, nil; 1914, 1,022,195 pounds; canned beef, 1913, nil; 1914, 151,200 
pounds; pickled and cured beef, 1913, 42,901 pounds; 1914, 156,143 pounds; pickled 
pork, 1913, nil; 1914, 812,872 pounds. 

In the same two months the United States exported to Denmark 280,176 gallons of 
mineral lubricating oil in 1914 as compared with 179,252 in 1913; to Norway, 335,468 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 119 

gallons in 1914, as against 151,179 gallons in 1913; to Sweden, 896.193 gallons in 1914, 
as against 385,476 gallons in 1913. 

I have already mentioned the framing of the Order in Council of the 20th October, 
and the transmission to your Excellency of particulars of ships and cargoes seized as in- 
stances of the efforts which we have made throughout the course of this war to meet all 
reasonable complaints made on behalf of American citizens, and in my note of the 7th 
January I alluded to the decision of our prize court in the case of the Miramichi, as evi- 
dencing the liberal principles adopted toward neutral commerce. 

I should also like to refer to the steps which we took at the beginning of the war to 
insure the speedy release of cargo claimed by neutrals on board enemy ships which were 
captured or detained at the outbreak of war. Under our prize court rules release of such 
goods can be obtained without the necessity of entering a claim in the prize court if 
the documents of title are produced to the officer representing His Maesty's Govern- 
ment, and the title to the goods is established to his satisfaction. It was shortly found, 
however, that this procedure did not provide for the case where the available evidence 
was so scanty that the officer representing the Crown was not justified in consenting to 
a release. In order, therefore, to ameliorate the situation we established a special com- 
mittee, with full powers to authorise the release of goods without insisting on full evi- 
dence of title being produced. This committee dealt with the utmost expedition with 
a large number of claims. In the great majority of cases the goods claimed were re- 
leased at once. In addition to the cases dealt with by this committee a very large amount 
of cargo was released at once by the procurator general on production of documents. 
Claimants therefore obtained their goods without the necessity of applying to the prize 
court and of incurring the expense involved in retaining lawyers, and without the risk, 
which was in some cases a considerable one, of the goods being eventually held to be 
enemy property and condemned. We have reason to know that our action in this mat- 
ter was highly appreciated by many American citizens. 

Another instance of the efforts which His Majesty's Government have made to deal 
as leniently as possible with neutral interests may be found in the policy which we have 
followed with regard to the transfer to a neutral flag of enemy ships belonging to com- 
panies which were incorporated in the enemy country, but all of whose shareholders were 
neutral. The rules applied by the British and by the American prize courts have always 
treated the flag as conclusive in favour of the captors in spite of neutral propriety inter- 
ests (see the case of the Pedro, 175 U. S., 354). In several cases, however, we have con- 
sented to waive our belligerent rights to treat as enemy vessels ships belonging to com- 
panies incorporated in Germany which were subsidiary to and owned by American cor- 
porations. The only condition which we have imposed is that these vessels should take 
no further part in trade with the enemy country. 

I have given these indications of the policy which we have followed, because I can- 
not help feeling that if the facts were more fully known as to the efforts which we have 
made to avoid inflicting any avoidable injury on neutral interests, many of the com- 
plaints which have been received by the administration in Washington, and which led to 
the protest which Your Excellency handed to me on the 29th December would never 
have been made. My hope is that when the facts which I have set out above are realised, 
and when it is seen that our naval operations have not diminished American trade with 
neutral countries, and that the lines on which we have acted are consistent with the 
fundamental principles of international law, it will be apparent to the Government and 
people of the United States that His Majesty's Government have hitherto endeavoured 
to exercise their belligerent rights with every possible consideration for the interests of 
neutrals. 

It will still be our endeavour to avoid injury and loss to neutrals, but the announce- 
ment by the German Government of their intention to sink merchant vessels and their 
cargoes without verification of their nationality or character, and without making any 
provision for the safety of non-combatant crews or giving them a chance of saving their 
lives, has made it necessary for His Majesty's Government to consider what measures 
they should adopt to protect their interests. It is impossible for one belligerent to de- 
part from rules and precedents and for the other to remain bound by them. 

I have the honour, etc., etc., (Signed) E. Grey. 

To His Excellency 

The Honourable W. H. Page 
etc., etc., etc. 



120 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 
Washington, February 15, 1915. 

The department notes that you have been informed by the British Government that 
the cargo of the American steamer Wilhelmina has been sent to prize court, but is not 
yet unloaded. The Government of the United States, of course, has no intention of inter- 
fering with the proper course of judicial procedure in the British prize courts, but deems 
it proper to bring to the attention of the British Government information which has been 
received in relation to the character and destination of the cargo and to point out certain 
considerations prompting the supposition that the seizure may not be justified. 

This Government is informed that the W. L. Green Commission Company, an 
American corporation organized in 1891, which in the past has made extensive ship- 
ments of goods to Germany, is the sole owner of the cargo which consists entirely of 
foodstuffs consigned to the W. L. Green Commission Company, Hamburg, and that the 
Company's manager, now in Europe, has instructions to sell the cargo solely to the civ- 
ilian population of Hamburg. A copy of the ship's manifest has been submitted to this 
Government, accompanied by a sworn statement from the Company's manager in which 
he represents that he was instructed to proceed to Germany to dispose of the cargo to 
private purchasers in that country, and not to any belligerent government nor armed 
forces of such government, nor to any agent of a belligerent government or of its armed 
forces. 

According to well-established practice among nations, admitted, as this Government 
understands, by the Government of Great Britain, the articles of which the Wilhelmina' s 
cargo is said to consist, are subject to seizure as contraband only in case they are 
destined for the use of a belligerent government or its armed forces. The Government 
of the United States understands that the British authorities consider the seizure of the 
cargo justified on the ground that a recent, order of the Federal Council of Germany, 
promulgated after the vessel sailed, required the delivery of imported articles to the Ger- 
man Government. The owners of the cargo have represented to this Government that 
such a position is untenable. They point out that, by a provision of the order in ques- 
tion as originally announced, the regulations in relation to the seizure of food products 
are made inapplicable to such products imported after January thirty-one, nineteen 
fifteen. They further represent that the only articles shipped on the Wilhelmina which 
are embraced within the terms of these regulations are wheat and bran, which constitute 
about fifteen per centum of the cargo as compared with eighty-five per centum consist- 
ing of meats, vegetables, and fruits. The owners also assert that the regulations con- 
template the disposition of foodstuffs to individuals through municipalities; that mu- 
nicipalities are not agents of the Government, and that the purpose of the regulations 
is to conserve the supply of food products and to prevent speculation and inflation of 
prices to noncombatants. 

The German Government has addressed a formal communication to the Government 
of the United States in relation to the effect of the decree issued by the German Fed- 
eral Council, and this Government deems it pertinent to call to the attention of the 
British Government a material portion of this communication, which is as follows: 

"1. The Federal Council's decision concerning the seizure of food products, which 
England alleges to be the cause of food products shipped to Germany being treated as 
contraband, bears exclusively on wheat, rye, both unmixed and mixed with other prod- 
ucts, and also wheat, rye, oats, and barley flour. 

"2. The Federal Council makes an express exception in section forty-five of the 
order. Section forty-five provides as follows : The stipulations of this regulation do not 
apply to grain or flour imported from abroad after January thirty-one. 

"3. Conjunctively with that saving clause the Federal Council's order contains a 
provision under which imported cereals and flours would be sold exclusively to the mu- 
nicipalities or certain specially designated organizations by the importers. Although 
that provision had for its object simply to throw imported grain and flours into such 
channels as supply the private consumption of civilians and, in consequence of that 
provision, the intent and purpose of the Federal Council's order which was to protect 
the civilian population from speculators and engrossers were fully met, it was neverthe- 
less rescinded so as to leave no room for doubt. 

"4. My Government is amenable to any proposition looking to control by a special 
American organization under the supervision of the American Consular officers and, if 
necessary, will itself make a proposition in that direction. 

"5. The German Government further calls attention to the fact that municipalities 
do not form part of or belong to the Government, but are self administrative bodies, 
which are elected by the inhabitants of the commune in accordance with fixed rules and 
therefore exclusively represent the private part of the population and act as it directs. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 121 

Although those principles are generally known and obtain in the United States as well 
as in England itself, the German Government desired to point out the fact so as to avoid 
any further unnecessary delay. 

"6. Hence it is absolutely assured that imported food products will be consumed by 
the civilian population in Germany exclusively." 

It will be observed that it is stated in this communication, which appears to confirm 
the contentions of the cargo owners, that a part of the order of the German Federal 
Council relating to imported food products has now been rescinded. 

This Government has received another communication from the German Govern- 
ment giving formal assurance to the Government of the United States that all goods im- 
ported into Germany from the United States directly or indirectly, which belong to the 
class of relative contraband, such as foodstuffs, will not be used by the German army or 
navy or by Government authorities, but will be left to the free consumption of the Ger- 
man civilian population, excluding all Government purveyors. 

If the British authorities have not in their possession evidence, other than that pre- 
sented to this Government as to the character and destination of the cargo of the Wil- 
helmina, sufficient to warrant the seizure of this cargo, the Government of the United 
States hopes that the British Government will release the vessel together with her cargo 
and allow her to proceed to her port of destination. 

Please communicate with the British Government in the sense of the foregoing. 

Bryan. 



German note, February 15, 1915, in reference to the ■proclamation of January 25, 
concerning foodstuffs .* 

The German Ambassador to the Secretary of State. 

1. The Federal Council's decision concerning the seizure of food products which 
England alleges to be the cause of food products shipped to Germany being treated as 
contraband, is exclusively on "wheat, rye, both unmixed and mixed with other products," 
and also "wheat, rye, oats, and barley flour." 

2. The Federal Council makes an express exception in Section 45 of the order. 
Section 45 provides as follows: "The stipulations of this regulation do not apply to grain 
or flour imported from abroad after January 31." 

3. Conjunctively with that saving clause, the Federal Council's order contains a 
provision under which imported cereals and flours could be sold exclusively to the munici- 
palities of certain specially designated organizations by the importers. Although that pro- 
vision had for its object simply to throw imported grain and flour into such channels as 
supply the private consumption of civilians, and, in consequence of that provision, the in- 
tent and purpose of the Federal Council's order which was to protect the civilian popula- 
tion from speculators and engrossers, were fully met, it was nevertheless rescinded so as 
to leave no room for doubt. 

4. My Government is amenable to any proposition looking to control by a special 
American organization under the supervision of the American Consular officers, and, if 
necessary, will itself make a proposition in that direction. 

5. The German Government further calls attention to the fact that municipalities 
do not form part of or belong to the Government, but are "self-administrative bodies," 
which are elected by the inhabitants of the commune in accordance with fixed rules, and, 
therefore, exclusively represent the private part of the population and act as it directs. 
Although these principles are generally known and obtain in the United States, as well 
as in England itself, the German Government desired to point out the fact so as to avoid 
any further unnecessary delay. 

6. Hence it is absolutely assured thai imported food products will be consumed by 
the civilian population in Germany exclusively, and there remains no doubt upon which 
England can prevent the exportation of food products from America to Germany for the 
use of civilians. 

The Imperial Government expresses the firm hope that the American Government 
will stand on its right in this matter. 



German statement, February 15, 1915, in regard to armed British merchantmen, the 
use of neutral flags and the mining of the war zone.f 

Paraphrase of a note from the German Ambassador to the Secretary of State. 
According to absolutely reliable information British merchant ships intend to op- 

* Not printed in Diplomatic Correspondence , but referred to in preceding note. 
tlNot printed in Diplomatic Correspondence, etc. The New York Times, February 16, 1915. 



122 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

pose armed resistance to German men-of-war in the area declared as war zone by the Ger- 
man Admiralty. 

Some of these ships were already armed with British naval guns. Now all the 
others are speedily being equipped in a similar way. Merchant ships have been in- 
structed to sail in groups, and to ram German submarines, while the examination is pro- 
ceeding, or should the submarines lie alongside, to throw bombs upon them, or else to 
attempt to overpower the examining party coming on board. 

A very high premium has been offered for the destruction of the first German sub- 
marine by a British merchant vessel. Therefore, British merchant ships cannot any more 
be considered as undefended, so that they may be attacked by German war vessels without 
warning or search. The British admitted that instructions had been given to misuse neu- 
tral flags. It is almost certain that British merchant vessels will by all means try to con- 
ceal their identity. Thereby, it also becomes almost impossible to ascertain the identity 
of neutral ships, unless they sail in daylight under convoy, as all measures suggested by 
neutrals, for instance, painting of the ships, in the national colors, may be promptly imi- 
tated by British ships. The attacks to be expected by masked British merchant vessels 
make a search impossible, as the examining party and the submarines themselves would 
thereby be exposed to destruction. 

Under the circumstances, the safety of neutral shipping in the war zone around the 
British Isles is seriously threatened. There is also an increased danger resulting from 
mines, as these will be laid in the war zone to a great extent. Accordingly, neutral ships 
are urgently warned against entering that area, while the course around Scotland will be 
safe. 

Germany has been compelled to resort to this kind of warfare by the murderous 
ways of British naval warfare, which aims at the destruction of legitimate neutral trade 
and at the starvation of the German people. Germany will be obliged to adhere to these an- 
nounced principles till England submits to the recognized rules of warfare, established by 
the Declarations of Paris and London, or till she is compelled to do so by the neutral 
powers. 



The German Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Gerard. 

Berlin, February 16, 1915. 

In reference to the note of the twelfth instant, Foreign Office number twenty-two 
sixty, relative to the German measures respecting the theater of war in the waters 
surrounding England, the undersigned has the honor to reply to His Excellency the 
Ambassador of the United States, James W. Gerard, as follows : 

The Imperial German Government have examined the communication of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States in the same spirit of good will and friendship which seems 
to have prompted this communication. 

The Imperial German Government are in entire accord with the Government of the 
United States that it is in the highest degree desirable for all parties to avoid the mis- 
understanding which might arise from the measures announced by the German Admi- 
ralty and to avert the intrusion of events calculated to interrupt the most friendly rela- 
tions which have so happily existed between the two Governments up to this time. 

On this assurance the German Government believe that they may depend on full 
understanding on the part of the United States, all the more because the action announced 
by the German Admiralty, as was dwelt upon at length in the note of the fourth instant, 
is in no wise directed against the legitimate trade and navigation of neutral states, but 
merely represents an act of self-defense which Germany's vital interests force her to take 
against England's method of conducting maritime war in defiance of international law, 
which no protest on the part of neutrals has availed to bring into accordance with the 
legal status generally recognized before the outbreak of hostilities. 

In order to exclude all possible doubt on this cardinal point the German Govern- 
ment beg to set forth once more the actual situation. 

Up to now Germany has scrupulously observed the existing provisions of interna- 
tional law relative to maritime war. In particular she assented without delay to the 
proposal made by the American Government directly after the war began to ratify the 
Declaration of London and embodied the contents thereof . without change in her prize 
law, even without formally binding herself in this direction. The German Government 
have adhered to these provisions, even where they conflicted with military interests. 
Our Government at the same time have permitted the supply of food by Denmark to 
England until the present, although they could well have prevented this traffic by means 
of their naval forces. 

In direct opposition to this, England has not shrunk from grave violations of inter- 
national law wherever she could thereby cripple Germany's peaceable trade with neutral 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 123 

countries. It will not be necessary for the German Government to go into great detail on 
this point, especially since the American note to the British Government dated Decem- 
ber twenty-eighth, nineteen fourteen, which has been brought to their knowledge, has 
dealt with this point very aptly if not very exhaustively on the ground of the experiences 
of months. 

It is conceded that the intention of all these aggressions is to cut off Germany from 
all supplies and thereby to deliver up to death by famine a peaceful civilian population, 
a procedure contrary to the laws of war and every dictate of humanity. 

The neutrals have not been able to prevent this interception of different kinds of 
trade with Germany contrary to international law. It is true that the American Gov- 
ernment have protested against England's procedure, and Germany is glad to acknowl- 
edge this, but in spite of this protest and the protests of the other neutral Governments 
England has not allowed herself to be dissuaded from the course originally adopted. 
Thus, the American ship Wilhelmina was recently brought into port by England, 
although her cargo was destined solely for the civil population of Germany and was to 
be used only for this purpose according to an express declaration of the German Gov- 
ernment. 

In this way the following has been created : Germany is to all intents and purposes 
cut off from oversea supplies with the toleration, tacit or protesting, of the neutrals 
regardless of whether it is a question of goods which are absolute contraband, or only 
conditional contraband, or not contraband at all, following the law generally recognized 
before the outbreak of the war. On the other hand England with the indulgence of 
neutral Governments is not only being provided with such goods as are not contraband 
or merely conditional contraband, namely, foodstuffs, raw material, et cetera, although 
these are treated by England when Germany is in question as absolute contraband, but 
also with goods which have been regularly and unquestionably acknowledged to be abso- 
lute contraband. The German Government believe that they are obliged to point out 
very particularly and with the greatest emphasis, that a trade in arms exists between 
American manufacturers and Germany's enemies which is estimated at many hundred 
million marks. 

The German Government have given due recognition to the fact that as a matter of 
form the exercise of rights and the toleration of wrong on the part of neutrals is limited 
by their pleasure alone and involves no formal breach of neutrality. The German Gov- 
ernment have not in consequence made any charge of formal breach of neutrality. The 
German Government can not, however, do otherwise, especially in the interest of abso- 
lute clearness in the relations between the two countries, than to emphasize that they, 
in common with the public opinion in Germany, feel themselves placed at a great disad- 
vantage through the fact that the neutral powers have hitherto achieved no success or 
only an unmeaning success in their assertion of the right to trade with Germany, 
acknowledged to be legitimate by international law, whereas they make unlimited use of 
their right to tolerate trade in contraband with England and our other enemies. Con- 
ceded that it is the formal right of neutrals not to protect their legitimate trade with 
Germany and even to allow themselves knowingly and willingly to be induced by Eng- 
land to restrict such trade, it is on the other hand not less their good right, although 
unfortunately not exercised, to stop trade in contraband, especially the trade in, arms, 
with Germany's enemies. 

In view of this situation the German Government see themselves compelled, after 
six months of patience and watchful waiting, to meet England's murderous method of 
conducting maritime war with drastic counter measures. If England invokes the powers 
of famine as an ally in its struggle against Germany with the intention of leaving a civ- 
ilized people the alternative of perishing in misery or submitting to the yoke of 
England's political and commercial will, the German Government are to-day determined 
to take up the gauntlet and to appeal to the same grim ally. They rely on the neutrals 
who have hitherto tacitly or under protest submitted to the consequences, detrimental to 
themselves, of England's war of famine to display not less tolerance toward Germany, 
even if the German measures constitute new forms of maritime war, as has hitherto 
been the case with the English measures. 

In addition to this, the German Government are determined to suppress with all 
the means at their disposal the supply of war material to England and her allies and 
assume at the same time that it is a matter of course that the neutral Governments 
which have hitherto undertaken no action against the trade in arms with Germany's 
enemies do not intend to oppose the forcible suppression of this trade by Germany. 

Proceeding from these points of view, the German Admiralty has declared the zone 
prescribed by it the seat of war; it will obstruct this area of maritime war by mines 
wherever possible and also endeavor to destroy the merchant vessels of the enemy in any 
other way. 



124 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

It is very far indeed from the intention of the German Government, acting in obedi- 
ence to these compelling circumstances, ever to destroy neutral lives and neutral prop- 
erty, but on the other hand they can not be blind to the fact that dangers arise through 
the action to be carried out against England which menace without discrimination all 
trade within the area of maritime war. This applies as a matter of course to war mines, 
which place any ship approaching a mined area in danger, even if the limits of interna- 
tional law are adhered to most strictly. 

The German Government believe that they are all the more justified in the hope 
that the neutral powers will become reconciled with this, just as they have with the 
serious injury caused them thus far by England's measui'es, because it is their will to 
do everything in any way compatible with the accomplishment of their purpose for the 
protection of neutral shipping even within the area of maritime war. 

They furnish the first proof of their good will by announcing the measures intended 
by them at a time not less than two weeks beforehand, in order to give neutral shipping 
an opportunity to make the necessary arrangements to avoid the threatening danger. 
The safest method of doing this is to stay away from the area of maritime war. Neutral 
ships entering the closed waters in spite of this announcement, given so far in advance, 
and which seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military purpose against Eng- 
land, bear their own responsibility for any unfortunate accidents. The German Govern- 
ment on their side expressly decline all responsibility for such accidents and their 
consequences. 

Furthermore, the German Government announced merely the destruction of enemy 
merchant vessels found within the area of maritime war, and not the destruction of all 
merchant vessels, as the American Government appear to have erroneously understood. 
This limitation which the German Government have imposed upon themselves impairs 
the military purpose, especially since the presumption will prevail, even in the case of 
neutral ships, that they have contraband on board, in view of the interpretation of the 
idea of contraband in which the English Government have indulged as regards Germany 
and which the German Government will accordingly apply against England. 

Naturally the Imperial Government are not willing to waive the right to establish 
the presence of contraband in the cargoes of neutral ships and, in cases requiring it, to 
take any action necessary on the grounds established.- Finally the German Government 
are prepared to accord, in conjunction with the American Government, the most earnest 
consideration to any measure that might be calculated to insure the safety of legitimate 
shipping of neutrals within the seat of war. They can not, however, overlook the fact 
that all efforts in this direction are considerably hampered by two circumstances : First, 
by the misuse of the neutral flag by English merchant vessels, which in the meantime 
has probably been established beyond a doubt by the American Government likewise. 
Second, by the above-mentioned trade in contraband, especially war materials, by neutral 
merchant vessels. In regard to the latter point, the German Government ventures to 
hope that the American Government upon reconsideration will see their way clear to a 
measure of intervention in accordance with the spirit of true neutrality. 

As regards the first point, the secret order of the British Admiralty has already 
been communicated to the American Government by Germany. It recommends English 
merchant vessels to use neutral flags and has in the meantime been confirmed by a state- 
ment of the British Foreign Office which refers to the municipal law of England and 
characterizes such action as quite unobjectionable. The English merchant marine has fol- 
lowed this counsel without delay, as is probably known to the American Government, 
from the cases of the Lusitania and Laertes. Moreover, the British Government have 
armed English merchant vessels and instructed them to resist by force the German sub- 
marines. In these circumstances it is very difficult for the German submarines to rec- 
ognize neutral merchant vessels as such, for even a search will not be possible in the 
majority of cases, since the attacks to be anticipated in the case of a disguised English 
ship would expose the commanders conducting a search and the boat itself to the danger 
of destruction. 

The British Government would then be in a position to render the German measures 
illusory if their merchant marine persists in the misuse of neutral flags and neutral 
vessels are not marked in some other manner admitting of no possible doubt. Germany 
must, in the exigency into which she has unlawfully been forced, make her measures 
effective at all events in order thereby to compel her adversary to conduct maritime war- 
fare in accordance with international law and thus to re-establish the freedom of the 
seas which she has ever advocated and for which she is fighting likewise to-day. 

The German Government, therefore, welcomes the fact that the American Govern- 
ment have made representations to the British Government relative to the use of their 
flag contrary to law and give expression to s the expectation that this action will cause 
England to respect the American flag in future. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 125 

In this expectation the commanders of the German submarines have been instructed, 
as was already stated in the note of fourth instant, to abstain from violence to Ameri- 
can merchant vessels when they are recognizable as such. 

In order to meet in the safest manner all the consequences of mistaking an Ameri- 
can for a hostile merchant vessel the German Government recommended that (although 
this would not apply in the case of danger from mines) the United States convoy their 
ships carrying peaceable cargoes and traversing the English seat of maritime war in 
order to make them recognizable. In this connection the German Government believe it 
should be made a condition that only such ships should be convoyed as carry no mer- 
chandise which would have to be considered as contraband according to the interpreta- 
tion applied by England against Germany. The German Government are prepared to 
enter into immediate negotiations with the American Government relative to the manner 
of convoy. They would, however, be particularly grateful if the American Government 
would urgently advise their merchant vessels to avoid the English seat of maritime war, 
at any rate until the flag question is settled. 

The German Government resign themselves to the confident hope that the American 
Government will recognize the full meaning of the severe struggle which Germany is 
conducting for her very existence and will gain full understanding of the reasons which 
prompt Germany and the aims of the measures announced by her from the above expla- 
nations and promises. 

The German Government repeat that in the scrupulous consideration for neutrals 
hitherto practiced by them they have determined upon the measures planned only under 
the strongest compulsion of national self-preservation. Should the American Govern- 
ment at the eleventh hour succeed in removing, by virtue of the weight which they have 
the right and ability to throw into the scales of the fate of peoples, the reasons which 
have made it the imperative duty of the German Government to take the action indi- 
cated, should the American Government in particular find a way to bring about the 
observation of the Declaration of London on the part of the Powers at war with Germany 
and thereby to render possible for Germany the legitimate supply of foodstuffs and in- 
dustrial raw materials, the German Government would recognize this as a service which 
could not be too highly estimated in favor of more humane conduct of war and would 
gladly draw the necessary conclusions from the new situation thus created. 

The undersigned requests the Ambassador to bring the above to the attention of 
the American Government and avails himself of the opportunity to renew, et cetera. 

Von Jagow. 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, February 19, 1915. 
Your 1105, 10th. Sir Edward Grey has just handed me the following memorandum 
since your telegram to him was given to the press in Washington. I consented to his 
proposal to give this memorandum out for publication in Saturday morning newspapers : 

The memorandum communicated on the nth February calls attention in courteous and friendly terms to the 
action of the captain of the British S. S. Lusitania in raising the flag of the United States of America when ap- 
proaching British waters and says that the Government of the United States feel a certain anxiety in consider- 
ing the possibility of any general use of the flag of the United States by British vessels traversing those waters 
since the effect of such a policy might be to bring about a menace to the lives and vessels of United States citizens. 

It was understood that the German Government had announced their intention of sinking British merchant 
vessels at sight by torpedoes without giving any opportunity of making any provision for saving the lives of 
noncombatant crews and passengers. It was in consequence of this threat that the Lusitania raised the United 
States flag on her inward voyage and on her subsequent outward voyage. A request was made by the United 
States passengers who were embarking on board her that the United States flag should be hoisted presumably 
to insure their safety. Meanwhile the memorandum from Your Excellency had been received. His Majesty's 
Government did not give any advice to the company as to how to meet this request and it is understood that the 
Lusitania left Liverpool under the British flag. 

It seems unnecessary to say more as regards the Lusitania in particular regard to the use of foreign flags by 
merchant vessels. The British merchant shipping act makes it clear that the use of the British flag by foreign 
merchant vessels is permitted in time of war for the purpose of escaping capture. It is believed that in the case 
of some other nations there is a similar recognition of the same practice with regard to their flags and that none 
have forbidden it. It would therefore be- unreasonable to expect His Majesty's Government to pass legislation 
forbidding the use of foreign flags by British merchant vessels to avoid capture by the enemy. Now that the 
German Government have announced their intention to sink merchant vessels at sight with their noncombatant 
crews, cargoes, and papers, a proceeding hitherto regarded by the opinion of the world not as war, but as piracy, 
it is felt that the United States Government could not fairly ask the British Government to order British mer- 
chant vessels to forego the means — always hitherto permitted — of escaping not only capture but the much worse 
fate of sinking and destruction. Great Britain has always when neutral accorded to the vessels of other States 



126 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

at war liberty to use the British flag as a means of protection against capture, and instances are on record when 
United States vessels availed themselves of this facility during the American Civil War. It would be contrary 
to fair expectation if now when the conditions are reversed the United States and neutral nations were to grudge 
to British ships liberty to take similar action. The British Government have no intention of advising their mer- 
chant shipping to use foreign flags as general practice or to resort to them otherwise than for escaping capture 
or destruction. 

The obligation upon a belligerent warship to ascertain definitely for itself the nationality and character of a 
merchant vessel before capturing it and "a fortiori" before sinking and destroying it has been universally recog- 
nized. If that obligation is fulfilled, hoisting a neutral flag on board a British vessel cannot possibly endanger 
neutral shipping and the British Government hold that if loss to neutrals is caused by disregard of this obligation 
it is upon the enemy vessel disregarding it and upon the Government giving orders that it should be disregarded 
that the sole responsibility for injury to neutrals ought to rest. 

Page. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, February 19, 1915. 
Sir Edward Grey has just handed me the following memorandum. Since your tele- 
gram to him was given to the press in Washington I consented to his proposal to give this 
memorandum out for publication in Saturday morning's newspapers: 

MEMORANDUM. 

The communication made by the United States Ambassador in his note to Sir Edward Grey of the sixteenth 
instant has been carefully considered and the following observations are offered in reply: — 

2. At the time when His Majesty's Government gave directions for the seizure of the cargo of the steamship 
Wilhelmina as contraband they had before them the text of the decree made by the German Federal Council on 
the twenty-fifth January, under Article forty-five of which all grain and flour imported into Germany after the 
thirty-first January was declared deliverable only to certain organizations under direct government control or to 
municipal authorities. The vessel was bound for Hamburg, one of the free cities of the German Empire, the gov- 
ernment of which is vested in the municipality. This was one of the reasons actuating His Majesty's Government 
in deciding to bring the cargo of the Wilhelmina before the prize court. 

3. Information has only now reached them that by a subsequent decree, dated the sixth February, the 
above provision in Article forty-five of the previous decree was repealed, it would appear for the express purpose 
of rendering difficult the anticipated proceedings against the Wilhelmina. The repeal was not known to His 
Majesty's Government at the time of detention of the cargo, or indeed, until now. 

4. How far the ostensible exception of imported supplies from the general Government monopoly of all grain 
and flour set up by the German Government may affect the question of the contraband nature of the shipment 
seized is a matter which will most suitably be investigated by the prize court. 

5. It is, however, necessary to state that the German decree is not the only ground on which the submission of 
the cargo of the Wilhelmina to a prize court is justified. The German Government have in public announcements 
claimed to treat practically every town or port on the English east coast as a fortified place and base of operations. 
On the strength of this contention they have subjected to bombardment the open towns of Yarmouth, Scarborough, 
and Whitby, among others. On the same ground, a number of neutral vessels sailing for English ports on the east 
coast with cargoes of goods on the German list of conditional contraband have been seized by German cruisers 
and brought before the German prize court. Again, the Dutch vessel Maria, having sailed from California with 
a cargo of grain consigned to Dublin and Belfast, was sunk in September last by the German cruiser Karlsruhe. 
This could only have been justified if, among other things, the cargo could have been proved to be destined for 
the British Government or armed forces and if a presumption to this effect had been established owing to Dub- 
lin or Belfast being considered a fortified place or a base for the armed forces. 

6. The German Government can not have it both ways. If they consider themselves justified in destroying 
by bombardment the lives and property of peaceful civil inhabitants of English open towns and watering places, 
and in seizing and sinking ships and cargoes of conditional contraband on the way thither, on the ground that 
they were consigned to a fortified place or base, "a fortiori" His Majesty's Government must be at liberty 
to treat Hamburg, which is in part protected by the fortifications at the mouth of the Elbe, as a fortified town, 
and a base of operations and supply for the purposes of Article thirty-four of the Declaration of London. If the 
owners of the cargo of the Wilhelmina desire to question the validity in international law of the action taken by 
order of His Majesty's Government they will have every opportunity of establishing their case in due course 
before the prize court, and His Majesty's Government would, in this connection,, recall the attention of the 
United States Government to the considerations put forward in Sir Edward Grey's note to Mr. Page of the 
tenth instant as to the propriety of awaiting the result of prize court proceedings before diplomatic action is 
initiated. It will be remembered that they have from the outset given a definite assurance that the owners of 
the Wilhelmina, as well as the owners of her cargo, if found to be contraband would be equitably idemnified. 

7. There is one further observation to which His Majesty's Government think it right, and appropriate in 
the present connection, to give expression. They have not, so far, declared foodstuffs to be absolute contraband. 
They have not interfered with any neutral vessels on account of their carrying foodstuffs, except on the basis of 
such foodstuffs being liable to capture if destined for the enemy forces or governments. In so acting they have 
been guided by the general principle, of late universally upheld by civilized nations, and observed in practice, that 
the civil populations of countries at war are not to be exposed to the treatment rightly reserved for combatants. 
This distinction has to all intents and purposes been swept away by the novel doctrines proclaimed and acted upon 
by the German Government. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 127 

8. It is unnecessary here to dwell upon the treatment that has been meted out to the civil population of Bel- 
gium, and those parts of France which are in German occupation. When Germany, long before any mines had 
been laid by British authorities, proceeded to sow mines upon the high seas, and, by this means, sunk a consider- 
able number not only of British but also of neutral merchantmen with their unoffending crews, it was, so His 
Majesty's Government held, open to them to take retaliatory measures, even if such measures were of a kind to 
involve pressure of the civil population — not indeed of neutral states — but of their enemies. They refrained from 
doing so. 

9. When, subsequently, English towns and defenseless British subjects, including women and children, were 
deliberately and systematically fired upon and killed by ships flying the flag of the Imperial German Navy, when 
quiet country towns and villages, void of defenses, and possessing no military or naval importance, were bom- 
barded by German airships, His Majesty's Government still abstained from drawing the logical consequences from 
this form of attack on defenseless citizens. Further steps in the same direction are now announced, and in fact 
have already been taken, by Germany. British merchant vessels have been torpedoed at sight without any attempt 
being made to give warning to the crew, or any opportunity being given to save their lives, a torpedo has been fired 
against a British hospital ship in daylight, and similar treatment is threatened to all British merchant vessels in 
future as well as to any neutral ships that may happen to be found in the neighborhood of the British Isles. 

10. Faced with this situation, His Majesty's Government consider it would be altogether unreasonable that 
Great Britain and her allies should be expected to remain indefinitely bound, to their grave detriment, by rules 
and principles of which they recognize the justice if impartially observed as between belligerents, but which are 
at the present moment openly set at defiance by their enemy. 

11. If, therefore, His Majesty's Government should hereafter feel constrained to declare foodstuffs absolute 
contraband, or to take other measures for interfering with German trade, by way of reprisals, they confidently 
expect that such action will not be challenged on the part of neutral states by appeals to laws and usages of war 
whose validity rests on their forming an integral part of that system of international doctrine which as a whole 
their enemy frankly boasts the liberty and intention to disregard, so long as such neutral states can not compel the 
German Government to abandon methods of warfare which have not in recent history been regarded as having the 
sanction of either law or humanity. 

Page. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. E. Page. 1 

[Telegram.] 

Department op State, 
Washington, February 20, 1915. 

You will please deliver to Sir Edward Grey the following identic note which we 
are sending England and Germany : 

In view of the correspondence which has passed between this Government and 
Great Britain and Germany respectively, relative to the declaration of a war zone by the 
German Admiralty and the use of neutral flags by British merchant vessels, this Gov- 
ernment ventures to express the hope that the two belligerent Governments may, through 
reciprocal concessions, find a basis for agreement which will relieve neutral ships en- 
gaged in peaceful commerce from the great dangers which they will incur in the high 
seas adjacent to the coasts of the belligerents. 

The Government of the United States respectfully suggests that an agreement in 
terms like the following might be entered into. This suggestion is not to be regarded as 
in any sense a proposal made by this Government, for it of course fully recognizes that 
it is not its privilege to propose terms of agreement between Great Britain and Ger- 
many, even though the matter be one in which it and the people of the United States are 
directly and deeply interested. It is merely venturing to take the liberty which it hopes 
may be accorded a sincere friend desirous of embarrassing neither nation involved and 
of serving, if it may, the common interests of humanity. The course outlined is offered 
in the hope that it may draw forth the views and elicit the suggestions of the British 
and German Governments on a matter of capital interest to the whole world. 

Germany and Great Britain to agree: " 

1. That neither will sow any floating mines, whether upon the high seas or in terri- 
torial waters ; that neither will plant on the high seas anchored mines except within can- 
non range of harbors for defensive purposes only ; and that all mines shall bear the stamp 
of the Government planting them and be so constructed as to become harmless if sepa- 
rated from their moorings. 

2. That neither will use submarines to attack merchant vessels of any nationality 
except to enforce the right of visit and search. 

3. That each will re quire their respective merchant vessels not to use neutral flags 
for the purpose of disguise or ruse de guerre. 

Germany to agree: 

That all importations of food or foodstuffs from the United States (and from such 
other neutral countries as may ask it) into Germany shall be consigned to agencies to 
be designated by the United States Government ; that these American agencies shall have 

1 Same to the American Embassy at Berlin. 



128 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

entire charge and control without interference on the part of the German Government, 
of the receipt and distribution of such importations, and shall distribute them solely to 
retail dealers bearing licenses from the German Government entitling them to receive 
and furnish such food and foodstuffs to noncombatants only; that any violation of the 
terms of the retailers' licenses shall work a forfeiture of their rights to receive such food 
and foodstuffs for this purpose; and that such food and foodstuffs will not be requisi- 
tioned by the German Government for any purpose whatsoever or be diverted to the use 
of the armed forces of Germany. 

Great Britain to agree: 

That food and foodstuffs will not be placed upon the absolute contraband list and 
that shipments of such commodities will not be interfered with or detained by British 
authorities if consigned to agencies designated by the United States Government in 
Germany for the receipt and distribution of such cargoes to licensed German retailers 
for distribution solely to the noncombatant population. 

In submitting this proposed basis of agreement this Government does not wish to 
be understood as admitting or denying any belligerent or neutral right established by 
the principles of international law, but would consider the agreement, if acceptable to 
the interested powers, a modus vivendi based upon expediency rather than legal right 
and as not binding upon the United States either in its present form or in a modified 
form until accepted by this Government. 

Bryan. 



Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
Berlin, March 1, 1915. 

Following is translation of the German reply: 

The undersigned has the honor to inform His Excellency, Mr. James W. Gerard, 
Ambassador of the United States of America, in reply to the note of the 22d instant that 
the Imperial German Government have taken note with great interest of the suggestion 
of the American Government that certain principles for the conduct of maritime war on 
the part of Germany and England be agreed upon for the protection of neutral shipping. 
They see therein new evidence of the friend;ly feelings of the American Government 
toward the German Government which are fully reciprocated by Germany. 

It is in accordance with Germany's wishes also to have maritime war conducted 
according to rules which without discriminately restricting one or the other of the bel- 
ligerent powers in the use of their means of warfare are equally considerate of the inter- 
ests of neutrals and the dictates of humanity. Consequently it was intimated in the 
German note of the 16th instant that observation of the Declaration of London on the 
part of Germany's adversaries would create a new situation from which the German 
Government would gladly draw the' proper conclusions. 

Proceeding from this view, the German Government have carefully examined the 
suggestion of the American Government and believe that they can actually see in it a 
suitable basis for the practical solution of the questions which have arisen. 

With regard to the various points of the American note they beg to make the fol- 
lowing remarks : 

1. With regard to the sowing of mines, the German Government would be willing 
to agree as suggested not to use floating mines and to have anchored mines constructed 
as indicated. Moreover, they agree to put the stamp of the Government on all mines to 
be planted. On the other hand, it does not appear to them to be feasible for the belliger- 
ents wholly to forego the use of anchored mines for offensive purposes. 

2. The German Government would undertake not to use their submarines to attack 
mercantile ships of any flag except when necessary to enforce the right of visit and search. 
Should the enemy nationality of the vessel or the presence of contraband be ascertained 
submarine would proceed in accordance with the general rules of international law. 

3. As provided in the American note, this restriction of the use of the submarines is 
contingent on the fact that enemy mercantile abstain from the use of the neutral flag 
and other neutral distinctive marks. It would appear to be a matter of course that such 
mercantile also abstain from arming themselves and from all resistance by force, since 
such procedure contrary to international law would render impossible any action of the 
submarines in accordance with international law. 

4. The regulation of legitimate importations of food into Germany suggested by the 
American Government appears to be in general acceptable. Such regulation would, of 
course, be confined to importations by sea, but that would on the other hand include indi- 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 129 

rect importations by way of neutral ports. The German Government would, therefore, 
be willing to make the declarations of the nature provided in the American note so that, 
the use of the imported food and foodstuffs solely by the noncombatant population 
would be guaranteed. The Imperial Government must, however, in addition (***)* 
having the importation of other raw material used by the economic system of noncom- 
batants including forage permitted. To that end the enemy Governments would have 
to permit the free entry into Germany of the raw material mentioned in the free list of 
the Declaration of London and to treat materials included in the list of conditional con- 
traband according to the same principles as food and foodstuffs. 

The German Government venture to hope that the agreement for which the Ameri- 
can Government have paved the way may be reached after due consideration of the re- 
marks made above, and that in this way peaceable neutral shipping and trade will not 
have to suffer any more than is absolutely necessary from the unavoidable effects of 
maritime war. These effects could be still further reduced if, as was pointed out in the 
German note of the 16th instant, some way could be found to exclude the shipping of 
munitions of war from neutral countries to belligerents on ships of any nationality. 

The German Government must, of course, reserve a definite statement of their posi- 
tion until such time as they may receive further information from the American Govern- 
ment enabling them to see what obligations the British Government are on their part 
willing to assume. 

The undersigned avails himself of this occasion, etc. 

(Signed) Von Jagow. 

Dated Foreign Office, Berlin, February 28, 1915. Gerard. 



The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State. 

Germany has declared that the English Channel, the north and west coasts of France, 
and the waters around the British Isles are a war area and has officially notified that 
all enemy ships found in that area, will be destroyed and that neutral vessels may be 
exposed to danger. This is in effect a claim to torpedo at sight, without regard to the 
safety of the crew or passengers, any merchant vessel under any flag. As it is not in the 
power of the German Admiralty to maintain any surface craft in these waters, this 
attack can only be delivered by submarine agency. 

The law and custom of nations in regard to attacks on commerce have always pre- 
sumed that the first duty of the captor of a -merchant vessel is to bring it before a prize 
court where it may be tried, where the regularity of the capture may be challenged and 
where neutrals may recover their cargoes. The sinking of prizes is in itself a question- 
able act to be resorted to only in extraordinary circumstances and after provision has 
been made for the safety of all the crew or passengers, if there are passengers on board. 
The responsibility for discriminating between neutral and enemy vessels, and between 
neutral and enemy cargo, obviously rests with the attacking ship, whose duty is to verify 
the status and character of the vessel and cargo and to preserve all papers before sinking 
or even capturing it. So also is the humane duty of providing for the safety of the crews 
of merchant vessels, whether neutral or enemy, an obligation upon every belligerent. 

It is upon this basis that all previous discussions of the law for regulating warfare 
at sea have proceeded. A German submarine, however, fulfills none of these obligations ; 
she enjoys no local command of the waters in which she operates; she does not take her 
captures within the jurisdiction of a prize court; she carries no prize crew which she 
can put on board a prize; she uses no effective means of discriminating between a neu- 
tral and an enemy vessel; she does not receive on board for safety the crew and passen- 
gers of the vessel she sinks ; her methods of warfare are therefore entirely outside the 
scope of any of the international instruments regulating operations against commerce in 
time of war. The German declaration substitutes indiscriminate destruction for regu- 
lated capture. Germany is adopting these methods against peaceful traders and non- 
combatant crews with the avowed object of preventing commodities of all kinds, includ- 
ing food for the civil population, from reaching or leaving the British Isles or northern 
France. 

Her opponents are therefore driven to frame retaliatory measures in order in their 
turn to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany. These 
measures will, however, be enforced by the British and French Governments without 
risk to neutral ships or to neutral or noncombatant life and in strict observance of the 
dictates of humanity. The British and French Governments will therefore hold them- 
selves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destina- 

1 Apparent omission. 



130 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

tion, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or cargoes unless 
they would otherwise be liable to condemnation. The treatment of vessels and cargoes 
which have sailed before this date will not beaffected. 

Cecil Spring-Eioe. 
British Embassy, 

Washington, March 1, 1915. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. II. Page. 

[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 
Washington, March 5, 1915. 

In regard to the recent communications received from the British and French Gov- 
ernments concerning restraints upon commerce with Germany, please communicate with 
the British foreign office in the sense following : 

The difficulty of determining action upon the British and French declarations of 
intended retaliation upon commerce with Germany lies in the nature of the proposed 
measures in their relation to commerce by neutrals. 

While it appears that the intention is to interfere with and take into custody all 
ships both outgoing and incoming, trading with Germany, which is in effect a blockade 
of German ports, the rule of blockade, that a ship attempting to enter or leave a German 
port regardless of the character of its cargo may be condemned, is not asserted. 

The language of the declaration is "the British and French Governments will, there- 
fore, hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying goods of presumed 
enemy destination, ownership, or origin. It is not intended to confiscate such vessels or 
cargoes unless they would otherwise be liable to condemnation." 

The first sentence claims a right pertaining only to a state of blockade. The last sen- 
tence proposes a treatment of ships and cargoes as if no blockade existed. The two 
together present a proposed course of action previously unknown to international law. 

As a consequence neutrals have no standard by which to measure their rights or to 
avoid danger to their ships and cargoes. The paradoxical situation thus created should 
be changed and the declaring powers ought to assert whether they rely upon the rules 
governing a blockade or the rules applicable when no blockade exists. 

The declaration presents other perplexities. 

The last sentence quoted indicates that the rules of contraband are to be applied to 
cargoes detained. The rule covering noncontraband articles carried in neutral bottoms 
is that the cargoes shall be released and the ships allowed to proceed. This rule can not, 
under the first sentence quoted, be applied as to destination. What then is to be done 
with a cargo of noncontraband goods detained under the declaration? The same ques- 
tion may be asked as to conditional contraband cargoes. 

The foregoing comments apply to cargoes destined for Germany. Cargoes coming 
out of German ports present another problem under the terms of the declaration. Under 
the rules governing enemy exports only goods owned by enemy subjects in enemy bot- 
toms are subject to seizure and condemnation. Yet by the declaration it is purposed to 
seize and take into port all goods of enemy "ownership and origin." The word "origin" 
is particularly significant. The origin of goods destined to neutral territory on neutral 
ships is not and never has been a ground for forfeiture except in case a blockade is de- 
clared and maintained. What then would the seizure amount to in the present case 
except to delay the delivery of the goods? The declaration does not indicate what dispo- 
sition would be made of such cargoes if owned by a neutral or if owned by an enemy sub- 
ject. Would a different rule be applied according to ownership? If so, upon what prin- 
ciples of international law would it rest? And upon what rule if no blockade is declared 
and maintained could the cargo of a neutral ship sailing out of a German port be con- 
demned? If it is not condemned, what other legal course is there but to release it? 

While this Government is fully alive to the possibility that the methods of modern 
naval warfare, particularly in the use of the submarine for both defensive and offensive 
operations, may make the former means of maintaining a blockade a physical impossibil- 
ity, it feels that it can be urged with great force that there should be also some limit to 
"the radius of activity," and especially so if this action by the belligerents can be con- 
strued to be a blockade. It would certainly create a serious state of affairs if, for exam- 
ple, an American vessel laden with a cargo of German origin should escape the British 
patrol in European waters only to be held up by a cruiser off New York and taken into 
Halifax. 

Similar cablegram seDt to Paris. 

Bryan. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 131 

Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Consulate General, 

London, March 9. 1915. 
British Government announces that: "All cotton for which contracts of sale and 
freight engagements had already been made before March 2, to be allowed free or bought 
at contract price if stopped provided the ship sails not later than March 31 ; similar treat- 
ment to be accorded to all cotton insured before March 2, provided the cotton is put on 
board not later than March 16. All shipments of cotton claiming the above protection to 
be declared before sailing and documents produced to and certificates obtained from con- 
sular officers or other authority fixed by the Government." 

Skinner. 

The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State. 

British Embassy, 
Washington, March 10, 1915 
The British Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State, and has 
the honor to transmit herewith twenty copies of a list enumerating certain oils and sub- 
stances included under the heading "Lubricants" in the British list of articles to be 
treated as conditional contraband. 

Cecil Spring-Rice. 



[Inclosure.] 
OILS AND SUBSTANCES INCLUDED UNDER THE HEADING LUBRICANTS IN THE BRITISH LIST OF ARTICLES TO BE TREATED 

AS CONDITIONAL CONTRABAND. 

I. Principal oils used as lubricants : 

Tallow oil. 

Lard oil. 

Neat's-foot oil (including sheep's foot oil, horse's foot oil, and fatty bone oil). 

Olive oil. 

Rape oil (including Colza oil, Ravisson oil, or Black Sea rape oil, and Jamba oil). 

Castor oil. 

Particularly for fine mechanisms — 

Hazelnut oil. 

Ben oil. 

Porpoise oil (including body oil and jaw oil). 

Dolphin oil or blackfish oil (including body oil and jaw oil). 

Sperm oil. 

Arctic sperm oil. 
Whale oil. 
Rosin oil. 

II. Solid lubricants: 

i. Graphite (including natural graphite, artificial graphite, Atcheson's graphite, colloidal graphite, de- 
flocculated graphite, "Oildag," "Aquadag." or "Waterdag") . 

2. Mineral jellies. 

3. Tallow (including mutton-tallow, beef -tallow and goat-and-buck-tallow). 

4. All unctuous bodies which do not flow (or flow extremely slowly) at ordinary temperatures con- 

taining : 

a. Tallow mixed with any other oil, fat, or mineral jelly. 

b. Any oil, fat, or mineral jelly containing aluminum soap, lead soap, lime soap, or rosin soap. 

c. Commercial forms of lead soap, lime soap, and aluminium soap. 

d. Any oil, fat, or mineral jelly containing water and an alkali, or containing potash or soda 

soap (but not including "superfatted soaps" of various kinds). 

5. Rosin greases or rosin soaps. 

Aluminium soap in oleaginous solution is also known as "oil-pulp," "thickener," "gelatin," and "viscom." 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, March 15, 1915. 
Following is the full text of a memorandum dated March 13, which Grey handed 
me to-day : 

On the 22d of February last I received a communication from Your Excellency of the identic note addressed 
to His Majesty's Government and to Germany, respecting an agreement on certain points as to the conduct of the 



132 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

war at sea. The reply of the German Government to this note has been published and it is not understood from 
the reply that the German Government are prepared to abandon the practice of sinking British merchant vessels 
by submarines, and it is evident from their reply that they will not abandon the use of mines for offensive pur- 
poses on the high seas as contrasted with the use of mines for defensive purposes only within cannon range of 
their own harbors as suggested by the Government of the United States. This being so, it might appear un- 
necessary for the British Government to make any further reply than to take note of the German answer. We 
desire, however, to take the opportunity of making a fuller statement of the whole position and of our feeling 
with regard to it. We recognize with sympathy the desire of the Government of the United States to see the 
European war conducted in accordance with the previously recognized rules of international law and the dictates 
of humanity. It is thus that the British forces have conducted the war, and we are not aware that these forces, 
either naval or military, can have laid to their charge any improper proceedings, either in the conduct of hostilities 
or in the treatment of prisoners or wounded. On the German side it has been very different. 

i. The treatment of civilian inhabitants in Belgium and the north of France has been made public by the 
Belgian and French Governments and by those who have had experience of it at first hand. Modern history 
affords no precedent for the sufferings that have been inflicted on the defenseless and noncombatant population 
in the territory that has been in German military occupation. Even the food of the population was confiscated 
until in Belgium an International Commission, largely influenced by American generosity and conducted under 
American auspices, came to the relief of the population and secured from the German Government a promise to 
spare what food was still left in the country, though the Germans still continue to make levies in money upon 
the defenseless population for the support of the German Army. 

2. We have from time to time received most terrible accounts of the barbarous treatment to which British 
officers and soldiers have been exposed after they have been taken prisoner while being conveyed to German 
prison camps ; one or two instances have already been given to the United States Government founded upon au- 
thentic and first-hand evidence which is beyond doubt. Some evidence has been received of the hardships to 
which British prisoners of war are subjected in the prison camps contrasting, we believe, most unfavorably with 
the treatment of German prisoners in this country. We have proposed, with the consent of the United States 
Government, that a commission of United States officers should be permitted in each country to inspect the treat- 
ment of prisoners of war. The United States Government have been unable to obtain any reply from the German 
Government to this proposal and we remain in continuing anxiety and apprehension as to the treatment of 
British prisoners of war in Germany. 

3. At the very outset of the war a German mine layer was discovered laying a mine field on the high seas. 
Further mine fields have been laid from time to time without warning and so far as we know are still being laid 
on the high seas, and many neutral as well as British vessels have been sunk by them. 

4. At various times during the war German submarines have stopped and sunk British merchant vessels, 
thus making the sinking of merchant vessels a general practice, though it was admitted previously, if at all, only 
as an exception, the general rule to which the British Government have adhered being that merchant vessels, if 
captured, must be taken before a prize court. In one case already quoted in a note to the United States Govern- 
ment, a neutral vessel carrying foodstuffs to an unfortified town in Great Britain has been sunk. Another case is 
now reported in which a German armed cruiser has sunk an American vessel, the William P. Frye, carrying a 
cargo of wheat from Seattle to Queenstown. In both cases the cargoes were presumably destined for the civil 
population. Even the cargoes in such circumstances should not have been condemned without the decision of a 
prize court, much less should the vessels have been sunk. It is to be noted that both these cases occurred before 
the detention by the British authorities of the Wilhelmina and her cargo of foodstuffs which the German 
Government allege is the justification for their own action. The Germans have announced their intention of 
sinking British merchant vessels by torpedo without notice and without any provision for the safety of the crew. 
They have already carried out this intention in the case of neutral as well as of British vessels, and a number of 
noncombatant and innocent lives on British vessels, unarmed and defenseless, have been destroyed in this way. 

5. Unfortified, open, and defenseless towns, such as Scarborough, Yarmouth, and Whitby, have been deliber- 
ately and wantonly bombarded by German ships of war, causing in some cases considerable loss of civilian life, 
including women and children. 

6. German aircraft have dropped bombs on the east coast of England where there were no military or 
strategic points to be attacked. On the other hand, I am aware of but two criticisms that have been made on 
British action in all these respects: (1) It is said that the British naval authorities also have laid some anchored 
mines on the high seas. They have done so, but the mines were anchored and so constructed that they would be 
harmless if they went adrift, and no mines whatever were laid by the British naval authorities till many weeks 
after the Germans had made a regular practice of laying mines on the high seas. (2) It is said that the British 
Government have departed from the view of international law which they had previously maintained that food- 
stuffs destined for the civil population should never be interfered with, this charge being founded on the sub- 
mission to a prize court of the cargo of the Wilhelmina. The special considerations affecting this cargo have 
already been presented in a memorandum to the United States Government, and I need not repeat them here. 
Inasmuch as the stoppage of all foodstuffs is an admitted consequence of blockade, it is obvious that there can 
be no universal rule based on considerations of morality and humanity which is contrary to this practice. The 
right to stop foodstuffs destined for the civil population must therefore in any case be admitted if an effective 
"cordon" controlling intercourse with the enemy is drawn, announced, and maintained. Moreover, independ- 
ently of rights arising from belligerent action in the nature of blockade, some other nations, differing from the 
opinion of the Governments of the United States and Great Britain, have held that to stop the food of the civil 
population is a natural and legitimate method of bringing pressure to bear on an enemy country, as it is upon 
the defense of a besieged town. It is also upheld on the authority of both Prince Bismarck and Count Caprivi, 
and therefore presumably is not repugnant to German morality. The following are the quotations from Prince 
Bismarck and Count Caprivi on this point. Prince Bismarck, in answering, in 1885, an application from the 
Kiel Chamber of Commerce for a statement of the view of the German Government on the question of the right 
to declare as contraband foodstuffs that were not intended for military forces, said: "I reply to the chamber of 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 133 

commerce that any disadvantage our commercial and carrying interests may suffer by the treatment of rice as 
contraband of war does not justify our opposing a measure which it has been thought fit to take in carrying on 
a foreign war. Every war is a calamity which entails evil consequences, not only on the combatants but also 
on neutrals. These evils may easily be increased by the interference of a neutral power with the way in which 
a third carries on the war to the disadvantage of the subjects of the interfering power, and by this means German 
commerce might be weighted with far heavier losses than a transitory prohibition of the rice trade in Chinese 
waters. The measure in question has for its object the shortening of the war by increasing the difficulties of 
the enemy, and is a justifiable step in war if impartially enforced against all neutral ships." Count Caprivi, dur- 
ing a discussion in the German Reichstag on the 4th of March, 1892, on the subject of the importance of inter- 
national protection for private property at sea, made the following statements : "A country may be dependent 
for her food or for her raw products upon her trade. In fact, it may be absolutely necessary to destroy the 
enemy's trade." * * * "The private introduction of provisions into Paris was prohibited during the siege, 
and in the same way a nation would be justified in preventing the import of food and raw produce." The 
Government of Great Britain have frankly declared, in concert with the Government of France, their intention 
to meet the German attempt to stop all supplies of every kind from leaving or entering British or French ports 
by themselves stopping supplies going to or from Germany for this end. The British fleet has instituted a 
blockade, effectively controlling by cruiser "cordon" all passage to and from Germany by sea. The difference 
between the two policies is, however, that while our object is the same as that of Germany, we propose to attain 
it without sacrificing neutral ships or noncombatant lives or inflicting upon neutrals the damage that must be 
entailed when a vessel and its cargo are sunk without notice, examination, or trial. I must emphasize again that 
this measure is a natural and necessary consequence of the unprecedented methods, repugnant to all law and 
morality, which have been described above, which Germany began to adopt at the very outset of the war, and 
the effects of which have been constantly accumulating. 

Page. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 

London, March 15, 1915. 
Following is the full text of a note, dated to-day, and an Order in Council I have just 
received from Grey: 

1. His Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the inquiries which, under instructions 
from your Government, Your Excellency addressed to me on the eighth instant regarding the scope and mode of 
application of the measures, foreshadowed in the British and French declarations of the first of March, for 
restricting the trade of Germany. Your Excellency explained and illustrated by reference to certain contingencies 
the difficulty of the United States Government in adopting a definite attitude toward these measures by reason of 
uncertainty regarding their bearing upon the commerce of neutral countries. 

2. I can at once assure Your Excellency that subject to the paramount necessity of restricting German trade 
His Majesty's Government have made it their first aim to minimize inconvenience to neutral commerce. From 
the accompanying copy of the Order in Council, which is to be published to-day, you will observe that a wide dis- 
cretion is afforded to the prize court in dealing with the trade of neutrals in such manner as may in the circum- 
stances be deemed just and that full provision is made to facilitate claims by persons interested in any goods 
placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court under the Order. I apprehend that the perplexities to 
which Your Excellency refers will for the most part be dissipated by the perusal of this document and that it is 
only necessary for me to add certain explanatory observations. 

3. The effect of the Order in Council is to confer certain powers upon the executive officers of His Majesty's 
Government. The extent to which those powers. 'will be actually exercised and the degree of severity with which the 
measures of blockade authorized will be put into operation, are matters which will depend on the administrative 
orders issued by the Government and the decisions of the authorities specially charged with the duty of dealing 
with individual ships and cargoes, according to the merits of each case. The United States Government may rest 
assured that the instructions to be issued by His Majesty's Government to the fleet and to the customs officials and 
executive committees concerned will impress upon them the duty of acting with the utmost dispatch consistent 
with the object in view and of showing in every case such consideration for neutrals as may be compatible with 
that object which is, succinctly stated, to establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or 
coming from Germany. 

4. His Majesty's Government have felt most reluctant at the moment of initiating a policy of blockade to 
exact from neutral ships all the penalites attaching to a breach of blockade. In their desire to alleviate the burden 
which the existence of a state of war at sea must inevitably impose on neutral sea-borne commerce, they declare 
their intention to refrain altogether from-the exercise of the right to confiscate ships or cargoes which belligerents 
have always claimed in respect to breaches of blockade. They restrict their claim to the stopping of cargoes des- 
tined for or coming from the enemy's territory. 

5. As regards cotton, full particulars of the arrangements contemplated have already been explained. It will 
be admitted that every possible regard has been had to the legitimate interests of the American cotton trade. 

6. Finally, in reply to the penultimate paragraph of Your Excellency's note, I have the honor to state that it 
is not intended to interfere with neutral vessels carrying enemy cargo of noncontraband nature outside European 
waters, including the Mediterranean. 



134 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

American Embassy, 

London, March 16, 1915. 

Sir : In accordance with the instructions of the department, and confirming my cable- 
gram No. 1780 of the 13th instant, I have the honor to transmit herewith copies, in dupli- 
cate, of a proclamation adding to the list of articles to be treated as contraband of war, 
dated March 11, 1915. 

I have, etc., Walter Hines Page. 



PROCLAMATION. 

March n, 1915. 

Adding to the List of Articles to be Treated as Contraband of War. 
George R. I. 

Whereas on the twenty-third day of December, 1914, we did issue our royal proclamation specifying the 
articles which it was our intention to treat as contraband during the continuance of hostilities or until we did 
give futher public notice, and 

Whereas it is expedient to make certain additions to the lists contained in the said proclamation: 

Now, therefore, we do hereby declare, by and with the advice of our privy council, that during the continu- 
ance of the war or until we do give further public notice,the following articles will be treated as absolute contra- 
band in addition to those set out in our royal proclamation aforementioned: 

Raw wool, wool tops and noils, and woolen and worsted yarns. 

Tin, chloride of tin, tit ore. 

Castor oil. 

Paraffin wax. 

Copper iodide. 

Lubricants. 

Hides of cattle, buffaloes, and horses ; skins of calves, pigs, sheep, goats, and deer ; leather, undressed or 
dressed, suitable for saddlery, harness, military boots, or military clothing. 

Ammonia and its salts whether simple or compound ; ammonia liquor, urea, aniline, and their compounds. 

And we do hereby declare that the following articles will be treated as conditional contraband in addition to 
those set out in our royal proclamation aforementioned: 

Tanning substances of all kinds (including extracts for use in tanning). 

And we do hereby further declare that the terms "foodstuffs" and "feeding stuffs for animals" in the list 
of conditional contraband contained in our royal proclamation aforementioned shall be deemed to include oleagi- 
nous seeds, nuts and kernels; animal and vegetable oils and fats (other than linseed oil) suitable for use in the 
manufacture of margarine ; and cakes and meals made from oleaginous seeds, nuts and kernels. 

Given at our court at Buckingham Palace, this eleventh day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand 
nine hundred and fifteen, etc., etc. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department of State, 
Washington, March 20, 1915. 

Department of State is in receipt of a telegram from the American Minister at 
Stockholm, as follows: 

His Britannic Majesty's Legation has the honor to inform the Royal Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs- 
that the American Steamship Wico has arrived in the United Kingdom with a full cargo of oil for Krooks Pe- 
troleum and Oil Company, Stockholm. In view of the recent seizure by German men of war off Falsterbo of the 
Steamship Bryssel and her cargo of oil His Majesty's Government require to have complete assurances that 
this vessel will not share the same fate before they can allow her to proceed to destination. His Britannic 
Majesty's Legation would therefore be much obliged to be furnished with such assurances for immediate com- 
munication to the Foreign Office. 

Ambassador Page is instructed to inquire of the British Government as to whether 
the vessel is held for reasons stated in the above telegram, and to state that, in that case, 
the Government of the United States considers that the vessel should be released at once, 
in view of the evident fact that. the United States Government can not admit the right of 
the British Government to detain the vessel without any evidence showing that her 
cargo has an illegal destination, and before a reply has been received to demand made on 
a nonbelligerent country, which such country is evidently unable to comply with, viz, 
that it give assurances that the ship while on her way will not be held up by the forces 
of another belligerent Government. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 135 

The Secretary of State to Minister Morris. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department of State, 
Washington, March 20, 1915. 

Mr. Bryan informs Mr. Morris that his telegram under date of March 18, 4 p. m., to 
the Department, has been communicated to Ambassador Page. Minister Morris is also 
advised that Ambassador Page has been instructed to make representations to the British 
Government for the release of the steamer Wico. 



The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State. 

British Embassy, 
Washington, March 23, 1915. 

My Dear Mr. Secretary : I beg to acknowledge the receipt of your informal letter of 
March 20th in which you are good enough to submit certain observations on the British 
contraband list. 

I have not in my possession any further information than that which I have com- 
municated to you, but I expect before long to receive a uniform printed list as revised 
up to date and I shall take pleasure in sending you a copy so soon as it arrives. 

In the list sent to you on March 10 which reached me by post the term "castor oil" was 
mentioned under the heading of " Principal oils used as lubricants," which were at that 
time treated as conditional contraband. According to the telegram, of which a copy was 
sent to you on March 13, "lubricants" were transferred to the list of absohite contraband 
and castor oil was mentioned separately. Apart from this and in the absence of informa- 
tion to the contrary I understand that the memorandum interpreting the term "lubri- 
cants" formerly listed as conditional contraband is to be considered as still interpreting 
this term as listed under absolute contraband. 

The materials enumerated in Articles 11 and 12 of the conditional contraband list 
appear, as you suggest, to have been transferred to the absolute list, but I am unable at 
the present moment to state definitely that this is so. 

I am taking steps to obtain a clear ruling on these points. 
I am, etc., 

Cecil Spring-Bice. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 
[Telegram.] 

Department of State, . 
Washington, March 30, 1915. 

You are instructed to deliver the following to His Majesty's Government in reply 
to your numbers 1795 and 1798 of March 15 : 

The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to the sub- 
jects treated in the British notes of March 13 and March 15, and to the British Order in 
Council of the latter date. 

These communications contain matters of grave importance to neutral nations. 
They appear to menace their rights of trade and intercourse not only with belligerents 
but also with one another. They call for frank comment in order that misunderstand- 
ings may be avoided. The Government of the United States deems it its duty, therefore, 
speaking in the sincerest spirit of friendship, to make its own view and position with re- 
gard to them unmistakably clear. 

The Order in Council of the 15th of March would constitute, were its provisions to 
be actually carried into effect as they stand, a practical assertion of unlimited belli- 
gerent rights over neutral commerce within the whole European area, and an almost un- 
qualified denial of the sovereign- rights of the nations now at peace. 

This Government takes it for granted that there can be no question what those 
rights are. A nation's sovereignty over its own ships and citizens under its own flag 
on the high seas in time of peace is, of course, unlimited ; and that sovereignty suffers 
no diminution in time of war, except in so far as the practice and consent of civilized 
nations has limited it by the recognition of certain now clearly determined rights, 
which it is conceded may be exercised by nations which are at war. 



136 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

A belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit and search, and the right 
of capture and condemnation, if upon examination a neutral vessel is found to be en- 
gaged in unneutral service or to be carrying contraband of war intended for the enemy's 
government or armed forces. It has been conceded the right to establish and maintain 
a blockade of an enemy's ports and coasts and to capture and condemn any vessel taken 
in trying to break the blockade. It is even conceded the right to detain and take to its 
own ports for judicial examination all vessels which it suspects for substantial reasons 
to be engaged in unneutral or contraband service and to condemn them if the suspicion 
is sustained. But such rights, long clearly defined both in doctrine and practice, have 
hitherto been held to be the only permissible exceptions to the principle of universal 
equality of sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and nations not engaged 
in war. 

It is confidently assumed that His Majesty's Government will not deny that it is a 
rule sanctioned by general practice that, even though a blockade should exist and the 
doctrine of contraband as to unblockaded territory be rigidly enforced, innocent ship- 
ments may be freely transported to and from the United States through neutral coun- 
tries to belligerent territory without being subject to the penalties of contraband traffic 
or breach of blockade, much less to detention, requisition, or confiscation. 

Moreover the rules of the Declaration of Paris of 1856— among them that free ships 
make free goods — will hardly at this day be disputed by the signatories of that solemn 
agreement. 

His Majesty's Government, like the Government of the United States, have often 
and explicitly held that these rights represent the best usage of warfare in the dealings 
of belligerents with neutrals at sea. In this connection I desire to direct attention to 
the opinion of the Chief Justice of the United States in the case of the Peterhof, which 
arose out of the Civil War, and to the fact that that opinion was unanimously sustained 
in the award of the Arbitration Commission of 1871, to which the case was presented 
at the request of Great Britain. From that time to the Declaration of London of 1909, 
adopted with modifications by the Order in Council of the 23d of October last, these 
rights have not been seriously questioned by the British Government. And no claim on 
the part of Great Britain of any justification for interfering with these clear rights of the 
United States and its citizens as neutrals could be admitted. To admit it would be to 
assume an attitude of unneutrality toward the present enemies of Great Britain which 
would be obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of this Government in the 
present circumstances ; and for Great Britain to make such a claim would be for her to 
abandon and set at naught the principles for which she has consistently and earnestly 
contended in other times and circumstances. 

The note of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which 
accompanies the Order in Council, and which bears the same date, notifies the Govern- 
ment of the United States of the establishment of a blockade which is, if defined by the 
terms of the Order in Council, to include all the coasts and ports of Germany and every 
port of possible access to enemy territory. But the novel and quite unprecedented fea- 
ture of that blockade, if we are to assume it to be properly so defined, is that it em- 
braces many neutral ports and coasts, bars access to them, and subjects all neutral ships 
seeking to approach them to the same suspicion that would attach to them were they 
bound for the ports of the enemies of Great Britain, and to unusual risks and penalties. 
It is manifest that such limitations, risks, and liabilities placed upon the ships of 
a neutral power on the high seas, beyond the right of visit and search and the right to 
prevent the shipment of contraband already referred to, are a distinct invasion of the 
sovereign rights of the nation whose ships, trade, or commerce is interfered with. 

The Government of the United States is, of course, not oblivious to the great changes 
which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hither- 
to governing legal blockade were formulated. It might be ready to admit that the old 
form of "close" blockade with its cordon of ships in the immediate offing of the blockaded 
ports is no longer practicable in face of an enemy possessing the means and opportunity 
to make an effective defense by the use of submarines, mines, and air craft; but it can 
hardly be maintained that, whatever form of effective blockade may be made use of, it is 
impossible to conform at least to the spirit and principles of the established rules of war. 
If the necessities of the case should seem to render it imperative that the cordon of block- 
ading vessels be extended across the approaches to any neighboring neutral port or coun- 
try, it would seem clear that it would still be easily practicable to comply with the well- 
recognized and reasonable prohibition of international law against the blockading of 
neutral ports by according free admission and exit to all lawful traffic with neutral 
ports through the blockading cordon. This traffic would of course include all outward- 
bound traffic from the neutral country and all inward-bound traffic to the neutral coun- 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 137 

try except contraband in transit to the enemy. Such procedure need not conflict in 
any respect with the rights of the belligerent maintaining the blockade since the right 
would remain with the blockading vessels to visit and search all ships either entering or 
leaving the neutral territory which they were in fact, but not of right, investing. 

The Government of the United States notes that in the Order in Council His 
Majesty's Government give as their reason for entering upon a course of action, which 
they are aware is without precedent in modern warfare, the necessity they conceive 
themselves to have been placed under to retaliate upon their enemies for measures of a 
similar nature which the latter have announced it their intention to adopt and which 
they have to some extent adopted; but the Government of the United States, recalling 
the principles upon which His Majesty's Government have hitherto been scrupulous to 
act, interprets this as merely a reason for certain extraordinary activities on the part 
of His Majesty's naval forces and not as an excuse for or prelude to any unlawful action. 
If the course pursued by the present enemies of Great Britain should prove to be in fact 
tainted by illegality and disregard of the principles of war sanctioned by enlightened 
nations, it can not be supposed, and this Government does not for a moment suppose, that 
His Majesty's Government would wish the same taint to attach to their own actions or 
would cite such illegal acts as in any sense or degree a justification for similar practices 
on their part in so far as they affect neutral rights. 

It is thus that the Government of the United States interprets the language of the 
note of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs which accompa- 
nies the copy of the Order in Council which was handed to the Ambassador of the United 
States near the Government in London and by him transmitted to Washington. 

This Government notes with gratification that "wide discretion is afforded to the 
prize court in dealing with the trade of neutrals in such manner as may in the circum- 
stances be deemed just, and that full provision is made to facilitate claims by persons 
interested in any goods placed in the custody of the marshal of the prize court under 
the order" ; that "the effect of the Order in Council is to confer certain powers upon the 
executive officers of His Majesty's Government" ; and that "the extent to which these 
powers will be actually exercised and the degree of severity with which the measures of 
blockade authorized will be put into operation are matters which will depend on the 
administrative orders issued by the Government and the decisions of the authorities 
especially charged with the duty of dealing with individual ships and cargoes according 
to the merits of each case." This Government further notes with equal satisfaction the 
declaration of the British Government that "the instructions to be issued by His Majes- 
ty's Government to the fleet and to the customs officials and executive committees con- 
cerned will impress upon them the duty of acting with the utmost dispatch consistent 
with the object in view, and of showing in every case such consideration for neutrals 
as may be compatible with that object, which is, succinctly stated, to establish a block- 
ade to prevent vessels from carrying goods for or coming from Germany." 

In view of these assurances formally given to this Government, it is confidently ex- 
pected that the extensive powers conferred by the Order in Council on the executive officers 
of the Crown will be restricted by "orders issued by the Government" directing the exer- 
cise of their discretionary powers in such a manner as to modify in practical application 
those provisions of the Order in Council which, if strictly enforced, would violate neutral 
rights and interrupt legitimate trade. Relying on the faithful performance of these 
voluntary assurances by His Majesty's Government the United States takes it for 
granted that the approach of American merchantmen to neutral ports situated upon the 
long line of coast affected by the Order in Council will not be interfered with when it 
is known that they do not carry goods which are contraband of war or goods destined to 
or proceeding from ports within the belligerent territory affected. 

The Government of the United States assumes with the greater confidence that His 
Majesty's Government will thus adjust their practice to the recognized rules of interna- 
tional law, because it is manifest that the British Government have adopted an extraordi- 
nary method of "stopping cargoes destined for or coming from the enemy's territory," 
which, owing to the existence of unusual conditions in modern warfare at sea, it will be 
difficult to restrict to the limits which have been heretofore required by the law of na- 
tions. Though the area of operations is confined to "European waters including the Me- 
diterranean," so great an area of the high seas is covered and the cordon of ships is so 
distant from the territory affected that neutral vessels must necessarily pass through 
the blockading force in order to reach important neutral ports which Great Britain as a 
belligerent has not the legal right to blockade and which, therefore, it is presumed she 
has no intention of claiming to blockade. The Scandinavian and Danish ports, for ex- 
ample, are open to American trade. They are also free, so far as the actual enforcement 
of the Order in Council is concerned, to carry on trade with German Baltic ports al- 
though it is an essential element of blockade that it bear with equal severity upon all 
neutrals. 



138 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

This Government, therefore, infers that the commanders of His Majesty's ships of 
war engaged in maintaining the so-called blockade will be instructed to avoid an en- 
forcement of the proposed measures of nonintercourse in such a way as to impose re- 
strictions upon neutral trade more burdensome than those which have been regarded as 
inevitable when the ports of a belligerent are actually blockaded by the ships of its 
enemy. 

The possibilities of serious interruption of American trade under the Order in Coun- 
cil are so many, and the methods proposed are so unusual and seem liable to constitute 
so great an impediment and embarrassment to neutral commerce that the Government 
of the United States, if the Order in Council is strictly enforced, apprehends many inter- 
ferences with its legitimate trade which will impose upon His Majesty's Government 
heavy responsibilities for acts of the British authorities clearly subversive of the rights 
of neutral nations on the hi^h seas. It is therefore, expected that His Majesty's Gov- 
ernment, having considered these possibilities, will take the steps necessary to avoid 
them, and, in the event that they should unhappily occur, will be prepared to make full 
reparation for every act which under the rules of international law constitutes a viola- 
tion of neutral rights. 

As stated in its communication of October 22, 1914, "this Government will insist 
that the rights and duties of the United States and its citizens in the present war be de- 
fined by the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States, ir- 
respective of the provisions of the Declaration of London, and that this Government re- 
serves to itself the right to enter a protest or demand in each case in which those rights 
and duties so defined are violated or their free exercise interfered with, by the author- 
ities of the British Government." 

In conclusion you will reiterate to His Majesty's Government that this statement 
of the views of the Government of the United States is made in the most friendly spirit, 
and in accordance with the uniform candor which has characterized the relations of the 
two Governments in the past, and which has been in large measure the foundation of the 
peace and amity existing between the two nations without interruption for a century. 

Bryan. 



The German Ambassador to the Secretary of State. 

[Translation.] 

Imperial German Embassy, 

Washington, April 4, 1915. 
Mr. Secretary of State : I have the honor to deliver to Your Excellency the in- 
closed memorandum on German-American trade and the question of delivery of arms. 
Accept, etc., 

J. Bernstorff. 



[ Inclosure— Translation.] 

MEMORANDUM. 

Imperial German Embassy, 
Washington, D. C, April Jf, 1915. 

The various British Orders in Council have one-sidedly modified the generally recog- 
nized principles of international law in a way which arbitrarily stops the commerce of 
neutral nations with Germany. Even before the last British Order in Council, the ship- 
ment of conditional contraband, especially food supplies, to Germany was practically im- 
possible. Prior to the protest sent by the American to the British Government on De- 
cember 28 last, such a shipment did not actually take place in a single case. Even after 
this protest the Imperial Embassy knows of only a single case in which an American 
shipper has ventured to make such a shipment for the purpose of legitimate sale to Ger- 
many. Both ship and cargo were immediately seized by the English and are being held 
in an English port under the pretext of an order of the German Federal Council (Bund- 
esrat) regarding the grain trade, although this resolution of the Federal Council relates 
exclusively to grain and flour, and not to other foodstuffs, besides making an express 
exception with respect to imported foodstuffs, and although - the German Government 
gave the American Government an assurance, and proposed a special organization 
whereby the exclusive consumption by the civilian population is absolutely guaranteed. 

Under the circumstances the seizure of the American ship was inadmissible accord- 
ing to recognized principles of international law. Nevertheless the United States Gov- 
ernment has not to date secured the release of the ship and cargo, and has not, after a 
duration of the war of eight months, succeeded in protecting its lawful trade with Ger- 
many. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 139 

Such a long delay, especially in matters of food supply, is equivalent to an entire 
denial. 

The Imperial Embassy must therefore assume that the United States Government 
acquiesces in the violations of international law by Great Britain. 

Then there is also the attitude of the United States in the question of the exporta- 
tion of arms. The Imperial Government feels sure that the United States Government 
will agree that in questions of neutrality it is necessary to take into consideration not 
only the formal aspect of the case, but also the spirit in which the neutrality is carried 
out. 

The situation in the present war differs from that of any previous war. Therefore 
any reference to arms furnished by Germany in former wars is not justified, for then it 
was not a question whether war material should be supplied to the belligerents, but who 
should supply it in competition with other nations. In the present war all nations hav- 
ing a war material industry worth mentioning are either involved in the war themselves 
or are engaged in perfecting their own armaments, and have therefore laid an embargo 
against the exportation of war material. The United States is accordingly the only 
neutral country in a position to furnish war materials. The conception of neutrality is 
thereby given a new purport, independently of the formal question of hitherto existing 
law. In contradiction thereto, the United States is building up a powerful arms industry 
in the broadest sense, the existing plants not only being worked but enlarged by all avail- 
able means, and new ones built. The international conventions for the protection of the 
rights of neutral nations doubtless sprang from the necessity of protecting the existing 
industries of neutral nations as far as possible from injury in their business. But it can 
in no event be in accordance with the spirit of true neutrality if, under the protection 
of such international stipulations, an entirely new industry is created in a neutral state, 
such as is the development of the arms industry in the United States, the business where- 
of, under the present conditions, can benefit only the belligerent powers. 

This industry is actually delivering goods only to the enemies of Germany. The 
theoretical willingness to supply Germany also if shipments thither were possible, does 
not alter the case. If it is the will of the American people that there shall be a true 
neutrality, the United States will find means of preventing this one-sided supply of arms 
or at least of utilizing it to protect legitimate trade with Germany, especially that in 
foodstuffs. This view of neutrality should all the more appeal to the United States Gov- 
ernment because the latter enacted a similar policy toward Mexico. On February 4, 
1914, President Wilson, according to a statement of a Representative in Congress in the 
Committee for Foreign Affairs of December 30, 1914, upon the lifting of the embargo 
on arms to Mexico, declared that "we should stand for genuine neutrality, considering 
the surrounding facts of the case * * *." He then held that "in that case, because Car- 
ranza had no ports, while Huerta had them and was able to import these materials, that 
it was our duty as a nation to treat (Carranza and Huerta) upon an equality if we 
wished to observe the true spirit of neutrality as compared with a mere paper neutrality." 

If this view were applied to the present case, it would lead to an embargo on the 
exportation of arms. 



Consul General Skinner to the Secretary of State. 

[Extract] 

American Consulate General, 

London, April 7, 1915. 

Sir: Referring to my telegram dated March 31st setting forth that under an un- 
proclaimed Order in Council dated March 23d it was proposed to requisition the cargo 
of the Wilhelmina, I have the honor to enclose herewith a full copy of the Order in ques- 
tion. 

I have, etc., Robert P. Skinner. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, April 8, 1915. 
Your 1296, March 20, regarding Wico. 

Foreign Office replies to my representations in the premises stating that it has been 
decided in this case to permit this vessel to proceed to her destination, and instruc- 
tions in that sense have already been issued. It is further stated that it is desired to 



140 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

point out that British Government feels that in event of further cargoes going to Stock- 
holm being seized by German ships, the whole question of permitting oil cargoes to pro- 
ceed to that destination will have to be seriously reconsidered. 

Page. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, April 8, 1915. 

The Prime Minister has just handed me the following, which I have communicated 
to Hayes and Brooking, who strongly recommend its acceptance by their principals : 

His Majesty's Government share the desire of the United States Government for an immediate settlement of 
the case of the Wilhelmina. This American ship laden with foodstuffs left New York for Hamburg on January 
22nd. She called at Falmouth of her own accord on February gth and her cargo was detained as prize on Feb- 
ruary nth. The writ instituting prize court proceedings was issued on February 27th, and claimed that the cargo 
should be condemned as contraband of war. No proceedings were taken or even threatened against the ship her- 
self, and in the ordinary course the cargo would have been unloaded when seized so that the ship would be free 
to leave. The owners of the cargo, however, have throughout objected to the discharge of the cargo and it is 
because of this objection that the ship is still at Falmouth with the cargo on board. 

His Majesty's Government have formally undertaken that even should the condemnation of the cargo as 
contraband be secured in the prize court they would none the less compensate the owners for any loss sustained in 
consequence of the ship having been stopped and proceedings taken against the cargo. 

It was understood at the time that the proceedings in the prize court would be in the nature of a test case, the 
decision in which would govern the treatment of any subsequent shipments of food supplies to Germany in similar 
circumstances. Since then the situation has, however, materially changed by the issue of the Order in Council of 
March n, 1915, and the measures taken thereunder which prevent further supplies being sent from America to 
Germany, whether contraband or not. 

In these circumstances there is no longer any object in continuing the judicial proceedings in the case of the 
Wilhelmina; for it can no longer serve as a test case, and it is really agreed that the owners of the cargo, even if 
proved to have no claim, are to be treated as if their claim was good. Nothing therefore remains but to settle the 
claim on proper and just conditions, and this would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be secured most 
expeditiously and with the least inconvenience to all parties by an agreement between the Crown and the claimants 
for the disposal of the whole matter. His Majesty's Government accordingly propose that such an agreement be 
arrived at on the following terms : "His Majesty's Government having undertaken to compensate the claimants 
by paying for the cargo seized on the basis of the loss of the profit the claimants would have made if the ship had 
proceeded in due course to Hamburg, and by indemnifying them for the delay caused to the ship so far as this 
delay has been due to the action of the British authorities, all proceedings in the prize court shall be stayed, on 
the understanding that His Majesty's Government buy the cargo from the claimants on the above terms. The 
cargo shall be discharged and delivered to the proper officer of the Crown forthwith. The sum to be paid shall be 
assessed by a single referee nominated jointly by the ambassador of the United States of America and His Ma- 
jesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, who shall certify the total amount after making such in- 
quiries as he may think fit, but without formal hearing or arbitration." His Majesty's Government would be 
grateful if the United States ambassador would inform the claimants of the above proposal at his early conveni- 
ence and obtain their acceptance. 

Page. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase — Extract.] 

Department of State, 

Washington, April 9, 1915. 

Your 1889, 6th. 

Ambassador Page is instructed to inform the Foreign Office that this Government, 
on behalf of the owners of the Seguranca, objects to its detention, as the shipper's mani- 
fest shows that the entire cargo was consigned to named consignees in Holland and is ac- 
companied by a certificate of the British Consul General at New York ; the loading of the 
vessel having, moreover, been supervised by said Consul General's inspector, and the 
vessel containing no cargo except what is specified in the manifest. The Ambassador is 
further instructed to advise the Foreign Office that this Government will support claims 
of owners of the vessel and cargo for damages for detention, as this Government does not 
admit the right of British Government to require that this cargo be reconsigned to the 
Netherlands Oversea Trust. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 141 

The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State. 

British Embassy, 
Washington, April 10, 1915. 

My Dear Mr. Secretary : With further reference to your letter of the 20th of March 
I am informed that the interpretation of lubricants now absolute contraband is as follows : 

Mineral. Including mineral oils, jellies or greases of all kinds, pure or compounded; 
graphite, natural or artificial; 

Vegetable. Including vegetable lubricating oils and fats of all kinds, and resin 
greases, and their mixtures; 

Animal. Including all animal oils and fats for use as lubricants, and their mixtures ; 

Fish. Including whale oil (train, blubber, sperm), seal or shark oil, and fish oil 
generally ; 

Mixtures or compounds of any of the foregoing. 

It will be observed that the above definition covers all the articles mentioned in the 
earlier list of lubricants sent to your Department on March 10 and that it is even more 
comprehensive inasmuch as it includes mixtures and compounds of these articles. 

The whole of the "hides" heading (Article 12) in the conditional list of December 
23, 1914, may be regarded as transferred to the list of absolute contraband. Harness and 
saddlery (Article 11) remain conditional contraband unless it falls within Article 10 of 
the absolute list of December 23. 

I am, etc. Cecil Spring-Kice. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 
[Telegram.] 

Department of State, 
Washington, April 12, 1915. 

You will say to British Government, in replying to its statement regarding release 
steamer Wico, that this Government considers that any seizure of American cargoes 
which might be made by the German authorities would be a matter which should be ad- 
justed between the Government of the United States and the German Government, and 
further say that the Government of the United States does not perceive that any such ac- 
tion on the part of the German authorities could afford justification for seizures of 
American cargoes by the British authorities. 

Bryan. 

The Secretary of State to the German Ambassador. 

Department of State, 
Washington, April 21, 1915. 

Excellency : I have given thoughtful consideration to your Excellency's note of the 
4th of April, 1915, enclosing a memorandum of the same date, in which Your Excellency 
discusses the action of this Government with regard to trade between the United States 
and Germany and the attitude of this Government with regard to the exportation of 
arms from the United States to the nations now at war with Germany. 

I must admit that I am somewhat at a loss how to interpret Your Excellency's treat- 
ment of these matters. There are many circumstances connected with these important 
subjects to which I would have expected Your Excellency to advert, but of which you 
make no mention, and there are other circumstances to which you do refer which I 
would have supposed to be hardly appropriate for discussion between the Government 
of the United States and the Government of Germany. 

I shall take the liberty, therefore, of regarding Your Excellency's references to the 
course pursued by the Government of the United States with regard to interferences 
with trade from this country, such as the Government of Great Britain have attempted, 
as intended merely to illustrate more fully the situation to which you desire to call our 
attention and not as an invitation to discuss that course. Your Excellency's long ex- 
perience in international affairs will have suggested to you that the relations of the two 
Governments with one another can not wisely be made a subject of discussion with a 
third Government, which can not be fully informed as to the facts and which can not be 
fully cognizant of the reasons for the course pursued. I believe, however, that I am 
justified in assuming that what you desire to call forth is a frank statement of the posi- 
tion of this Government in regard to its obligations as a neutral power. The general 
attitude and course of policy of this Government in the maintenance of its neutrality I 
am particularly anxious that Your Excellency should see in their true light. I had hoped 



142 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

that this Government's position in these respects had been made abundantly clear, but 
I am of course perfectly willing to state it again. This seems to me the more necessary 
and desirable because, I regret to say, the language which Your Excellency employs in 
your memorandum is susceptible of being construed as impugning the good faith of the 
United States in the performance of its duties as a neutral. I take it for granted that no 
such implication was intended, but it is so evident that Your Excellency is laboring un- 
der certain false impressions that I can not be too explicit in setting forth the facts as 
they are, when fully reviewed and comprehended. 

In the first place, this Government has at no time and in no manner yielded any one 
of its rights as a neutral to any of the present belligerents. It has acknowledged, as a 
matter of course, the right of visit and search and the right to apply the rules of con- 
traband of war to articles of commerce. It has, indeed, insisted upon the use of visit and 
search as an absolutely necessary safeguard against mistaking neutral vessels for ves- 
sels owned by an enemy and against mistaking legal cargoes for illegal. It has admitted 
also the right of blockade if actually exercised and effectively maintained. These are 
merely the well-known limitations which war places upon neutral commerce on the high 
seas. But nothing beyond these has it conceded. I call' Your Excellency's attention to 
this, notwithstanding it is already known to all the world as a consequence of the pub- 
lication of our correspondence in regard to these matters with several of the belligerent 
nations, because I can not assume that you have official cognizance of it. 

In the second place, this Government attempted to secure from the German and 
British Governments mutual concessions with regard to the measures those Governments 
respectively adopted for the interruption of trade on the high seas. This it did, not of 
right, but merely as exercising the privileges of a sincere friend of both parties and as 
indicating its impartial good will. The attempt was unsuccessful; but I regret that 
Your Excellency did not deem it worthy of mention in modification of the impressions 
you expressed. We had hoped that this act on our part had shown our spirit in these 
times of distressing war as our diplomatic correspondence had shown our steadfast re- 
fusal to acknowledge the right of any belligerent to alter the accepted rules of war at sea 
in so far as they affect the rights and interests of neutrals. 

In the third place, I note with sincere regret that, in discussing the sale and exporta- 
tion of arms by citizens of the United States to the enemies of Germany, Your Excellen- 
cy seems to be under the impression that it was within the choice of the Government of 
the United States, notwithstanding its professed neutrality and its diligent efforts to 
maintain it in other particulars, to inhibit this trade, and that its failure to do so mani- 
fested an unfair attitude toward Germany. This Government holds, as I believe Your 
Excellency is aware, and as it is constrained to hold in view of the present indisputable 
doctrines of accepted international law, that any change in its own laws of neutrality 
during the progress of a war which would affect unequally the relations of the United 
States with the nations at war would be an unjustifiable departure from the principles 
of strict neutrality by which it has consistently sought to direct its actions, and I re- 
spectfully submit that none of the circumstances urged in Your Excellency's memoran- 
dum alters the principle involved. The placing of an embargo on the trade in arms at 
the present time would constitute such a change and be a direct violation of the neutral- 
ity of the United States. It will, I feel assured, be clear to Your Excellency that, hold- 
ing this view and considering itself in honor bound by it, it is out of the question for 
this Government to consider such a course. _ 

I hope that Your Excellency will realize the spirit in which I am drafting this reply. 
The friendship between the people of the United States and the people of Germany is so 
warm and of such long standing, the ties which bind them to one another in amity are _ so 
many and so strong, that this Government feels under a special compulsion to speak with 
perfect frankness when any occasion arises which seems likely to create any misunder- 
standing, however slight or temporary, between those who represent the Governments of 
the two countries. It will be a matter of gratification to me if I have removed from Your 
Excellency's mind any misapprehension you may have been under regarding either the 
policy or the spirit and purposes of the Government of the United States. Its neutrality 
is founded upon the firm basis of conscience and good will. 

Accept, etc., w - J - Bryan - 

Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State. 

American Embassy, 

Berlin, April 26, 1915. 
Sir: With reference to my telegram No. 2097, dated April 21, 1915, I have the 
honor to transmit to you herewith five copies of Reichsgeset'zblatt, 1915, No. 49, with 
translation, containing the modifications and amendments of the German prize ordinance 
recently promulgated. 

I have, etc., J™ s w - Gerard. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 143 

[Translation.] 

Ordinance relative to amendments of the prize ordinance of September 30, igog. 

In retaliation of the regulations adopted by England and her allies, deviating from the London declaration of 

maritime law of February 26, 1909, I approve of the following amendments of the prize ordinance of September 

30, 1909, and of its supplements, dated October -18, November 23, and December 14, 1914, for the period of the 

present war. 

Articles 21, 23, 27, 33, 35, 40, and the additions to Article 23 shall be replaced by the following provisions: 
Article 21. The following articles and materials, designated absolute contraband, shall be considered con-' 
traband of war: 

1. Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts. 

2. Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of a'l kinds, and their distinctive component parts. 

3. Powder and explosives of all kinds. 

4. Cannon barrels, gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, field kitchens and bakeries, supply wagons, field 
forges, searchlights and searchlight accessories, and their distinctive component parts. 

5. Range finders and their distinctive component parts. 

6. Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments. 

7. Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character. 

8. Saddle, draft, and pack animals suitable for use in war. 

9. All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character. 

10. Articles of camp equipment and their distinctive component parts. 

11. Armor plates. 

12. Lead, pig, sheet, or pipe. 

13. Barbed wire, and implements for fixing and cutting the same. 

14. Tinplate. 

15. Warships, including boats and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be 
used on a vessel of war; ship plates and construction steel. 

16. Submarine sound signaling apparatus. 

17. Aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and aircraft of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts, together 
with accessories, articles and materials, recognizable as intended for use in connection with balloons and aircraft. 

18. Implements and devices designed exclusively for the manufacture and repair of arms and munitions of 
war. 

19. Lathes of all kinds. 

20. Mining lumber. 

21. Coal and coke. 

22. Flax. 

Article 23. The following articles and materials suitable for warlike as well as for peaceful purposes, com- 
ing under the designation of conditional contraband, shall be considered as contraband of war: 

1. Foodstuffs. 

2. Forage and all kinds of feeding stuffs. 

3. Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes, suitable for use in war. 

4. Wool from animals, raw or dressed, together with woolen carded yarns, and worsted yarns. 

5. Gold and silver, in coin or bullion ; paper money. 

6. Vehicles of all kinds, especially all motor vehicles available for use in war, and their component parts. 

7. Rubber tires for motor vehicles, together with all articles or materials especially used in the manufac- 
ture or repair of rubber tires. 

8. Rubber and gutta-percha, together with goods made thereof. 

9. Railway materials, both fixed and rolling stock, and materials for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and 
telephones. 

10. Fuel, excepting coal and coke ; lubricants. 

11. Sulphur, sulphuric acid, nitric acid. 

12. Horseshoes and shoeing materials. 

13. The following ores : Wolframite, scheelite, molybdenite, nickel ore, chrome ore, haematite iron ore, man- 
ganese ore, lead ore. 

14. The following metals : Wolfram, molybdenum, vanadium, nickel, selenium, cobalt, hsmatite pig iron, 
manganese, aluminium, copper. 

15. Antimony, together with the sulphides and oxides of antimony. 

16. Ferro alloys, including ferrowolfram, ferromolybdenum, ferromanganese, ferrovanadium, ferrochrome. 

17. Harness and saddlery. 

18. Leather, treated and untreated, when suitable for saddlery, harness, military boots or military clothing. 

19. Tanning materials of all kinds, including extracts used in tanning. 

20. All kinds of lumber, rough or treated, especially hewn, sawed, planed, fluted, excepting mining lumber 
tar of charcoal. 

21. Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds, floating docks, parts of docks, and their component parts. 
The following articles cannot be declared contraband of war: 

1. Raw cotton, raw silk, raw jute, raw hemp. 

2. Resin, lacks, hops. 

3. Raw skins, horns, bones, and ivory. 

4. Natural and artificial fertilizers. 

5. Earth, clay, lime, chalk ; stones, including marble ; bricks, slates, and roofing tiles. 

6. Porcelain and glass. 

7. Paper, and the materials prepared for its manufacture. 

8. Soap ; paints, including the materials exclusively used for their manufacture, and varnish. 



144 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

9. Chloride of lime, soda, caustic soda, sulphate of soda in cakes, ammonia, sulphate of ammonia, and 

copper sulphate. 

10. Machines for agriculture, for mining, for the textile industry, and for printing. 

11. Precious stones, fine stones, pearls, mother-of-pearl, and corals. 

12. Clocks, standing clocks and watches, excepting chronometers. 

13. Fashion and fancy goods. 

14. Feathers of all kinds, hair and bristles. 

15. Furniture and decorative articles, office furniture and requirements. 

Article 33. In the absence of conditions to the contrary, the hostile destination referred to in article 32 is 
to be presumed when (A) the goods are consigned to an enemy authority or the agent of such or to a dealer 
shown to have supplied articles of the kind in question or products thereof to the armed forces or the adminis- 
trative authorities of the enemy state; (B) the goods are consigned to order or the ship's papers do not show 
who is the consignee or the goods are consigned to a person in territory belonging to or occupied by the enemy ; 
(C) the goods are destined for an armed place of the enemy or a place serving as a base of operations or supplies 
to the armed forces of the enemy. 

Merchant vessels themselves are not to be considered as destined for the armed forces or the administrative 
authorities of the enemy solely for the reason that they are found en route to one of the places referred to under 
letter C. 

Article 35. Articles of conditional contraband are liable to seizure only on a vessel en route to territory 
belonging to or occupied by the enemy or to the armed forces of the enemy, and such vessel is not intended to 
unload these articles in an intermediate neutral port— that is to say, in a port at which the vessel is to call 
previous to reaching the ultimate destination designated. 

This paragraph shall not apply if the conditions provided in article 33, letter B, are present or if the vessel 
is bound for a neutral country with regard to which it is shown that the enemy government draws articles of the 
kind in question from that country. 

Article 40. A vessel cannot be captured on the ground of an already completed voyage carrying contraband. 
If, however, the vessel carried contraband to the enemy contrary to the indications of the ship's papers, it shall 
be liable to capture and condemnation until the end of the war. 

This ordinance shall take effect the day of its promulgation. 

Chief Headquarters, April 18, 1915. . (Signed) Wilhelm. 

[l. s.] v. Tirpitz. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 
[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, April 28, 1915. 

Your 1471, 26th. 

Replying to my representations of 17th instant Foreign Office advises me as follows : 

r 

The steamship Segaranca was allowed to proceed on April 22, all the consignees having agreed to receive 
their goods through the Netherlands Oversea Trust. 

While His Majesty's Government do not "require" cargoes to be consigned to the Netherlands Oversea 
Trust, they do accept a consignment in that form as proof that the cargo is intended for bona fide consumption 
in Holland, and they find by experience that n.o objection to that course is raised by reputable shippers and con- 
signees. 

As this practice has greatly facilitated and expedited the release of vessels bound for Dutch ports when 
brought in or calling for examination, it is hoped that the United States Government will not do anything to 
interfere with its smooth working in the future. 

Page. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. E. Page. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department op State, 
Washington, May 6, 1915. 

Ambassador Page is instructed to inform the Foreign Office that the owners of the 
Seguranca advise the Department that though the British Consul General supervised the 
loading of the vessel, he failed to advise them of the practice of consigning shipments to 
the Netherlands Oversea Trust, and that if the British Government desires the practice 
followed as a matter of convenience, it should bring the same to the knowledge of ship- 
pers. 

Ambassador Page is also instructed to inform the Foreign Office that the United 
States Government does not object to the consignment of American shipments to the 
Netherlands Oversea Trust, provided the plan be voluntarily acquiesced in by the ship- 
pers, but that it does object to the holding up by British Government of noncontraband 
cargoes until reconsigned to Netherlands Oversea Trust, and maintains also that ship- 
ments consigned to other consignees in Holland have the same le°;al status as those con- 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 145 

signed to Netherlands Oversea Trust; that the United States Government finds no legal 
justification for the detention of noncontraband cargoes and that in the circumstances 
of this case the burden of proof is not on shipper to establish the noncontraband char- 
acter, but is on the British Government to show contraband character of shipments. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador Gerard. 

Department of State, 
Washington, May 13, 1915. 

Please call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs and after reading to him this com- 
munication leave with him a copy. 

In view of recent acts of the German authorities in violation of American rights on 
the high seas which culminated in the torpedoing and sinking of the British steamship 
Lusitania on May 7, 1915, by which over 100 American citizens lost their lives, it is clear- 
ly wise and desirable that the Government of the United States and the Imperial Ger- 
man Government should come to a clear and full understanding as to the grave situation 
which has resulted. 

The sinking of the British passenger steamer Falaba by a German submarine on 
March 28, through which Leon C. Thrasher, an American citizen, was drowned; the at- 
tack on April 28 on the American vessel Gushing by a German aeroplane ; the torpedoing 
on May 1 of the American vessel Gulflight by a German submarine, as a result of 
which two or more American citizens met their death; and, finally, the torpedoing and 
sinking of the steamship Lusitania, constitute a series of events which the Government 
of the United States has observed with growing concern, distress, and amazement. 

Becalling the humane and enlightened attitude hitherto assumed by the Imperial 
German Government in matters of international right, and particularly with regard to 
the freedom of the seas; having learned to recognize the German views and the German 
influence in the field of international obligation as always engaged upon the side of jus- 
tice and humanity ; and having understood the instructions of the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment to its naval commanders to be upon the same plane of humane action prescribed 
by the naval codes of other nations, the Government of the United States was loath to 
believe — it can not now bring itself to believe — that these acts, so absolutely contrary to 
the rules, the practices, and the spirit of modern warfare, could have the countenance or 
sanction of that great Government. It feels it to be its duty, therefore, to address the 
Imperial German Government concerning them with the utmost frankness and in the 
earnest hope that it is not mistaken in expecting action on the part of the Imperial Ger- 
man Government which will correct the unfortunate impressions which have been cre- 
ated and vindicate once more the position of that Government with regard to the sacred 
freedom of the seas. 

The Government of the United States has been apprised that the Imperial German 
Government considered themselves to be obliged by the extraordinary circumstances of 
the present war and the measures adopted by their adversaries in seeking to cut Germany 
off from all commerce, to adopt methods of retaliation which go much beyond the ordinary 
methods of warfare at sea, in the proclamation of a war zone from which they have 
warned neutral ships to keep away. This Government has already taken occasion to in- 
form the Imperial German Government that it can not admit the adoption of such meas- 
ures or such a warning of danger to operate as in any degree an abbreviation of the 
rights of American shipmasters or of American citizens bound on lawful errands as pas- 
sengers on merchant ships of belligerent nationality ; and that it must hold the Imperial 
German Government to a strict accountability for any infringement of those rights, in- 
tentional or incidental. It does not understand the Imperial German Government to 
question those rights. It assumes, on the contrary, that the Imperial Government ac- 
cept, as of course, the rule that the lives of noncombatants, whether they be of neutral 
citizenship or citizens of one of the nations at war, can not lawfully or rightfully be put 
in jeopardy by the capture or destruction of an unarmed merchantman, and recognize 
also, as all other nations do, the obligation to take the usual precaution of visit and 
search to ascertain whether a suspected merchantman is in fact of belligerent nationality 
or is in fact carrying contraband of war under a neutral flag. 

The Government of the United States, therefore, desires to call the attention of the 
Imperial German Government with the utmost earnestness to the fact that the objection 
to their present method of attack against the trade of their enemies lies in the practical 
impossibility of employing submarines in the destruction of commerce without disregard- 
ing those rules of fairness, reason, justice, and humanity, which all modern opinion re- 
gards as imperative. It is practically impossible for officers of a submarine to visit a 
merchantman at sea and examine her papers and cargo. It is practically impossible for 



146 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

them to make a prize of her ; and, if they can not put a prize crew on board of her, they 
can not sink her without leaving her crew and all on board of her to the mercy of the 
sea in her small boats. These facts it is understood the Imperial German Government 
frankly admit. We are informed that in the instances of which we have spoken time 
enough for even that poor measure of safety was not given, and in at least two of the 
cases cited not so much as a warning was received. Manifestly submarines can not be 
used against merchantmen, as the last few weeks have shown, without an inevitable 
violation of many sacred principles of justice and humanity. 

American citizens act within their indisputable rights in taking their ships and in 
traveling wherever their legitimate business calls them upon the high seas, and exercise 
those rights in what should be the well- justified confidence that their lives will not be 
endangered by acts done in clear violation of universally acknowledged international 
obligations, and certainly in the confidence that their own Government will sustain them 
in the exercise of their rights. 

There was recently published in the newspapers of the United States, I regret to 
inform the Imperial German Government, a formal warning, purporting to come from 
the Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United 
States, and stating, in effect, that any citizen of the United States who exercised Lis 
right of free travel upon the seas would do so at his peril if his journey should take him 
within the zone of waters within which the Imperial German Navy was using subma- 
rines against the commerce of Great Britain and France, notwithstanding the respectful 
but very earnest protest of his Government, the Government of the United States. I 
do not refer to this for the purpose of calling the attention of the Imperial German 
Government at this time to the surprisingly irregularity of a communication from the 
Imperial German Embassy at Washington, addressed to the people of the United States 
through the newspapers, but only for the purpose of pointing out that no warning that 
an unlawful and inhumane act will be committed can possibly be accepted as an excuse 
or palliation for that act or as an abatement of the responsibility for its commission. 

Long acquainted as this Government has been with the character of the Imperial 
German Government and with the high principles of equity by which they have in the 
past been actuated and guided, the Government of the United States can not believe 
that the commanders of the vessels which committed these acts of lawlessness did so ex- 
cept under a misapprehension of the orders issued by the Imperial German naval authori- 
ties. It takes it for granted that, at least within the practical possibilities of every such 
case, the commanders even of submarines were expected to do nothing that would in- 
volve the lives of noncombatants or the safety of neutral ships, even at the cost of failing 
of their object of capture or destruction. It confidently expects, therefore, that the Im- 
perial German Government will disavow the acts of which the Government of the United 
States complains, that they will make reparation so far as reparation is possible for in- 
juries which are without measure, and that they will take immediate steps to prevent the 
recurrence of anything so obviously subversive of the principles of warfare for which the 
Imperial German Government have in the past so wisely and so firmly contended. 

The Government and the people of the United States look to the Imperial German 
Government for just, prompt and enlightened action in this vital matter with the greater 
confidence because the United States and Germany are bound together not only by spe- 
cial ties of friendship but also by the explicit stipulations of the treaty of 1828 between 
the United States and the Kingdom of Prussia. 

Expressions of regret and offers of reparation in case of the destruction of neutral 
ships sunk by mistake, while they may satisfy international obligations, if no loss of life 
results, can not justify or excuse a practice, the natural and necessary effect of which 
is to subject neutral nations and neutral persons to new and immeasurable risks. 

The Imperial German Government will not expect the Government of the United 
States to omit any word or any act necessary to the performance of its sacred duty of 
maintaining the rights of the United States and its citizens and of safeguarding their 
free exercise and enjoyment. 

Bryan. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

American Embassy, 
London, May 18, 1915. 
Sir: Adverting to the Department's cablegram No. 140S of April 12, regard to the 
detention of the S. S. Wico by the British authorities, and instructing me to acquaint the 
British Government that the Government of the United States considered that any ques- 
tion arising out of the seizure of American cargoes by the German authorities would be 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 147 

a matter for adjustment between the two Governments, and could not afford justification 
for the seizure of American cargoes by the British authorities, I have the honor to trans- 
mit herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of a note, under date of 
May 16, which I have received from the Foreign Office in reply to my representations 
in the premises. 

I have, etc., Walter Hinbs Page. 



[Inclosure.] 
The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

Foreign Office, 

May 16, 1915. 
Sir: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the 16th ultimo, in which Your Excel- 
lency stated, in connection with the detention of the American ship Wico, that the Government of the United 
States considered that any question arising out of the seizure of American cargoes by the German authorities 
would be a matter for adjustment between the two Governments, and could not afford justification for the seiz- 
ure of American cargoes by British authorities. 

I regret that. my note of the 7th instant did not explain with sufficient clearness the attitude which His 
Majesty's Government feel constrained to adopt in the matter. They had no intention of claiming the right 
to interfere with neutral vessels on their way to neutral ports, on the ground that such vessels were liable to 
be captured by enemy cruisers. I should have stated that the recent seizures of a number of such vessels and 
their diversion to German ports were effected in circumstances which left no doubt that there was collusion 
between the parties interested in the cargoes and the German authorities. 

The right which His Majesty's Government claim, and which they feel confident will not be questioned by 
the United States Government, is that neutral ships may be held up in cases where there are good grounds to 
suspect that their ostensible destination is not the genuine destination, and that fraudulent arrangements have 
been concerted with the enemy cruisers for delivering ship and cargo into their hands. 
I have, etc., 

For the Secretary of State : 

W. Langley. 



British memorandum, May 20, 1915, in reference to the detention of American ships 
and cargoes* 

First: There are at the present moment three American ships detained in this 
country. Two of them are cotton ships, which are dealt with below. The third is the 
steamer Joseph W. Fordney. This vessel, with a cargo of foodstuffs consigned to E. Klin- 
gener at Malmo (Sweden), was brought into Kirkwall on April 8th. She had been 
sighted by His Majesty's ships about ten miles from the Norwegian coast and had there- 
upon endeavored, with the evident desire to evade search, to escape rapidly into Norwegian 
territorial waters, but without success. 

On the vessel's arrival in Kirkwall, inquiries were at once addressed to His Maj- 
esty's Minister at Stockholm, with regard to the consignee of the cargo, and a reply was 
received to the effect that no person of that name could be identified at Malmo, though 
there was a person of that name who resided at Gothenburg, and was manager of the Goth- 
enburg branch of Hugo Hartvig, and who had stated that the consignments addressed to 
him on board the Joseph W. Fordney were intended for storage in Malmo. 

Second : The suspicious conduct of the vessel in endeavoring to elude His Majes- 
ty's patrols and the known connections of the consignee of her cargo have tended to con- 
firm other evidence, which has come to the knowledge of His Majesty's Government, that 
the foodstuffs were in reality destined for Germany. It was accordingly decided that the 
cargo must be placed in the Prize Court, and the vessel is at present discharging at Portis- 
head, England, on the completion of which operation she will be released. 

His Majesty's Government feel satisfied that in the circumstances of this case un- 
due interference with American interests cannot with reason be imputed to them. 

Third : The number of neutral vessels carrying American cargoes and at present 
held up is thirty-six. Of these twenty- three carry cargoes of American cotton. The United 
States Government are aware that since the enforcement of the blockade measures an- 
nounced in the supplement to The London Gazette, of the 12th of March last, His Majesty's 
Government have acted as regards shipments of American cotton in accordance with the 
provisions of an arrangement arrived at in collaboration with representatives of the Amer- 
ican cotton interests. The terms of the arrangement are as follows : 

A. All cotton for which contracts, sale and freight engagements already have 
been made before March 2nd, is to be allowed free transit or bought at the contract price 
if stopped, provided the ship sails not later than the 31st of March. 

* Not printed in Diplomatic Correspondence, etc. The New York Times, May 21, 1915. 



148 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

B. Similar treatment is to be accorded all cotton insured before the 2nd of March, 
provided it is put aboard not later than the 16th of March. 

C. All shipments of cotton claiming the above protection are to be declared before 
sailing, and documents produced and certificates obtained from Consular officers or other 
authorities fixed by the Government. 

Fourth : In accepting this scheme, -which it may be noted applies to shipments of 
cotton for a neutral destination only, the principal representatives of the American cotton 
interests described it to his Majesty's Ambassador at Washington as conceding all that the 
American interests could properly ask. It was never suggested that vessels or cargoes 
with an enemy destination should be allowed to proceed. His Majesty's Government were, 
moreover, given to understand that the provisions of the arrangement were acceptable to 
the United States Government, 

Fifth : It is intended shortly to furnish a statement showing precisely what car- 
goes or portions of cargoes his Majesty's Government have dealt with under the above ar- 
rangement, and as regards those which they have decided to purchase at the contract 
price under the terms of Paragraph A of the arrangement, direct discussions have 
already been opened with the special representatives of the American parties interested in 
London. 

Sixth : A considerable portion of the cotton has already been sold, and arrange- 
ments are being made for handing over the proceeds to the parties entitled to receive the 
total value, as a first installment of the completed transaction. It is obvious that all these 
arrangements require some time for adjustment. Meanwhile, it is not believed that the 
original owners can, as appears to be apprehended, be suffering acutely by the delay of 
full payment. It is to be presumed that in accordance with the customs of trade, the own- 
ers drew bills to the value of their goods before or at the time of shipment, and, if such 
bills have been negotiated in the usual way, it is difficult to understand why the drawers 
should be put to inconvenience on this account, at least before the date when the bills fall 
due. 

Seventh : On an impartial review of the facts it will, his Majesty's Government 
feel sure, be admitted that no arbitrary interference with American interests has, in regard 
to these cargoes, occurred, seeing that his Majesty's Government has acted throughout in 
conformity with the terms of an arrangement agreeable to the interests concerned, and 
that United States citizens will suffer no pecuniary loss. 

Eighth : As regards other American cargoes, or portions of cargoes, which have 
been placed in the Prize Court his Majesty's Government resort to this measure in cases 
where either the goods concerned are contraband, or there is evidence that, although os- 
tensibly consigned to a person in neutral countries, they are in reality destined to the 
enemy in contravention of the rules of blockade. The right to submit such cases to the 
public investigation of a judicial tribunal is one which his Majesty's Government cannot 
forego, and they feel convinced that the enlightened opinion in the United States cannot 
adversely criticize their course of action in this respect. 

Ninth : It is true that a number of these cases have been pending in the Prize Court 
for some time. This is notably the case in regard to certain vessels carrying large ship- 
ments of meat and lard ostensibly consigned to Scandinavian ports. The United States 
Government are, however, no doubt aware that much of the delay involved in these in- 
stances is due to the fact that the negotiations have been carried on for many weeks with a 
representative of the principal American meat packers, for an arrangement designated to 
limit importation into neutral countries adjacent to Germany, to quantities actually re- 
quired in those countries for bona fide home consumption. The American meat packers 
have demanded as a part of the settlement to be agreed upon, that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment should buy the cargoes of several ships now held up in the Prize Court. Hence the 
delay in bringing these cases to adjudication. 

The negotiations for an amicable settlement have, unfortunately, come to a stand- 
still owing to the exorbitant terms insisted upon by the representative of the American 
packers. This stage having now been reached, His Majesty's Government have decided to 
go on with the Prize Court proceedings in these cases, and it is not expected that a deci- 
sion will be much longer delayed. 

Tenth : It may finally be pointed out that repeated complaint, as to injury suffered 
generally by American trade in consequence of interference due to British naval measures, 
derives little substance from the published American trade returns. A table of figures 
taken from these returns and showing the amount of recent American trade with Germany 
and with neutral countries supplying Germany, is annexed hereto. It certainly tends to 
disprove any contention that American trade with neutral countries has recently suffered. 
It will be seen that whereas American exports to Germany and Austria in February, 1915, 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 149 

fell by $21,500,000, as compared with, the same month in 1914, American exports to Scan- 
dinavia, Holland and Italy rose by the enormous figure of $61,100,000. 

Eleventh: Similar figures for the month of March have not yet reached His Maj- 
esty's Government, but they have received statistics for that month of the value of exports 
and imports through New York, as issued by the Collector of the Port, and while point- 
ing out a large increase in the value of exports in 1915, compared with those of 1914, as 
shown in the tables annexed, they desire especially to call attention to a separate state- 
ment indicating the increase in the amount of the export to Scandinavian and Dutch ports 
of two commodities only — bacon and lard. These figures show that as against 1,253 boxes of 
bacon and 9,816 tierces of lard exported to the ports noted in the above countries in March, 
1914, there were exported in March, 1915, 32,222 boxes of bacon and 95,676 tierces of lard. 

Twelfth : His Majesty's Government consider that the abnormal increase in sup- 
plies imported by neutral countries, as shown in these statistics, alone justifies their as- 
sumption as to the ultimate destination of many items in cargoes consigned to one or 
the other of the countries in question in the vessels which they have detained, but they 
would call attention to the fact that it is only when they have believed themselves to be in 
possession of conclusive evidence of the enemy destination of a cargo that they have seized 
such a cargo, and that American interests, as for instance in the case of cotton, have re- 
ceived especially sympathetic consideration. 



Statement of the Secretary of State, May 21, 1915, regarding an error in the fore- 
going:* 

The foreign trade advisers' attention has been called to the statement of the Foreign 
Office of Great Britain, published in this morning's papers, an extract from which follows: 

"Fourth : In accepting this scheme, which, it may be noted, applies to shipments 
of cotton for a neutral destination only, the principal representative of the American inter- 
ests described it to his Majesty's Ambassador at Washington as conceding all that the 
American interests could properly ask. It was never suggested that vessels or cargoes 
with an enemy destination should be allowed to proceed. His Majesty's Government were, 
moreover, given to understand that the provisions of the arrangements were acceptable to 
the United States Government." 

The plan referred to is the one which was entered into between the cotton shippers 
of this country and the British Embassy, a portion of which is quoted in the statement of 
the British Foreign Office. 

Without discussing at this time the statement that "it was never suggested that 
vessels or cargoes with an enemy destination should be allowed to proceed," the foreign 
trade advisers, who informally and unofficially represented the cotton shippers in the nego- 
tiations which led to the so-called cotton arrangement, state that it was distinctly under- 
stood between Sir Arthur Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador, and Robert F. Rose, 
the foreign trade adviser conducting this discussion on behalf of the American cotton ex- 
porters, that nothing done by the foreign trade advisers should be regarded as official, and 
that everything done was to be considered as informal and unofficial, and in no way binding 
the United States Government to any arrangement reached, or be construed as a recogni- 
tion of the Order in Council to be issued or the Declaration of March 1, which has been 
issued. This statement was made to the British Ambassador on March 3, when the first 
conference in the matter was held, was repeated at each subsequent conference, and each 
time the absolute assurance from the British Ambassador was received that, in acting for 
the cotton shippers in any way, the foreign trade advisers were to be regarded as not repre- 
senting the United States Government in any manner. 



Statement of the British Ambassador, May 21, 1915, correcting an error in the fore- 
going^ 

The terms of the arrangement quoted in the British statement as telegraphed were 
arrived at in Loudon between a private representative of the American cotton interests in 
London and British officials in London. The reference to the British Ambassador in Par- 
agraph 4 is, therefore, an error. 

The arrangement in question formed the subject of conversations between the Am- 
bassador and representatives of the cotton interests in this country. There never was any 
question of a formal and official understanding between the United States Government 
and t he British Embassy. 

* Not printed in Diplomatic Correspondence, etc. The New York Times, May 22, 1915. 
t Not printed in Diplomatic Correspondence, etc. The New York Times, May 22, 1915. 



150 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State ad Interim. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, June 22, 1915. 
Lord Crewe, in charge of Foreign Office during Sir Edward Grey's temporary ab- 
sence, has just handed me a printed memorandum dated June 17. It is not an answer to 
the principles set forth in the note transmitted in your 1343 of March 30, but merely an 
explanation of concrete cases and the regulations under which they are dealt with. Fo- 
reign Office wishes to arrange for simultaneous publication here and in Washington morn- 
ing of 25th inst. Please telegraph if this date is satisfactory. Memorandum reads as fol- 
lows: 

1. His Majesty's Government have on various occasions, and notably in the communication which was ad- 
dressed to the United States Ambassador on the 15th March last, given assurances to the United States Gov- 
ernment that they would make it their first aim to minimize the inconvenience which must inevitably be caused 
to neutral commerce from the existence of a state of w a r at sea, and in particular from the measures taken by 
the Allied Governments for the restriction of the enemies' oversea trade. In view of the representation and 
complaints made to this department by the Ambassador from time to time as to the peculiar hardships alleged 
to have been wrongly inflicted on American trade and shipping by the operation of those measures, His Majesty's 
Government desire to offer the following observations respecting to manner in which they have consistently 
endeavored to give practical effect to those assurances. 

2. It will be recalled that, at the moment when His Majesty's Government announced their measures 
against enemy commerce, they declared their intention to refrain altogether from the exercise of the right to 
confiscate ships or cargoes, which belligerents had always previously claimed in respect of breaches of blockade ; 
that under Article Five [1] of the enactment of the 11th March, it was expressly provided that any person claiming 
to be interested in goods placed in the Prize Court in puisuance of the provision of that enactment, might forth- 
with issue a writ against the proper officer of the Cro W n, the object being to confer upon claimants the right 
to institute proceedings without waiting for the writ of the procurator general, and thus to remove all possible 
cause of legitimate grievance on account of delay; and that, finally, a pacific assurance was given to the United 
States Government that the instructions to be issued by His Majesty's Government to the fleet, and to the cus- 
toms officials and executive officials concerned, would impress upon them the duty of acting with the utmost 
dispatch consistent with the object in view, and of showing in every case such consideration for neutrals as 
might be compatible with that object, namely, to prevent vessels carrying goods for, or coming from, the 
enemy's territory. 

3. The above measures were all designed to alleviate the burdens imposed upon neutral sea-borne com- 
merce in general. Various special concessions, over and above those enumerated, have moreover been made in 
favour of United States citizens. 

4. Thus His Majesty's Government have acted, as regards shipments of American cotton, in accordance 
with the provisions of an agreement arrived at in direct collaboration with representatives of the American cot- 
ton interests. In accepting this scheme, the principal representative of those interests described it as conceding 
all that American interests could properly ask. The provisions of the arrangement were, as the United States 
Ambassador is aware, as follows : 

"(1) All cotton for which contracts of sale and freight engagements have already been made before the 
2d March is to be allowed free [or bought at contract price if stopped], provided the ship sails not later than 
the 31st March. 

"(2) Similar treatment is to be accorded to all cotton insured before the 2d March, provided it is put on 
board not later than the 16th March. 

"(3) All shipments of cotton claiming the above protection are to be declared before sailing, and docu- 
ments produced to, and certificates obtained from, consular officers or other authority fixed by the Government." 

5. Considerable shipments of cotton have already been dealt with under this arrangement, and in certain 
cases the dates specified have been extended in favour of American shippers. The Board of Trade have 
already paid a sum exceeding £4.50,000 to various American claimants, and all claims are being and will continue 
to be paid as rapidly as they are presented and the proofs of title can be checked. If in some cases progress 
has been delayed, this has been due to the fact which has seriously embarrassed His Majesty's Government — 
that a number of consignments, for which the American shippers had specifically invoked the protection of the 
arrangement, are now claimed by Swedish and Dutch firms, whose title of ownership, notwithstanding the 
action of the American shipper, appears, in some cases to be valid, and in others has led to the issue of writs 
in the Prize Court. 

6. It has been explicitly acknowledged by the special representatives of the American claimants, who have 
been in constant and direct communication with the Board of Trade, that all the claims so far submitted under 
the cotton arrangement have been settled with the utmost promptitude so soon as the production of the neces- 
sary documents by the claimants allowed of this being done. There is, at the present moment, no claim before 
His Majesty's Government that has not been paid, and the sums so paid over are already considerably in excess 
of the amounts realized by the sale of the goods. 

7. As regards the more general allegation of delay in dealing with cases of detained cargoes, the following 
facts and figures may be quoted : 

"The total number of vessels which, having cleared from United States ports since the initiation of the 
retaliatory measures against German trade, are still detained in United Kingdom ports, is 27; of this number, 
8 are discharging cotton which His Majesty's Government has agreed to purchase under the above arrangement. 
Of the remaining 19 vessels, 7 are free to depart so soon as the items of their cargo placed in the Prize Court 
have been discharged. The other 12, of which 3 only are American ships, are detained pending inquiries as to 
suspicious consignments, and particulars as to the dates and approximate causes of detention are furnished 
in the accompanying list: It will be observed that 8 have been detained for a period of less than a week, and 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 151 

3 for a period of less than a fortnight, while the detention of i is due to the difficulties in regard to transit 
across Sweden and Russia." 

8. His Majesty's Government remain convinced that, on an impartial review of the facts, it will be admitted 
that no arbitrary interference with American interests has, in regard to cotton cargoes, occurred; while if 
due regard be paid to the enormous volume of American and neutral shipping which is continually engaged in 
the trans-Atlantic trade, the figures and dates quoted in the preceding paragraph will emphasize the restricted 
nature of any interference which has taken place and the close attention with which the officials concerned have 
adhered to their instructions to act in all cases with expedition and with every possible consideration for 
neutrals. 

g. Since His Majesty's Government have been compelled to adopt their present measures against German 
commerce, they have given special consideration to the question of avoiding as far as possible unnecessary 
damage to the interests of neutrals in regard to the export of goods of German origin, and here again liberal 
concessions have been made to United States citizens. Under the rules enacted on the nth March provision 
is made for the investigation of all neutral claims respecting such goods in the Prize Court, and it is obvious 
that these claims can receive due and equitable consideration most properly before a judicial tribunal. Never- 
theless, in deference to the express desire of the United States Government, arrangments were made toward 
the end of March whereby United States citizens who might desire to import goods of German origin via a neu- 
tral port were enabled to produce proof of payment to His Majesty's Embassy at Washington. If such proof 
were deemed satisfactory, His Majesty's Government gave an undertaking that the goods concerned should not 
be interfered with in transit, and the American importer was freed from the necessity of submitting his claim 
to the Prize Court in London for adjudication. A few days later His Majesty's Government further agreed 
to recognize the neutral ownership of goods of enemy origin even if not paid for before the ist March, pro- 
vided they were subject of an f. o. b. contract of earlier date, and had arrived at a neutral port before the 15th 
March. 

10. Special treatment has also been accorded to cargoes of particular products destined for the United 
States and stated to be indispensable for the industries of the country; and, in notes addressed to the United 
States Ambassador in April and May, undertakings were given not to interfere during transit with certain 
cargoes of dyestuffs, potash, and German beet seed. 

n. When it became apparent that large quantities of enemy goods were still passing out through neutral 
countries, His Majesty's Government felt it necessary to fix a definite date after which such shipments must 
cease to enjoy the special immunity, theretofore granted, from liability to being placed in the Prize Court. It 
had been observed that a large increase had taken place in the number of vessels sailing from neutral coun- 
tries to America and one of the principal lines of steamships advertised a daily in place of a weekly service. 
In such circumstances it appeared scarcely possible that goods of enemy origin, bought and paid for prior to 
the 1st March, should not have already been shipped to their destination. First June was accordingly fixed as 
the date after which the privilege allowed in the case of such shipments should cease; but once more a special 
favour was granted by extending the date in exceptional cases to the 15th June. 

12. Importers in the United States having now had three months in which to clear off their purchases in 
enemy territory, His Majesty's Government trust that, in presence of the circumstances enumerated, the United 
States Government will acknowledge the great consideration which has been shown to American interests. 

13. Nevertheless a fresh appeal has now been made to His Majesty's Government that shipments of 
American owned goods of enemy origin, if paid for before the beginning of March, should be allowed to be 
shipped without molestation after the 15th June. The appeal is based principally upon the contentions [A] that 
insufficient time has already elapsed; [B] that no mention of a time limit is made in the enactment of the nth 
March; [C] that the proofs of ownership required by His Majesty's Government are of an exacting nature and 
involve much time for preparation. 

14. The first contention [A] has already been dealt with. As regards [B] and [C], it is true that the 
enactment of the nth March contains no mention of a time limit. But it seems to be overlooked that the 
time limit had been fixed only for the special immunity granted as an exception from that enactment. It was 
as a friendly concession to American interests that His Majesty's Government agreed to an investigation of claims 
outside the Prize Court. As for the exacting nature of the proofs required by His Majesty's Government, experi- 
ence has shown that such proofs were necessary. 

15. In deference, however, to the renewed representations of the United States Ambassador, His Majesty's 
Government have given further directions that in all such cases, as may have been specially submitted through 
the British Embassy at Washington or to His Majesty's Government direct on or before the 15th June and 
passed, the goods shall be allowed to proceed without interference, if shipped from a neutral port on the condi- 
tions already laid down, notwithstanding the fact that shipment may not have been made before the 15th June. 

16. His Majesty's Government will also be prepared hereafter to give special consideration to cases pre- 
sented to them and involving particular hardships, if the goods concerned are required for neutral Governments 
or municipalities, or in respect of works of public utility, and where payment can be shown to have been made 
before the ist March, 1915. 

17. With the above exceptions, His Majesty's Government regret they can not continue to deal through the 
diplomatic channel with individual cases, but they would again point out that special provision is made for 
the consideration of such cases in the Prize Court. 

18. Complaints have not infrequently been made that undue delay occurs in dealing with American cargoes 
in the Prize Court. An interesting comment on this subject was made by the president of the Prize Court in 
the case of the cargo ex steamship Ogeechee on the 14th instant. His lordship, according to the transcript 
from the official shorthand writer's notes, made the following observations : 

"It is a very extraordinary thing that, when the Crown are ready to go on, the claimants come here and 
say, 'We can not proceed for six weeks.' Some day, towards the end of last term, I had a row of eminent 
counsel in front pressing me to fix a case at once. I fixed it very nearly at once — that is to say, the second day 
of the following term. They all came and said: 'We want an adjournment for six weeks.'" 

19. The solicitor general hereupon remarked : 



152 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

"If I might say so on that one of the reasons I applied to-day on behalf of the Crown that the matter 
should be dealt with as soon as possible is for that very reason. There has been such a strong desire on the 
part of America and American citizens that there should be no delay, but one finds, in fact, the delay comes 
from there." 

.20. The president then stated: 
"I know that. I do not know what the explanation is. but I am anxious that there should be no delay." 

21. It is true that a number of cases, principally relating to cargoes which, though ostensibly consigned to 
a person in a neutral country, are in reality believed to be destined for the enemy, have been pending in the 
Prize Court for some time. The United States Government are aware that most of these cargoes consist of 
meat and lard, and that much of the delay in bringing these cargoes to adjudication was due to the fact that 
negotiations were being carried on for many weeks with a representative of the principal American meat pack- 
ers, for an amicable settlement out of court. When at length, owing to the failure of the negotiations, His 
Majesty's Government decided that they would continue the Prize Court proceedings, and had at the request 
of the claimants fixed the earliest possible date for the hearing, counsel for the latter asked for an adjournment 
in their interests despite the fact that the Crown was, by his own admission, ready to proceed. 

22. His Majesty's Government are earnestly desirous of removing all causes of avoidable delay in dealing 
with American cargoes and vessels which may be detained, and any specific inquiries or representations which 
may be made by the United States Government in regard to particular cases will always receive the most 
careful consideration and all information which can be afforded without prejudice to Prize Court proceedings 
will be readily communicated; but they can scarcely admit that on the basis of actual facts, any substantial 
grievance on the part of American citizens is justified or can be sustained, and they therefore confidently 
appeal to the opinion of the United States Government as enlightened by this memorandum. 

Page. 



The German Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Gerard. 

[Translation.] 

Foreign Office, 
Berlin, July 8, 1915. 

The undersigned has the honor to make the following reply to the note of His Excel- 
lency, Mr. James W. Gerard, Ambassador of the United States of America, dated the 
10th ultimo, Foreign Office No. 3814, on the subject of the impairment of American in- 
terests by the German submarine war. 

The Imperial Government has learned with satisfaction from the note how earn- 
estly the Government of the United States is concerned in seeing the principles of hu- 
manity realized in the present war. Also, this appeal meets with full sympathy in 
Germany, and the Imperial Government is quite willing to permit its statements and 
decisions in the case under consideration to be governed by the principles of humanity 
just as it has done always. 

The Imperial Government welcomed it with gratitude when the American Govern- 
ment in its note of May 15, 1915, itself recalled that Germany had always permitted 
itself to be governed by the principles of progress and humanity in dealing with the law 
of maritime war. Since the time when Frederick the Great negotiated with John 
Adams, Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson the treaty of friendship and com- 
merce of September 10, 1785, between Prussia and the Republic of the West, German 
and American statesmen have in fact always stood together in the struggle for the free- 
dom of the seas and for the protection of peaceable trade. In the international proceed- 
ings which have since been conducted for the regulation of the right of maritime war 
Germany and America have jointly advocated progressive principles, especially the 
abolishment of the right of capture at sea and the protection of the interests of neu- 
trals. Even at the beginning of the present war the German Government immediately 
declared its willingness, in response to the proposal of the American Government, to 
ratify the Declaration of London and thereby to subject itself, in the use of its naval 
forces, to all the restrictions provided therein in favor of neutrals. Germany has like- 
wise been always tenacious of the principle that war should be conducted against the 
armed and organized forces of the enemy country, but that the civilian population of the 
enemy must be spared as far as possible from the measures of war. The Imperial Gov- 
ernment cherishes the definite hope that some way will be found when peace is con- 
cluded, or perhaps earlier, to regulate the law of maritime war in a manner guarantee- 
ing the freedom of the seas, and will welcome it with gratitude and satisfaction if it can 
work hand in hand with the American Government on that occasion. 

If in the present war the principles which should be the ideal of the future have 
been traversed more and more the longer its duration, the German Government has no 
guilt therein. 

It is known to the American Government how Germany's adversaries, by com- 
pletely paralyzing peaceable traffic between Germany and the neutral countries, have 
aimed from the very beginning, and with increasing lack of consideration, at the destruc- 
tion not so much of the armed forces as the life of the German nation, repudiating in 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 153 

so doing all the rules of international law and disregarding all the rights of neutrals. 
On November 3, 1914, England declared the North Sea to be a war area, and by plant- 
ing poorly anchored mines and the stoppage and capture of vessels made passage ex- 
tremely dangerous and difficult for neutral shipping, so that it is actually blockading 
neutral coasts and ports, contrary to all international law. Long before the beginning 
of the submarine war England practically completely intercepted legitimate neutral 
navigation to Germany also. Thus Germany was driven to submarine war on trade. 
On November 16, 1914, the English Prime Minister declared in the House of Commons 
that it was one of England's principal tasks to prevent food for the German population 
from reaching Germany by way of neutral ports. Since March 1 of this year England 
has been taking from neutral ships, without further formality, all merchandise pro- 
ceeding to Germany, as well as all merchandise coming from Germany, even when neu- 
tral property. Just as was the case with the Boers, the German people is now to be 
given the choice of perishing from starvation, with its women and children, or of relin- 
quishing its independence. 

While our enemies thus loudly and openly have proclaimed war without mercy un- 
til our utter destruction, we are conducting war in self-defense for our national exist- 
ence and for the sake of peace of assured permanency. We have been obliged to adopt 
submarine warfare to meet the declared intentions of our enemies and the method of war- 
fare adopted by them in contravention of international law. 

With all its efforts in principle to protect neutral life and property from damage as 
much as possible, the German Government recognized unreservedly in its memorandum 
of February 4 that the interests of neutrals might suffer from submarine warfare. How- 
ever, the American Government will also understand and appreciate that in the fight for 
existence which has been forced upon Germany by its adversaries and announced by 
them, it is the sacred duty of the Imperial Government to do all within its power to pro- 
tect and to save the lives of German subjects. If the Imperial Government were derelict 
in these, its duties, it would be guilty before God and history of the violation of those 
principles of the highest humanity which are the foundation of every national existence. 

The case of the Lusitania shows with horrible clearness to what jeopardizing of hu- 
man lives the manner of conducting war employed by our adversaries leads. In most 
direct contradiction of international law, all distinctions between merchantmen and war 
vessels have been obliterated by the order to British merchantmen to arm themselves 
and to ram submarines and the promise of rewards therefor ; and neutrals who use mer- 
chantmen as travelers have thereby been exposed in an increasing degree to all the dan- 
gers of war. If the commander of the German submarine which destroyed the Lusita- 
nia had caused the crew and travelers to put out in boats before firing the torpedo this 
would have meant the sure destruction of his own vessel. After the experiences in the 
sinking of much smaller and less seaworthy vessels, it was to be expected that a mighty 
ship like the Lusitania would remain above water long enough, even after the torpedo- 
ing, to permit the passengers to enter the ship's boats. Circumstances of a very peculiar 
kind, especially the presence on board of large quantities of highly explosive materials, 
defeated this expectation. In addition, it may be pointed out that if the Lusitania had 
been spared thousands of cases of ammunition would have been sent to Germany's ene- 
mies and thereby thousands of German mothers and children robbed of their supporters. 

In the spirit of friendship with which the German nation has been imbued toward 
the Union and its inhabitants since the earliest days of its existence, the Imperial Gov- 
ernment will always be ready to do all it can, during the present war also, to prevent the 
jeopardizing of the lives of American citizens. 

The Imperial Government therefore repeats the assurances that American ships will 
not be hindered in the prosecution of legitimate shipping, and the lives of American 
citizens on neutral vessels shall not be placed in jeopardy. 

In order to exclude any unforeseen dangers to American passenger steamers, made 
possible in view of the conduct of maritime war on the part of German's adversaries, the 
German submarines will be instructed to permit the free and safe passage of such pas- 
senger steamers when made recognizable by special markings and notified a reasonable 
time in advance. The Imperial Government, however, confidently hopes that the Ameri- 
can Government will assume the guarantee that these vessels have no contraband on 
board. The details of the arrangements for the unhampered passage of these vessels 
would have to be agreed upon by the naval authorities of both sides. 

In order to furnish adequate facilities for travel across the Atlantic Ocean for 
American citizens, the German Government submits for consideration a proposal to in- 
crease the number of available steamers by installing in the passenger service a reason- 
able number of neutral steamers, the exact number to be agreed upon, under the Ameri- 
can flag under the same conditions as the American steamers above mentioned. 

The Imperial Government believes that it can assume that in this manner adequate 



154 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

facilities for travel across the Atlantic Ocean can be afforded American citizens. There 
would therefore appear to be no compelling necessity for American citizens to travel to 
Europe in time of war on ships carrying an enemy flag. In particular the Imperial Gov- 
ernment is unable to admit that American citizens can protect an enemy ship through the 
mere fact of their presence on board. Germany merely followed England's example 
when it declared part of the high seas an area of war. Consequently accidents suffered 
by neutrals on enemy ships in this area of war can not well be judged differently from 
accidents to which neutrals are at all times exposed at the seat of war on land when 
they betake themselves into dangerous localities in spite of previous warning. 

If, however, it should not be possible for the American Government to acquire an 
adequate number of neutral passenger steamers, the Imperial Government is prepared 
to interpose no objections to the placing under the American flag by the American Gov- 
ernment of four enemy passenger steamers for the passenger traffic between America and 
England. The assurances of "free and safe" passage for American passenger steamers 
would then be extended to apply under the identical pre-conditions to these formerly 
hostile passenger ships. 

The President of the United States has declared his readiness, in a way deserving of 
thanks, to communicate and suggest proposals to the Government of Great Britain with 
particular reference to the alteration of maritime war. The Imperial Government will 
always be glad to make use of the good offices of the President, and hopes that his efforts 
in the present case, as well as in the direction of the lofty ideal of the freedom of the 
seas, will lead to an understanding. 

The undersigned requests the Ambassador to bring the above to the knowledge of the 
American Government, and avails himself of the opportunity to renew to His Excellency 
the assurance of his most distinguished consideration. 

von Jagow. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department op State, 
Washington, July 14, 1915. 
In view of differences which are understood to exist between the two Governments 
as to the principles of law applicable in prize court proceedings in cases involving Ameri- 
can interests, and in order to avoid any misunderstanding as to the attitude of the 
United States in regard to such proceedings, you are instructed to inform the British 
Government that in so far as the interests of American citizens are concerned the Gov- 
ernment of the United States will insist upon their rights under the principles and rules 
of international law as hitherto established, governing neutral trade in time of war, 
without limitation or impairment by Orders in Council or other municipal legislation 
by the British Government, and will not recognize the validity of prize court proceed- 
ings taken under restraints imposed- by British municipal law in derogation of the rights 
of American citizens under international law. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

Department op State, 
Washington, July 15, 1915. 

Ambassador Page is informed that it has been brought to the attention of the De- 
partment that the steamship Neches, of American register, sailing from Eotterdam for 
the United States, carrying a general cargo, after being detained at the Downs, was 
brought to London, where it was required by the British authorities to discharge cargo, 
the property of American citizens. 

It appears that the ground advanced to sustain this action is that the goods origi- 
nated, in part at least, in Belgium, and fall, therefore, within the provisions of paragraph 
4 of the Order in Council of March 11, which stipulates that- every merchant vessel sail- 
ing from a port other than a German port, carrying goods of enemy origin, may be re- 
quired to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. 

Ambassador Page is instructed in this case to reiterate the position of the Govern- 
ment of the United States as set forth in the Department's instruction of March 30, 1915, 
with respect to the Order in Council mentioned, the international invalidity of which 
the Government of the United States regards as plainly illustrated by the present in- 
stance of the seizure of American-owned goods passing from the neutral port of Eotter- 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 155 

darn to a neutral port of the United States merely because the goods came originally 
from territory in the possession of an enemy of Great Britain. 

Mr. Page is also instructed to inform the Foreign Office that the legality of this 
seizure can not be admitted and that in the view of the Government of the United 
States it violates the right of the citizens of one neutral to trade with those of another, as 
well as with those of belligerents except in contraband, or in violation of a legal block- 
ade of an enemy seaport ; and that the rights of American owners of goods to bring them 
out of Holland, in due course, in neutral ships must be insisted upon by the United 
States, even, though such goods may have come originally from the territories of enemies 
of Great Britain. He is directed further to insist upon the desire of this Government that 
goods taken from the TSfech.es, which are the property of American citizens, should be 
expeditiously released to be forwarded to their destination, and to request that he be 
advised of the British Government's intended course in this matter at the earliest mo- 
ment convenient to that Government. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador J. W. Gerard* 

[Telegram.]' 

Department of State. 
Washington, July 21, 1915. 

You are instructed to deliver textuallv the following note to the Minister for For- 
eign Affairs: 

The note of the Imperial German Government dated the 8th of July, 1915, has 
received the careful consideration of the Government of the United States, and it regrets 
to be obliged to say that it has found it very unsatisfactory, because it fails to meet the 
real differences between the two Governments, and indicates no way in which the accepted 
principles of law and humanity may be applied in the grave matter of controversy, but 
proposes, on the contrary, arrangements for a partial suspension of those principles which 
virtually set them aside. 

The Government of the United States notes with satisfaction that the Imperial Ger- 
man Government recognizes without reservation the validity of the principles insisted on 
in the several communications which this Government has addressed to the Imperial Ger- 
man Government with regard to its announcement of a war zone and the use of subma- 
rines against merchantmen on the high seas — the principle that the high seas are free, 
that the character and cargo of a merchantman must first be ascertained before she can 
lawfully be seized or destroyed, and that the lives of noncombatants may in no case be put 
in jeopardy unless the vessel resists or seeks to escape after being summoned to submit 
to examination, for a belligerent act of retaliation is per se an act beyond the law, and 
the defense of an act as retaliatory is an admission that it is illegal. 

The Government of the United States is, however, keenly disappointed to find that 
the Imperial German Government regards itself as in large degree exempt from the obli- 
gation to observe these principles, even where neutral vessels are concerned, by what it 
believes the policy and practice of the Government of Great Britain to be in the present 
war with regard to neutral commerce. The Imperial German Government will readily 
imderstand that the Government of the United States cannot discuss the policy of the. 
Government of Great Britain with regard to neutral trade except with that Government 
itself, and that it must regard the conduct of other belligerent Governments as irrelevant 
to any discussion with the Imperial German Government of what this Government regards 
as grave and unjustifiable violations of the rights of American citizens by German naval 
commanders. 

Illegal and inhuman acts, however justifiable they may be thought to be, against 
an enemy who is believed to have acted in contravention of law and humanity, are mani- 
festly indefensible when they deprive neutrals of their acknowledged rights, particularly 
when they violate the right to life itself. If a belligerent cannot retaliate against an 
tnemy without injuring the lives of neutrals, as well as their property, humanity, as well 
as justice and a due regard for the dignity of neutral powers, should dictate that the prac- 
tice be discontinued. If persisted in it would in such circumstances constitute an unpar- 
donable offense against the sovereignty of the neutral nation affected. 

The Government of the United States is not unmindful of the extraordinary condi- 
tions created by this war or of the radical alterations of circumstance and method of 
attack produced by the use of instrumentalities of naval warfare which the nations of 
the world cannot have had in view when the existing rules of international law were for- 
mulated, and it is ready to make every reasonable allowance for these novel and unex- 
pected aspects of war at sea; but it cannot consent to abate any essential or fundamental 

* Not printed in Diplomatic Correspondence, The Nezv York Times, July 24, 1915. 



156 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

right of its people because of a mere alteration of circumstances. The rights of neutrals 
in time of war are based upon principle, not upon expediency, and the principles are im- 
mutable. It is the duty and obligation of belligerents to find a way to adapt the new 
circumstances to them. 

The events of the past two months have clearly indicated that it is possible and 
practicable to conduct such submarine operations as have characterized the activity of the 
imperial German Navy within the so-called war zone in substantial accord with the ac- 
cepted practices of regulated warfare. The whole world has looked with interest and 
increasing satisfaction at the demonstration of that possibility by German naval com- 
manders. It is manifestly possible, therefore, to lift the whole practice of submarine 
attack above the criticism which it has aroused and remove the chief causes of offense. 

In view of the admission of illegality made by the Imperial Government when it 
pleaded the right of retaliation in defense of its acts, and in view of the manifest possi- 
bility of conforming to the established rules of naval warfare, the Government of the 
United States cannot believe that the Imperial Government will longer refrain from dis- 
avowing the wanton act of its naval commander in sinking the Lusitania or from offering 
reparation for the American lives lost, so far as reparation can be made for a needless 
destruction of human life by an illegal act. 

The Government of the United States, while not indifferent to the friendly spirit in 
which it is made, cannot accept the suggestion of the Imperial German Government that 
certain vessels be designated and agreed upon which shall be free on the seas now illegally 
proscribed. The very agreement would by implication, subject other vessels to illegal 
attack, and would be a curtailment and therefore an abandonment of the principles for 
which this Government contends, and which in times of calmer counsels every nation 
would concede as of course. 

The Government of the United States and the Imperial German Government are 
contending for the same great object, have lung stood together in urging the very prin- 
ciples upon which the Government of the United States now solemnly insists. They are 
both contending for the freedom of the seas. The Government of the United States will 
continue to contend for that freedom, from whatever quarter violated, without compromise 
and at any cost. It invites the practical co-operation of the Imperial German Govern- 
ment at this time, when co-operation may accomplish most and this great common object 
be most strikingly and effectively achieved. 

The Imperial German Government expresses the hope that this object may be in 
some measure accomplished even before the present war ends. It can be. The Govern- 
ment of the United States not only feels obliged to insist upon it, by whomsoever violated 
or ignored, in the protection of its own citizens, but is also deeply interested in seeing it 
made practicable between the belligerents themselves, and holds itself ready at any time 
to act as the common friend who may be privileged to suggest a way. 

In the meantime the very value which this Government sets upon the long and 
unbroken friendship between the people and Government of the United States and the 
people and Government of the German nation impels it to press very solemnly upon the 
Imperial German Government the necessity for a scrupulous observance of neutral rights 
in this critical matter. Friendship itself prompts it to say to the Imperial Government 
that repetition by the commanders of German naval vessels of acts in contravention of 
those rights must be regarded by the Government of the United States, when they affect 
American citizens, as deliberately unfriendly. 

Lansing. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram.] 

American Embassy, 
London, July 24, 1915. 
Following note, dated July 23, received from Sir Edward Grey this morning : 

On the 2d April Your Excellency handed me a copy of a communication containing the criticisms of the 
United States Government on the measures we have been constrained to take on account of the menace to 
peaceful commerce resulting from the German submarine policy. This communication has received the most 
careful consideration of His Majesty's Government. 

2. I fully appreciate the friendly spirit and the candour which are shown in the communication and, reply- 
ing in the same spirit, I trust that I may be able to convince xour Excellency and also the administration at 
Washington that the measures we have announced are not only reasonable and necessary in themselves, but con- 
stitute no more than an adaptation of the old principles of blockade to the peculiar circumstances with which 
we are confronted. 

3. I need scarcely dwell on the obligation incumbent upon the allies to take every step in their power to 
overcome their common enemy in view of the shocking violation of the recognized rules and principles of 
civilized warfare of which he has been guilty during the present struggle. Your Excellency's attention has 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 157 

already been drawn to some of these proceedings in the memorandum which I handed to you on the 19th Feb- 
ruary. Since that time Lord Bryce's report, based on evidence carefully sifted by legal experts, describing the 
atrocities committed in Belgium, the poisoning of wells in German Southwest Africa, the use of poisonous 
gases against the troops in Flanders, and finally the sinking of the Lusitania without any opportunity to passen- 
gers and noncombatants to save their lives, have, shown how indispensable it is that we should leave unused 
no justifiable method of defending ourselves. 

4. Your Excellency will remember that in my notes of the 13th and 15th March I explained that the 
allied Governments intended to meet the German attempt to stop all supplies of every kind from leaving or 
entering British or French ports by themselves intercepting goods going to or from Germany. I read the com- 
munication from Your Excellency's Government not as questioning the necessity for our taking all the steps 
open to us to cripple the enemy's trade, but as directed solely to the question of the legitimacy of the particu- 
lar measures adopted. 

5. In the various notes which I have received from Your Excellency the right of a belligerent to establish 
a blockade of the enemy ports is admitted a right which has obviously no value save in so far as it gives 
power to a belligerent to cut off sea-borne exports and imports of his enemy. The contention which I under- 
stand the United States Government now put forward is that if a belligerent is so circumstanced that his 
commerce can pass through adjacent neutral ports as easily as through ports in his own territory, his opponent 
has no right to interfere and must restrict his measures of blockade in such a manner as to leave such avenues 
of commerce still open to his adversary. This is a contention which His Majesty's Government feel unable to 
accept and which seems to them unsustainable either in point of law or upon principles of international equity. 
They are unable to admit that a belligerent violates any fundamental principle of international law by applying 
a blockade in such a way as to cut off the enemy's commerce with foreign countries through neutral ports if 
the circumstances render such an application of the principles of blockade the only means of making it effective. 
The Government of the United States indeed intimates its readiness to take into account "the great changes 
which have occurred in the conditions and means of naval warfare since the rules hitherto governing legal 
blockade were formulated," and recognizes that "the form of close blockade with its cordon of ships in the 
immediate offing of the blockaded ports is no longer practicable in the face of an enemy possessing the means 
and opportunity to make an effective defense by the use of submarines, mines, and aircraft." 

6. The only question then which can arise in regard to the measures resorted to for the purpose of carry- 
ing out a blockade upon these extended lines is whether, to use Your Excellency's words, they "conform to 
the spirit and principles of the essence of the rules of war"; and we shall be content to apply this test to the 
action which we have taken in so far as it has necessitated interference with neutral commerce. 

7. It may be noted in this connection that at the time of the Civil War the United States found themselves 
under the necessity of declaring a blockade of some 3,000 miles of coast line, a military operation for which 
the number of vessels available was at first very small. It was vital to the cause of the United States in that 
great struggle that they should be able to cut off the trade of the Southern States. The Confederate Armies 
were dependent on supplies from over seas, and those supplies could not be obtained without exporting the 
cotton wherewith to pay for them. To cut off this trado the United States could only rely upon a blockade. 
The difficulties confronting the Federal Government were in part due to the fact that neighbouring neutral 
territory afforded convenient centres from which contraband could be introduced into the territory of their 
enemies and from which blockade running could be facilitated. Your Excellency will no doubt remember how, 
in order to meet this new difficulty, the old principles relating to contraband and blockade were developed and 
the doctrine of continuous voyage was applied and enforced under which goods destined for the enemy terri- 
tory were intercepted before they reached the neutral ports from which they were to be re-exported. 

8. The difficulties which imposed upon the United States the necessity of reshaping some of the old rules 
are somewhat akin to those with which the allies are now faced in dealing with the trade of their enemy. 
Adjacent to Germany are various neutral countries which afford her convenient opportunities for carrying on 
her trade with foreign countries. Her own territories are covered by a network of railways and waterways, 
which enable her commerce to pass as conveniently through ports in such neutral countries as through her 
own. A blockade limited to enemy ports would leave open routes by which every kind of German commerce 
could pass almost as easily as through the ports in her own territory. Rotterdam is indeed the nearest outlet 
for some of the industrial districts of Germany. 

9. As a counterpoise to the freedom with which one belligerent may send his commerce across a neutral 
country without compromising its neutrality, the other belligerent may fairly claim to intercept such commerce 
before it has reached, or after it has left, the neutral State, provided, of course, that he can establish that the 
commerce with which he interferes is the commerce of his enemy and not commerce which is bona fide 
destined for or proceeding from the neutral State. It seems, accordingly, that if it be recognized that a block- 
ade is in certain cases the appropriate method of intercepting the trade of an enemy country, and if the blockade 
can only become effective by extending it to enemy commerce passing through neutral ports, such an extension 
is defensible and in accordance with principles which have met with general acceptance. 

10. To the contention that such action is not directly supported by written authority, it may be replied 
that it is the business of writers on international law to formulate existing rules rather than to offer sugges- 
tions for their adaptation to altered circumstances, and Your Excellency will remember the unmeasured terms 
in which a group of prominent international lawyers of all nations condemned the doctrine which had been 
laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the Springbok, a doctrine upheld by the 
Claims Commission at Washington in 1873. But the United States and the British Governments took a broader 
view and looked below the surface at the underlying principles, and the Government of this country, whose 
nationals were the sufferers by the extension and development of the old methods of blockade made by the 
United States during the Civil War, abstained from all protest against the decisions by which the ships and 
their cargoes were condemned. 

11. What is really important in the general interest is that adaptations of the old rules should not be 
made unless they are consistent with the general principles upon which an admitted belligerent right is based. 
It is also essential that all unnecessary injury to neutrals should be avoided. With these conditions it may be 



158 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

safely affirmed that the steps we are taking to intercept commodities on their way to and from Germany 
fully comply. We are interfering with no goods with which we should not be entitled to interfere by blockade 
if the geographical position and the conditions of Germany at present were such that her commerce passed 
through her own ports. We are taking the utmost possible care not to interfere with commerce genuinely 
destined for or proceeding from neutral countries. Furthermore, we have tempered the severity with which 
our measures might press upon neutrals by not applying the rule which was invariable in the old form of 
blockade that ships and goods on their way to or from the blockaded area are liable to condemnation. 

12. The communication made by the United States Embassy on the 2d April describes as a novel and quite 
unprecedented feature of the blockade that it embraces many neutral ports and coasts and has the effect of 
barring access to them. It does not appear that our measures can be properly so described. If we are success- 
ful in the efforts we are making to distinguish between the commerce of neutral and enemy countries there will 
be no substantial interference with the trade of neutial ports except in so far as they constitute ports of 
access to and exit from the enemy territory. There are at this moment many neutral ports which it would 
be mere affectation to regard as offering facilities only for the commerce of the neutral country in which 
they are situated, and the only commerce with which we propose to interfere is that of the enemy who seeks to 
make use of such ports for the purposes of transit to 01 from his own country. 

13. One of the earlier passages in Your Excellency's memorandum was to the effect that the sovereignty 
of neutral nations in time of war suffers no diminution except in so far as the practice and consent of civilized 
nations has limited it "by the recognition of certain now clearly determined rights," which it is considered 
may be exercised by nations at war; and these it defines as the right of capture and condemnation for unneu- 
tral service, for the carriage of contraband and for breach of blockade. I may, however, be permitted to point 
out that the practice of nations on each of the three subjects mentioned has not at any time been uniform or 
clearly determined, nor has the practice of any maritime nation always been consistent. 

14. There are various particulars in which the exact method of carrying a blockade into effect has from 
time to time varied. The need of a public notification, the requisite standard of effectiveness, the locality of 
the blockading squadrons, the right of the individual ship to a preliminary warning that the blockade is in 
force, and the penalty to be inflicted on a captured blockade runner are all subjects on which different views 
have prevailed in different countries and in which the practice of particular countries has been altered from 
time to time. The one principle which is fundamental and has obtained universal recognition is that by means 
of blockade a belligerent is entitled to cut off by effective means the sea-borne commerce of his enemy. 

15. It is the same with contraband. The underlying principle is well established, but as to the details 
there has been a wide variety of view. As for unneutral service — the very term is of such recent introduc- 
tion that many writers of repute on international law do not even mention it. It is impossible in the view of 
His Majesty's Government in these circumstances to maintain that the right of a belligerent to intercept the 
commerce of his enemy is limited in the way suggested in Your Excellency's communication. 

16. There are certain subsidiary matters dealt with in Your Excellency's communication to which I think 
it well to refer. Amongst these may be mentioned your citation of the Declaration of Paris, due no doubt to 
the words which occur in the memorandum sent by me to Your Excellency on the 1st March, wherein it was 
stated that the allied Governments would hold themselves free to detain and take into port ships carrying 
goods of presumed enemy destination, ownership, or origin, and to our announcement that vessels might be 
required to discharge goods of enemy ownership as well as those of enemy origin or destination. 

17. It is is not necessary to discuss the extent to which the second rule of the Declaration of Paris is 
affected by these measures or whether it could be held to apply at all as between Great Britain and the 
United States. In actual practice, however, we are not detaining goods on the sole ground that they are the 
property of an enemy. The purpose of the measures we are taking is to intercept commerce on its way from 
and to the enemy country. There are many cases in which proof that the goods were enemy property would 
afford strong evidence that they were of enemy origin or enemy destination, and it is only in such cases that we 
are detaining them. Where proof of enemy ownership would afford no evidence of such origin or destina- 
tion we are not in practice detaining the goods. 

18. His Majesty's Government have been gratified to observe that the measures which they are enforcing 
have had no detrimental effect on the commerce of the United States. Figures of recent months show that 
the increased opportunities afforded by the war for American commerce have more than compensated for the 
loss of the German and Austrian markets. 

19. I trust that in the light of the above explanations it will be realized that the measures to which we 
have resorted have been not only justified by the exigencies of the case, but can be defended as in accordance 
with general principles which have commended themselves to the Governments of both countries. I am glad to 
be able to assure Your Excellency that we shall continue to apply these measures with every desire to occasion 
the least possible amount of inconvenience to persons engaged in legitimate commerce. 

I have, etc., E. Grey. 



Ambassador W. H. Page to the Secretary of State. 

[Telegram — Paraphrase.] 

American Embassy, 
London, July SI, 1915. 

Your 1848, July 14, 5 p. m. I have to-day received the following note from Sir Ed- 
ward Grey: 

Foreign Office, July 31, 1915. 
Your Excellency: 

1. I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note dated the 16th instant in which you were good 
enough to communicate to me for the information of His Majesty's Government, the opinion held by the Gov- 
ernment of the United States, that in view of differences which they understand to exits between the two 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 159 

countries as to the principles, of law applicable in cases before the prize court, they could not recognize the 
validity of proceedings taken in His Majesty's prize court in derogation of the rights of citizens of the United 
States. 

2. I do not understand to what divergence of views as to the principles of law applicable in cases before 
the prize court the Government of the United States refer, for I am not aware of any differences existing be- 
tween the two countries as to the principles of law applicable in cases before such courts. 

3. British prize courts, "According to the ancient form of commission under which they sit, are to determine 
cases which come before them according to the course of admiralty and the law of nations and the statutes, 
rules, and regulations for the time being in force in that behalf." 

As to the principles applied by the American prize courts, I note that in the case of the Amy Warwick (2 
Sprague, 123), it was held that prize courts are subject to the instructions of their own sovereign. In the ab- 
sence of such instructions their jurisdiction and rules of decision are to be ascertained by reference to the known 
powers of such tribunals and the principles by which they are governed under the public law and the practice 
of nations. It would appear, therefore, that the principles applied by the prize courts of the two countries are 
identical. 

4. As illustrating further the attitude adopted by the judges of British prize courts toward these two sources 
of law, the municipal legislation of its Sovereign on the one hand and the principles of International Law on the 
other, I should like to refer Your Excellency to a classical passage in the judgment of Lord Stowell, in the case of 
the Fox, in which that famous judge observed in the course of the discussion : "A question has been stated, what 
would be the duty of the court under Orders in Council, that were repugnant to the Law of Nations? It has been 
contended on one side that the court would at all events be bound to enforce the Orders in Council, on the other 
that the court would be bound to apply the rule of the law of nations adapted to the particular case, in disregard of 
the Orders in Council. This court is bound to administer the law of nations to the subjects of other countries 
in the different relations in which they may be placed toward this country and its Government. That is what 
others have a right to demand for their subjects and to complain if they receive it not. This is its unwritten 
law evidenced in the course of its decisions and collected from the common usage of civilized states. At the 
same time it is strictly true that by the Constitution of this country the King in Council possesses legislative 
rights over this court and has power to issue orders and instructions which it is bound to obey and enforce; 
and these constitute the written law of this court. These two propositions, that the court is bound to admin- 
ister the law of nations, and that it is bound to enforce the King's Orders in Council, are not at all inconsist- 
ent with each other, because- these orders and instructions are presumed to conform themselves, under the 
given circumstances, to the principles of its unwritten law. They are either directory applications of those 
principles to the cases indicated in them — cases which, with all the facts and circumstances belonging to them, 
and which constitute their legal character could be but imperfectly known to the court itself ; or they are posi- 
tive regulations, consistent with these principles, applying to matters which would require more exact and 
definite rules than those general principles are capable of furnishing. The constitution of this court, relatively 
to the legislative power of the King in Council, is analogous to that of the courts of common law relatively to 
that of the Parliament of this Kingdom. These courts have their unwritten law, the approved reasons, prin- 
ciples of natural reason and justice — they have likewise the written or statute law in acts of Parliament, 
which are directory applications of the same principles to particular subjects, or positive regulations consistent 
with them, upon matters which would remain too much at large if they were left to the imperfect information 
which the courts could extract from mere general speculations. What would be the duty of the individuals 
who preside in these courts, if required to enforce an act of Parliament which contradicted those principles, is 
a question which I presume they would not entertain a priori; because they will not entertain a priori, the sup- 
position that any such will arise. In like manner this court will not let itself loose into speculations as to what 
would be its duty under such an emergency; because it can not, without extreme indecency, presume that any 
such emergency will happen. And it is the less disposed to entertain them because its own observation and 
experience attest the general conformity of such orders and instructions to its principles of unwritten law." 

5. The above passage has recently been quoted and adopted by the president of the prize court in the 
case of the Zamora, in which Sir S. Evans said: " I make bold to express the hope and belief that the-nations 
of the world need not be apprehensive that Orders in Council will emanate from the Government of this coun- 
try in such violation of the acknowledged laws of nations that it is conceivable that our prize tribunals, hold- 
ing the law of nations in reverence, would feel called upon to disregard and refuse obedience to the provisions 
of such orders." 

6. In the note which I handed to Your Excellency on the 23d of July, I endeavored to convince the Govern- 
ment of the United States, and I trust with success, that the measures that we have felt ourselves compelled 
to adopt, in consequence of the numerous acts committed by our enemies in violation of the laws of war and 
the dictates of humanity are consistent with the principles of international law. The legality of these measures 
has not yet formed the subject of a decision of the prize court; but I wish to take this opportunity of remind- 
ing Your Excellency that it is open to any United States citizen whose claim is before the prize court to 
contend that any Order in Council which may affect his claim is inconsistent with the principles of international 
law and is, therefore, not binding upon the court. If the prize court declines to accept his contentions, and 
if, after such a decision has been upheld on appeal by the Judicial Committee of His Majesty's Privy Council, 
the Government of the United States of America considers that there is serious ground for holding that the 
decision is incorrect and infringes the rights of their citizens, it is open to them to claim that it should be sub- 
jected to review by an international tribunal. 

7. This principle that the decisions of the national prize courts may properly be subjected to international 
review was conceded by Great Britain in Article 7 of the Jay Treaty of 1793 and by the United States of 
America under the Treaty of Washington of 1871. Your Excellency will no doubt remember that certain cases 
(collectively known as the "Matamoros cases") were submitted to the commission established under Articles 
12-17 of the Treaty of Washington. In each of these cases proceedings in prize had been instituted in the prize 
courts of the United States, and in each case the judgment of the Supreme Court, the court of last resort, in 
cases of prize had been obtained, the United States filed a demurrer in these cases, alleging that as they had 



160 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

been heard by the prize courts of the United States of original and appellate jurisdiction, the decision of the 
appellate court was final and no claim based upon it could be made before the commission. The demurrer 
was unanimously overruled and the cases heard, and the agent of the United States, in his report of the pro- 
ceedings of the commission, stated that he personally "maintained no doubt of the jurisdiction of the commis- 
sion as an international tribunal to review the decisions of the prize courts of the United States, where the 
parties alleging themselves aggrieved had prosecuted their claims by appeals to the court of last resort, as this 
jurisdiction, however, had been sometimes questioned, he deemed it desirable that a formal adjudication by the 
commission should be had upon this question." 

8. The same principle was accepted both by the United States Government and His Majesty's Government 
in 1907 in connection with the proposed establishment of an international prize court, although certain constitu- 
tional difficulties have led the United States Government to propose that the right of recourse to the interna- 
tional prize court in connection with a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States should take the form 
of a direct claim for compensation. 

9. It is clear, therefore, that both the United States Government and His Majesty's Government have 
adopted the principle that the decisions of a national prize court may be open to review if it is held in the prize 
court and in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal that the orders and instructions issued by 
His Majesty's Government in matters relating to prize are in harmony with the principles of international 
law; and should the Government of the United States, unfortunately, feel compelled to maintain a contrary 
view, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to concert with the United States Government in order to 
decide upon the best way of applying the above principle to the situation which would then have arisen. I 
trust, however, that the defense of our action, which I have already communicated to Your Excellency, and the 
willingness of His Majesty's Government (which has been shown in so many instances) to make reasonable 
concessions to American interests, will prevent the necessity for such action arising. 

10. In any case, I trust that the explanations given above will remove the misapprehension under which I 
can not but feel the Government of the United States are labouring as to the principles applied by British prize 
courts in dealing with the cases which come before them. 

I have, etc., E. Grey. 

Page. 



British proclamation, August 21, 1915, declaring cotton contraband of war.* 

Now, therefore, we do hereby declare, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, 
that, during the continuance of the war, or until we do give further public notice, the fol- 
lowing articles will be treated as absolutely contraband, in addition to those set out in our 
royal proclamation aforementioned : Raw cotton, cotton linters, cotton waste, and cotton 
yarn. 

And we do hereby further declare that this our royal proclamation shall take effect 
from the date of its publication in the London Gazette. 



The Secretary of State to Ambassador W. H. Page. 

Department of State, 
Washington, October 21, 1915. 

Sik : I desire that you present a note to Sir Edward Grey in the sense of the fol- 
lowing : 

(1) The Government of the United States has given careful consideration to Your 
Excellency's notes of January 7, February 10, June 22, July 23, July 31, (2) August 13, 
and to a note verbale of the British Embassy of August 6, relating to restrictions upon 
American commerce by certain measures adopted by the British Government during the 
present war. This Government has delayed answering the earlier of these notes in the 
hope that the announced purpose of His Majesty's Government "to exercise their bellig- 
erent rights with every possible consideration for the interests of neutrals" and their 
intention of "removing all causes of avoidable delay in dealing with American cai'goes" 
and of causing "the least possible amount of inconvenience to persons engaged in legiti- 
mate trade," as well as their "assurances to the United States Government that they 
would make it their first aim to minimize the inconveniences" resulting from the "meas- 
ures taken by the Allied Governments," would in practice not unjustifiably infringe upon 
the neutral rights of American citizens engaged in trade and commerce. It is, there- 
fore, a matter of regret that this hope has not been realized, but, that, on the contrary, 
interferences with American ships and cargoes destined in good faith to neutral ports 
and lawfully entitled to proceed have become increasingly vexatious, causing American 
shipowners and American merchants to complain to this Government of the failure to 

* Not printed in Diplomatic Correspondence, etc. The New York Times, August 22, 1915. 



• DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 161 

take steps to prevent an exercise of belligerent power in contravention of their just 
rights. As the measures complained of proceed directly Irom orders issued by the Brit- 
ish Government, are executed by British authorities, and arouse a reasonable apprehen- 
sion that, if not resisted, they may be carried to an extent even more injurious to Ameri- 
can interests, this Government directs the attention of His Majesty's Government to the 
following considerations : 

(2) Without commenting upon the statistics presented by His Majesty's Govern- 
ment to show that the export trade of the United States has increased in volume since 
the war began further than to point out that the comparative values fail to take into 
account the increased price of commodities resulting from a state of war or to make any 
allowance for the diminution in the volume of trade which the neutral countries in Eu- 
rope previously had with the nations at war, a diminution which compelled them to buy 
in other markets, I will pass directly to the matters which constitute the specific com- 
plaints of this Government. 

( 3 ) First. The detentions of American vessels and cargoes which have taken place 
since the opening of hostilities have, it is presumed, been pursuant to the enforcement 
of the Orders in Council, which were issued on August 20 and October 29, 1914, and 
March 11, 1915, and relate to contraband traffic and to the interception of trade to and 
from Germany and Austria-Hungary. In practice these detentions have not been uni- 
formly based on proofs obtained at the time of seizure, but many vessels have been de- 
tained while search was made for evidence of the contraband character of cargoes or of 
an intention to evade the nonintercourse measures of Great Britain. The question, con- 
sequently, has been one of evidence to support a belief of — in many cases a bare suspicion 
of — enemy destination, or occasionally of enemy origin of the goods involved. Whether 
this evidence should be obtained by search at sea before the vessel or cargo is taken into 
port, and what the character of the evidence should be, which is necessary to justify the 
detention, are the points to which I direct Your Excellency's attention. 

(4) In regard to search at sea, an examination of the instructions issued to naval 
commanders of the United States, Great Britain, Eussia, Japan, Spain, Germany, and 
France from 1888 to the beginning of the present war shows that search in port was not 
contemplated by the Government of any of these countries. On the contrary, the con- 
text of the respective instructions shows that search at sea was the procedure expected 
to be followed by the commanders. All of these instructions impress upon the naval offi- 
cers the necessity of acting with the utmost moderation — and in some cases commanders 
are specifically instructed — in exercising the right of visit and search, to avoid undue 
deviation of the vessel from her course. 

(5) An examination of the opinions of the most eminent text writers on the laws 
of nations shows that they give practically no consideration to the question of search in 
port, outside of examination in the course of regular prize court proceedings. 

(6) The assertion by His Majesty's Government that the position of the United 
States in relation to search at sea is inconsistent with its practice during the American 
Civil War is based upon a misconception. Irregularities there may have been at the be- 
ginning of that war, but a careful search of the records of this Government as to the 
practice of its commanders shows conclusively that there were no instances when ves- 
sels were brought into port for search prior to instituting prize court proceedings, or 
that captures were made upon other grounds than, in the words of the American jiote of 
November 7, 1914, "evidence found on the ship under investigation and not upon circum- 
stances ascertained from external sources." A copy of the instruction issued to Ameri- 
can naval officers on Aug. 18, 1862, for their guidance during the Civil War is appended. 

(7) The British contention that "modern conditions" justify bringing vessels into 
port for search is based upon the size and seaworthiness of modern carriers of commerce 
and the difficulty of uncovering the real transaction in the intricate trade operations 
of the present day. It is believed that commercial transactions of the present time,, 
hampered as they are by censorship of telegraph and postal communication on the part 
of belligerents, are essentially no more complex and disguised than in the wars of recent 
years, during which the practice of obtaining evidence in port to determine whether a 
vessel should be held for prize proceedings was not adopted. The effect of the size and 
seaworthiness of merchant vessels upon their search at sea has been submitted to a board 
of naval experts, which reports that : 

"At no period in history has it been considered necessary to remove every package 
of a ship's cargo to establish the character and nature of her trade or the service on which 
she is bound, nor is such removal necessary. * * * 

"The facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships are in fact greater than 
in former times, and no difference, so far as the necessities of the case are concerned, can 
be seen between the search of a ship of a thousand tons and one of twenty thousand 
tons — except possibly a difference in time — for the purpose of establishing fully the char- 



162 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

acter of her cargo and the nature of her service and destination. * * * This method 
would be a direct aid to the belligerents concerned in that it would release a belligerent 
vessel overhauling the neutral from its duty of search ^nd set it free for further bellig- 
erent operations." 

(8) Turning to the character and sufficiency of the evidence of the contraband na- 
ture of shipments to warrant the detention of a suspected vessel or cargo for prize pro- 
ceedings, it will be recalled that when a vessel is brought in for adjudication courts of 
prize have heretofore been bound by well-established and long-settled practice to consider 
at the first hearing only the ship's papers and documents, and the goods found on board, 
together with the written replies of the officers and seamen to standing interrogatories 
taken under oath, alone and separately, as soon as possible and without communication 
with or instruction by counsel, in order to avoid possibility of corruption and fraud. 

(9) Additional evidence was not allowed to be introduced except upon an order of 
the court for "further proof," and then only after the cause had been fully heard upon 
the facts already in evidence or when this evidence furnished a ground for prosecuting 
the inquiry further. This was the practice of the United States courts during the War 
of 1812, the American Civil War, and the Spanish-American War, as is evidenced by the 
reported decisions of those courts, and has been the practice of the British prize courts 
for over a century. This practice has been changed by the British prize court rules 
adopted for the present war by the Order in Council of August 5. Under these new 
rules there is no longer a "first hearing" on the evidence derived from the ship, and the 
prize court is no longer precluded from receiving extrinsic evidence for which a sug- 
gestion has not been laid in the preparatory evidence. The result is, as pointed out 
above, that innocent vessels or cargoes are now seized and detained on mere suspicion, 
while efforts are made to obtain evidence from extraneous sources to justify the deten- 
tion and the commencement of prize proceedings. The effect of this new procedure is 
to subject traders to risk of loss, delay, and expense so great and so burdensome as prac- 
tically to destroy much of the export trade of the United States to neutral countries of 
Europe. 

(10) In order to place the responsibility for the delays of vessels and cargoes upon 
American claimants, the Order in Council of October 29, 1914, as pointed out in the Brit- 
ish note of February 10, seeks to place the burden of proof as to the noncontraband char- 

• acter of the goods upon the claimant in cases where the goods are consigned to order, 
or the consignee is not named or the consignee is within enemy territory. Without ad- 
mitting that the onus probandi can rightfully be made to rest upon the claimant in 
these cases, and is sufficient for the purposes of this state to point out that the three 
classes in cases indicated in the Order in Council of October 29 apply to only a few of 
the many seizures or detentions which have actually been made by British authorities. 

(11) The British contention that in the American* Civil War the captor was allowed 
to establish enemy destination by "all the evidence at his disposal," citing the Bermuda 
case (3 Wallace, 515), is not borne out by the facts of that case. The case of the Ber- 
muda was one of "further proof," a proceeding not to determine whether the vessel should 
be detained and placed in a prize court, but whether the vessel, having been placed in 
prize court, should be restored or condemned. The same ruling was made in the case of 
the Sir William Peel (5 Wallace, 517). These cases, therefore, can not be properly 
cited as supporting the course of a British captor in taking a vessel into port, there to 
obtain extrinsic evidence to justify him in detaining the vessel for prize proceedings. 

(12) The further contention that the greatly increased imports of neutral countries, 
adjoining Great Britain's enemies, raise a presumption that certain commodities, such as 
cotton, rubber, and others more or less useful for military purposes, though destined for 
those countries, are intended for re-exportation to the belligerents who can not import 
them directly, and that this fact justifies the detention for the purpose of examination of 
all vessels bound for the ports of those neutral countries, notwithstanding the fact that 
most of the articles of trade have been placed on the embargo lists of those countries, can 
not be accepted as laying down a just or legal rule of evidence. Such a presumption is 
too remote from the facts and offers too great opportunity for abuse by the belligerent, 
who could, if the rule were adopted, entirely ignore neutral rights on the high seas and 
prey with impunity upon neutral commerce. To such a rule of legal presumption this 
Government can not accede, as it is opposed to those fundamental principles of justice 
which are the foundation of the jurisprudence of the United States and Great Britain. 

(13) Before passing from the discussion of this contention as to the presumption 
raised by increased importations to neutral countries, this Government directs atten- 
tion to the fact, that His Majesty's Government admit that the British exports to those 
countries have also materially increased since the present war began. Thus Great Brit- 
ain concededly shares in creating a condition which is relied upon as a sufficient ground 
to justify the interception of American goods destined to neutral European ports. If 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 163 

British exports to those ports should be still further increased, it is obvious that, under 
the rule of evidence contended for by the British Government, the presumption of enemy 
destination could be applied to a greater number of American cargoes, and American 
trade would suffer to the. extent that British trade benefited by the increase. Great 
Britain can not expect the United States to submit to such manifest injustice or to per- 
mit the rights of its citizens to be so seriously impaired. 

(14) "When goods are clearly intended to become incorporated in the mass of mer- 
chandise for sale in a neutral country it is an unwarranted and inquisitorial proceeding 
to detain shipments for examination as to whether those goods are ultimately destined 
for the enemy's country or use. Whatever may be the conjectural conclusions to be 
drawn from trade statistics, which, when stated by value, are of uncertain evidence as 
to quantity, the United States maintains the right to sell goods into the general stock of 
a neutral country and denounces as illegal and unjustifiable any attempt of a belligerent 
to interfere with that right, on the ground that it suspects that the previous supply of 
such goods in the neutral country, which the imports renew or replace, has been sold to 
an enemy. That is a matter with which the neutral vendor has no concern and which can 
in no way affect his rights of trade. Moreover, even if goods listed as conditional con- 
traband are destined to an enemy country through a neutral country, that fact is not in 
itself sufficient to justify their seizure. 

(15) In view of these considerations the United States, reiterating its position in 
this matter, has no other course but to contesc seizures of vessels at sea upon conjectural 
suspicion and the practice of bringing them into port for the purpose, by search or other- 
wise, of obtaining evidence, for the purpose of justifying prize proceedings, of the car- 
riage of contraband or of breaches of the Order in Council of March 11. Belying up- 
on the regard of the British Government for the principles of justice so frequently and 
uniformly manifested prior to the present war, this Government anticipates that the 
British Government will instruct their officers to refrain from these vexatious and ille- 
gal practices. 

(16) Second. The Government of the United States further desires to direct par- 
ticular attention to the so-called "blockade" measures imposed by the Order in Council 
of March 11. The British note of July 23, 1915, appears to confirm the intention indi- 
cated in the note of March 15, 1915, to establish a blockade so extensive as to prohibit 
trade with Germany or Austria-Hungary, even through the ports of neutral countries 
adjacent to them. Great Britain, however, admits that it should not, and gives as- 
surances that it will not, interfere with trade with the countries contiguous to the terri- 
tories of the enemies of Great Britain. Nevertheless, after over six months' application 
of the "blockade" order, the experience of American citizens has convinced the Govern- 
ment of the United States that Great Britain has been unsuccessful in her efforts to dis- 
tinguish between enemy and neutral trade. Arrangements have been made to create in 
these neutral countries special consignees, or consignment corporations, with power to 
refuse shipments and to determine when the state of the country's resources requires the 
importation of new commodities. American commercial interests are hampered by the 
intricacies of these arrangements, and many American citizens justly complain that their 
bona fide trade with neutral countries is greatly reduced as a consequence, while others 
assert that their neutral trade, which amounted annually to a large sum, has been en- 
tirely interrupted. 

(17) It makes this practice even more harassing to neutral traders that the British 
authorities require a consignor to prove that his shipments are not bound to an enemy of 
Great Britain, even when the articles are on the embargo list of the neutral country to 
which they are destined, and that notwithstanding the assertion in the last British note 
that interference with such trade by a belligerent can only take place "provided, of 
course, that he (the belligerent) can establish" that the commerce is with the enemy. 

(18) While the United States Government was at first inclined to view with leniency 
the British measures which were termed in the correspondence, but not in the Order in 
Council of March 11, a "blockade," because of the assurances of the British Government 
that inconvenience to neutral trade would be minimized by the discretion left to the 
courts in the application of the Order in Council and by the instructions which it was 
said would be issued to the administrative and other authorities having to do with the 
execution of the so-called "blockade" measures, this Government is now forced to the re- 
alization that its expectations^ which were fully set forth in its note of March 30, were 
based on a misconception of the intentions of the British Government. Desiring to avoid 
controversy and in the expectation that the administration of the Order in Council 
would conform to the established rules of international law, this Government has until 
now reserved the question of the actual validity of the Order in Council of March 11, in 
so far as it is considered by the Government of Great Britain to establish a blockade 
within the meaning of that term as understood in the law and the practice of nations ; but 



164 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

in the circumstances now developed it feels that it can no longer permit the validity of 
the alleged blockade to remain unchallenged. 

(19) The Declaration of Paris in 1856, which has been universally recognized as cor- 
rectly stating the rule of international law as to blockade, expressly declares that "block- 
ades, in order to be binding, must be effective; that is to say, maintained by force suffi- 
cient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." The effectiveness of a blockade 
is manifestly a question of fact. It is common knowledge that the German coasts are 
open to trade with the Scandinavian countries and that German naval vessels cruise both 
in the North Sea and the Baltic and seize and bring into German ports neutral vessels 
bound for Scandinavian and Danish ports. Futhermore, from the recent placing of cot- 
ton on the British list of contraband of war, it appears that the British Government 
have themselves been forced to the conclusion that the blockade is ineffective to prevent 
shipments of cotton from reaching their enemies, or else that they are doubtful as to the 
legality of the form of blockade which they have sought to maintain. 

(20) Moreover, it is an essential principle which has been universally accepted that 
a blockade must apply impartially to the ships of all nations. This was set forth in the 
Declaration of London, is found in the prize rules of Germany, France, and Japan, and 
has long been admitted as a basic principle, of the law of blockade. This principle, how- 
ever, is not applied in the present British "blockade," for, as above indicated, German 
ports are notoriously open to traffic with the ports of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. 
So strictly has this principle been enforced in the past that in the Crimean War the Judi- 
cial Committee of the Privy Council on appeal laid down, that if belligerents them- 
selves trade with blockade ports they can not be regarded as effectively blockaded. ( The 
Franciska, Moore, P. C, 56.) This decision has special significance at the present time, 
since it is a matter of common knowledge that Great Britain exports and re-exports 
large quantities of merchandise to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Holland, whose 
ports, so far as American commerce is concerned, she regards as blockaded. In fact, 
the British note of August 13 itself indicates that the British exports of many articles, 
such as cotton, lubricating oil, tobacco, cocoa, coffee, rice, wheat flour, barley, spices, 
tea, copra, etc., to these countries have greatly exceeded the British exports of the same 
articles for the corresponding period of 1914. The note also shows that there has been an 
important British trade with these countries in many other articles, such as machinery, 
beef, butter, cotton waste, etc. 

(21) Finally, there is no better settled principle of the law of nations than that 
which forbids the blockade of neutral ports in time of war. The Declaration of London, 
though not regarded as binding upon the signatories because not ratified by them, has 
been expressly adopted by the British Government without modification as to blockade in 
the British Order in Council of October 29, 1914. Article 18 of the Declaration declares 
specifically that "The blockading forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts." 
This is, in the opinion of this Government, a correct statement of the universally ac- 
cepted law as it exists to-day and as it existed prior to the Declaration of London. The 
meaning of this statement is elucidated by Mr. Eenault in the report of the drafting com- 
mittee upon the convention, in which he states : 

"This rule has been thought necessary the better to protect the commercial interests 
of neutral countries ; it completes article 1, according to which a blockade must not ex- 
tend beyond the ports and coasts of the enemy, which implies that, as it is an operation 
of war, it must not be directed against a neutral port, in spite of the importance to a bel- 
ligerent of the part played by that port in supplying his adversary." 

As the conference assembled at London upon the invitation of the British Govern- 
ment, it is important to recall the instruction of Sir Edward Grey to the British dele- 
gates, "setting out the views of his Majesty's Government, founded on the decisions of 
the British courts," in which he says: 

"A blockade must be confined to the ports and coast of the enemy, but it may be in- 
stituted of one port or of several ports or of the whole of the seaboard of the enemy. It 
may be instituted to prevent the ingress only or egress only, or both." 

He added: 

"Where the ship does not intend to proceed to the blockaded port, the fact that goocis 
on board are to be sent on by sea or by inland transport is no. ground for condemnation." 

In support of this announcement, Sir Edward Grey referred to several decisions of 
British prize courts, among which an early one of 1801 held that goods shipped from Lon- 
don to Emden, thence inland or by canal to Amsterdam, then blockaded by sea, were not 
subject to condemnation for breach of blockade. (Jonge Pieter, 4 C. E. 79.) This has 
been the rule for a century, so that it is scarcely necessary to recall that the Matamoras 
cases, well known to the British Government, support the same rule, that neutral ports 
may not be blockaded, though "trade with unrestricted inland commerce between such a 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 165 

port and the enemy's territory, impairs undoubtedly, and very seriously impairs, the val- 
ue of a blockade of the enemy's coast." 

(22) Without mentioning the other customary elements of a regularly imposed 
blockade, such as notification of the particular coast line invested, the imposition of the 
penalty of confiscation, etc., which are' lacking in the present British "blockade" policy, 
it need only be pointed out that, measured by the three universally conceded tests above 
set forth, the present British measures cannot be regarded as constituting a blockade in 
law, in practice, or in effect. 

(23) It is incumbent upon the United States Government, therefore, to give the 
British Government notice that the blockade, which they claim to have instituted under 
the Order in Council of March 11, cannot be recognized as a legal blockade by the United 
States. 

(24) Since the Government of Great Britain has laid much emphasis on the ruling 
of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Springbok case, that goods of contra- 
band character seized while going to the neutral port of Nassau, though actually bound 
for the blockaded ports of the south, were subject to condemnation, it is not inappropri- 
ate to direct attention to the British view of this case in England prior to the present 
war, as expressed by Sir Edward Grey in his instructions to the British delegates to the 
London Conference in 1908 : 

"It is exceedingly doubtful whether the decision of the Supreme Court was in reality 
meant to cover a case of blockade-running in which no question of contraband arose. 
Certainly if such was the intention, the decision would pro tanto be in conflict with the 
practice of the British courts. His Majesty's Government sees no reason for departing 
from that practice, and you should endeavor to obtain general recognition of its correct- 
ness." 

It may be pointed out also that the circumstances surrounding the Springbok case 
were essentially different from those of the present day to which the rule laid down in 
that case is sought to be applied. When the Springbok case arose, the ports of the Con- 
federate States were effectively blockaded by the naval forces of the United States, 
though no neutral ports were closed, and a continuous voyage through a neutral port re- 
quired an all-sea voyage terminating in an attempt to pass the blockading squadron. 

(25) Third. It appears to be the position of Great Britain that if, as the United 
States alleges, American citizens or American interests are directly and adversely af- 
fected by the British policies of contraband and nonintercourse, resulting in interference 
with ships and cargoes, they should seek redress in the prize courts which the British 
Government have established, and that, pending the exhaustion of such legal remedies 
with the result of a denial of justice, the British Government "can not continue to deal 
through the diplomatic channels with the individual cases." 

(26) It is declared that this was the course followed by the United States during 
the American Civil War and the Spanish War, and that both countries have supported the 
practice by allowing their prize court decisions, when shown to be unjust or inadequate, 
to be reviewed by an international tribunal, as was done under the treaties of 1794 and 
1871. The ground upon which this contention is put forth, and the results which would 
follow, if the course of procedure suggested were accepted, give the impression that His 
Majesty's Government do not rely upon its soundness or strength. Nevertheless, since it 
has been advanced, I can not refrain from presenting certain considerations which will 
show that the proposed course embodies the form rather than the substance of redress. 
The cases which the British Government would have claimants pi;esent to their prize 
courts are essentially different from cases arising wholly within the jurisdiction of a for- 
eign country. They result from acts committed by the British naval authorities upon 
the high seas, where the jurisdiction over neutral vessels is acquired solely by interna- 
tional law. Vessels of foreign nationality flying a neutral flag and finding their pro- 
tection in the country of that flag, are seized without facts warranting a reasonable 
suspicion that they are destined to blockaded ports of the enemy or that their cargoes 
are contraband, although the possession of such facts is, by international law, essential 
to render a seizure legal. The officers appear to find their justification in the Orders in 
Council and regulations of the British Government, in spite of the fact that in many of 
the present cases the Orders in Council and the regulations for their enforcement are 
themselves complained of by claimants as contrary to international law. Yet the very 
courts which, it is said, are to dispense justice to dissatisfied claimants, are bound by the 
Orders in Council. This is unmistakably indicated to be the case in the British note of 
July 31, which states that — 

"British prize courts 'according to the ancient form of commission under which 
they sit are to determine cases according to the course of admiralty and the law of nations 
and the statutes, rules, and regulations for the time being in force in that behalf.' " 

This principle, the note adds, has recently been announced and adhered to by the 



166 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

British prize court in the case of the Zamora. It is manifest therefore, that, if prize 
courts are bound by the laws and regulations under which seizures and detentions are 
made, and which claimants allege are in contravention of the law of nations, those 
courts are powerless to pass upon the real ground of complaint or to give redress for 
wrongs of this nature. Nevertheless, it is seriously suggested that claimants are free to 
request the prize court to rule upon a claim of conflict between an Order in Council and 
a rule of international law. How can a tribunal fettered in its jurisdiction and proced- 
ure by municipal enactments declare itself emancipated from their restrictions and at 
liberty to apply the rules of international law with freedom? The very laws and regula- 
tions which bind the court are now matters of dispute between the Government of the 
United States and that of His Britannic Majesty. If Great Britain followed, as she de- 
clares that she did, the course of first referring claimants to local remedies in cases aris- 
ing out of American wars, it is presumed that she did so because of her knowledge or 
understanding that the United States had not sought to limit the jurisdiction of its 
courts of prize by instructions and regulations violative of the law and practice of na- 
tions, or open to such objection. 

(27) The British note of February 10 states that the British Government in the 
American Civil War, "in spite of remonstrances from many quarters, placed full reliance 
on the American prize courts to grant redress to the parties interested in cases of al- 
leged wrongful capture by American ships of war and put forward no claim until the 
opportunity for redress in those countries had been exhausted." 

The Government of the United States recalls that during the progress of that war 
Great Britain, in several instances, demanded through diplomatic channels damages for 
seizures and detentions of British ships alleged to have been made without legal justifi- 
cation. Among these may be mentioned the cases of the Magicienne, the Don Jose, the 
Labuan, and the Saxon. Two of these cases were, at the time the demands were made, 
before American prize courts for adjudication. It is understood also that during the 
Boer War, when British authorities seized the German vessels, the Hertzog, the General, 
and the Bundesrath, and released them without prize proceedings, compensation for 
damages suffered was arranged through diplomatic channels. 

(28) There is, furthermore, a real and far-reaching injury for which prize courts 
offer no means of reparation. It is the disastrous effect of the methods of the allied 
Governments upon the general right of the United States to enjoy its international 
trade free from unusual and arbitrary limitations imposed by belligerent nations. 
Unwarranted delay and expense In bringing vessels into port for search and investi- 
gation upon mere suspicion has a deterrent effect upon trade ventures, however lawful 
they may be, which can not be adequately measured in damages. The menace of inter- 
ference with legal commerce causes vessels to be withdrawn from their usual trade 
routes and insurance on vessels and cargoes to be refused, while exporters for the 
same reason are unable or unwilling to send their goods to foreign markets and im- 
porters dare not buy commodities abroad because of fear of their illegal seizure or be- 
cause they are unable to procure transportation. For such injuries there can be no 
remedy through the medium of courts established to adjust claims for goods detained 
or condemned. For specific injuries suffered by private interests prize courts, if they 
are free to apply the law of nations, might mete out an adequate indemnity, but for 
the injury to the trade of a nation by the menace of unwarranted interference with its 
lawful and established pursuit there can manifestly be found no remedy in the prize 
courts of Great Britain, to which United States citizens are referred for redress. 

(29) There is another ground why American citizens can not submit their wrongs 
arising out of undue detentions and seizures to British prize courts for reparation 
which I can not pass over unnoticed. It is the manner in which British courts obtain 
jurisdiction of such cases. The jurisdiction over merchant vessels on the high seas is 
that of the nation whose flag it rightfully flies. This is a principle of the law and 
practice of nations fundamental to the freedom of the high seas. Municipal enact- 
ments of a belligerent power can not confer jurisdiction over or establish rules of evi- 
dence governing the legality of seizures of vessels of neutral nationality on the high 
seas. International law alone controls the exercise of the belligerent right to seize 
and detain such vessels. Municipal laws and regulations in violation of the interna- 
tional rights of another nation, can not be extended to the vessels of the latter 
on the high seas so as to justify a belligerent nation bringing them into its ports, 
and, having illegally brought them within its territorial jurisdiction, compelling them 
to submit to the domestic laws and regulations of that nation. Jurisdiction obtained 
in such a manner is contrary to those principles of justice and equity which all nations 
should respect. Such practice should invalidate any disposition by a municipal court 
of property thus brought before it. The Government of the United States has, there- 
fore, viewed with surprise and concern the attempt of His Majesty's Government to 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 167 

confer upon the British prize courts jurisdiction by this illegal exercise of force in 
order that these courts may apply to vessels and cargoes of neutral nationalities seized 
on the high seas, municipal laws and orders which can only rightfully be enforceable 
within the territorial waters of Great Britain, or against vessels of British nationality 
when on the high seas. 

(30) In these circumstances the United States Government feels that it can not 
reasonably be expected to advise its citizens to seek redress before tribunals which 
are, in its opinion, unauthorized by the unrestricted application of international law 
to grant reparation, nor to refrain from presenting their claims directly to the British 
Government through diplomatic channels. 

(31) This Government is advised that vessels and cargoes brought in for exam- 
ination prior to prize proceedings are released only upon condition that costs and ex- 
penses incurred in the course of such unwarranted procedure, such as pilotage, wharf- 
age, demurrage, harbor dues, warehousage, unlading costs, etc., be paid by the claim- 
ants or on condition that they sign a waiver of right to bring subsequent claims 
against the British Government for these exactions. This Government is loathe to be- 
lieve that such ungenerous treatment will continue to be accorded American citizens 
by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, but in order that the position of the 
United States Government may be clearly understood, I take this opportunity to inform 
Your Excellency that this Government denies that the charges incident to such deten- 
tions are rightfully imposed upon innocent trade or that any waiver of indemnity 
exacted from American citizens under such conditions of duress can preclude them 
from obtaining redress through diplomatic channels or by whatever other means may 
be open to them. 

(32) Before closing this note, in which frequent reference is made to contraband 
traffic and contraband articles, it is necessary, in order to avoid possible misconstruc- 
tion, that it should be clearly understood by His Majesty's Government that there is 
no intention in this discussion to commit the Government of the United States to a 
policy of waiving any objections which it may entertain as to the propriety and right 
of the British Government to include in their list of contraband of war certain articles 
which have been so included. The United States Government reserves the right to 
make this matter the subject of a communication to His Majesty's Government at a 
later day. 

(33) I believe it has been conclusively shown that the methods sought to be em- 
ployed by Great Britain to obtain and use evidence of enemy destination of cargoes 
bound for neutral ports and to impose a contraband character upon such cargoes are 
without justification; that the blockade, upon which such methods are partly founded, 
is ineffective, illegal, and indefensible : that the judicial procedure offered as a means 
of reparation for an international injury is inherently defective for the purpose; and 
that in many cases jurisdiction is asserted in violation of the law of nations. The 
United States, therefore, can not submit to the curtailment of its neutral rights by 
these measures, which are admittedly retaliatory, and therefore illegal, in conception 
and in nature, and intended to punish the enemies of Great Britain for alleged ille- 
galities on their part. The United States might not be in a position to object to them 
if its interests and the interests of all neutrals were unaffected by them, but,' being 
affected, it can not with complacence suffer further subordination of its rights and 
interests to the plea that the exceptional geographic position of the enemies of Great 
Britain require or justify oppressive and illegal practices. 

(34) The Government of the United States desires, therefore, to impress most 
earnestly upon His Majesty's Government that it must insist that the relations be- 
tween it and His Majesty's Government be governed, not by a policy of expediency, 
but by those established rules of international conduct upon which Great Britain in 
the past has held the United States to account when the latter nation was a bellig- 
erent engaged in a struggle for national existence. It is of the highest importance to 
neutrals not only of the present day, but of the future that the principles of interna- 
tional right be maintained unimpaired. 

(35) This task of championing the integrity of neutral rights, which have re- 
ceived the sanction of the civilized world against the lawless conduct of belligerents 
arising out of the bitterness of the great conflict which is now wasting the countries of 
Europe, the United States unhesitatingly assumes, and to the accomplishment of that 
task it will devote its energies, exercising always that impartiality which from the out- 
break of the war it has sought to exercise in its relations with the warring nations. 

I inclose as supplements to this instruction the United States Navy Order of 
August 18, 1862, and a statement regarding vessels detained by British authorities. 



168 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

These two documents should be transmitted as inclosures in your note to Sir Edward 
Grey. 

I am, etc., 

Robert Lansing. 
Inclosures : 

United States Navy Order of August 18, 1862, and Statement regarding vessels de- 
tained by British authorities. 



APPENDIX NO. 1. 



Instructions of the Secretary of the Navy to flag officers commanding squadrons and 
officers commanding cruisers, relative to the right of search. 

Navy Department, August 18, 1862. 

Sir: Some recent occurrences in the capture of vessels, and matters pertaining to 
the blockade, render it necessary that there should be a recapitulation of the instruc- 
tions heretofore from time to time given, and, also of the restrictions and precautions 
to be observed by our squadrons and cruisers. 

It is essential, in the remarkable contest now waging, that we should exercise 
great forbearance, with great firmness, and manifest to the world that it is the inten- 
tion of our Government, while asserting and maintaining our own rights, to respect 
and scrupulously regard the rights of others. It is in this view that the following 
instructions are explicitly given: 

First. That you will exercise constant vigilance to prevent supplies of arms, 
munitions, and contraband of war from being conveyed to the insurgents, but that 
under no circumstances will you seize any vessel within the waters of a friendly 
nation. 

Secondly. That, while diligently exercising the right of visitation on all suspected 
vessels, you are in no case authorized to chase and fire at a foreign vessel without show- 
ing your colors and giving her the customary preliminary notice of a desire to speak and 
visit her. 

Thirdly. That when that visit is made, the vessel is not then to be seized without 
a search carefully made, so far as to render it reasonable to believe that she is engaged 
in carrying contraband of war for or to the insurgents, and to their ports directly or 
indirectly by transshipment, or otherwise violating the blockade; and that if, after visi- 
tation and search, it shall appear to your satisfaction that she is in good faith and without 
contraband, actually bound and passing from one friendly or so-called neutral port to 
another, and not bound or proceeding to or from a port in the possession of the insur- 
gents, then she can not be lawfully seized. 

Fourthly. That, to avoid difficulty and error in relation to papers which strictly 
belong to the captured vessel, and mails that are carried, or parcels under official seals, 
you will, in the words of the law, "preserve all the papers and writings found on board 
and transmit the whole of the originals unmutilated to the judge of the district to which 
such prize is ordered to proceed ; but official seals, or locks, or fastenings of foreign au- 
thorities, are in no case, nor on any pretext, to be broken, or parcels covered by them 
read by any naval authorities, but all bags or other things covering such parcels, and duly 
seized and fastened by foreign authorities, will be, in the discretion of the United States 
officer to whom they may come delivered to the consul, commanding naval officer, or lega- 
tion of the foreign government, to be opened, upon the understanding that whatever is 
contraband or important as evidence concerning the character of a captured vessel will 
be remitted to the prize court, or to the Secretary of State at Washington, or such sealed 
bag or parcels may be at once forwarded to this Department, to the end that the proper 
authorities of the foreign Government may receive the same without delay. 

You are specially informed that the fact that a suspicious vessel has been indicated 
to you as cruising in any limit which has been prescribed' by this Department does not 
in any way authorize you to depart from the practice of the rules of visitation, search, 
and capture prescribed by the law of nations. 

Very respectfully, Gideon Welles, 

Secretary of the. Navy. 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 169 

APPENDIX NO. 2. 

Statement regarding vessels detained by British authorities. 

September 10, 1915. 

(1) Vessels whose cargoes and papers have been of such a character as to require but 
brief time for examination, have been held in British ports, according to this Govern- 
ment's information, for prolonged periods, in some instances for more than a month, and 
then released ivithout the institution of prize court proceedings. 

The steamer Chester, which sailed from Baton Rouge for Rotterdam with a cargo of 
illuminating oil, was taken into Falmouth,September 21, 1914, and held until Novem- 
ber 4 of that year. 

The steamer Ocean, carrying the same kind of a cargo, from New York to Rotterdam, 
was taken into Plymouth. September 23, 1914, and similarly released November 5. 

The steamer Charlois and the steamer New York, carrying similar cargoes, were 
taken into British ports on September 30 and October 12, 1914, respectively and simi- 
larly released on October 27. 

The steamers American and Rotterdam, carrying cargoes of oil to Rotterdam, were 
also detained under conditions similar to those of the vessels just mentioned in the fall 
of 1914. 

The steamer Christian Knudsen, carrying a cargo of oil in bulk, consigned to a 
Danish corporation in Copenhagen, was brought into the port of Kirkwall, detained for 
11 days and then released. 

Vessels carrying oil from the United States to long-established markets in Scandina- 
vian countries have repeatedly been detained without being sent to the prize court for 
adjudication. Among them may be mentioned the Brindilla, the Platuria, the Wico, the 
Polarine, the Pioneer, the Llama, the Muskogee, and the John D. Rockefeller. 

The steamer Denver, which carried a full cargo of cotton from Norfolk to Bremen 
and which had been loaded under the supervision of a British consular officer, was taken 
into Kirkwall in January last, as the Department was informed by the British Govern- 
ment, just to examine her papers and to verify her cargo. 

The George W. Haicley was held for a month because she refused to comply with a 
requirement of the British authorities to discharge a single shipment, the illegal destina- 
tion of which does not appear to have been disclosed by any evidence. The vessel car- 
ried a mixed cargo, including a shipment of oil. The British authorities insisted that 
the vessel should discharge the oil, which, the shipper represented, was consigned to one 
of its long-established agents in Sweden. Finally it was announced that the vessel would 
be released as an act of grace. 

The steamer Wico was held by the British authorities last March. This Govern- 
ment was advised that the British Minister at Stockholm had informed the Swedish For- 
eign Office that the vessel had arrived in a British port with a full cargo of oil for a 
concern in Stockholm, and that, in view of the recent seizure by a German man-of-war 
of the steamship Bryssel and her cargo, the British Government required complete as- 
surances from the Swedish Government before the Wico could be allowed to proceed to 
destination, that she would not share the fate of the Bryssel. 

Subsequently this Government was informed that the vessel had been allowed to pro- 
ceed, but that the British Government felt that, in the event of further cargoes going to 
Stockholm being seized by German ships, the whole question of permitting oil cargoes to 
proceed to that destination would have to be seriously reconsidered. 

The steamer Llama, carrying a cargo of oil to a Scandinavian port, was taken into 
Kirkwall and subsequently released on June 5 last. After departing from Kirkwall the 
ship was again arrested on June 6, and although the officer of the war vessel which 
seized the Llama apparently was shown the ship's release papers, he placed a prize crew 
on board and ordered the vessel to Aberdeen and thence to Leith, where she was finally 
released on June 12, although she could not proceed until June 15, owing to a shortage 
of coal. 

(2) Vessels have been held until they have reeonsigned their cargoes to a consignee 
in a neutral country designated by the British Government. 

The steamer Seguranca, which carried a general cargo from NeAv York to the Nether- 
lands, was detained at a great loss to the owners of the vessel and to the shippers in a 
British port for the greater part of last April, in order that her cargo might be reeon- 
signed to the Netherlands Oversea Trust. The manifest showed that the entire cargo 
was consigned to named consignees in the Netherlands and was accompanied by a certifi- 
cate of the British consul general in New York, stating that the loading was supervised 
by his inspector and that the vessel contained no cargo other than that specified in the 



170 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

manifest. A large part of the cargo, consisting of fresh fruit stored in the hold of the 
vessel, was subject to decay with great rapidity. 

A similar requirement was imposed on the steamer F. J. Lisman, which during last 
June was detained at London. It appears that, after a prolonged detention of the ship 
of over a month, representatives of the shippers were compelled to discharge both contra- 
band and non-contraband articles, and that the captain and the shippers, finding their 
efforts to comply with the requirements of the British authorities hopeless, abandoned 
the voyage. 

The steamers A. A. Raven and Vitalia, carrying articles listed as conditional con- 
traband, were detained in a British port in March last until the goods shipped to speci- 
fied consignees in Holland could be consigned to the Netherlands Oversea Trust. 

The steamer Neches was detained last May for about two weeks in order that a ship- 
ment of cotton destined for Kotterdam might be consigned to the Netherlands Oversea 
Trust. 

The steamer Zzandjik was detained last June, as the Department was informed, 
while the British minister at The Hague made inquiries as to whether the Netherlands 
Oversea Trust had accepted the consignment of the cargo. 

(3) Detentions have been made without evidence amounting to probable cause. 
The steamer Annam, which was detained at Kirkwall last April, carried a cargo of 

food products from the United States to Swedish ports. She was detained owing to a 
"suspicion," as the British Government stated, that a part of its cargo was destined for 
Germany. 

The steamer Dronning Olga was detained at Kirkwall in April last and the cargo, 
which consisted of cotton and food products, was placed in the prize court on the 
ground, as the Department was informed by the British Government, that it was "be- 
lieved" that it was ultimately destined for Germany. 

The steamer Hilding, which sailed from New York for Copenhagen with a general 
cargo consisting largely of food products^ was seized and taken into Leith last April, and 
this Government was informed that the cargo had been seized as contraband with the 
expectation of holding it under the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, if the charge 
that the goods were contraband should fail. 

Numerous similar instances might be cited. 

The steamers Christian Knudsen and Platuria, carrying oil from New York to Den- 
mark, were detained by the British authorities last Fall, taken into British ports, and 
held until the British Government, as they stated, could make an investigation as to 
the destination of the cargoes. Furthermore, this Government was informed that the 
vessels had been detained pending the receipt of guarantees from Denmark against the 
exportation of the cargoes and that the orders were given for the release of the vessels 
on the receipt of satisfactory guarantees. 

The steamer Brindilla, which sailed from New York, October 13 last, with a cargo 
of oil for Alexandria, was taken into port at Halifax and later released, as the Depart- 
ment was informed, when the British authorities received information that the ship's 
cargo was expected at Alexandria. 

The steamer Ambra was taken into a British port in July last, and this Government 
was informed that this vessel was held pending inquiries that had been instituted con- 
cerning destination of certain items of her cargo. About a week later the vessel was 
allowed to proceed. 

In July last this Government was informed by the British Government that the pro- 
longed detention of the oil steamers Polarine, Platuria, and Pioneer was due to the fact 
that His Majesty's Government's attention had latterly been drawn to the very large 
quantities of oil which had been shipped to Scandinavian countries during the last few 
months ; that there had been every reason to suspect that some of the oil was destined for 
enemy countries; and that the arrival of the steamers in quick succession necessitated 
the institution of inquiries as to the ultimate destination of the oil. 

The owners of these vessels and their cargoes complained to the Government of the 
United States against their detention, stating that the vessels carried the usual cargoes 
consigned in good faith to long-established subsidiaries in neutral countries, and further 
representing that, since supplies from Russia and Roumania had been prevented from 
entering Scandinavian ports, a large increase of business with them had been expected, 
but it had been found that during the first five months of the year 1915 total shipments 
of all petroleum products to these countries were less than for the same period last year, 
although business in previous years had steadily increased. 

(4) Vessels have been held, according to statements of the British Government, be- 
cause of the manner in which shipments have been consigned. 

The steamer Einerjarl was brought into Kirkwall last May and its cargo of cotton- 
seed cake, shipped from Newport News to Denmark, which the shippers represented was 



DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 171 

to be used exclusively for consumption in Denmark, was seized. This Government was 
informed that the cargo was discharged because it was consigned "to order." 

The steamers Alfred Nobel, Bjorstjerne Bjornsen, and Friedland were seized last 
Autumn because their cargoes were consigned "to order." 

The shipments on the steamers America and Artemis have been placed in prize court 
under the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, because, the goods being consigned by the 
shippers to themselves, there was no guarantee of their ultimate destination. 

(5) Goods have been seized by the Britiish Government on the ground, as this Gov- 
ernment has been informed, that the country to which they were shipped had not pro- 
hibited their export. 

In the fall of the year 1914 copper shipped from the United States to Sweden on the 
steamers Francisco, Antares, Idaho, Tyr, and Toronto was seized by the British authori- 
ties, because, as the British Government stated, the Swedish Government had not yet 
prohibited the re-exportation of copper from Sweden. 

A consignment of rubber on the Swedish ship Zamore had been placed in prize 
court last January, because, as the British Government stated, of the absence of a com- 
prehensive prohibition on the exportation of rubber in all its forms from Denmark. 

(6) The British authorities have repeatedly seised articles classified as contraband, 
articles classified as conditional contraband, as well as noncontraband goods, shipped to 
Scandinavian countries, to the Netherlands, and to Italy, then neutral, although the re- 
exportation of such commodities from these countries had been forbidden. 

In December last the steamer Tellus was ordered to discharge a shipment of copper 
shipped from New York directly to a consignee in Milan, Italy, although by an Italian 
decree of November 13, 1914, the exportation of goods shipped in this manner was for- 
bidden. 

The steamer Joseph W. Fordney was seized 4 miles off the coast of Norway and, in 
charge of a prize crew, brought into Kirkwall April 8 last. The ship's manifest showed 
that the cargo consisted entirely of cattle fodder consigned to a person in Malmo, Swe- 
den. It appeared from information presented to this Government, that an affidavit re- 
garding the character and destination of the cargo, made by the shipper of the entire 
cargo, was attached to the bill of lading, and that this affidavit contained a certification 
by the British consul general and the Swedish consul, and also a statement by the lat- 
ter to the effect that the exportation from Sweden of the goods of which the cargo con- 
sisted was prohibited. The vessel was brought into a British port and her cargo dis- 
charged. This Government was informed by the British Government that, apart from 
the uncertainty of the address of the consignee of the cargo of this vessel, His Majes- 
ty's Government had evidence that the cargo was not destined for bona fide Swedish 
consumption but was intended for Germany. 

Numerous other similar instances might be cited, including those of the detention 
of vessels carrying oil to Scandinavian ports which have been mentioned. 

(7) Detentions have been made pending assurances that embargoed goods would be 
allowed to pass through a neutral country to Great Britain's allies. 

The steamer Leelanaw, which carried a cargo of cotton from Galveston to Gothen- 
burg for transshipment to Moscow, was detained in a British port early in June last. 
Kelative to the detention of this vessel the British Foreign Office said: 

"In view of the fact that cotton has now been placed on the Swedish prohibition of 
export list, His Majesty's Government have not considered it advisable to allow this 
large cargo to go on to Gothenburg until they are assured that there is a fair chance of 
it reaching its declared ultimate destination." 

After nearly a month's detention the vessel was released on the understanding that 
she should proceed directly to Archangel. 

The steamers Jentland and Syrius appear to have been recently detained under cir- 
cumstances similar to those of the steamer Leelanaw. 

(8) From time to time this Government has been informed of the seizure of cargoes 
on the ground that consignees have been known to trade with the enemy or because they 
were suspected of doing so. 

In January last this Government was advised by the British Government that the 
British Government had been compelled to place in prize court a consignment of rubber 
on board the Swedish vessel Zamora, the consignee of these goods being regarded with 
grave suspicion, and there being reason to believe that the ultimate destination of the 
rubber was the enemy forces. 

(9) Vessels have been seized and brought into port and have been required by the 
British authorities to pay pilotage, harbor, unloading, warehouse, storage or other dues, 
costs, and expenses in advance of a judicial determination of the validity of the seizure 
of vessel or cargo. 

Instances of such treatment of vessels may be found in the cases of the detention of 



172 AMERICAN RIGHTS AND BRITISH PRETENSIONS 

the steamer Neches last May, the Ogeechee, which was seized last April, and the Antilla, 
which was seized in February last and subjected to a prolonged detention. In the case 
of the last mentioned ship, it appears, however, that the cost of discharging was borne 
by the British Government. 

(10) Detention of vessels proceeding from European ports. 

The steamer Ogeechee, which left Bremen April 3 last for the United States, was 
detained at Sharpness and compelled to discharge its entire cargo, which consisted of 
approximately 200 shipments of goods urgently needed by American citizens. In most 
if not all cases it appears that ownership of these goods at the time of the seizure had 
passed to American consignees. In many instances American citizens had contracted for 
the sale of the goods consigned to them and were prevented from carrying out their con- 
tracts. 

The release of shipments on the vessel has been allowed on the production of proofs 
of American ownership of the goods prior to March 11, 1915. American consignees in 
order to avoid loss have endeavored to comply with the requirements in the presenta- 
tion of proofs. 

The steamer Neches, which sailed from Rotterdam to the United States, was 
brought to London and compelled, in June last, to discharge cargo on the ground, appar- 
ently, that the goods originated partly in Belgium. The vessel was detained about a 
month and, after having been damaged to the extent of approximately £1,500 as a result 
of a collision with another vessel while under the control of the British Admiralty, 
and after having been involved in litigation growing out of such collision, was allowed 
to proceed. 

The following is a list of the vessels detained prior to March 11 last, among which 
are some regarding the detention of which details have been briefly stated in this mem- 
orandum : 

Platuria, Brindilla, John D. Rockefeller, Kroonland, Noorham, Rotterdam, Sande- 
fjord, Thomas J. Fordney, Fram, Edward Pierce, Ellen, Tellus, Sif, Kim, Canton, Ogee- 
chee, Friedland, Gallileo, Uller, Verona, Zuiderdijk, Greenbrier, Rerm, Arkansas, Ascot, 
Carolyn, Breiford, Bergensfjord, Bjornstjerne Bjornsen, Ida Cunco, Kentticky, General 
Minetonka, General Caloric, Denver. 



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